YouSaid · the spoken record

Sidikou

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159
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2014-10-14
most recent
2018-11-15
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11
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un-security-council

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  1. MONUSCO has put in place robust mitigating measures to ensure that our operations are able to effectively target armed groups while reducing the risk of human-rights abuses. The recent violence at the Kitona demobilization camp, which left two dead and several wounded, is a reminder of the need for careful planning and coordinated support for the return and reintegration of the more than 5,000 ex-combatants now in the national DDR programme. Coordinating advocacy for that phase of the programme with partners such as the World Bank will be a priority in the coming period.

    2016-03-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7654 (2016) · source

  2. Military cooperation offers a clear opportunity to significantly increase the military pressure on priority armed groups and protect civilians more effectively. The rate of surrender had risen in the past year, and that trend could continue in the coming months with a renewal of more coordinated military operations. A key priority for the coming year will be linking those efforts to a viable disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process in order to ensure that the military pressure leads to an eventual path to reintegration or repatriation. It will also be important to support those operations by managing weapons and explosives effectively. All United Nations support will be provided in accordance with the human-rights due-diligence policy.

    2016-03-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7654 (2016) · source

  3. Since my arrival in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, I have intensified my engagement with President Kabila himself, and he has indicated his willingness to enhance cooperation with MONUSCO and to re-engage in discussions on the joint development of an exit strategy for MONUSCO. President Kabila's commitment to renewing the coordination of military operations, which resulted in January in a technical agreement between the Government and MONUSCO and in the recent resumption of greater cooperation in planning operations, has paved the way for improved cooperation. That is important, as MONUSCO Will be more effective if challenges can be addressed in a spirit of close cooperation with the Congolese authorities and of mutual trust and confidence.

    2016-03-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7654 (2016) · source

  4. MONUSCO has intensified efforts to approach the protection of civilians and the neutralization of armed groups as mission-wide priorities, with an added focus on non-military initiatives, including strong political advocacy, enhanced reporting and effective liaison with communities. MONUSCO has also begun developing tailored strategies to address the threat posed by armed groups. The Mission continues to work closely with Special Envoy Djinnit's Office with a view to dealing better with the regional aspects. I would like to highlight the importance of renewing the partnership between the Government and MONUSCO if such threats are to be addressed more effectively.

    2016-03-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7654 (2016) · source

  5. Inter-ethnic tensions in Ituri province, fuelled by conflicts over land, large-scale displacements owing to the situation in North Kivu, and other population movements have again raised the possibility of serious violence in this area. Recent reported returns for former M-23 combatants to Masisi territory and other parts of the Kivus serve to underscore the urgent need to implement the Nairobi Declarations. The situation in part of South Kivu also remains fragile. In mid-February, Congolese security services discovered weapons caches in the Ruzizi Plain, near Uvira. The subsequent arrests of several Congolese and Burundians on charges related to the caches and participation in an insurrection movement, as well as the remobilization of an ethnic militia in Haut Plateau, are signs that the clashes in Burundi could destabilize South Kivu.

    2016-03-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7654 (2016) · source

  6. I am concerned in particular about the situation in southern Lubero and Walikale territories, where fighting between newly emerged Mayi-Mayi groups and FDLR units has resulted in mass displacements of civilians and heightened tensions between local communities, with an increasing number of human rights violations over recent months. The rhetoric by some actors has become increasingly strong, and there is a real risk of escalation intercommunal conflict. The spate of kidnappings in areas formerly occupied by the Mouvement du 23 mars (M-23) in Masisi and Ituri territories is indicative of a lack of effective State presence in conflict-affected areas.

    2016-03-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7654 (2016) · source

  7. Reports of increasing restriction of the democratic space, in particular with regard to members of the opposition, the media and civil society, are of concern. As set out in the report before the Council, the situation in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains highly complex, in particular in North Kivu and Ituri provinces, with the deterioration of the security situation in some areas. In the Beni area of North Kivu, the Allied Democratic Forces continue to carry out brutal attacks against civilians, the national security forces and MONUSCO. The Forces democratiques pour la liberation du Rwanda (FDLR) and the myriad Mayi-Mayi groups in North Kivu also remain a significant threat to civilians.

    2016-03-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7654 (2016) · source

  8. Progress in that area will make it possible to lift one of the existing obstacles. The support of MONUSCO will be necessary in revising the voter lists. Nevertheless, to limit the risks involved in its involvement, securing political consensus beforehand is essential. That would contribute to overcoming numerous impediments and would mark a first, crucial step in the efforts aimed at ensuring the holding of credible elections. (spoke in English) Another key message conveyed by the Secretary- General during his visit to the Democratic Republic of the Congo was that of the importance of there being sufficient space for political activities and the exercise of public liberties for the credibility of any electoral process.

    2016-03-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7654 (2016) · source

  9. The risk of violence for us is real, unless the political differences are resolved. During his recent visit to the Democratic Republic ofthe Congo, the Secretary-General called on President Kabila, the Presidents of the two chambers of Parliament and members of the majority parties and civil society to engage constructively in a political dialogue that has the interests of the people at the centre. He highlighted the need to hold credible elections in line with the Constitution, with a view to consolidate the progress made in the country over the past decade. In that regard, we are working closely with the African Union and are supporting its efforts to facilitate a political dialogue with the support of regional and international partners. Updating the voter rolls continues to be a key element in holding credible elections.

    2016-03-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7654 (2016) · source

  10. At the outset, allow me to thank you, Mr. President, for this opportunity personally to present to the Security Council the latest report (8/2016/233) of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and to brief members on the latest developments on the ground. The Democratic Republic of the Congo is at a pivotal moment. Elections should be held towards the end of the year, while political tensions are rising as the polls approach. The electoral process has long been at an impasse, with significant obstacles to be overcome in order to hold the elections. A credible dialogue among all political stakeholders remains essential in order to find a solution to the situation in which the electoral process finds itself and to avoid an escalation oftension.

    2016-03-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7654 (2016) · source

  11. (Spoke in French) In conclusion, I thank the Security Council and the Member States for their active support to MONUSCO. I also express my gratitude to all the personnel of the Mission and of the United Nations who are working in difficult and at times dangerous conditions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In that regard, I pay solemn tribute to Staff Sergeant Dyson Mayao, of Malawi, who lost his life last year serving in the Force Intervention Brigade tasked with protecting civilians against attacks in the city of Erengeti.

    2016-01-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7603 (2016) · source

  12. The resumption of security cooperation would be a key aspect in that regard, and could lead to meaningful reductions in the capabilities and influence of armed groups in the east. The Council's encouragement of such an approach would be particularly useful at this time. Thirdly, regarding the Mission's force reduction and transformation, I am confident that the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and MONUSCO will soon resume structured and meaningful discussions within the framework of the strategic dialogue in order to agree on ways to effectively implement MONUSCO's mandate and jointly develop an exit strategy. The Council's continued support for such an approach will be important, particularly upon entering the mandate renewal discussions in March.

    2016-01-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7603 (2016) · source

  13. Such a process should build confidence among the citizens, ease political tensions, reduce the risk of escalation and contribute to an atmosphere conducive to the protection of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution. Secondly, there is a window of opportunity now to deepen our partnership with Governments and move towards a common vision and joint approach to addressing insecurity in the east of the country. I have received clear signals of this from President Kabila himself and others in the Government. I believe it is important that every effort be made to work collaboratively with the FARDC and State authorities to meet the many challenges and protect civilians at this difficult time.

    2016-01-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7603 (2016) · source

  14. That, combined with greater air reconnaissance and operational capabilities, is designed to ensure responsiveness, agility and the ability to take forward a robust strategy to protect civilians in the coming period. In conclusion, I would like to draw the Council's attention to three areas where strong messaging and engagement would be particularly useful. First, given the very real risks of civil unrest and violence related to the electoral process, it is critical that every effort be made to rebuild confidence among the stakeholders to find a way forward. I would encourage the Council to support an inclusive dialogue that upholds the Constitution.

    2016-01-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7603 (2016) · source

  15. The Council is well aware of the proposed reduction of MONUSCO's force by 1,700 troops. I am ready to address questions regarding how the reduction will be taken forward, in close coordination with the Government via a strategic dialogue and in line with resolution 2211 (2015). In that regard, I would highlight that the drawdown will be accompanied by a process of force transformation, which will ensure that MONUSCO exercises greater operational capability in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, even as the force gradually reduces in overall numbers. The key goal is to continue to project force and to be able to protect civilians as the number of static sites decreases. The core of the force transformation is rapid deployment capability, delivered by rapid reaction brigades, which will start deployment into MONUSCO next month.

    2016-01-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7603 (2016) · source

  16. Increased early warning activities to ensure the effective protection of civilians in this area are also a key priority. The crisis in Burundi has produced new risks of renewed instability in South Kivu, Already there are 13,000 refugees from Burundi sheltering in the camp of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Uvira territory, and a new flow of refugees into the country has been reported. The Mission has received worrisome reports of infiltrations by armed elements into this province, with local actors expressing fears that some groups are trying to establish rear bases in Uvira and Fizi territories. We will continue to closely monitor the situation along the border and the impact of the Burundian crisis on Democratic Republic of the Congo, to ensure that appropriate contingency plans are in place.

    2016-01-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7603 (2016) · source

  17. That dynamic could easily spark violence in adjoining territories where competition over land and customary authority has already heightened tensions. Reports of increased recruitment into self- defence groups based on ethnicity are a worrying sign, and the upcoming elections period could serve to further politicize and instrumentalize the groups on the ground. MONUSCO is engaged with the Government and the FARDC command to encourage increased military pressure on local militia in North Kivu and to cooperate with a view to bringing about increased voluntary disarmament. That, in combination with ongoing disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes and political engagement to resolve conflict, is a key priority for the Mission in the coming period.

    2016-01-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7603 (2016) · source

  18. Since October, FARDC Sukola II operations have intensified against the FDLR in Lubero and bordering territories. That has been accompanied by an increase in Mayi-Mayi operations against the FDLR and its allies. Civilians have been caught up in the fighting and have been displaced, forcibly abducted or targeted for massacres or harassment, often on the basis of ethnicity and perceived collaboration with the FDLR. Reprisal attacks by suspected FDLR elements have been reported, most recently on 7 January in Miriki, southern Lubero, where displaced members of the Hutu community had sought refuge. At least 18 people were killed in the attack, mostly women and children from the Nande community. The situation appears to be worsening in Lubero, and could potentially turn into an open inter-ethnic conflict between the Hutu and Nande communities.

    2016-01-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7603 (2016) · source

  19. The Mission has taken immediate steps to strengthen the protection of civilians through increased joint police and military patrols, and the redeployment of an additional company operating base of the Force Intervention Brigade, along with increased outreach and early warning activities. On 4 and 5 December, I visited Beni to meet with local authorities and civil society to assess options for further action. I returned to the area on 12 December with a delegation of the Special Envoy of the Secretary- General for the Great Lakes Region to engage their diplomatic support. I have also encouraged the Government at the highest levels to engage directly on this serious issue. President Kabila's recent visit to the east is a positive sign in that regard.

    2016-01-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7603 (2016) · source

  20. In the Beni territory, the ADF has been the target of operations by the FARDC under Sukola I operations for the past two years. Nonetheless, the ADF remains able to coordinate simultaneous attacks on the FARDC and MONUSCO. The Council will recall that more than 500 civilians have been killed by the ADF and its allies since 2014, and since December of last year there have been 45,000 newly displaced civilians. That situation continues today, with some people displaced as far north as Ituri province, with ongoing tensions among the communities on the ground. MONUSCO has responded against suspected ADF locations, including a 1 December 2014 aerial operation following ADF attacks around Eringeti and Makembi.

    2016-01-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7603 (2016) · source

  21. For example, the Forces armees de la Republique de'mocratique du Congo (FARDC) completed 20 trials in the past three months, finding 19 officers guilty of rape. For the past nine months, the FARDC has supported the commission overseeing the action plan against sexual violence, to which President Kabila recommitted his support last December. Turning to the security situation, there has been a significant deterioration in the eastern part of the country in recent weeks, particularly in the Beni and Lubero territories of North Kivu, where activities by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and the Force democratiques de liberation du Rwanda (FDLR), among other groups, pose ongoing and serious threats to the civilian populations.

    2016-01-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7603 (2016) · source

  22. In the absence of agreement on the electoral process, political polarization has heightened tensions and contributed to an atmosphere of increased harassment and human rights violations. Since last year, MONUSCO has registered more than 260 human rights violations related to elections, mostly against opposition members, civil society representatives and journalists. That, combined with the rising number of human rights abuses by armed groups in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, illustrates a worrying trend of narrowing political space and a real challenge to the conduct of peaceful, credible elections. However, in other areas where there have been longstanding human rights concerns, it is important to acknowledge the significant steps taken by the Congolese authorities.

    2016-01-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7603 (2016) · source

  23. In that context, it is encouraging to note that, at the end of December, the Catholic Bishops Conference met separately with leaders of the majority and opposition parties, the Electoral Commission and civil society representatives to seek their views on reviving the electoral process. I understand that all participants agreed on the need for some form of dialogue. I am continuing my contacts with the committee established by the Bishops Conference to support further confidence-building efforts and encourage a way forward. However, many of my interlocutors have expressed scepticism that the rift between the majority and the opposition can be bridged, potentially leading to delays in the electoral calendar.

    2016-01-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7603 (2016) · source

  24. (spoke in English) The presidential and legislative elections scheduled for November of this year are a deeply divisive issue, particularly given the continued absence of an agreed electoral calendar or a budget for the elections. The formal preparations for a national dialogue, announced by President Kabila as a means to forge consensus on the electoral process, have not yet begun, in part due to strong opposition against the initiative by many major opposition groups. President Kabila is continuing consultations, including with the United Nations and the African Union, on the designation of an international facilitator for the national dialogue. During my meetings with the President, I have expressed the readiness of MONUSCO to support an inclusive Congolese process guided by the country's Constitution.

    2016-01-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7603 (2016) · source

  25. I thank you, Mr. President, for this opportunity to brief the Security Council on the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo. I will brief the Council in person next March but, given the prevailing situation in the country, it seemed appropriate that I remain in the Mission area for today's briefing. My briefing will focus on three issues, namely, the evolution of the political situation in relation to the national elections scheduled for later this year, recent trends in security in the east of the country, and the planned withdrawal of some of the troops of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic ofthe Congo (MONUSCO). I will try to make recommendations to the Council on each of those issues.

    2016-01-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7603 (2016) · source

  26. Given that conduct and discipline is primarily a responsibility of the troop- and police-contributing countries, the Commission has shared the detailed report with those countries and requested their response and comments on the findings ahead of a meeting with them and Somalia in order to agree on the concrete steps to be taken to implement the recommendations contained in the report.

    2015-05-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7445 (2015) · source

  27. The Commission, with input from AMISOM, has also prepared a draft annex to the existing memorandum of understanding between the Commission and the troop- and police-contributing countries intended to set up a more robust response to sexual exploitation and abuse and improve prevention efforts, accountability and reporting of the troop- and police-contributing countries on sexual exploitation and abuse, as well as to ensure that victims receive the support they need.

    2015-05-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7445 (2015) · source

  28. We have moved all the shops out of the AMISOM base camp. We are restructuring the camp to prevent unauthorized access by AMISOM. personnel to Somalis living within the Mission area. The AU Commission has recruited and deployed a Conduct and Discipline Officer to the Mission. We are instituting a hotline in AMISOM. in order to specifically respond to the challenges for victims and witnesses that were noted in the investigation report. As a means of encouraging more reporting of sexual exploitation and abuse cases and confidence-building, the AU Commission, with input from AMISOM, has developed a whistle-blower policy that we expect will be passed by the policy organs of the AU this year.

    2015-05-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7445 (2015) · source

  29. continues to implement its mandate to restore peace and stability in the country. Beyond concluding that two of the allegations contained in the Human Rights Watch report are indeed cases of proven sexual exploitation and abuse perpetrated by AMISOM. soldiers, the investigation team made a number of observations and recommendations to strengthen existing mechanisms that the AU Commission and the troop- and police-contributing countries to AMISOM. have put in place to address sexual exploitation and abuse. These recommendations are informing our response and we have already taken the following specific actions. I have issued directives to the Force Commander, the Police Commissioner and other senior Mission leadership to immediately implement the recommendations contained in the investigation report.

    2015-05-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7445 (2015) · source

  30. The final report of the benchmarking exercise jointly developed by both the AU and the United Nations will be submitted to the Security Council soon, and I look forward to the Council's consideration and endorsement of the report's recommendations. I would like to conclude by addressing the outcomes of the independent investigations of allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse allegedly perpetrated by AMISOM. personnel as reported by Human Rights Watch in June 2014. As I have stated on several occasions, I would like to reiterate solemnly before Council that AMISOM's leadership is committed to enforcing the African Union's zero tolerance policy. We will continue to respect the dignity of all Somali women and girls and uphold the religious and cultural values of Somalia as AMISOM.

    2015-05-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7445 (2015) · source

  31. As Somalia continues to work towards establishing rule of law institutions, the Federal Government has signed memorandums of understanding with the interim regional administrations. This is a timely development, and AMISOM. police will support the recruitment, vetting, training and deployment of 600 police officers for each of the administrations. The role of AMISOM. police in support of Somalia necessitates the establishment of a support package for the Somali police force that comprises elementary infrastructure, rudimentary equipment and sustainment items required to commence policing operations in the regions.

    2015-05-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7445 (2015) · source

  32. The planned strategic review of the United Nations Support Office for the African Union Mission in Somalia (UNSOA) is therefore critical and should, inter alia, recognize the need for an expansion of UNSOA's quantitative and qualitative capacities as well as the need to adapt the Support Office to the nature of AMISOM. operations, as well as to its other clients. Thirdly, the benchmarking exercise proposed two recommendations on the role of the AMISOM. police component. The first is the deployment of formed police units to provide operational and logistical support and bolster the confidence of the national police force. The second is to deploy individually deployed police officers to provide support for the vetting, recruitment, training and mentoring of local Somali police personnel.

    2015-05-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7445 (2015) · source

  33. Today, the Somali authorities have developed the Guulwade (Victory) Plan, which we should all support in a coordinated manner. This is critical if we are to turn the Somali national army into a more effective partner to AMISOM. Secondly, we will have to make a decision regarding the logistical support package to AMISOM. Although it has significantly evolved, logistical support has seen shortfalls that have been an important element among many that contributed to the lack of a sustained pace in operations. The approach in logistical support must therefore take a new direction.

    2015-05-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7445 (2015) · source

  34. While the foregoing are noble objectives to which I am sure the Council will give its blessings, I would like to highlight some key assumptions on which these laudable objectives are premised and to which we need to give more careful consideration. If AMISOM. is to achieve these objectives and if we are to make the right decisions at this crucial point in our support to Somalia, we will need to make some hard decisions regarding, in particular, first, our support to the Somalia security forces. The contribution, assumed by the Somali national army on the basis ofresolution 2124 (2013), did not materialize fast enough. When it did materialize, the sustainability of the required follow-through operations was severely constrained by a combination of shortage in resources and considerable weaknesses in the chain of command.

    2015-05-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7445 (2015) · source

  35. The enabling of policing will free up troops for area security operations, which is a requirement for stabilization. In addition, the establishment of a joint AMISOM/UNSOM. civilian presence will further enhance the recovery and stabilization efforts. Finally, the extension will enable AMISOM. to secure main supply routes and other routes connecting with newly recovered areas and interim regional administrations, which will ensure free access Within and through the newly recovered areas, which in turn will facilitate governance and the delivery of services and humanitarian assistance. It will also enable freedom of movement and force protection for military, Government and local authorities and enable resupply and access for commercial and market traffic.

    2015-05-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7445 (2015) · source

  36. That extension will enable AMISOM. to achieve three interlocking objectives. First, it will allow the Mission to resume offensive operations against Al-Shabaab, which will be conducted under an enhanced AMISOM chain of command, in a cross-sector manner when necessary, with specialized capabilities based on the use of Mission assets, including helicopters which may be generated from within or without the continent while recognizing the limitations and risks involved. Secondly, the extension will enable the consolidation and stabilization of the recovered areas, which will require a gradual shift to police and necessitate an agreement on the rebalancing of AMISOM. uniformed personnel numbers at the right time, dictated by an agreed sequencing of operations that is continually adapted.

    2015-05-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7445 (2015) · source

  37. In particular, the force's effectiveness was undermined by a lack of most of the force enablers and multipliers authorized under resolution 2124 (2103), including the helicopters capable of giving it the degree of agility and flexibility it needs to adjust to Al-Shabaab's change of tactics. Given the extent of the threat and the status of the political process, ending the surge in uniformed personnel before the end of 2016 could run a serious risk of reversals that could derail Vision 2016's objectives and risk the success of the investment that has been made by all concerned. Finally, therefore, AMISOM's continued presence is potentially required until the end of 2016. I therefore welcome the recommendation to extend the surge with a structured, targeted reconfiguration of AMISOM. designed to respond to evolving realities.

    2015-05-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7445 (2015) · source

  38. That, in turn, has created the essential space for the unfolding of the political process, especially the federalization process, albeit with uneven progress across the regions. The joint offensives of AMISOM. and the Somali national army have also provided the space needed for stabilization efforts in the recovered areas, despite the fact that a number of important factors have posed challenges to it. While the joint operations were able to recover territory, Al-Shabaab has still retained certain capabilities, mostly employing asymmetric warfare tactics, that have affected the population's confidence in the army and AMISOM. and impeded further necessary action against it, largely because AMISOM. does not have the configuration and resources to respond accordingly.

    2015-05-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7445 (2015) · source

  39. have initiated consultations with the troop-contributing countries and are working to secure their necessary buy-in on the recommendations. The joint mission reviewed the benchmarks for a United Nations peacekeeping operation in Somalia as outlined in resolution 2124 (2013), and found that, while progress was being made on various benchmarks at varying speeds, the situation in Somalia as a whole would not be conducive to the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation until the end of 2016, at the earliest. It is gratifying that, in its draft report, the joint AU-United Nations mission appreciates that, with the targeted support of partners, there has been considerable success in reducing Al-Shabaab's territorial control and degrading its leadership.

    2015-05-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7445 (2015) · source

  40. I would also like to assure the Council that we will be reinvigorating operations against Al-Shabaab as part of the outcomes and recommendations of the recently concluded joint African Union-United Nations mission, and that there will soon be a more prominent resumption of offensive operations in some areas. For obvious operational security reasons, I will leave it at that. I would now like to turn to the second issue, relating to my thoughts on the outcomes of the joint African Union-United Nations mission on benchmarks for a United Nations peacekeeping operation in Somalia, and its recommendations for the next steps in the military campaign begun last month in Somalia from 14 to 25 April. AMISOM, the African Union (AU) Commission and UNSOM.

    2015-05-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7445 (2015) · source

  41. Overall, Al-Shabaab activities are likely to continue, since its intention of carrying out terrorist attacks and its ability to do so have not diminished. Targeted assassinations seem to be their preferred tactic, owing to their high effectiveness and low cost. In response, however, we - and by that I mean AMISOM, together with our Somali counterparts - have boosted our joint operations, especially in urban centres, in order to continue to disrupt Al-Shabaab activities. In terms of offensive operations, I should emphasize that AMISOM. troops, together with the Somali national army, have not relented in our efforts to defeat Al-Shabaab. Operation Eagle and Operation Indian Ocean have shown that AMISOM's offensive operations against Al-Shaabab can produce positive results, particularly in reducing that terrorist group's territorial control.

    2015-05-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7445 (2015) · source

  42. There have also been significant political developments, especially relating to the federalization process, the constitutional review and the electoral process, that my Office has been supporting, together with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) and the Federal Government of Somalia, as my good friend and colleague Nick Kay discussed in his briefing this morning. With regard to the security situation, the overall prevailing security situation in Somalia can be described as having elevated terrorism threat levels characterized by a rise in Al-Shabaab activities, mainly owing to an increased number of attacks involving improvised explosive devices and targeted assassinations.

    2015-05-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7445 (2015) · source

  43. Mr. Sidikou: I am honoured and pleased to address the Security Council today on the situation in Somalia. I would like to brief the Council on three important developments - the prevailing security situation in Somalia; my thoughts on the recently concluded joint African Union-United Nations benchmarking exercise; and the outcomes of our investigation of sexual exploitation and abuse and the steps that the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has taken to ensure an effective prevention and response regime.

    2015-05-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7445 (2015) · source

  44. That is why we are supporting the Government to engage the Somali diaspora to help generate more economic activities in Somalia and to contribute to early recovery activities. Please allow me to thank all stakeholders and partners of Somalia, including the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the European Union, the League ofArab States and individual Member States for their continuing support to the Federal Government of Somalia and to the African Union. I wish to encourage all of us to continue in this partnership to achieve peace, stability, recovery and development in Somalia. As we continue to work more closely, we will become more effective on the ground. This is what ultimately will also enhance the integrity of the international community as an honest broker in the peace process for Somalia.

    2015-02-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7375 (2015) · source

  45. The Government, with the support of the international community, has to redouble its efforts to provide basic services to the areas under its control. We need to provide food, sanitation and clean drinking water. We need to rehabilitate medical facilities and educational institutions. We need to generate employment for the Somali youth in order to wean them away from the conflict and divert their energies towards more productive activities. Clearly, our political or military approaches can fully succeed only if they are underpinned by a reconstruction and development plan to support them. The Somali business community and diaspora are vibrant, contributing at least $1 billion dollars to Somalia in remittances. Their involvement and support is critical as Somalia moves into a post-war economy.

    2015-02-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7375 (2015) · source

  46. In this phase, there is an extremely urgent need for the accelerated development of the Somali security forces to continue enabling stabilization efforts and to avoid reversals of the gains that have been made to date. The integration of militia and the standing up of the Somali National Army requires the concerted efforts of all partners rallying behind a Somali-led process. Let me seize this opportunity to thank the Security Council for the unprecedented support provided to the Somali National Army. The provision of non-lethal support, as authorized by the Security Council, has contributed significantly to enhancing the operational effectiveness of the Somali National Army. In the eyes of ordinary Somalis, liberation from Al-Shabaab will only translate into peace if and when they begin to see its dividends.

    2015-02-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7375 (2015) · source

  47. We have also realized that we need to reconfigure the Mission and resource it appropriately to be able to achieve these priorities. Using our experience so far in the recovered areas, we have been able to define the critically required resources, including engineering, medical and civilian-military cooperation capabilities. With these capabilities, our military units will carry out basic social service support to local government authorities that will both facilitate the restoration of governance and also win the population. I believe also that our policing efforts have to now involve more community policing. This is critical as we seek to support the Government in realizing the Vision 2016 agenda and the peacebuilding and State-building goals outlined in the New Deal Compact.

    2015-02-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7375 (2015) · source

  48. At the end of the retreat, we prioritized the following actions in addition to continued efforts to degrade the capabilities ofAl-Shabaab: first, the urgent need to support the rebuilding of the Somali National Army through the organization and integration of local forces while taking into account their sustainability; secondly, the need to enhance support for effective defence and security services in Somalia and to focus on community-centred approaches to safety and security, including community policing; thirdly, the need to focus on ensuring sustained access to the recovered areas by securing the main supply routes as a key priority; and, fourthly, the need to ensure that all our operations are fully compliant with applicable and relevant international human rights and humanitarian law standards, in line with the Secretary-General's human rights due diligence policy.

    2015-02-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7375 (2015) · source

  49. Yes, we have achieved a lot, but we can do better and achieve even more. It is in that regard that, early this year, AMISOM and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia held a retreat in Kampala with the Federal Government of Somalia and our partners to reconsider how we are doing business.

    2015-02-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7375 (2015) · source

  50. The need, therefore, to support the Somali political and traditional leadership at both the federal and regional levels as the political process enters an even more sensitive stage, which includes the constitution-making process and the elections, cannot be overemphasized. While we anticipate that the conventional phase of military operations against Al-Shabaab will be largely completed by the end of this year, we cannot claim that Al-Shabaab will thus have been defeated. As predicted, Al-Shabaab has and will continue to resort to asymmetric attacks. They will continue to seek to disrupt our main supply routes and step up attacks in the subregion. The Al-Shabaab of today is not the Al-Shabaab of yesterday. We must therefore respond to this new reality accordingly. We simply cannot continue to do business as usual.

    2015-02-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7375 (2015) · source