YouSaid · the spoken record

Van Walsum

lines on the record: 588
first: 1999-01-21
most recent: 2000-12-12
sittings or episodes: 88
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“On the basis of that briefing the Council could then decide on the strength of the military component required to enable UNTAET to carry out that part of its mandate which concerns the provision of security throughout the territory of East Timor. This is an important matter for my delegation. In October, when we discussed the wording of resolution 1272 (1999), the Netherlands strongly defended the figure of up to 8,950 troops, as had been recommended by the Secretary-General. On 27 April, in the Security Council, Mr. Annabi informed us that UNTAET was then reviewing the possibility of reducing the strength of its military component, and promised us that the result of that review would be brought to the attention of the Security Council.”
2000-05-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4147 (2000) · source
“On the positive side, it is encouraging to hear that cooperation between the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) and the TNI along the border is developing satisfactorily. However, the Council should be cautious in drawing from this the conclusion that as a result the military component of UNTAET may now be downsized. The Netherlands is of the opinion that, as part of the process leading to a possible decision to that effect, the Council should receive a separate briefing on the military and security situation in East Timor, including the state of the militias in West Timor.”
2000-05-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4147 (2000) · source
“In reminding Indonesia of its responsibilities in West Timor, we are not interfering in its domestic affairs. Let me repeat the gist of paragraph 12 of resolution 1272 (1999), which was adopted exactly seven months ago today. On that occasion, the Security Council stressed that it was the responsibility of the Indonesian authorities to take immediate and effective measures to ensure the safe return of refugees in West Timor and other parts of Indonesia to East Timor, the security of refugees, and the civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps and settlements, in particular by curbing the violent and intimidatory activities of the militias there. All of that continues to be valid today, with the exception of the word "immediate", which obviously has lost its meaning in a resolution that is seven months old.”
2000-05-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4147 (2000) · source
“It is of deep concern to the Netherlands that, according to our information, militia activity and intimidation continue unabated, in particular in Kupang, where the presence of East Timorese and Indonesian military and militia leaders brought back from East Timor is considerable. Apparently, personnel of the Indonesian armed forces (TNI) are still not reintegrated into the normal military command and control structures, but remain stuck in the refugee camps. We are convinced that the central authorities in Jakarta are trying to rein in the militias, and we appreciate the difficulties they may have in seeing their instructions fully implemented on the ground. Nevertheless, the Government of Indonesia has to step up its efforts in this regard.”
2000-05-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4147 (2000) · source
“Is the registration merely a matter of counting the people, or will the refugees be asked where in East Timor they are from, whether they wish to return and, if so, why they have not yet done so? The last question is of obvious relevance. My next question here is when the registration process will be completed, and when its results will be available. Many of the remaining refugees were presumably pro-Indonesian. Could the Secretariat elaborate on the efforts made to convince these people that it is safe for them to return, and tell us to what extent these efforts have the desired effect? Of course, this leads to the preliminary question of what is being done in East Timor to ensure that it is indeed safe for these people to return?”
2000-05-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4147 (2000) · source
“We, too, would like to thank Assistant Secretary-General Annabi for a very useful and informative briefing. Before commenting on some of the information we received from him today, I would like once again to express my delegation's appreciation for all the work that is being done by the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) under very difficult circumstances. Let me begin by focusing on West Timor. My delegation is concerned that many thousands of refugees still remain there. I have a few specific questions and would be grateful if Mr. Annabi could give me equally specific replies, although I understand that may not always be the case. My first question concerns the process of the registration of refugees in the camps of West Timor. We would like to know exactly how this is carried out.”
2000-05-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4147 (2000) · source
“Inviolate borders imply inviolate citizenship for all ethnic groups living within these borders. This is just one instance of the many measures that can be taken to improve Lusaka's chances. The mission's report states that the Secretary-General's decision on deployment will be complex. We believe it can be made less complex by all of us.”
2000-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4143 (2000) · source
“In this connection, my delegation would like to suggest that the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo have a fresh look at the nationality question. We understand that in 1981 the Zairean parliament repealed the 1972 nationality law, thus stripping the Banya Rwanda and the Banya Mulenge of their Zairean citizenship. To be sure, the Banya Mulenge were of Rwandan descent, but their forebears had migrated to South Kivu between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. This is, of course, a matter of domestic jurisdiction, and we are not suggesting that the Security Council should get involved in it. But we do want to point out that stripping ethnic groups of their nationality on account of their kinship with an ethnic group in a neighbouring country cannot be reconciled with the African doctrine of inviolate borders.”
2000-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4143 (2000) · source
“Without such a solution, we cannot simply move the demarcation line to the eastern border and call it MONUC III, and with it, such an operation will not be necessary. This is why the Lusaka signatories must find a common solution to the problem of the armed groups. If we focus too much on military solutions, however, we tend to overlook another condition for preserving the Congo's territorial integrity, and that is the successful implementation of the inter-Congolese dialogue. We fervently hope that no one in Kinshasa may be tempted to believe that the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement is an a la carte menu that can also be sampled without the dialogue. If we want to preserve the territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, we need all the help from Kinshasa that we can get.”
2000-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4143 (2000) · source
“With MONUC II we will not be able to put an end to all the bloodshed, but our focus should be on the preservation of the Congo's territorial integrity. One of the first decisions of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was not to tamper with the existing borders. This decision bespoke great wisdom at the time, for what would have been more natural for the newly independent African States than to want to revise their borders, which had been arbitrarily drawn by their former colonial masters. This is not just a matter for Africa; the entire international community has a duty to honour this African wisdom. This is why disengagement is not enough but must be followed by withdrawal. It was made very clear to our mission that a solution to the problem of the armed groups is a prerequisite condition for this withdrawal.”
2000-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4143 (2000) · source
“The most important conclusion drawn by our mission is that all the forces want to disengage, and each of the five Presidents consulted by us was unequivocal in his appeal for a rapid deployment of MONUC II. The argument that the Democratic Republic of the Congo is too big and MONUC II too small has clearly become less persuasive since the coming into force on 14 April of the ceasefire cum disengagement plan, which generally seems to be holding. A strip of land even as narrow as 30 kilometres, running right through the country, would be manageable from a military observer mission's point of view. Such a demarcation zone, however, should also serve as a warning to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and to the international community that disengagement cannot be the end of our involvement.”
2000-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4143 (2000) · source
“That country is one of the largest and potentially one of the wealthiest countries in Africa and lies in the very centre of the continent. The presence within its borders of the armies, invited or uninvited, of five other African countries evidently affects its national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Obviously, in such a huge country the deployment of 500 observers protected by 5,000 troops would indeed be a hare- brained operation if we were dealing with a fierce and bitter war between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its Southern African Development Community (SADC) allies on the one hand, and Rwanda and Uganda on the other, and if the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo II (MONUC II) was devised as an inter-position force. But that is not the case.”
2000-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4143 (2000) · source
“At a time when United Nations peacekeepers are taken hostage by rebels at one end of Africa, and a Security Council mission fails to prevent the outbreak of a full-scale war at the other end, the idea of deploying another peace operation in the heart of that troubled continent can easily be depicted as a hare- brained plan. The arguments against such an operation are valid and should be taken seriously. It is, in fact, somewhat disconcerting that so few of them have been heard in this morning's debate. But, in the end, my delegation believes that all these arguments are overruled by the more compelling argument that the United Nations cannot afford simply to leave the Democratic Republic of the Congo to its fate.”
2000-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4143 (2000) · source
“My delegation, too, is grateful to Ambassador Holbrooke for his presentation of the mission's report, and I personally share his enthusiasm about the effective functioning of the mission. It has pointed out by other speakers that his style of leadership was largely responsible for that. I heard Ambassador Holbrooke describe the mission as "three members from Africa, three from the European Union and one from the United States". There are, of course, other ways of looking at this; last Friday, I described the mission as "three from Africa, three from the P-5 and one from the Netherlands". It is easy to find arguments for not going into the Congo.”
2000-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4143 (2000) · source
“The Security Council cannot deviate from what it has repeatedly and solemnly stated with regard to the need "to bring to justice, in an appropriate manner, individuals who incite or cause violence against civilians in situations of armed conflict or who otherwise violate international humanitarian and human rights law." (S/PRST/1999/6) We continue to hold the view that without full accountability for the atrocities committed in Sierra Leone, no lasting peace can be established in that country.”
2000-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4139 (2000) · source
“The Netherlands delegation expressed its dismay at these provisions at the time because we felt they conveyed a dangerous message, namely, that committing unspeakable atrocities pays. We proposed to include a reference to our concerns in resolutions 1260 (1999) and 1270 (1999) but we were prevailed upon not to insist because any talk of accountability was likely to prolong the war. Today, we can only wonder to what extent the international community's failure to insist on the Revolutionary United Front's accountability may have contributed to Mr. Sankoh's current foolhardiness. In any case, it must be clear that someone who flouts the Lome Agreement cannot invoke that same Agreement as a basis for his impunity. The Lorne Agreement binds only the countries that are parties to it.”
2000-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4139 (2000) · source
“We are here to listen to the Secretary-General and to other delegations, especially those that represent African organizations such as the Organization of African Unity or the Economic Community of West African States, so I shall be very brief. The Secretary-General stated very clearly that Mr. Sankoh must be held accountable and we have heard this echoed by all other speakers. Last year, the signing of the Lorne Agreement was welcomed with a sense of relief. At last there seemed to be hope for peace in Sierra Leone. But parts of the Lome Peace Agreement clearly did not bode well for future peace. Important Government posts were set aside for perpetrators of monstrous crimes, and a blanket amnesty was decreed for them with, almost unbelievably, a special amnesty provision for Mr. Sankoh.”
2000-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4139 (2000) · source
“It is disconcerting that more than half a year after the decision of the Indonesian People's Consultative Assembly, which the Security Council welcomed on 25 October 1999, the situation of the refugees in West Timor continues to be a source of concern. Let me conclude by quoting the final paragraph of the article I have already quoted three or four times: "After the horrors of the past, East Timor has a just claim to an international commitment to concrete assistance, rapid response and respect for the aspirations to self-determination."”
2000-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4133 (2000) · source
“The international community cannot remain silent on the issue of the many thousands of refugees who still remain in West Timor. We have a whole series of questions on this issue, such as how many of those refugees have expressed the wish to return to East T imor? What are the prospects for their return? Are the international aid organizations in a position to deliver effective support to the camp dwellers? Are the Indonesian authorities sufficiently cooperative, including in restraining the remaining militias? Our information indicates that the militias still enjoy relatively unrestrained freedom of action.”
2000-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4133 (2000) · source
“According to the article I mentioned, the search for qualified personnel is under way and training is being provided. I would be grateful for more specific information in that regard. The United Nations is currently concentrating on domestic civilian reconstruction, and rightly so. Nevertheless, we should realize that external peace and security are also essential. Several aspects are relevant in this respect. First, good bilateral relations with Indonesia - they depend on both sides, and the first steps have given rise to optimism. Secondly, integration in the wider region would also seem a prerequisite - including, possibly, membership in the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), if ASEAN members should so decide.”
2000-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4133 (2000) · source
“In any case, the objective must be that the East Timorese themselves acquire a greater sense of ownership with regard to the process. The article I just referred to points out that the key to success is the participation of the East Timorese people in all aspects of the efforts currently underway in East Timor. Of course the cooperation in the National Consultative Council is an important aspect of East Timorese participation, but it is not easy to assess to what extent this involvement at the top gives the broad mass of the people of East Timor a sufficient feeling of influence, codetermination and contribution. I realize that there are obstacles in the way to a greater involvement of the people, not the least of which may be the lack of suitably qualified East Timorese personnel.”
2000-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4133 (2000) · source
“Quite on the contrary, UNTAET is doing splendid work and deserves our profound admiration. We all know the circumstances of utter destruction and neglect in which the Transitional Administration had to begin its very complex task. It is also true that the absence of any kind of structure required an enormous amount of preparatory work which has remained invisible to outsiders. Nevertheless, if there is a problem of increasing disillusionment or demoralization among the population of East Timor, then it is, by definition, our business. It is an issue with which UN TAET and the international community as a whole will have to deal. Perhaps there may be a need for more visible projects and a stepped-up information campaign.”
2000-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4133 (2000) · source
“International support may be a necessary precondition for success. It alone is not sufficient. It is also crucial that the East Timorese population supports the process of reconstruction and that it continues to believe in it. Therefore, it would seem necessary that the East Timorese understand what the obstacles are in the process and the limitations to what the United Nations and other organizations can do within a given period of time. Several speakers have made mention of the recent media reports which indicate that a certain disillusionment with the United Nations efforts is taking root in East Timor because the people do not see concrete results in their everyday lives. When I suggest that we should take these reports seriously, I am not at all suggesting that UNTAET is not doing its job.”
2000-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4133 (2000) · source
“Precisely because this Council acted so expeditiously during the crisis of September 1999, the world is now watching to see whether the United Nations can do the job of getting East T imor started on its way to independence. East Timor demands our constant attention, but it also requires financial support. The International Herald Tribune of 26 April 2000 carried a collective contribution by Xanana Gusmao, Sven Sandstrom, Shigemitsu Sugisaki and Sergio Vieira de Mello, and in this article the need for donor support is also emphasized. In this connection, it is my pleasure to state that in addition to the $19 million we have made available in response to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) appeal, the Netherlands will shortly deposit about $2.2 million in the UNTAET Trust Fund.”
2000-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4133 (2000) · source
“We too are grateful to Assistant Secretary-General Annabi for his comprehensive briefing, and we also wish to thank you for having called an open meeting on the issue of East T imor, an issue which, by its nature, lends itself well to discussion before the full membership of the United Nations. Apart from thus underpinning the trend towards greater transparency of the Council proceedings when transparency is useful, which is so dear to the Canadian presidency's heart, it also makes it clear to everyone that the United Nations and its Security Council are committed to making a success of their involvement with East Timor. We are conscious of the fact that we are not just dealing with the future of the people of East Timor but that also the reputation of the Security Council of the United Nations itself is at stake.”
2000-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4133 (2000) · source
“Such a situation could once more lead to a humanitarian tragedy. We would not like to give the impression that we have already found a way of making sure that something of the sort will never happen again. The Rwanda report is at its most poignant where it describes the false expectations aroused by the United Nations presence, for instance among the people who had sought refuge at the Ecole Technique OfficieIle. The essence of the Srebrenica tragedy is of a similar nature. This may well be the most important problem to be studied by the Brahimi panel, for as long as it is not solved it jeopardizes the whole concept of peace operations. Hence, it must be solved. The inarticulate urge to do something is a notoriously bad motivating force, but the solution cannot be that we do not do what needs to be done.”
2000-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4127 (2000) · source
“We support the proposals for enhancing early warning and early response capacity. It is at least equally important, however, that we be aware that with all the training of staff at Headquarters, in agencies and in programmes, and, not least, of personnel in field missions, we cannot rule out that people may once again expect a degree of protection from a United Nations peace operation that the latter cannot deliver. We should not forget that this is what Srebrenica and Rwanda had in common. No matter how much we may increase the robustness of our mandates or how widely we may broadcast their strict limitations, we can never be sure that frightened civilians will not force their way into the compound of a United Nations peace operation and then expect protection beyond that operation's legal mandate or physical capacity.”
2000-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4127 (2000) · source
“We have noted with deep respect the statement made by the Belgian Prime Minister on the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the beginning of the Rwanda genocide. Belgium, of course, is not alone in having failed. The whole international community should acknowledge its share of the responsibility. But the best way of doing so today is to show understanding for Rwanda's legitimate security concerns. Similarly, my delegation fully subscribes to the recommendation that the international community should support efforts to rebuild Rwandan society after the genocide, paying particular attention to the need for reconstruction, reconciliation and respect for human rights. We also agree that everything must be done to prevent future catastrophes of the type that took place in Srebrenica and in Rwanda.”
2000-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4127 (2000) · source
“Equally, in the context of lessons learned, we would like to point out that the report briefly touches on the origin of the problem in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which rightly finds itself at the very top of the Council's agenda. The outflow from the humanitarian protection zone under Operation Turquoise is described as the starting point of one of the most complicated and sensitive humanitarian emergencies of recent years: the huge exodus of Rwandan refugees into Zaire, whose camps were to become infiltrated by the Interahamwe and other forces behind the genocide. In this connection, we would like to comment briefly on some of the recommendations contained in the report. We agree that the United Nations should acknowledge its part of the responsibility for not having done enough to prevent or stop the genocide in Rwanda.”
2000-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4127 (2000) · source
“We believe that the unwillingness to condemn the Interim Government of Rwanda for the genocide it was directing was due not only to its Council membership. As for the role of the individual members of the Interim Government, the report raises the question of whether their accountability was made sufficiently clear to them at the time. This question is of immediate "lessons-learned" relevance for the situation in Sierra Leone. Can we trust all the actors in that country to be fully aware that the amnesty provisions of the Lome Accord do not apply to human rights abuses committed after the signing of that instrument and are not binding on non-parties, anyway?”
2000-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4127 (2000) · source
“We have already referred to the complicating factor that, during the genocide, Rwanda was a member of the Security Council. The report recommends that further study be given to the possibility of suspending the participation of the representative of a State member of the Security Council in similar circumstances. We would not object to such a study, but we believe that it would be difficult to define the nature and scale of the occurrence that might justify such a suspension. Moreover, quite apart from the issue of Council membership, we are concerned about the general reluctance to acknowledge that, in the event of massive human rights abuses taking place in a given country - especially if they have given rise to armed rebellion - the Government of that country may be in the wrong.”
2000-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4127 (2000) · source
“It is understandable, but unfortunate, that a troop- contributing country which suffers heavy casualties will inevitably find itself under pressure from its parliament and its media to withdraw its contingent. The more this reflex can be counted on, the greater the likelihood that precisely such a contingent will be targeted by parties opposed to the peace operation. We have no solution for this problem, but it raises a discomforting question as to the suitability of democratic countries for peace operations. We recall how, in the case of Sierra Leone, Nigeria suddenly found it more difficult to play its leading role in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) after it had restored democratic rule.”
2000-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4127 (2000) · source
“Thirdly, we should pay more attention to non-governmental organizations and, perhaps, somewhat less to countries with experience in the region. Most non-governmental organizations have a wealth of up- to-date information from the ground. On that basis, they tend to have a fresh approach and an open mind and are unlikely to mistake killers for victims. Fourthly, even- handedness is not a virtue when genocide is going on. It is pointed out in the report that the credibility of the United Nations requires that troop contributors refrain from withdrawing unilaterally from a peace operation if that withdrawal may be expected to jeopardize the operation in question.”
2000-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4127 (2000) · source
“On 28 April, Ambassador Gambari of Nigeria complained that too much attention was being paid to the ceasefire negotiations and too little to the massacres. Two days later, on 30 April, the Council issued a presidential statement which admitted for the first time that killings of civilians had taken place especially in areas under the control of members or supporters of the Interim Government of Rwanda. Even in that statement, however, the word "genocide" did not appear. We see a number of lessons to be learned from this part of the report. First, we should not treat a peace process as something of a higher order than the populations of the countries concerned. Secondly, we should not clutch at a peace process that has ceased to be relevant. A peace process may be dead, in which case it is the conflict that demands our attention.”
2000-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4127 (2000) · source
“On 15 April 1994, after the Interim Government had taken office and already fled from Kigali, the President of the Security Council made a statement to the press which made no mention of the ongoing massacres but reaffirmed that the Arusha Peace Agreement was the only viable framework for the resolution of the Rwanda conflict. The Council therefore demanded that the parties agree to an immediate ceasefire and return to the negotiating table. This statement was made at a time when, according to an estimate of Human Rights Watch, killers carried out the most devastating massacres of the genocide, in some cases slaying hundreds or even thousands of people in one or two days. Obviously, this unworldliness of the Council could not last.”
2000-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4127 (2000) · source
“Ndiaye reported so many massacres of Tutsis that he asked himself whether the term "genocide" might be applicable. It is clear why a report of that nature was not immediately welcomed by an international community which had just placed its trust in the Arusha Peace Agreement. What is disconcerting, however, is that for so long afterwards - even after the genocide had begun - many protagonists continued to focus on the risk of jeopardizing the Arusha Peace Agreement, as though that accord were of a higher value than the thousands of people who were meanwhile being killed.”
2000-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4127 (2000) · source
“The initial indignation caused by that event had soon died down because killings in Rwanda were seen as an age-old phenomenon, best viewed with a degree of even-handedness and not too much emotion. Tutsis were at risk in Government-controlled areas, and Hutu lives were in peril where the Rwandese Patriotic Front was in control. On 4 August 1993, the Arusha Peace Agreement was welcomed with a sense of relief because it gave the international community a peace process to support, as the perfect expression of its even- handedness. This may explain why, one week later, hardly anyone paid any attention to the report of Mr. Waly Bacre Ndiaye, the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions. Mr.”
2000-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4127 (2000) · source
“Once the window of opportunity has passed, the need to intervene will usually increase in inverse proportion to a dwindling political will to do so. It is not our intention to apportion blame, for almost all of us live in a glass house as far as action or inaction in the field of peacekeeping is concerned. Besides, as for timing, Dallaire's 11 January cable was by no means the first warning signal. How had the international community reacted to the events of 9 March 1992, when a systematic slaughter of the T utsis in Nyarnata was aborted thanks to the Italian lay sister Tonia Locatelli, who succeeded in alerting the international media by radio but was then brutally murdered herself?”
2000-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4127 (2000) · source
“In a case of such urgency, simply replying that the proposed action would clearly go beyond the mandate entrusted to the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) under resolution 872 (1993) does not, in our view, constitute proper handling. It is true that Rwanda's membership of the Security Council complicated matters, but we feel that the other 14 Council members should have been informed without delay. Of course, the need to protect the informant required a high degree of confidentiality, but if that was the Secretariat's primary concern it might have been safer to inform 14 Permanent Representatives than President Habyarimana. The point we wish to make is that feasibility depends on timing. Action which is feasible one day may not be feasible a month later.”
2000-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4127 (2000) · source
“Accordingly, instead of criticizing anyone, we would like to begin by commending Ghana and Tunisia, which allowed their troops to remain in Rwanda throughout the terrible weeks of the genocide, despite the withdrawal of other contingents. Next, we would like to make some observations on the issue of feasibility. The report poses what it terms the "natural question": why a force numbering 2,500 could not stop the actions of the militia and Rwandese Government Forces soldiers that began setting up roadblocks and killing politicians and Tutsi in the early hours after the plane crash which killed the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi. The question becomes even more pertinent if we ask ourselves what could have been done if the 11 January cable of Brigadier General Dallaire had been handled properly.”
2000-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4127 (2000) · source
“We hope that all the questions that remain unanswered today will be addressed by the panel chaired by Mr. Brahimi, which has been asked to conduct to a major study on United Nations peace operations. As we are reminded in the Rwanda report, there is also a Srebrenica report, and both are relevant to the present analysis. For obvious reasons, my delegation is acutely aware of this. But in the report before us, we are also reminded of the responsibility of the great majority of United Nations Member States, which were not prepared to send any troops or materiel at all to Rwanda. A similar observation could, of course, be made about Srebrenica.”
2000-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4127 (2000) · source
“First, allow me to express my delegation's appreciation both to the members of the Independent Inquiry - Mr. Carlsson, Mr. Han Sung- Joo and General Kupolati - for what is commonly called the Carlsson report, and to the Secretary-General for having taken the initiative to set up this Inquiry. The objective of our contribution to this debate is to share with the Council a number of thoughts that have crossed our mind while reading the Carlsson report. Some of these thoughts may be relevant to what we are doing in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We do not expect to come up with answers during this meeting. An open Council meeting may be the appropriate forum for articulating questions; finding answers will require more time for careful study.”
2000-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4127 (2000) · source
“Again, this results in a weakening of the prospects for social and economic development. In other words, Afghanistan is experiencing a humanitarian emergency, and once more women and children are the most vulnerable group. Over the years, the Netherlands has generously contributed to humanitarian assistance to the country on the understanding that it should be equally accessible to men and women and special attention should be paid to the position of women and girls. But international assistance cannot undo the damage caused by the marginalization of half the population. We therefore appeal to the Taliban to bring their rules on access to employment, education and health care services more into line with those of the international community, including the rest of the Islamic world.”
2000-04-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4124 (2000) · source
“In a country where on average 10 people are killed or injured by exploding landmines every day, it is, of course, criminal to exclude women from mine-awareness training. Although we recognize recent signs of modest relaxation of Taliban rules on access of women and girls to certain services, and while we also note that there are regional differences in the interpretation and observance of these rules, the exclusion of girls from education remains of grave concern to my delegation. It should be kept in mind that it is not just the education of girls that is affected by these restrictions, for a very large part of the teaching corps in Afghanistan used to consist of women. Due to employment restrictions on women, education for boys is stagnating as well.”
2000-04-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4124 (2000) · source
“The restrictions most acutely affect educated women in the cities, but their impact is also felt by poor, uneducated women, their children and other family members. Eventually this cannot fail to have a negative influence on the prospects for development in Afghanistan. There are even more alarming consequences of publicly accepted discrimination against women. My delegation strongly condemns the way in which over the years many Afghan women and girls have become victims of gender-specific human rights violations, such as rape, assault, forced marriage and prostitution. Violence against women and girls sometimes seems to be used as an instrument of intimidation and humiliation of entire population groups. The exclusion of women from services is not an innocent, culturally determined idiosyncrasy.”
2000-04-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4124 (2000) · source
“The offensive of the Taliban on 1 March this year has led to another stream of displaced persons, and once again women and children were the primary victims. The civilian population is becoming ever more destitute and desperate, and the future of Afghanistan as a country looks bleaker by the day. For many people in Afghanistan international humanitarian assistance is a lifeline. We are therefore deeply concerned about the forced entries by Taliban armed groups into the United Nations premises in Kandahar, which compelled the United Nations to withdraw its international staff from that city and resulted in the suspension of humanitarian assistance in southern Afghanistan. The rigid social code imposed by the Taliban results in many restrictions for women and girls, for example with regard to employment, education and health care services.”
2000-04-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4124 (2000) · source
“Trying to settle the dispute by military means prolongs the conflict, carries the risk of further regionalization and increases the suffering of the Afghan people, and it will not contribute to a process of reconciliation in the future. No one can win this war, but all can destroy the country. The warring parties are responsible for finding a political solution that will end the suffering of the Afghan people. We appeal to them to stop the fighting and return to the negotiating table. It is of the utmost importance that the neighbouring countries strictly adhere to the Tashkent Declaration, in particular to the commitment not to provide military support to any Afghan party and to prevent the use of their territories for such purposes. The humanitarian situation in Afghanistan remains alarming.”
2000-04-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4124 (2000) · source
“I join you, Mr. President, and other speakers in expressing our condolences to the delegation of Tunisia on the passing away of former President Bourguiba. I also join other speakers in expressing our delight at seeing you, Sir, back in the chair. I thank Mr. Renninger for his briefing on the situation in Afghanistan and Ambassador Listre for his information on the activities of the sanctions Committee. I further welcome Ms. Angela King, whose expertise in gender issues is clearly indispensable when we are dealing with a country like Afghanistan. My delegation condemns the latest offensives, and we are gravely concerned at the military build-up and the preparations for further large-scale offensives by the parties. It remains our conviction that there is no military solution to the conflict in Afghanistan.”
2000-04-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4124 (2000) · source
“I would like to add a word, if I may, on Iraq's obligations regarding the repatriation of all Kuwaiti nationals, or their remains. I did not mention this issue in my intervention this morning because it was not referred to in the report of the Secretary-General. But, as other delegations have made reference to the issue, I would like to join them in welcoming the appointment of Ambassador Yuli Vorontsov as high-level coordinator. The Council should not discuss humanitarian matters concerning Iraq without reminding the Government of Iraq of its commitment to facilitate the repatriation of all Kuwaiti and third country nationals, as reiterated in operative paragraph 13 of resolution 1284 (1999).”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120Resumption1 (2000) · source
“In this manner, it is likely to achieve the suspension of the sanctions before the end of this year. My delegation urges the Government of Iraq to opt for that course of action, not least for the sake of the Iraqi people.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source