YouSaid · the spoken record

Sidikou

lines on the record
159
first
2014-10-14
most recent
2018-11-15
sittings or episodes
11
sources
un-security-council

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  1. For that reason, less than a month before the crucial conference that is take place, I left Nouakchott to be speak before the Security Council. Let us act quickly and effectively in the conviction that doing so is in our common interest.

    2018-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8402 (2018) · source

  2. We welcome the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel, the implementation of which we discussed with key stakeholders of the United Nations system at a retreat held in Dakar last week. Our discussions with the Sahel Alliance are under way, and we signed a memorandum of understanding on 30 October in Niamey to implement an emergency development programme, in particular concerning water issues. All of that, however, is inadequate for meeting the €l.9 billion needed for development, especially given that the sum of €414 million euros for security enhancement has failed to materialize. I therefore solemnly call for increased investment in the Sahel. All forms of financing to promote prosperity are an investment in preventing insecurity.

    2018-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8402 (2018) · source

  3. Those countries require a greater level of tangible solidarity on the part of the international community in confronting challenges, the successful outcome or failure of which - no one in this Chamber should be in doubt - will have significant repercussions far beyond the borders of Africa. There is still time to take all the necessary measures and to finally act accordingly. Lastly, I should like to highlight the recent work of the G-5 Sahel in the area of development - the only solution that can ensure long-term stability in the region. We are currently organizing the first G-S Sahel donor and partner coordination conference to be held on Thursday, 6 December, in Nouakchott. A portfolio of 40 structure-related projects constitutes the first phase of the priority investment plan planned for the period 2019-2021.

    2018-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8402 (2018) · source

  4. My presence here attests to the importance of the Sahel in preserving the geopolitical balance of the world. Let us therefore formalize the international community's attention. As you so rightly pointed out recently, Mr. President, while the world finds itself confronted with multiple new and extreme crises, causing regions that have long been stable to totter, on the African continent, including in the great Sahel region, a nexus of five devoted countries has courageously united in the face of adversity to prevent the ship from sinking. Those five countries are struggling to hold on despite everything and to work within their limited means to meet all those immense security and development challenges.

    2018-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8402 (2018) · source

  5. Accordingly, courageous decisions must be made to support some Member States. As the Chairman of the G-5 Sahel stressed a few days ago at the Paris Peace Forum, "We are unable to rally international solidarity to achieve sustainable multilateral support for the Joint Force, which was established to fight terrorism and organized crime". In keeping with Secretary-General Antonio Guterres's call, I therefore add my voice to those of many Heads of State and representatives of our peoples to request that the Joint Force of the G-5 Sahel be mandated under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. Such a decision would consolidate the legitimacy of our efforts and give meaning to the shared responsibility in the fight against the hydra-headed terrorist threat.

    2018-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8402 (2018) · source

  6. That should be a cause of great concern that we might meet again in this Chamber in a few months' time to discuss a response to a security and humanitarian crisis of a much greater and tragic scale. How can we initiate multilateral action to effectively support regional efforts? The G-5 Sahel has seen many disparate interventions in the areas of migration, security, humanitarian assistance and development. Given the magnitude of crises, let us go beyond calls and other warnings. Let us ensure that the funding of multilateral institutions is commensurate with our security and development needs. Let us skilfully use our resources to avoid a Vicious circle the harmful consequences of which will represent an even greater future challenge. You have called for a return to the fundamental principles of the United Nations, Mr. President.

    2018-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8402 (2018) · source

  7. A large segment of young people, who make up the majority of the population, finds itself totally helpless, and unfortunately sees only two obvious options for the foreseeable future - either to flee through illegal immigration, with all the horrors it entails, or to embrace the hollow causes championed by terrorist groups that are only too happy to profit from the surrounding misery, while promising remuneration gleaned from the many forms of trafficking in which they engage. Given such a situation, it must be acknowledged that its development will lead to a further deterioration on the ground if we do not begin to take the appropriate measures and provide the necessary resources.

    2018-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8402 (2018) · source

  8. President, the Sahel is experiencing a multidimensional crisis that illustrates the relevance of such an approach. Environmental and socioeconomic challenges make up the backdrop to which many factors undermining our stability have been added. Some G-S Sahel countries are facing high levels of tension leading, inter alia, to the closure of schools, health-care facilities, police stations and courts.

    2018-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8402 (2018) · source

  9. With regard to the command of the Joint Force, a new duo - Brigadier General Hanena Ould Sidi of Mauritania and General Oumar Bikimo of Chad, appointed by the Heads of State - has taken office. They are at the helm of an arrangement consisting of the Headquarters, now in Bamako, and three forward command posts located in the west, the centre and the east. Upon assuming office, the new leadership began work on improving stewardship of the Joint Force and preparing for new operations. The Force has already conducted six operations. However, our brave troops, who stand ready to sacrifice themselves, will not be able to achieve results without the timely provision of the necessary means. As you have emphasized the important role of multilateralism in conflict resolution, Mr.

    2018-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8402 (2018) · source

  10. However, the G-5 Sahel trust fund received pledged money only from and Rwanda and the West African Economic and Monetary Union. I am pleased and grateful to announce that yesterday the United Arab Emirates disbursed €10 million to our trust fund. On behalf of the people of the Sahel, in particular the G-5 Sahel, I thank that country. At the initiative of the President of the Niger, His Excellency Mr. Mahamadou Issoufou, no effort has been spared to ensure the efficient management of the funds that have been received. The G-5 Sahel Council of Ministers has adopted the statutes guiding the support committee for the trust fund. Based in Nouakchott, that structure will facilitate the disbursement of the trust fund's resources and will be operational in the coming weeks.

    2018-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8402 (2018) · source

  11. A regional conference on impunity, access tojustice and human rights in the context of emerging threats to peace and security in West Africa and the Sahel was held in Niamey on 10 September, which further demonstrated the critical importance accorded to respect for human rights in the comprehensive approach put in place to respond to the crisis in the Sahel. Concerning the financing of the Joint Force, I must speak frankly about the gravity of the situation. On 23 February, the international high-level conference on the Sahel held in Brussels concluded with pledges. To date, we are far from the €414 million that were pledged. We have received the equivalent of €17.9 million in equipment, services and valuable technical assistance from partners, such as the African Union and the European Union.

    2018-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8402 (2018) · source

  12. That event marked a halt to the operationalizing of the Joint Force, which enjoys the logistical support of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). The Joint Force is clearly facing new challenges, including a lack of equipment, shortcomings at the logistical level and a lack of financing. Nevertheless, progress has been seen in the establishment of the compliance framework through the implementation of mechanisms aimed at ensuring respect for human rights and international humanitarian law. That work is being carried out with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and MINUSMA and is focused primarily on the police component of the Joint Force and on monitoring operations and investigations to identify those responsible whenever an incident occurs.

    2018-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8402 (2018) · source

  13. On behalf of the States members of the Group of Five for the Sahel (G-5 Sahel), I thank the Security Council for convening this briefing dedicated to the Joint Force of our regional organization. I also offer my profound thanks to Secretary-General Guterres for his biannual report (S/2018/1006) to the Security Council. Six months ago, I provided the members of Security Council with an overview of the situation in the Sahel (see S/PV.8266). Since then, we have seen an increased level ofinsecurity in certain G-5 Sahel countries that is cause for alarm. On 29 June, a terrorist attack destroyed the G-5 Sahel Joint Force's headquarters in Sevare, Mali.

    2018-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8402 (2018) · source

  14. It remains only to take strong action to realize all those good intentions in an appropriate framework and to thereby meet the expectations of the people of the Sahel, including young people without hope for the future who are reluctant to join the ranks of the retrograde terrorist groups or to attempt the suicidal venture of clandestine migration, and women living in the desert areas of the Sahel who face drought and see their newborns die in their arms owing to the prevailing insecurity that has caused the medical staff to flee the area and, more generally, the population's lack of basic services. It is high time to act for the Sahel beyond speeches and half-measures. The time for resolute action must begin here in the Chamber under the momentum of the Security Council.

    2018-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8266 (2018) · source

  15. At the specific level of the G-5 Sahel, we have in place a development and security strategy that includes an operational plan - the Priority Investment Programme i for whose implementation we count on the contribution of the entire international community. I note with satisfaction that a number of friends and partners of the Sahel, many of whom are represented in the Chamber, have already indicated their intention to support the Priority Investment Programme. We can clearly see that the deliberations to find the proper solutions to adequately deal with the immense challenges of the Sahel region have taken place and that multifaceted solutions, as well as some of the necessary resources, have been identified.

    2018-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8266 (2018) · source

  16. We are therefore faced with a vicious circle that requires a more global solution and a more holistic approach in our response to the Sahelian situation. The security-development nexus must therefore be at the heart of our effort. It should be very tangible on the ground for the people of the Sahel. From here, from the Chamber, the necessary momentum will emerge to transform the commitments made by all into concrete actions in order to rapidly achieve the crucial goal of pacification and of securing the Sahel region in parallel with the implementation of an ambitious socioeconomic development plan that meets the expectations of our populations, in particular young people and women. To that end, the United Nations developed the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel together with the African Union, which we commend.

    2018-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8266 (2018) · source

  17. It is with this in mind that we are also involved in the in-depth work that is beginning to be carried out, particularly with the support of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, with a view to ensuring strict respect for human rights in this fight against terrorism. The promotion of citizens' rights and freedoms should be considered an asset and not a constraint, because it greatly contributes to discrediting the discourse of the backward forces we are fighting. It is crucial for our success to be long term and not ephemeral, and for the security response not be isolated from the rest of the complex Sahel problem. Without peace and security there can be no development or prosperity. The clear lack of development and socioeconomic progress favours the increase in insecurity and instability.

    2018-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8266 (2018) · source

  18. It should also be noted with gratitude that the first financial contributions, mainly African, to date, have already arrived or are in the process of arriving, particularly from Rwanda and the member countries of the West African Economic and Monetary Union. Also, all the mobilization for the Sahel currently taking place must materialize very quickly in a tangible way on the ground so as to restore hope and confidence to our populations, their support being essential to the success in the long term of the multidimensional intervention of the international community that has come to the aid of our region.

    2018-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8266 (2018) · source

  19. The expected share of the five countries to the financing the Joint Force is therefore paid by all, sometimes with some delays. In addition, the trust fund established to manage the financial effort of the international community in support of the Joint Force already has an account with the Central Bank of Mauritania, the headquarters country of the G-5 Sahel. Following the meeting ofour organization's Defence Ministers two weeks ago in Ouagadougou, instructions were given to urgently appoint the members of the Trust Fund Support Committee, including its guarantor, the European Union, with a view to accelerating its operations.

    2018-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8266 (2018) · source

  20. For the nebulous international terrorist network and all related groups, the failure of our intervention would mean offering them on a silver platter the best possible operational basis to organize the almost unlimited spread throughout the world of an even more terrifying mass terrorism than we are already unfortunately experiencing today. Aware that they are the first to be affected, our States, despite their very limited financial resources, recently undertook major efforts to increase the capabilities of our defence forces and security sectors, which now benefit, on average, from more than 20 per cent of our five countries' budgets, often to the detriment of social sectors, despite their critical nature, which constitutes a particularly painful trade-off for our Governments.

    2018-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8266 (2018) · source

  21. It is therefore a question of succeeding, on the Joint Force of the G-5 Sahel, in setting up an effective operational force with an African backbone but strongly supported by the entire international community, led by the United Nations, in order to send a clear and strong message to all the negative forces and thereby carry out one of the most dangerous missions, whose failure would mean the total destabilization of a good part of the African continent, a region, we should recall, that is a neighbour to the Mediterranean, and therefore the European continent. It is also an important crossroads of traffic towards the rest of the world - America, Asia and the Middle East, in particular.

    2018-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8266 (2018) · source

  22. and, in the case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the establishment within MONUSCO of a rapid Force Intervention Brigade, which is made up exclusively of troops from the countries of the subregion and has been responsible for the most significant successful military interventions by the United Nations in that country since the establishment of a United Nations mission there nearly 20 years ago. I am therefore speaking from experience, having recently had an opportunity to experience the various realities of intervention missions on a daily basis, but always in a context framed by a Security Council resolution.

    2018-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8266 (2018) · source

  23. More specifically, with respect to the solutions for supporting the Joint Force suggested by the Secretary- General and better adapted to the context, as Council members know, before taking up my duties last February at the helm ofthe G-S Sahel, I had the honour of leading two important international missions, one under the auspices of the African Union - the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) - and the other under the auspices of the United Nations - the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). In both cases, the good collaboration between African forces and the United Nations led to positive results, particularly in Somalia, through the substantial logistical support provided by the United Nations to AMISOM.

    2018-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8266 (2018) · source

  24. Such an evolution of the Joint Force's mandate would be precisely in line with the recommendations resulting from the consultations conducted last March by the Security Council in the context of improving peacekeeping operations with a view to making them more flexible, more dynamic and more adapted to the different theatres of operations - in short, more effective in a constantly changing world. This is therefore also a good opportunity to take advantage of this more pragmatic and dynamic approach to United Nations interventions.

    2018-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8266 (2018) · source

  25. Against that backdrop, it would undeniably be a matter for the Security Council to place the United Nations contribution at a more appropriate level, which will include compulsory contributions as the best option in order to be able to provide long-term support. This is an opportunity to reiterate our call to the Council to provide the Joint Force with the strengthened mandate it deserves and the resources necessary to complete its operationalization and ensure its full and efficient response capability.

    2018-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8266 (2018) · source

  26. In the same vein, the configuration ofMINUSMA support for the Joint Force currently authorized by resolution 2391 (2017) severely limits effective regional coverage and operational control on all fronts identified as urgent for future interventions by the Force to fight terrorist groups and other criminal organizations determined to spread terror in the Sahelian space. We therefore confirm the diagnosis established by the Secretary-General in his report, which highlights in particular the inadequacy of the mechanism put in place to support the Joint Force. It is "neither sustainable nor commensurate with the challenges we face in the Sahel" (S/2018/432, para. 74).

    2018-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8266 (2018) · source

  27. In line with the Secretary-General's statements, we must acknowledge that we are still far from reaching a good cruising speed in the concrete implementation of our security response to the crisis that threatens to totally destabilize the Sahel and its surroundings. Although more than 80 per cent of our troops are already deployed at headquarters in Sevare' and in the three operational areas, the fact remains that the troops are still generally poorly equipped, and the military bases and, more generally, the logistics necessary for an effective intervention are lacking, especially in an environment that is often hostile in several respects.

    2018-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8266 (2018) · source

  28. Moreover, in order to comply with United Nations standards in this area, the Joint Force has integrated into its strategic concept of operations the human rights compliance framework advocated by the United Nations. This United Nations support following resolution 2391 (2017) is therefore to be welcomed. It has already enabled us to collaborate during the setting up of the Joint Force's headquarters in Se'vare, Mali, and during the conduct of the first two operations of the Force, namely, Operation Hawbi and Operation Pagnali, in the sensitive border area between Mali, Burkina Faso and the Niger.

    2018-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8266 (2018) · source

  29. As the Secretary-General notes in his report, over recent months, we have been in the process of successfully establishing the Joint Force of the Group ofFive for the Sahel, which is composed of 5,000 soldiers and which enjoys the support of the international community, in particular through the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and Operation Barkhane, led by France. A so-called technical arrangement was concluded in that regard among the United Nations, the European Union and the Group of Five for the Sahel last February, and was signed by the President of the Niger and current President of the G-5 Sahel, His Excellency Mr. Mahamadou Issoufou.

    2018-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8266 (2018) · source

  30. Foremost among those challenges is the security crisis, which has for several years, but with extreme urgency recently, been characterized by the proliferation of armed conflicts in our countries, the spread ofextremist religious terrorism, drug trafficking and other forms of cross-border crime with international ramifications, the migratory crisis and its most hideous manifestation, namely, the abject trafficking in human beings, organized by illegal immigration channels towards Europe. On the strictly military level, the mobilization of our five countries and the support of the international community have enabled the taking of a very positive first step forward.

    2018-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8266 (2018) · source

  31. Faced with multiple challenges, which are often minimized or ignored, the Sahel region has gradually become a major area of instability in Africa and is today a growing threat to international security. Five countries at the heart of the Sahelian space - Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and the Niger - decided to join forces as an organization and form a core group to face with solidarity the immense shared challenges that threaten the stability of already fragile States and hinder socioeconomic development.

    2018-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8266 (2018) · source

  32. I would like to begin by thanking the Security Council for organizing this meeting on the situation in the Sahel, a region of the world that is facing a thorny and complex crisis. This demonstrates the Council's interest in our subregion, despite the many other sources of concern for international peace and security. On behalf of the member countries of the Group of Five for the Sahel (G-S Sahel), I would like to thank Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, whose pertinent and strategic report on the establishment of the Joint Force of the G-5 Sahel (S/2018/432) perfectly summarizes the reality of the current issues in that region of Africa and proposes several pragmatic ways to make the international community's response to the multifaceted crisis more effective.

    2018-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8266 (2018) · source

  33. In that context, the recent visit of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission represents a significant reinforcement of the international community's collective efforts to help the Democratic Republic of the Congo make progress towards holding elections. Only through joint efforts, in solidarity and synergy, can the obstacles facing the Democratic Republic ofthe Congo be overcome.

    2017-10-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8067 (2017) · source

  34. Publishing a realistic electoral calendar, establishing a budget for the elections, implementing measures to ease tensions and ensuring respect for fundamental rights and freedoms are the main conditions that must be now be met in order to advance the political process. In that regard, while United Nations support is essential, it is not enough. Regional actors, including the African Union, the Southern African Development Community and the Economic Community of Central African States, have a key role to play in helping all the stakeholders in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to meet the challenges they are facing and in advancing the political process for the holding of elections.

    2017-10-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8067 (2017) · source

  35. MONUSCO is also in the process of introducing and testing a new strategy of protection by projection, specifically aimed at areas affected by the closure of MONUSCO bases and designed to provide the mission with greater flexibility in fulfilling its mandate to protect civilians. In conclusion, I would like to emphasize MONUSCO's commitment to supporting, through its good offices, the principles of the Agreement of 31 December 2016, which represent the only viable way to create the necessary conditions for holding credible and peaceful elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

    2017-10-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8067 (2017) · source

  36. It has modified its sector boundaries to enable the force to redeploy its troops in the eastern provinces and to intervene with more flexibility throughout the country. The Mission has also improved the mobility of the Intervention Brigade and strengthened its presence in the Kasai region, largely through redeployments of civilian, military and police personnel. In order to respect the ceiling on military personnel numbers authorized under resolution 2348 (2017) and to meet the new budget requirements, the Mission will soon complete the repatriation of 1,687 military units.

    2017-10-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8067 (2017) · source

  37. We estimate that about 8.5 million people, including 5.5 million children, are currently in need of humanitarian assistance. The number of internally displaced persons has reached 3.8 million, and more than 621,000 Congolese have sought refuge in various areas of the subregion, such as Angola, Zambia and so forth. In the Kasai region alone, some 2.8 million people are facing critical levels of food insecurity, and more than 1.5 million children continue to face the risk of violence, displacement and loss of access to education and medical services. Despite the significant challenges that the evolving situation presents, MONUSCO has continued to adjust its deployment and presence to better adapt its footprint to the priorities set out in resolution 2348 (2017), with a view to maximizing its effectiveness in the face ofbudget cuts.

    2017-10-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8067 (2017) · source

  38. I firmly condemn the attacks by the Kamuina Nsapu, the recruitment of children and the targeting of schools, churches and other protected sites, as well as the incidents of disproportionate use of force and deliberate targeting of civilians attributed to the Congolese armed forces. The violence must stop and its perpetrators must be held accountable. The impact of the deteriorating security situation on civilian life is clearly visible. Between June and August, MONUSCO identified 1,329 cases ofviolations or abuses of human rights. Armed groups carried out 533 attacks, while State actors accounted for 769 violations, of which 27 per cent were attributed to the armed forces and 24 per cent to national police. On top of that, the worsening humanitarian situation is clear evidence of the impact of the conflict on the civilian population.

    2017-10-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8067 (2017) · source

  39. We should add that, following that incident, two members of the FARDC were arrested, and MONUSCO initiated an investigation into the Blue Helmets' response during those events. Besides the situation in North and South Kivu, in Tanganyika province the clashes between the Twa and Luba militias have again increased, against the backdrop of a resurgence in Mayi-Mayi Kata-Katanga activities and emerging divisions among several Twa militias. The security situation in the western part of the country remains volatile, following major clashes between the Bundu Dia Mayala political-religious sect and security forces in Kinshasa and Kongo Central. Violent incidents continue in the Kasai region, involving clashes between Kamuina Nsapu militia and security forces as well as inter-ethnic conflicts.

    2017-10-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8067 (2017) · source

  40. In South Kivu, Mayi-Mayi groups have been carrying out attacks on several strategic FARDC installations since the end of June. Less than two weeks ago, Mayi-Mayi Yakutumba mounted an attack on Uvira, the second- largest city in South Kivu province, and was only repulsed thanks to a rapid and robust response from MONUSCO and exemplary coordination with the FARDC. The complexity of the current situation in South Kivu was tragically illustrated on 15 September when, in clashes with Burundian asylum seekers, Congolese security forces resorted to excessive force, resulting in 37 Burundians killed and 117 wounded. One FARDC soldier was also killed, and six FARDC soldiers and one national police officer were wounded. That tragedy should never have happened.

    2017-10-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8067 (2017) · source

  41. I have repeatedly called for such actions to stop and for the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution ofthe Democratic Republic of the Congo to be fully respected so as to establish conditions conducive to the holding of credible and peaceful elections. (spoke in French) In these politically uncertain circumstances, the security situation in several regions of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has deteriorated further, with an increase in targeted attacks on the national security forces by Mayi-Mayi groups. In North Kivu, repeated Mayi-Mayi attacks on Forces armees de la Republique democratique du Congo (FARDC) positions have been taking place in an environment marked by tensions between the Hutu and Nande communities. The so- called Allied Democratic Forces have also attempted to seize several FARDC positions.

    2017-10-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8067 (2017) · source

  42. I have consistently reminded all stakeholders of their responsibility to ensure respect for rights and freedoms during this period of heightened political uncertainty. That will require full implementation of all the confidence-building measures stipulated in the Agreement, ensuring the opening of the political space and full respect for human rights, including respect for everyone's political rights and freedoms, including freedom of opinion and expression and the right to peaceful assembly. The United Nations is concerned about the fact that journalists, political opponents and civil society activists continue to be subject to intimidation, harassment and violence, mostly in connection with their activities and the expression of their opinions concerning the political process.

    2017-10-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8067 (2017) · source

  43. The Commission is still underfunded, and the multi-partner basket support fund for the Project of Assistance to the Electoral Cycle in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, managed by the United Nations Development Programme, has reached only 6 per cent of the estimated $123 million required. Nor has MONUSCO been provided with any additional resources to support the updating of the voter registry or the broader electoral process. That is in large part due to the uncertainties about the electoral calendar and the political process going forward. The establishment of conditions conducive to the holding of elections depends largely on the implementation of confidence-building measures.

    2017-10-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8067 (2017) · source

  44. As of mid-September, the Electoral Commission had registered more than 41 million voters. Women represented 48 per cent of registered voters, a slightly lower figure than in 2006, 2011 and 2016. In early September, voter-registration training began in the Kasai and Kasai Central provinces, the last remaining provinces in the country to undergo that process. However, there is still uncertainty about the registration of members of the diaspora, the mode of voting and the timeline for enacting critical legislation. Regrettably, the financial resources required to ensure sustained progress towards the holding of elections are not yet forthcoming.

    2017-10-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8067 (2017) · source

  45. The Congolese stakeholders were also urged to step up their efforts to prepare for the timely holding of free, fair, peaceful and credible presidential and legislative elections in accordance with the Agreement and, at the same time, to take additional confidence-building measures to establish an environment conducive to a successful conclusion of the electoral process. In that regard, I would like to turn to two specific points -progress with regard to the holding ofelections, and the establishment of conditions conducive to that. With regard to the first point, although the publication of an electoral calendar and a budget remain key milestones in the political process and will be essential to lowering political tensions and uncertainty as to a way forward, it is important to note that progress has been made with voter registration.

    2017-10-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8067 (2017) · source

  46. The participants once again reaffirmed the centrality of the Agreement of 31 December 2016 and the importance of ensuring its full implementation in order to pave the way for the timely holding of free, fair, peaceful and credible elections. The discussions during the event acknowledged the progress made by the Independent National Electoral Commission with the voter registration process and stressed the need for publishing an electoral calendar as soon as possible and providing a budget for the elections.

    2017-10-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8067 (2017) · source

  47. That has generated new political debate around the varying interpretations of the Agreement, particularly with regard to the implementation of the transitional arrangement in the future. Regrettably that has led in turn to the re-emergence of a climate of political uncertainty and tension. It was in the light of those developments that on the sidelines of the opening of the General Assembly at its seventy-second session, the United Nations convened a side event on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The meeting welcomed the authorities' commitment to respecting the Constitution and stressed the need for further confidence-building measures to establish conditions conducive to ensuring the successful conclusion of the electoral process.

    2017-10-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8067 (2017) · source

  48. As the Council is aware, in recent months the challenges related to the implementation of the Comprehensive and Inclusive Political Agreement of 31 December 2016 have unfortunately persisted. The broad consensus achieved among key political actors with the Agreement's signing has not been maintained consistently throughout the year, specifically as that relates to the transitional oversight mechanism - the Conseil national de suivi de l'accord - and to the implementation of confidence-building measures for sealing the Agreement and the electoral timelines. Recently, discussions have centred on the notion that elections will most probably not be held before the end of 2017, unlike what was foreseen in the Agreement.

    2017-10-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8067 (2017) · source

  49. Mr. Sidikou: I would like to thank the members of the Security Council for the opportunity to brief them today on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. I would first like to take this opportunity to express my deepest condolences and sympathy to the families, as well as to the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania, for the deaths of the two Tanzanian peacekeepers killed in an attack on 9 October by the Allied Democratic Forces on the Mamundioma base of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic ofthe Congo (MONUSCO). I condemn it and all attacks on MONUSCO personnel, who serve the cause of peace and stability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

    2017-10-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8067 (2017) · source

  50. The Secretary-General has recommended the deployment of two additional formed police units (FPUs) to help the Congolese authorities address the potential threat of electoral and politically motivated violence in key urban centres where there is no police or FPU presence. The primary responsibility for the implementation of the agreement rests with its signatories and will require the same level of commitment and compromise that led to its signing, on 31 December. MONUSCO will continue to provide support for the implementation of the agreement, while also supporting efforts to address the mounting threats faced by the civilian population during the transition period. I thank you again, Mr. President, for this opportunity to brief the Council today. I look forward to the ensuing discussions.

    2017-03-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7903 (2017) · source