YouSaid · the spoken record

Rosemary DiCarlo

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97
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2020-04-24
most recent
2021-02-11
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9
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un-security-council

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  1. Importantly, the OSCE’s Special Monitoring Mission should have safe and secure access throughout Ukraine in order to fully implement its mandate. Ukraine will mark this year the thirtieth anniversary of its independence. We reiterate our full support for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders. As the Secretary-General has consistently affirmed, the United Nations stands with the people of Ukraine in their search for sustainable peace.

    2021-02-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/159 (2021) · source

  2. The Secretary-General has consistently expressed the strong backing of the United Nations for the lead role of the Normandy Four and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)-facilitated Trilateral Contact Group in finding a peaceful settlement to the conflict. Today I reiterate our support for these mechanisms. The Council will hear shortly from the Special Representative in Ukraine of the OSCE’s Chairperson-in-Office, Ambassador Heidi Grau, on the latest discussions in the Trilateral Contact Group, as well as from the Chief Monitor of the OSCE’s Special Monitoring Mission, Ambassador Halit Çevik, on the overall security situation on the ground. It is essential that we support their critical efforts.

    2021-02-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/159 (2021) · source

  3. The risk of backsliding is real if negotiations become deadlocked. We therefore are deeply concerned by the increase in security incidents in several hotspots along the contact line in recent months. This dangerous trend needs to be quickly reversed. On 17 February 2015, the Council endorsed, in resolution 2202 (2015), the package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk agreements. As we have said before, the package of measures”, together with the Minsk protocol and the Minsk memorandum, remains the only agreed framework for a negotiated, peaceful settlement of the conflict in eastern Ukraine.

    2021-02-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/159 (2021) · source

  4. Critical work with more than 1 million people internally displaced as a result of the conflict also continues. This is particularly important in the light of the increased socioeconomic impact of COVID-19 on the most vulnerable. Guided by the Government of Ukraine-United Nations partnership framework for 2018-2022 and the sustainable peace and development agenda, the United Nations in Ukraine will continue to support efforts to strengthen social cohesion and recovery, with a focus on eastern Ukraine. Until a sustainable political solution to the conflict in eastern Ukraine is found, the situation on the ground will remain fragile. The fact that the ceasefire has largely held up and that discussions continue in the established formats is no reason for complacency. Neither is it a substitute for meaningful progress.

    2021-02-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/159 (2021) · source

  5. The United Nations is actively engaged in a range of other critical areas through the work of the United Nations country team on the ground. This includes providing medicine and personal protective equipment and sharing expertise with medical professionals dealing with the onslaught of the COVID-19 pandemic. Later this month, Ukraine should receive the first delivery of vaccines from the COVAX facility. Furthermore, the United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine continues its critical protection, monitoring, reporting and advocacy work on both sides of the contact line. The United Nations is also working with women and youth civil-society leaders engaged in local peace and dialogue initiatives to promote national unity.

    2021-02-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/159 (2021) · source

  6. In non-Government-controlled areas, humanitarian access has been limited since 2015, and has been severely restricted since the advent of COVID-19. The United Nations Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator and the team on the ground are working to resolve these issues to enable the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance to the those in need. We urge all actors with influence to help lift undue restrictions on the freedom of movement across the contact line and secure the opening of additional exit and entry crossing points. More than 120 humanitarian partners aim to assist 1.9 million people under the new humanitarian response plan, which prioritizes life-saving assistance, basic services and protection needs. The United Nations seeks $168 million to provide help to all areas in need.

    2021-02-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/159 (2021) · source

  7. In a positive development, two centres providing a wide range of services opened on the Government-controlled side of the contact line, with more expected to open at all crossing points this year. Despite the ceasefire, periodic shelling and small-arms fire continue to damage or destroy homes, hospitals, schools, roads and water systems. In 2020, around 60 incidents affected the supply of clean water and sanitation in eastern Ukraine. Mines and unexploded ordinance continue to claim lives. Humanitarian access remains a significant challenge for the United Nations and other international humanitarian actors operating across the contact line. On the Government-controlled side, reinstating expedited procedures for the clearance of imported COVID-19-related humanitarian supplies is critical.

    2021-02-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/159 (2021) · source

  8. Almost 10 months after the contact line was closed to contain the spread of COVID-19, the conflict-affected population continues to pay a heavy price. Pensioners residing in areas beyond Government control and registered as internally displaced persons face worsened economic conditions and added health risks. Since March 2020, they have been unable to retrieve their Government pensions. Before the onset of COVID-19, people crossed the contact line an average of 1.2 million times each month, for social, health and other services and to maintain family ties. Currently, only two of the five entry/exit crossing points have been partially reopened. As a result, the average monthly crossings have dropped to only 36,000.

    2021-02-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/159 (2021) · source

  9. On the contrary, the coronavirus-disease (COVID-19) pandemic has compounded the difficult socioeconomic conditions of civilians in conflict-affected areas, including through the further tightening of already severe restrictions on the freedom of movement across the contact line. It has also worsened access-related issues for the United Nations, as well as shortages of medicine, equipment and medical personnel, particularly in non- government-controlled areas. Over 3.4 million people are still in need of sustained humanitarian assistance. More than half of those in need are women, and 40 per cent are elderly. The United Nations and our partners are particularly concerned about vulnerable groups living along the contact line.

    2021-02-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/159 (2021) · source

  10. The Secretary-General welcomed this development, which was consistent with his earlier appeal for a global ceasefire. Since then, the United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine has reported a significant decrease in civilian casualties from exchange of fire. Another encouraging development is the release and exchange of conflict- related detainees. These are welcome developments. But, as we have seen in recent weeks, without progress on the related security and political tracks, the overall situation remains fragile. Indeed, despite numerous pledges, the sides have made little significant progress on implementing the other agreed political and security provisions. And while there is relative calm, the humanitarian situation has not improved.

    2021-02-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/159 (2021) · source

  11. I last briefed the Security Council on the situation in Ukraine nearly one year ago, on 18 February 2020 (see S/PV.8726). At that time, I and many in the Council expressed cautious optimism about the renewed peace efforts in eastern Ukraine following the 9 December 2019 Normandy format summit. The conclusions the leaders of France, Germany, the Russian Federation and Ukraine endorsed in Paris outlined a series of steps to stabilize the situation on the ground, including through confidence-building measures and a sustained ceasefire. The leaders also agreed to support efforts, both in the Normandy Four and the Trilateral Contact Group, to make progress on the key security and political provisions of the Minsk agreements. The Trilateral Contact Group agreed to an indefinite ceasefire, which came into force on 27 July 2020.

    2021-02-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/159 (2021) · source

  12. But it has also confirmed that where there is real political will to make and sustain peace, almost no barrier is insurmountable, especially if there is support from the global community. The collective and individual engagement of members of the Council will remain crucial, especially in supporting the Secretary-General’s call for a global ceasefire and engaging with parties to conflicts and their backers to ensure that the appeal is heeded. The pandemic was impossible to predict. Many of its consequences for peace and security are not. Not surprisingly, COVID-19 has hit hardest in the most vulnerable places and among the most vulnerable people. That is why recovering better must involve strengthening our capacity for prevention with more political and financial investment.

    2021-01-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/90 (2021) · source

  13. As the impact of the pandemic continues to increase, thus deepening vulnerabilities and fomenting grievances, the risk of tensions and instability will continue to rise, magnified by inequalities in the global recovery. As wealthier countries get vaccinated, the developing world, including countries already affected by conflict and instability, risk being left behind. That would be a catastrophic moral failure, as Mr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus noted last week. It would also be a severe blow to peace and security. One thing is clear — the pandemic has served as a political stress test as much as a structural and public health one. It has laid bare where acute crisis is seen as an opportunity to gain advantage in the battlefield or as a pretext to perpetuate or entrench oppressive practices.

    2021-01-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/90 (2021) · source

  14. And here, let me thank the Government and people of Switzerland for their cooperation in hosting this and other meetings during the pandemic. Furthermore, we have had to adapt our electoral assistance to comply with virus-related restrictions and to bring it in line with Government decisions to hold elections as planned or reschedule them. Since the onset of the pandemic, we have supported 18 countries in holding 19 elections and one referendum. In addition, we provided electoral assistance to eight countries where elections planned for 2020 did not take place. In Bolivia, for example, despite tensions over the initial postponement of elections, thanks to the commitment of the Bolivian people and the support of the United Nations, polling took place peacefully in October.

    2021-01-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/90 (2021) · source

  15. In Yemen, our Special Envoy has not let up on efforts to help bring the devastating conflict to an end. He has continued his shuttle diplomacy, in addition to virtual meetings. With the support of the Swiss Government and the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Special Envoy successfully and safely convened the parties in Geneva last year for talks that led to the largest prisoner swap since the start of the Yemeni conflict. Our urgent work to end the suffering in Syria also continues. Today, the fifth meeting of the Syrian Constitutional Committee is taking place in Geneva, a demonstration of the determination of the Syrian people to resolve issues that have undermined peace in that war-torn country.

    2021-01-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/90 (2021) · source

  16. We take note of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Minsk Group co-Chairs’ united position for a comprehensive and sustainable settlement of the conflict and hope that both countries will embark on a path of dialogue. The pandemic has affected how we support political and peace processes. Without exception, our special representatives, envoys and missions have had to adjust to the changing reality brought about by the pandemic, combining virtual and in-person work and taking calculated risks to fulfil their mandates to advance peace processes, de-escalate crises and prevent conflict. New tools — such as digital focus groups — have been developed and used to broaden the inclusiveness of our engagements. They have been particularly useful to enhance our outreach to women and youth.

    2021-01-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/90 (2021) · source

  17. And in eastern Ukraine, the ceasefire agreed on 21 July has continued to hold, constituting the longest such period since the start of the conflict and giving us cause for hope. Despite these positive developments, in a number of other contexts, the ceasefire call had more mixed results. In some situations, regrettably, we saw dangerous escalation. In the South Caucasus, despite the support of both Armenia and Azerbaijan for the Secretary-General’s ceasefire appeal, large-scale hostilities in and around Nagorno-Karabakh broke out in September. The clashes presented a serious risk of regional escalation. The Secretary-General welcomed the 9 November ceasefire and called on all concerned to cooperate fully with United Nations entities to ensure unfettered access to conflict-affected areas.

    2021-01-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/90 (2021) · source

  18. The increased levels of violence in the country underscore the stakes. The United Nations will do everything in its power to assist Afghans and achieve an inclusive, negotiated political solution to the conflict. In Mozambique, notwithstanding serious obstacles caused by the pandemic, insurgent groups, with the active support of the Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy, began a process of disarmament. An estimated 29 per cent of the process was completed in 2020 — an important milestone. The announcement of a unilateral ceasefire by a breakaway group of the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana on 23 December is encouraging and will allow negotiations to take place without the threat of violence.

    2021-01-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/90 (2021) · source

  19. The Libyan Political Dialogue Forum met in Tunis, despite an initial lack of much-needed in-person meetings, thanks to the creativity and perseverance of all involved. The Forum represents a pivotal opportunity for moving towards inclusive, intra-Libyan political negotiations and national elections on 24 December 2021. I would like to thank the Government and people of Tunisia for their support in assisting with mitigation measures, which enabled the holding of this event. Libya remains at a critical juncture; it is imperative that the Libyan parties maintain the momentum towards peace, with the full support of the Security Council. Afghanistan is also at a historically consequential inflection point. The Afghanistan peace negotiations present an opportunity to end decades of instability and conflict.

    2021-01-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/90 (2021) · source

  20. Yet, by exacerbating existing fragilities it has amplified the prevention challenge I underlined in September and made the steps needed to address that challenge more urgent. The Secretary-General’s call for a global ceasefire generated widespread support and, in some instances, added new momentum to faltering peace processes. Libya is an example of how sustained political engagement, more unified support from the international community, and commitment by the parties can lead to tangible progress. The signing of a ceasefire agreement by the Libyan parties on 23 October was a major achievement. Since then, the 5+5 Joint Military Commission has been working to operationalize the ceasefire agreement and establish a ceasefire- monitoring mechanism.

    2021-01-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/90 (2021) · source

  21. By upending lives and economies, challenging community relations and undermining trust in the very institutions meant to address its fall out, the pandemic has exacerbated inequality and corruption; bred misinformation, stigmatization and hate speech; and created new flashpoints for tension and increased risks of instability. We remain particularly alarmed by the impact of COVID-19 on women and youth as well as other populations suffering from marginalization. This includes the loss of employment and income and the dramatic escalation of gender-based and domestic violence. Young women and men are also at risk of being left behind in education and economic opportunities. The pandemic has hindered diplomatic action and complicated our peacemaking efforts. It has not, for the most part, affected the underlying dynamics of armed conflicts.

    2021-01-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/90 (2021) · source

  22. Thank you, Sir, for the opportunity to update the Security Council on the impact of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) on peace and security. Since the Council last met on this issue in September (see S/2020/897), the devastation wrought by the pandemic has deepened. More than 2 million people have died. Close to 100 million — over 1 per cent of the world’s population — have been infected. Workers have lost over $3 trillion in wages. And new strains of the virus are poised to unleash more severe waves of infection at a time when health systems and social safety net are already on the brink. The pandemic’s impact on peace and security is of pressing concern. The trends that we reported on in September, and which the Secretary-General had already warned about in July, have intensified.

    2021-01-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/90 (2021) · source

  23. In December 2021, we will hold the fifteenth general cooperation meeting between the United Nations and the League to advance a biennial framework that encompasses activities on peace and security, development, human rights and humanitarian concerns. Allow me to conclude by stressing the critical role of the Security Council in amplifying our collective efforts in the region. The impact of a united and actively engaged Security Council is incomparable. We look to the Council, as a principal steward of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, to continue to support the collaborative work of the United Nations with the League of Arab States to promote peace and prosperity in the Arab region.

    2021-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/66 (2021) · source

  24. I commend the Arab Women Mediators Network, an entity established under the auspices of the League in collaboration with UN-Women, which will enable the region to increase women’s participation in resolving conflicts and sustaining peace. We encourage expansion of that important initiative. The United Nations and the Arab League have increased cooperation in recent years, conducting staff exchanges and workshops on mediation and peacebuilding, and capacity-building exercises on inclusive peacemaking, among other activities. The United Nations Liaison Office to the League of Arab States, established in 2019, has strengthened our communication and cooperation. The Office has also facilitated regular contacts between United Nations Special Envoys and the League. We look forward to building on those contacts as we address regional crises.

    2021-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/66 (2021) · source

  25. The Secretary-General continues to call for restraint by all sides and stresses the need to avoid acts or rhetoric that may escalate tensions. We urge all concerned, in the region and beyond, to opt for dialogue to address their respective security concerns. The United Nations stands ready to support such measures. We welcome the recent Al-Ula declaration, which recognizes the importance of unity among the Gulf Cooperation Council States, and hope it will strengthen regional security, stability and prosperity. The United Nations and the League recognize the urgent need to include more women at all levels and aspects of peace processes. We have made important strides in that area. For example, 30 per cent of participants in the Syrian Constitutional Committee are women, as are 22 per cent of participants in the Libya Political Dialogue.

    2021-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/66 (2021) · source

  26. Since the outbreak of the conflict in Syria, successive United Nations envoys have worked closely with the League in the search for a political solution. We are grateful for the League’s support to Special Envoy Pedersen’s efforts to facilitate the work of the Syrian Constitutional Committee and to broaden the political process to all aspects of resolution 2254 (2015). On Yemen, the support of key Member States of the United Nations and the League is crucial to not only achieve progress on the political track but also to support the world’s largest aid operation and urgently address the growing risk of famine before it is too late. Despite our efforts, heightened tensions in the Persian Gulf region persist.

    2021-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/66 (2021) · source

  27. The two-State solution that realizes the legitimate national aspirations of Palestinians and Israelis in line with United Nations resolutions is the only way to lead to sustainable peace between the two peoples. The financial situation of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) remains a serious concern. Adequate funding is essential for UNRWA to continue delivering its vital services to millions of Palestine refugees in the region and playing its critical stabilizing role. Our two organizations are also active in the Friends of Sudan format, which supports the Sudan’s transition to democratic governance. We are grateful for the League’s generous pledge of support at the Sudan Partnership Conference, hosted by Germany last June.

    2021-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/66 (2021) · source

  28. An active member of the International Follow-up Committee to the Berlin Conference on Libya, the League co-chairs its political working group, together with Algeria and Germany. The League has also been an active member of the quartet on Libya, along with the United Nations, the African Union and the European Union. In relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the United Nations and the League work to uphold the broad regional and international consensus on the two- State solution, promote intra-Palestinian reconciliation and focus on preventive diplomacy to avoid an escalation of tensions. We welcome the increased engagement of the League and its members, including through an expanded Middle East Quartet and the so-called Amman format.

    2021-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/66 (2021) · source

  29. Resolution 2532 (2020), in support of that call, reinforced the global commitment to change the calculations of conflict parties in order to end wars and crises in the region and beyond. The Arab region has experienced much tumult over the past decade. Conflicts in Libya, Syria and Yemen, a stalled Middle East peace process and fissures among members of the League have exacerbated regional instability and hampered economic and social development. The close cooperation between the United Nations, including our special envoys and representatives, and the League has been crucial in augmenting our efforts to address various situations in the Arab world. On Libya, the League has actively supported the efforts of the United Nations to broker the 23 October ceasefire and a return to the political process.

    2021-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/66 (2021) · source

  30. It has exacerbated strains on the multilateral system just as the need for solidarity and cooperation has never been more critical. On 23 November 2020, the Secretary-General held a high-level interactive dialogue with the heads of 23 regional and subregional organizations, including Secretary-General Aboul Gheit. Participants agreed on the multidimensional impact of the pandemic, including on peace and security, and pledged to work together, especially in fragile settings, to address those concerns. In the early days of the pandemic, Secretary-General Aboul Gheit and Secretary-General Guterres called for a global ceasefire to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and open space for diplomacy. Since then, both the League and the United Nations have worked to implement that call.

    2021-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/66 (2021) · source

  31. The challenges that we face today, including the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, remind us of the wisdom of the drafters of the Charter of the United Nations, who 75 years ago enshrined the potential role of regional arrangements in the maintenance of peace and security. Their vision has clearly taken hold. Cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations has grown and evolved exponentially since 1945. Today it encompasses such areas as preventive diplomacy, mediation, countering terrorism, the prevention of violent extremism, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, human rights, climate change and, most recently, our collective response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The COVID-19 pandemic has served as a stress test for the global community.

    2021-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/66 (2021) · source

  32. I thank you, Mr. President, for convening this discussion on cooperation between the Security Council and the League of Arab States; it is an honour to be with you today. I would also like to extend a warm welcome to Mr. Ahmed Aboul Gheit, Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, a valued partner of the United Nations. The Secretary-General has made cooperation with regional organizations to prevent conflict and sustain peace a priority. We know that no organization or country alone can address the complex challenges our world faces today. The United Nations needs the cooperation of those groups and their members.

    2021-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/66 (2021) · source

  33. Philippe Kridelka and his predecessor, His Excellency Mr. Marc Pecsteen de Buytswerve, in their role as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). As Belgium leaves the Security Council at the end of the year, we look forward to providing our full support to the next Facilitator. I would also like to thank the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission for our continued cooperation.

    2020-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1324 (2020) · source

  34. The Secretariat also received information from a Member State that a listed entity shipped “valves, electronics and measuring equipment suitable for use in ground testing of liquid-propellant ballistic missiles and space-launch vehicles” to Iran. The Secretariat is seeking further clarification from the Member State and will report back accordingly. The Iranian nuclear issue is an important non-proliferation subject, with consequences for regional and global peace and security. In implementing the JCPOA, the countries concerned had shown that their dialogue and diplomacy, supported by a united Security Council, could forge a path to resolving that issue. We hope that those countries and the Council can do so again. Let me conclude by acknowledging the leadership of His Excellency Mr.

    2020-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1324 (2020) · source

  35. In addition, the Secretariat received information from a Member State that an entity on the 2231 list had transferred some of its assets to another entity not subject to the asset-freeze provision of the resolution. We are still analysing available information and will report back, as appropriate. In the current reporting period, the Secretariat also received information pertaining to individuals and entities on the 2231 list. Iran notified the Secretary- General and the Security Council that Mr. Moshen Fakhrizadeh had been “assassinated in a terrorist attack” on 27 November in Tehran province. Council members will recall that Mr. Fakhrizadeh is an individual on the 2231 list.

    2020-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1324 (2020) · source

  36. During the current reporting period, Australian authorities also provided the Secretariat with photos of documents collected from the crew in the course of that S/2020/1324 arms seizure. The Secretariat has shared relevant details with Iran and the other Member State concerned to verify the authenticity of the issued documents. Fourthly, regarding the asset-freeze provisions, the Secretariat continued its review of a case involving an academic institution that signed memorandums of understanding with an entity on the 2231 list. We were informed that such memorandums are not legally binding and do not involve any financial commitment or activities.

    2020-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1324 (2020) · source

  37. The Secretariat also provided updates on two arms-related cases from the ninth report of the Secretary-General (S/2020/531). Regarding Israeli information concerning four alleged Dehlavieh anti-tank guided missiles in Libya, the Secretariat was able to ascertain that one of the four missiles had characteristics consistent with Iranian-produced Dehlavieh missiles. Nevertheless, we were not able to determine if that missile was transferred to Libya and/or whether its transfer was inconsistent with the resolution. Regarding the Australian weapons seizure off the Gulf of Oman in June 2019, we are of the view that the seized ammunitions were not of Iranian manufacture.

    2020-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1324 (2020) · source

  38. We also note that the 90-day extension of the United States waiver — covering activities related to the existing unit at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant — expired at the end of August 2020. The United States did not announce any further extension of that waiver. Secondly, the Secretariat did not receive any official information alleging action inconsistent with the ballistic missile-related provisions of the resolution. Thirdly, on arms transfers, Israel provided information to the Secretary- General and the Security Council regarding the continued proliferation of advanced weaponry by Iran contrary to resolution 2231 (2015). Iran categorically rejected such claims in its own letter addressed to the Secretary-General.

    2020-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1324 (2020) · source

  39. I will now turn to the measures set out in annex B to the resolution, as outlined in the Secretary-General’s tenth report. First, on the nuclear-related provisions, we have not received any reports on the supply, sale or transfer to Iran of nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use items contrary to paragraph 2 of annex B. The Security Council continued its consideration of requests for the supply, sale or transfer of nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use items to Iran through the procurement channel. Four new proposals were submitted through the channel during the reporting period, bringing the total to 52 proposals received since 16 January 2016. The Council has received five notifications, submitted pursuant to paragraph 2 of annex B, for certain nuclear-related activities consistent with the Plan.

    2020-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1324 (2020) · source

  40. We also note the 4 December report of the IAEA regarding Iranian intentions to install additional cascades of IR-2m centrifuge machines at Natanz. Iran has stated its intention to remain in the Plan and that the steps it has taken are reversible. It is essential that Iran refrain from further steps reducing its commitments and return to full implementation of the Plan. The Secretary-General calls on all participants to work constructively to address their differences within the dispute-resolution mechanism outlined in the Plan. He also underscores the importance of all initiatives in support of trade and economic relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran, especially during the current economic and health challenges posed by the coronavirus disease pandemic.

    2020-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1324 (2020) · source

  41. Furthermore, steps taken by the United States not to extend waivers for trade in oil with Iran and certain non-proliferation projects may have impeded the ability of Iran and other Member States to implement certain provisions.During the reporting period, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) informed the Security Council that Iran had decreased its stockpile of heavy water. Iran has also stayed within the JCPOA’s limits of no more than 5,060 IR-1 centrifuges installed in 30 cascades at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant. However, the IAEA verified that Iran had installed a cascade of IR-2m centrifuges at Natanz and begun feeding uranium hexafluoride into them. Iran had also enriched uranium up to 4.5 per cent U-235, and its total enriched uranium stockpile was 2,442.9 kg — surpassing JCPOA stipulated limits in both cases.

    2020-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1324 (2020) · source

  42. Those States also expressed their strong support for the Plan and the continued implementation of the resolution. Similarly, the President of the Security Council for the month of August and the President of the Security Council for the month of September indicated that they were not in a position to take any action with regard to the letter from the United States dated 20 August. The President of the Council in October also took note of those developments. We regret the steps taken by the United States when it withdrew from the Plan, as well as the steps taken by Iran to reduce some of its nuclear-related commitments under the Plan. The reimposition by the United States of all its national sanctions that had been lifted or waived pursuant to the Plan is contrary to the goals set out in the Plan and in resolution 2231 (2015).

    2020-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1324 (2020) · source

  43. In the preparation of the tenth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2020/1177), we have taken careful note of the developments in the Security Council following the receipt of letters from the United States on 20 August and 23 September. We note the view of the United States that, as of 20 September, all provisions of prior resolutions that had been terminated by resolution 2231 (2015) apply in the same manner. The United States is also of the view that the measures contained in paragraphs 7, 8 and 16 to 20 of resolution 2231 (2015) were also terminated. The majority of Security Council members and Iran have written to the Council stating that, among other things, the 20 August letter from the United States did not initiate the process set forth in paragraph 11 of resolution 2231 (2015).

    2020-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1324 (2020) · source

  44. Such actions deepen the differences related to the JCPOA and render efforts to address other regional conflicts more difficult. We call on all concerned to avoid any actions that may result in further escalation of tensions. The Secretary-General has consistently underscored the importance of the JCPOA and has encouraged all States to support it. He also believes that Iran should address the concerns raised about its activities in relation to the restrictive measures in annex B to the resolution. As we have stated before, issues not directly related to the Plan should be addressed without prejudice to preserving the agreement and its accomplishments.

    2020-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1324 (2020) · source

  45. I thank you, Mr. President, for convening today’s meeting on non-proliferation. United Nations non-proliferation efforts seek to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and technology, promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament. Those efforts have a bearing on the prevention and peaceful resolution of conflict at both the regional and international levels. The full implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and of resolution 2231 (2015) can contribute to regional stability. Regrettably, however, regional tensions have increased. In the past several years, we have witnessed attacks on critical infrastructure, heated rhetoric and the heightened risk of miscalculation.

    2020-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1324 (2020) · source

  46. It can move forward decisively in its transition, but that process could still be derailed by the many challenges it faces. It is incumbent on all of us to support the Sudan in its efforts to achieve democratic governance, economic prosperity and an inclusive society for all Sudanese people.

    2020-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1183 (2020) · source

  47. UNITAMS will support the transitional Government by helping to create a protective environment. Joint UNAMID-UNITAMS teams are conducting assessment visits focused on the protection of civilians to ensure that lessons learned from UNAMID are applied and sustained. UNITAMS will have child protection advisers, women’s protection advisers, human rights officers and police trainers to support the transitional Government’s efforts. However, the effective protection of civilians can be achieved only through the Sudan’s own efforts. Key to such efforts will be the implementation of the Juba peace agreement, which is a major step towards ending years of conflict in the country, addressing the root causes and building sustainable peace. The Sudan is at a critical juncture.

    2020-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1183 (2020) · source

  48. UNITAMS is also working closely with the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) in anticipation of its drawdown. The protection of civilians remains a concern, especially for women and children, who face a multitude of risks in areas still under the control of armed groups. The protection of civilians will be the responsibility of the transitional Government, but UNITAMS will provide support and help to create a protective environment for vulnerable populations. I welcome the steps the Government has taken to address that issue, including through the formulation of a national plan for civilian protection and the announcement that 12,000 members of a protection force will be deployed to Darfur. National and local authorities have made a strong commitment to ensuring basic security and protection across the Sudan.

    2020-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1183 (2020) · source

  49. It will also leverage the work of the United Nations country team. UNITAMS is headquartered in Khartoum but will establish field offices in Darfur, the Two Areas and Eastern Sudan. Let me stress that UNITAMS will be a fully integrated Mission, and the Mission staff and the United Nations country team S/2020/1183 are now developing an integrated strategic framework and coordination structures to maximize United Nations support and effectiveness. Our goal is for UNITAMS, together with the country team, to begin delivering on all the Mission’s strategic objectives by 1 January 2021. As the Mission establishes itself, we count on the transitional Government’s continued support. In that regard, I urge the transitional Government to finalize the status-of-mission agreement for UNITAMS.

    2020-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1183 (2020) · source

  50. After a thorough planning process involving the United Nations system, the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan (UNITAMS), began to deploy to Khartoum in October. The team is now continuing its consultations with transitional authorities regarding priorities for this time-bound mission. The transitional Government has underscored the need for UNITAMS to have a light footprint, which is how the Mission has been configured. The Mission will focus on the four objectives outlined in resolution 2524 (2020): assisting the political transition; supporting peace processes; bolstering peacebuilding, civilian protection and the rule of law; and promoting the mobilization of economic, development and humanitarian assistance. The Mission will provide good offices, technical support and capacity-building.

    2020-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1183 (2020) · source