YouSaid · the spoken record

Rosemary DiCarlo

lines on the record: 97
first: 2020-04-24
most recent: 2021-02-11
sittings or episodes: 9
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“It is critical that the international community continue supporting the country’s economic recovery through funding the basic income cash transfer programme known as the Sudan Family Support Programme, which is intended to mitigate the social impact of the transitional Government’s economic reform agenda. I once again welcome the intention of the United States to rescind the Sudan’s designation as a State sponsor of terrorism, a change that will facilitate the country’s access to critical international financial assistance. I also welcome the commitment of President Emmanuel Macron of France to holding an international economic conference in Paris next year in support of the Sudan.”
2020-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1183 (2020) · source
“The COVID-19 pandemic has further aggravated humanitarian needs, which have also been driven by severe flooding, intercommunal violence and prolonged displacement. In recent weeks, over 48,000 people have fled the conflict in the Tigray region of Ethiopia and sought refuge in the Sudan, which has put an additional strain on the Sudanese authorities. In the International Monetary Fund’s staff-monitored programme, which was signed in September, the transitional Government agreed to implement the removal of subsidies and undertake macroeconomic reforms, which have caused serious hardships for the population in the short term.”
2020-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1183 (2020) · source
“The increased spending on emergency health programmes, coupled with a decline in public revenues, has led to a budget deficit of approximately $250 million per month. Rampant inflation and exchange rate fluctuations are negatively affecting the amounts of funding available for programme delivery. Further, the inflation rate increased to 229.85 per cent in October, negatively affecting United Nations agencies’ and partners’ operations. On 19 December, we will mark the second anniversary of the revolution in the Sudan. Demonstrations continue to intermittently occur across the country because of the economic crisis, voicing demands for Government reform and rejection of the amendments to the Constitutional Document. Some have been accompanied by loss of life and injuries.”
2020-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1183 (2020) · source
“I welcome the efforts of women’s organizations to develop a common agenda in promoting the inclusion of women. The equal right to political participation and representation of women in decision-making at all levels of the transition is an integral part of democratization. I commend the transitional Government’s efforts in relation to legal reforms that promote gender equality.The dire economic situation continues to cast a dark and long shadow over all the foregoing efforts. Restrictions occasioned by the coronavirus disease (COVID-19), including the five-month-long shutdown to prevent the spread of the disease resulted in a severe decline in economic activity and a loss of approximately 42 per cent of State revenues. Given the Sudan’s arrears, the country has been unable to avail itself of debt relief.”
2020-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1183 (2020) · source
“The Council of Ministers also called for the swift formation of the Transitional Legislative Council, emphasizing its exclusive power of oversight and accountability, and its role in guiding the transitional period. I hope that consensus can be found to ensure the functioning of clearly defined transitional institutions that are inclusive and effective. I also echo the transitional Government’s call for the swift formation of the legislative body pursuant to the Constitutional Document. Let me note that while the transitional authorities have committed to the promotion of gender equality, women remain underrepresented in transitional structures. There are only three women among the Cabinet’s 18 ministers, and the Council of Partners has only one female representative.”
2020-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1183 (2020) · source
“Despite the progress observed, political forces are increasingly fragmented. Disagreements have surfaced particularly over the mandate and functions of the Council of Partners for the Transitional Period that was established on 1 December. Key political stakeholders expressed concern that the nominally advisory and coordination body may have been given additional powers that would undermine those of other transitional institutions. While initially supportive, the Council of Ministers and the Forces for Freedom and Change subsequently rejected the suggested authority of the Council of Partners and its current composition and deplored the lack of women and youth representation.”
2020-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1183 (2020) · source
“It expands the membership of the Sovereign Council from 11 to 14 members and provides for the signatories to select 25 per cent of ministerial portfolios and 75 seats out of the 300 in the Transitional Legislative Council. It also provides for the establishment of the Council of Partners for the Transitional Period and exempts representatives of the signatories from the ban on running for office in elections that will follow this period. The formation of the Transitional Legislative Council has now been postponed until 31 December. All political stakeholders will need to engage in constructive consultations to ensure the creation of an inclusive and representative body that reflects the diversity of the Sudan’s social and political landscape and includes significant representation of women.”
2020-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1183 (2020) · source
“I thank the South African presidency of the Security Council for this opportunity to brief the Council today on the situation in the Sudan. Since my last briefing in September (see S/PV.8761), the Sudan has made progress in its democratic transition. The Juba Agreement for Peace in the Sudan between the transitional Government, the Sudan Revolutionary Front alliance and the Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minawi faction was signed on 3 October and enshrined in the Constitutional Document on 2 November. The amended Constitutional Document extends the transitional period to 39 months from the date of signature of the Juba peace agreement.”
2020-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1183 (2020) · source
“I would also like to recognize the exceptional service of health-care workers, which has allowed us to continue delivering on the promise of peace amidst this pandemic.”
2020-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/897 (2020) · source
“To mitigate COVID-related risks in situations of armed conflict and prevent the possible deterioration of other situations into instability and violence, the collective and individual engagement of members of the Security Council is indispensable. As the Secretary-General has stated, addressing COVID-19 requires coordination, unity and solidarity. The better the global response to the pandemic, the better our prospects for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts around the world. The Security Council’s decisive engagement in follow-up to the call for a ceasefire will be essential. In conclusion, I wish to pay tribute to our staff in the field during these difficult times, especially those who have lost their lives to COVID-19.”
2020-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/897 (2020) · source
“The Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa and the Special Representative for Central Africa provided support to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the Economic Community of Central African States in the development of regional COVID-19 response strategies. And the Secretary- General’s Peacebuilding Fund has also rapidly responded to adapt country- level programming to support the peacebuilding and prevention dimensions of the pandemic. The focus of the Security Council — and of resolution 2532 (2020) — is rightly on situations of armed conflict. But let me conclude by underlining the risks the wide-reaching impacts of COVID-19 hold for other situations, as well and highlight the magnitude of the challenge of conflict prevention before us.”
2020-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/897 (2020) · source
“In the aftermath of the 4 August explosion in Beirut, the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon has been leading coordination of United Nations support S/2020/897 to Lebanon, including its response to a marked increase in COVID-19 cases after the explosion. In Somalia, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia provided prefabricated buildings to be used for isolation facilities, and with the World Health Organization, a testing laboratory in Mogadishu. In Colombia, the United Nations Verification Mission delivered food and biosafety kits to ex-combatants and other communities.”
2020-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/897 (2020) · source
“I will now briefly turn to how we have adapted operations in the midst of the pandemic. First, we have created a joined-up support structure for our missions. The Field Support Group on COVID-19, organized under the joint purview of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, the Department of Peace Operations and the Department of Operational Support, has been working to strengthen United Nations risk-management systems and protect our personnel and their capacity to continue critical operations. The well-being of our staff members is of the utmost importance. Secondly, our missions are strongly committed to aid host countries in their COVID-19 response. In Cyprus, we facilitated the work of the bicommunal Technical Committee on Health, as part of our good offices support.”
2020-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/897 (2020) · source
“The session resumed following further testing and advice from medical authorities. Planning for the new United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan commenced virtually to avoid delays due to COVID-related restrictions. The planning team then visited the Sudan to continue consultations with the Government and other key stakeholders to ensure that the Mission can start delivering on its objectives by January 2021. We anticipate deploying an advance team of the Mission within weeks. The Security Council’s backing for the ceasefire call in resolution 2532 (2020) is significant. Leadership from the Council and the support of Member States with leverage are essential if we are to change the calculations of conflict parties, open the space for dialogue and end these wars.”
2020-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/897 (2020) · source
“In Libya, we are working towards a ceasefire agreement and the resumption of intra-Libyan political talks. In both contexts, we have combined shuttle diplomacy and the use of digital technologies. We convened meetings of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission in Libya online and have conducted large-scale virtual consultations with over 500 Yemenis regarding their views on the requisites for peace. As far as is possible and safe, we are taking calculated risks to move processes forward. On 24 August, the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Syria convened the Constitutional Committee for its third session in Geneva. Extensive precautions were taken to enable the meeting to take place. Even with such precautions, meetings were temporarily suspended due to the positive COVID-19 test results of four participants.”
2020-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/897 (2020) · source
“The Secretary- General’s call for a global ceasefire on 23 March aimed to help create better conditions for the delivery of life-saving humanitarian aid and open up space for diplomacy. The initial response was encouraging. A number of temporary truces were announced — from Colombia to Ukraine, and from Philippines to Cameroon. However, many expired without extensions, resulting in little improvement on the ground. In response to the call, our special representatives, envoys and mediators stepped up efforts to advance political and peace discussions in a number of regions. In Yemen, we are actively discussing with the parties a draft joint declaration, which includes provisions on a nation-wide ceasefire, economic and humanitarian measures and the resumption of the political process.”
2020-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/897 (2020) · source
“And as we consider the compound and overlapping health, socioeconomic and humanitarian aspects of the pandemic, we cannot but be concerned for the future. In the short term, the pandemic could also potentially derail fragile peace processes and conflict prevention initiatives due to restrictions on travel and in-person contacts.Our own ability to support political processes has been limited by such restrictions. With many of our engagements moving online, we have had to develop our digital skills and work even harder to nurture the trust and willingness to compromise that are at the heart of preventive diplomacy and mediation. Let me now turn to the status of the call for a global ceasefire.”
2020-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/897 (2020) · source
“As the United Nations Focal Point for Electoral Assistance Activities, I have ensured that, together with the United Nations Development Programme, we have clear guidance on the operational aspects of holding elections in times of COVID-19. More broadly, to date, and contrary to our expectations, we have not observed a significant change in the dynamics of a number of ongoing armed conflicts as a result of COVID-19. Some situations have deteriorated since the onset of the pandemic, but this is largely due to other drivers. Nevertheless, as we have seen in the Sahel, the risk remains that parties to conflict, including terrorist and violent extremist groups, use the uncertainty created by the pandemic to press their advantage.”
2020-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/897 (2020) · source
“There are also growing limitations being placed on the media, civic space and freedom of expression. Social media platforms are used to spread disinformation about the pandemic. And there has been a rise in stigma and hate speech, especially against migrants and foreigners. To help counter the spread of false and harmful information, the Secretary-General launched the Verified initiative to increase the volume and reach of trusted, accurate information surrounding the crisis. The third risk is to political and peace processes. We continue to see tensions surrounding decisions to postpone elections or to proceed with a vote, even with mitigation measures. These decisions are best made following broad consultation across the political spectrum, including with health authorities.”
2020-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/897 (2020) · source
“However, such erosion increases fragility and has the potential to drive instability in settings where people perceive that authorities have not addressed the pandemic effectively or have not been transparent about its impact. Reports of corruption related to COVID-19 responses are accentuating this trend. The second risk relates to the aggravation of certain human rights challenges during the pandemic, which in turn can fuel conflict. We are witnessing increased discrimination, including in access to health services. Gender-based violence, particularly in the home, surged around the world as COVID-19 lockdowns became necessary. Many of the economic costs of the pandemic are also disproportionately affecting women, who are overrepresented in some of the sectors hardest hit by shutdowns and ensuing layoffs and cuts.”
2020-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/897 (2020) · source
“I thank the President of the Security Council for this opportunity to update the Council on the impact of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic on peace and security. It is sobering to realize that the risks the Secretary-General identified to the Council on 2 July are manifesting in a number of countries across the world (see S/2020/663, annex I). But we are also witnessing resilience, innovation and inclusive political action to mitigate the impact of some of them. Conscious that my briefing will be complemented by those of my colleagues that follow, I would like to begin by highlighting three heightened risks. The first is the erosion of trust in public institutions. This was obviously a problem before the pandemic, and it is not specific to conflict situations.”
2020-09-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/897 (2020) · source
“Let me conclude by acknowledging the leadership of Ambassador Marc Pecsteen de Buytswerve in his role as the Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and to assure him once again of the Secretariat’s full support. I would also like to thank the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission for the continued cooperation.”
2020-06-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/644 (2020) · source
“Based on these technical findings, while also having taken into account the information provided by Iran, the Secretariat assessed that the examined cruise missiles and delta-wing UAVs and/or parts thereof used in the attacks on Saudi Arabia were of Iranian origin. Finally, the Secretariat also received information from Australia, Israel and Saudi Arabia regarding alleged transfers of arms and related materiel from Iran. We are analysing these issues, and the Secretary-General will report back to the Council, if appropriate, in due course. Notwithstanding the current challenges to the JCPOA, it remains the best way to ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. Its full implementation, as well as faithful adherence to resolution 2231 (2015), is also fundamental to regional stability.”
2020-06-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/644 (2020) · source
“We also ascertained that the jet engines and other components of the UAVs and cruise missiles show similarity to known Iranian models or have similar components (gyroscopes and engines) to an Iranian UAV reportedly recovered in Afghanistan in 2016. Furthermore, the sections of the cruise missiles recovered from the attacks and the sections seized by the United States in November 2019 form part of the same missile system, and it is highly likely that they were produced by the same entity. Finally, some of the items in the two seizures by the United States (a digital air data computer and the “Model V10” gyroscope) were identical or similar to those found in the debris of the cruise missiles and the delta-wing UAVs used in the 2019 attacks on Saudi Arabia.”
2020-06-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/644 (2020) · source
“In December 2019 , we stated that we had not yet been able to independently corroborate that those weapons and their components were of Iranian origin or had been transferred from Iran in a manner inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015) (see S/PV.8695). Since then, we have made further progress in our examination of the cruise missiles and delta-wing UAVs used in the attacks. We were able to confirm that some of the components of the delta-wing UAVs (ignition coils) and the cruise missiles (pressure sensors of the fuel-feed system) had been exported to Iran in 2016 and 2018, respectively. In our analysis, we took note of the feedback from Iran that “the concerned pressure transmitter is not a dual-use item to be monitored by the Government”.”
2020-06-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/644 (2020) · source
“Our findings indicate that the container launch units of the anti-tank guided missiles were of Iranian origin and had post-2016 production dates. We ascertained that the optical weapon sights had been delivered to Iran between February 2016 and April 2018, and observed that thermal optical weapon sights have design characteristics similar to those also produced by a commercial entity in Iran. We also found that the components associated with the anti-ship missile, the unidentified missile, as well as the cruise missile, bore Farsi markings. The transfer of such materiel from Iran after 16 January 2016 may be inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015). Let me now turn to the cruise missiles and delta-wing UAVs used in the attacks on Saudi Arabia last year.”
2020-06-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/644 (2020) · source
“Thirdly, on the arms-related restrictions, the Secretariat analysed two United States seizures of arms and related materiel and continued its assessment of the cruise missiles and delta-wing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) used in the 2019 attacks on Saudi Arabia. Regarding the November 2019 and February 2020 United States seizures of arms and related materiel, the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran informed the Secretariat that the “allegedly seized anti-tank guided missiles and thermal optical weapon sights do not conform to the products manufactured by the Islamic Republic of Iran.” Iran further informed us that similar optical sights claimed to be exported to Iran and later seized in Aden are still in use in different military units.”
2020-06-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/644 (2020) · source
“Secondly, regarding the ballistic missile-related provisions, France, Germany, Iran, Israel, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States provided information on Iran’s launch of Simorgh and Qased space-launch vehicles in February and April of this year. The information provided reflects divergent views among those Member States as to whether the launches are inconsistent with paragraph 3 of annex B. Paragraph 3 called upon Iran not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic missile technology.”
2020-06-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/644 (2020) · source
“As guided by the Security Council, the report focuses on annex B to the resolution. It also provides Council members with findings and recommendations, as called for in paragraph 7 of presidential note S/2016/44. First, regarding the nuclear-related provisions, we stress that the procurement channel is a vital transparency and confidence-building mechanism. We call on all Member States and the private sector to support and use the procurement channel. Furthermore, we regret the decision of the United States of 27 May to terminate the sanctions waivers related to the modernization of the Arak reactor. Exemptions set out in paragraph 2 of annex B are specifically designed to provide for the transfer of such items, materials, equipment, goods and technology required for the nuclear activities of Iran under the Plan.”
2020-06-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/644 (2020) · source
“We also urge Iran to address concerns raised by other States regarding its actions that are inconsistent with the restrictive measures in annex B of the resolution. We encourage JCPOA participants to resolve all differences within the dispute-resolution mechanism under the Plan. We also urge all Member States to avoid provocative rhetoric and actions that may have a further negative impact on the JCPOA and regional stability. The full implementation of the Plan is key to securing tangible economic benefit for the Iranian people. We are encouraged by the positive developments in the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges, which started to process its first transactions. I will now turn to the Secretary-General’s ninth report on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2020/531).”
2020-06-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/644 (2020) · source
“The Secretary-General has appealed for the waiving of sanctions that could undermine a country’s capacity to respond to the pandemic. Furthermore, he has expressed concern that the posture of private sector actors seeking to avert risk may continue to impede legitimate humanitarian aid transactions, especially with regard to banking needs. We also regret the steps Iran has taken since July 2019 in response to the United States withdrawal from the JCPOA. As a result of those steps, taken under the monitoring of the IAEA, Iran has surpassed JCPOA-stipulated limits on its uranium- enrichment level and on its stockpiles of heavy water and low-enriched uranium. Iran has also lifted JCPOA limitations on its nuclear research and development activities. Today we appeal again to Iran to return to full implementation of the Plan.”
2020-06-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/644 (2020) · source
“Before that date, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verified in 11 reports that Iran was complying with its nuclear commitments contained in the Plan. As we have said, we regret the United States withdrawal from the Plan. The re-imposition of United States national sanctions lifted under the Plan, as well as the decision not to extend waivers for the trade in oil with Iran and on all remaining JCPOA-originating projects, are contrary to the goals of the JCPOA. These actions have impeded the ability of Iran and other Member States to fully implement the Plan and the resolution. On 12 March, in a letter to the Secretary-General, Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif wrote that United States sanctions were constraining his country’s response to the coronavirus disease pandemic.”
2020-06-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/644 (2020) · source
“At the outset, let me recognize the presence today of His Excellency Mr. Michael Pompeo, Secretary of State of the United States of America, and His Excellency Mr. Javad Zarif, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran. I would also like to recognize the presence of Secretary-General António Guterres. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), endorsed in resolution 2231 (2015), is a significant achievement of multilateral diplomacy and dialogue. It remains crucial to the global nuclear non-proliferation architecture and to regional and international security. It is therefore regrettable that the future of this agreement is in doubt. The United States withdrew from the agreement in May 2018.”
2020-06-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/644 (2020) · source
“That includes any support required by the AU-led process. Transboundary water cooperation is a key element in the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals. I would like to emphasize that climate change, combined with projected demographic growth and socioeconomic changes, will increase water management challenges — not only for Blue Nile riparian countries but worldwide. Cooperation is not a zero-sum game. It is the key to a successful collective effort to reduce poverty and increase growth, thus delivering on the development potential of the region. We firmly hope that Egypt, Ethiopia and the Sudan will persevere in their efforts to achieve an agreement on the Renaissance Dam that is beneficial to all.”
2020-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/636 (2020) · source
“They include the binding nature of an agreement, the dispute-resolution mechanism and the management of water flow during droughts. While the United Nations has not participated in the negotiations on the Renaissance Dam, the Secretary-General is fully seized of the matter. I reiterate the Secretary-General’s call, on 19 May, for the parties to peacefully resolve all outstanding differences with urgency. Those differences can be overcome and an agreement reached if all parties show the necessary political will to compromise, in line with the spirit of cooperation highlighted in the 2015 Declaration of Principles on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. The United Nations stands ready to assist, through technical and expert support, as appropriate and as requested by the three countries.”
2020-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/636 (2020) · source
“Following the inconclusive negotiations in February, the three countries agreed to appoint observers to the talks, including the Republic of South Africa, the United States and the European Union, whose representatives have been observers to the recent meetings. On 26 June, South Africa, as Chair of the African Union (AU), convened the Bureau of the African Union Heads of State. President Al Sisi, Prime Minister Ahmed and Prime Minister Hamdok attended the session and agreed to an AU-led process aimed at resolving outstanding issues. The parties will meet over the next two weeks for that purpose. I commend the parties for their determination to negotiate an agreement, and I applaud the African Union’s efforts to facilitate a process to that end. The remaining differences are technical and legal in nature.”
2020-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/636 (2020) · source
“In 2018, the three countries formed a National Independent Scientific Research Study Group to discuss the filling and operation of the Renaissance Dam. Since 2019, trilateral discussions have been held at the ministerial level, as well as among the Heads of State, with the assistance of the United States and the World Bank. A draft text was discussed, but the three riparian States were not able to reach an agreement on the text presented in February 2020. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, the Sudan therefore took the initiative earlier this month to seek to narrow differences on this issue. We understand that 90 per cent of the technical issues have already been settled.”
2020-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/636 (2020) · source
“Recognizing the need for cooperation on the Renaissance Dam to fully realize its benefits and mitigate its potential negative effects on the downstream countries, the Blue Nile riparian countries have undertaken several commendable initiatives over the past decade. Those include the establishment of an international panel of experts in 2012 to examine the Dam’s design and construction plans, a follow-up Tripartite National Committee in 2014 and the 2015 Declaration of Principles on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. The Declaration takes note of the rising demand on the transboundary water resources of Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan. These three countries committed to several principles, including cooperation, equitable and reasonable utilization, security and the peaceful settlement of disputes.”
2020-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/636 (2020) · source
“The Blue Nile, which contributes approximately 85 per cent of the main Nile volume when it merges with the White Nile in Khartoum, is an important transboundary water resource critical for the livelihoods and development of the people of the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Republic of the Sudan. The construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, a major hydropower project located on the Blue Nile in Ethiopia’s Benishangul-Gumuz region, began in April 2011. Through the generation of hydroelectricity, the Renaissance Dam will significantly boost Ethiopia’s energy sources, allowing it to increase electrification, accelerate industrialization and export excess electricity to the region.”
2020-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/636 (2020) · source
“We should do everything we can to support the transition and the Sudanese people in addressing the existing challenges. I trust that we all share this sense of urgency and collective responsibility to enable the success of the truly historic transition in the Sudan. The Secretary-General attaches utmost importance to this endeavour and looks forward to working closely with the Security Council to make that happen.”
2020-04-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/336 (2020) · source
“We have also conveyed to the African Union Commissioner for Peace and Security an invitation for the African Union to join the planning exercise as a key partner. As our team has been unable to travel to the Sudan because of restrictions imposed following the outbreak of COVID-19, we decided to launch the planning exercise of the future mission from New York, with members of the team convening in virtual format from their respective locations, including New York, Khartoum, Addis Ababa and elsewhere. The team is expected to physically deploy to the Sudan as soon as the situation allows in order to refine and validate the outcome of the planning exercise with key Sudanese stakeholders, including the transitional Government of the Sudan, civil-society organizations, political parties, women and youth groups.”
2020-04-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/336 (2020) · source
“Besides seeking an integration of the mission and the United Nations country team under a single leadership, we envisage a future United Nations presence that is lean, effective and innovative in employing and coordinating resources across the United Nations system. Gender equality and the implementation of the women and peace and security agenda will be a strong cross-cutting priority. Given the urgent need to establish as soon as possible a presence on the ground to support the transition, Under-Secretary-General Lacroix and I have instructed a team of United Nations colleagues to lead a multi-disciplinary inter-agency planning exercise over the coming weeks. This team will develop a framework for the future United Nations presence in the Sudan, based on the guiding principles contained in the special report.”
2020-04-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/336 (2020) · source
“These include, first, supporting the achievement of the political benchmarks contained in the Constitutional Declaration; secondly, supporting the implementation of peace agreements in the conflict-affected areas; thirdly, supporting nationally led peacebuilding and the strengthening of human rights and rule-of-law institutions; and, fourthly, facilitating international support for economic reforms setting the Sudan on a path to sustainable development. The protection of civilians is also an area of focus. We believe that it requires a comprehensive approach in order to be effective in the long term. Therefore, it will be an integral part of our peacebuilding efforts in the Sudan. It is crucial that we work closely with Sudanese authorities and that we assist them in discharging their protection responsibility.”
2020-04-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/336 (2020) · source
“In parallel, we have been working on planning the future mission. In the special report submitted on 12 March to the Security Council (S/2020/202), the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission recommend the establishment of a follow-on presence with a Sudan-wide mandate. The mission’s objective would be to support the Sudan in successfully completing its transition. It would provide an effective response to the support needs outlined by Prime Minister Hamdok in his two letters to the Secretary-General.”
2020-04-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/336 (2020) · source
“The situation in the Sudan is clearly dire, and the need for support is real and urgent. Prime Minister Hamdok has written twice to the Secretary-General to ask for the establishment of a political and peacebuilding mission that would support Sudanese efforts to overcome specific challenges. When I visited Khartoum in February, the Prime Minister and key stakeholders in the country, including civil- society groups, conveyed a similar request to me. As a response to those requests, Mr. Nicholas Haysom, the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and South Sudan, was deployed to Khartoum in early March and has been working tirelessly to provide political support and to advocate with major international partners the need to generate as much assistance as possible for the Sudan as soon as possible.”
2020-04-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/336 (2020) · source
“Needs are largely driven by a deepening economic crisis. Structural flaws in the Sudan’s economy have driven up the rate of inflation and have hampered its ability to import needed commodities. That has directly affected the Sudan’s population, with people facing long lines for bread and petrol due to shortages of wheat and fuel. Last week, Prime Minister Hamdok warned that the transition could collapse without quick economic support. With the risk of a wider spread of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) in the Sudan, the economic challenges could worsen. The Secretary-General has encouraged the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to show flexibility in granting the Sudan exceptional access to financial instruments established to assist developing countries respond to the challenges of COVID-19.”
2020-04-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/336 (2020) · source
“I am grateful for the opportunity to brief the Security Council on the way forward for the United Nations engagement in the Sudan. Six months after the establishment of the transition, the Sudan continues to face significant challenges. Its political fragility has been brought into focus with recent protests by elements affiliated with the former regime, as well as by security incidents like the mid-January protest of former intelligence operatives, which led to violent confrontations in Khartoum. Under-Secretary-General Lacroix has already mentioned the assassination attempt against Prime Minister Hamdok. The humanitarian situation in the country remains worrisome. The number of people who need humanitarian assistance across the Sudan increased from about 8 million to 9.3 million at the end of 2019.”
2020-04-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/336 (2020) · source