YouSaid · the spoken record

Van Walsum

lines on the record: 588
first: 1999-01-21
most recent: 2000-12-12
sittings or episodes: 88
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“My delegation would appreciate receiving more detailed information on this matter. We cannot simply conclude that the matter is complex because we are dealing with such a mixed bag of motives. Some of these reasons fall under the heading of logistics, but intentional disinformation comes close to intimidation, and intimidation comes close to force. To that extent, we are dealing with an unresolved political problem. Precisely because the Indonesian Government has adopted such a positive attitude in so many respects, we feel the Council should remind it today that under resolution 1272 (1999) it continues to be responsible for the safe return of refugees.”
1999-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4085 (1999) · source
“Finally, while we speak in positive terms about developments in East Timor, there are still tens of thousands of refugees stuck in camps in West Timor and elsewhere in Indonesia. Mr. Annabi mentioned that close to 120,000 refugees had returned. INTERFET, FRETILIN and the Indonesian armed forces (TNI) have agreed on arrangements for the safety of border crossings. Can we conclude that the message that it is safe to return to East Timor has come through to the refugees and that the efforts to intimidate them into staying are now subsiding? Mr. Annabi mentioned the following reasons why refugees might not return: misinformation, a lack of infrastructure in areas to which refugees wish to return, and the absence of a wish to return in the immediate future for a variety of reasons.”
1999-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4085 (1999) · source
“We have received the report on the joint mission to East Timor undertaken by the three Special Rapporteurs of the Commission on Human Rights, and we hope that the report of the United Nations Commission of Inquiry will also be presented as soon as possible. These reports can constitute important steps in the process of East Timorese reconciliation. From the perspective of my own country, I must mention one particular instance of human rights violations, namely the murder in East Timor in September of the Dutch journalist Sander Thoenes. We understand that INTERFET has concluded its investigation into the matter and now expect its report to be made available to the Secretary-General without delay.”
1999-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4085 (1999) · source
“The Netherlands, as well as other Council members, has made the same point on previous occasions, and we are therefore pleased to see that agreement has been reached on the establishment of a National Consultative Commission. The Secretary-General states in his report that, through this consultative mechanism, UNTAET will ensure that the needs and wishes of the East Timorese people are fully represented in the implementation of the transitional administration. There is another issue to which the Secretary- General's report rightfully draws our attention: that those responsible for grave violations of human rights must be held accountable for their actions. Both international and Indonesian investigative activities are taking place. We would like to hear the Secretariat's views on the interrelationship between these activities.”
1999-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4085 (1999) · source
“We have to make sure that East Timor does not become permanently dependent on outside aid instead of independent. Furthermore, as with every complex operation involving several aid organizations, there is also the risk of a lack of synergy of aid efforts. We would be interested in hearing the views of the Secretariat on these considerations, including its thoughts concerning division of labour and of competences among the organizations involved. We welcome the emphasis in the Secretary-General's report to the General Assembly on the need for the international community to work in close consultation and liaison with the East Timorese themselves.”
1999-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4085 (1999) · source
“An initial contribution has already been made to the trust fund for the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor. During the new fiscal year, a further $2.3 million will be made available to that fund. Money left over from our contribution of $220,000 to the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) trust fund can also be used for similar purposes under the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). Finally, $1.8 million has been donated to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The diversity and intensity of international aid is, of course, very satisfying. However, in a sense, there can also be too much aid. The local absorption capacity of East Timor has to be taken into account.”
1999-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4085 (1999) · source
“Of course, despite the improvements of the past few months, it should be realized that the people of East Timor are only at the beginning of a long process of rehabilitating their economy and society and building the institutions of a modern democratic State in which the rule of law prevails. As members of the Security Council have repeatedly stressed, the international community has a duty to help the East Timorese on this difficult road. The Netherlands notes with satisfaction that, through a variety of channels, both multilateral and bilateral, aid is being offered. Mr. Annabi reminded us that, at the donor conference in Tokyo last week, $522 million was pledged. The Government of the Netherlands will donate approximately $7.3 million to the United Nations consolidated inter-agency appeal for East Timor.”
1999-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4085 (1999) · source
“The Netherlands wishes to pay tribute to the countries participating in the multinational Force - the International Force, East Timor (INTERFET) - which has been essential in establishing a safe and secure environment, without which the current process of reconstruction could not have begun. I would like to mention in particular the lead nation, Australia, and the participation of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries. They have demonstrated their will to take on responsibilities for security in their region. This, of course, is the region to which East Timor belongs. The Netherlands is encouraged by the positive developments in the relationship between East Timor and Indonesia. We understand that President Wahid intends to visit East Timor on 17 January, and we consider this step of great importance.”
1999-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4085 (1999) · source
“We thank you, Mr. President, for calling this open meeting and Mr. Annabi for his briefing. Circumstances have changed considerably and very much for the better since the last time the Council had an open debate on the subject of East Timor, which was on 11 September 1999. The new situation is also reflected in the fact that the General Assembly has decided to drop the item on the question of Timor from its agenda and include a new item on the agenda of the fifty-fifth session, entitled "The situation in East Timor during its transition to independence".”
1999-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4085 (1999) · source
“Section C of this resolution forms a significant further step in shielding the people of Iraq as much as possible from the consequences of the defiant behaviour of their Government. A number of steps provided for in section C will have to be taken by the sanctions Committee. I trust that all delegations on that Committee, including those which today have abstained on the present resolution, will join me in tackling these matters as vigorously as possible.”
1999-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4084 (1999) · source
“Thus, it will be up to the Government of Iraq itself to trigger the suspension of the sanctions. As I mentioned earlier, it is not realistic to expect an early positive signal from Baghdad. It is precisely for that reason that I, in my dual capacity as representative of the Netherlands and Chairman of the sanctions Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 661 (1990), am relieved that the present resolution provides for a considerable enhancement of the humanitarian programme, which will be implemented irrespective of whether or not the Iraqi regime chooses to cooperate with the Security Council. Since 1991, the Council has made it clear that sanctions were imposed only to contain and coerce the Government of Iraq, and it has taken steps to minimize the adverse effects which they had on the people of Iraq.”
1999-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4084 (1999) · source
“The present resolution adds significantly to that by offering Iraq a possible suspension of sanctions well before full compliance. This is a completely new element in the Council's approach to the question of Iraq, and an important political step. For this suspension to materialize, Iraq must have cooperated with UNMOVIC and IAEA in all respects for a period of 120 days, in particular in fulfilling, in all the aspects referred to in this resolution, the work programmes to be drawn up by UNMOVIC and IAEA and to be approved by the Council. Let me be clear about our understanding of the word "cooperation": it involves much more than just a constructive attitude on the part of Iraq. To cooperate is to act together. It is not so much a question of attitude as of performance.”
1999-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4084 (1999) · source
“Before the new system can start to become operational, the Council will be asked to approve various steps. That will be the opportunity for making sure that the OMV-plus regime established by this resolution will be effective. The Netherlands also calls on the newly elected Council members to be vigilant on that score. In this Council, a great deal has been said about the need for Iraq to see light at the end of the tunnel. The thoughtless use of this phrase almost made it sound as if the Council had locked Iraq up in a dark cave with no exit. However, the existing resolutions, in particular resolution 687 (1991), already clearly illuminate the exit: sanctions will be lifted once Iraq has complied fully with the obligations imposed by the Security Council.”
1999-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4084 (1999) · source
“However, the concessions referred to earlier will make it considerably more difficult - although, we believe, not impossible - to achieve the Council's objectives. The text contains ambiguities which must not be allowed to undermine the effectiveness of the OMV-plus regime. It asks considerably less in the way of Iraqi performance before a possible suspension of sanctions than we would have considered desirable. The complex organizational system envisaged can all too easily lead to misguided micromanagement and operational paralysis of the new arms control body, the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). We can accept the result, but this is not a text that the Netherlands would have sponsored in April.”
1999-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4084 (1999) · source
“The previous arms control regime, which the Security Council established in 1991 and which it operated through the activities of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), was instrumental in finding and destroying Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. UNSCOM. and IAEA did an excellent job in the face of continual Iraqi obstruction and deception. We pay tribute to the commitment and perseverance of their leaders and staff members. The current resolution represents a shift in the Council's approach to Iraq, from active disarmament to ongoing monitoring and verification, while retaining the possibility of addressing unresolved disarmament issues, known as OMV-plus.”
1999-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4084 (1999) · source
“Given their well-known position, no one expects the Iraqi authorities to promise cooperation, let alone welcome the new resolution. But the new situation is a reality, and we sincerely hope that Iraq will soon begin to recognize the promising openings it is being offered by the international community. For the Netherlands, the primary objective has always been the implementation of the disarmament obligations which the Council imposed on Iraq after that country had attempted to wipe a sovereign State off the map. Iraq must never again be able to threaten its neighbours or develop or otherwise acquire weapons of mass destruction.”
1999-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4084 (1999) · source
“In the statements made by the Iraqi authorities, we have found no indication at all that they would be prepared to cooperate with the Security Council other than on the basis of an unconditional lifting of the sanctions, and no member of the Council has shown any readiness to meet that condition. That is why it does not make a great deal of difference that our resolution was not adopted by consensus. Article 27 of the United Nations Charter describes how Council decisions are made, and Article 25 stipulates that every Member of the United Nations is obliged to accept and carry out such decisions. Nothing in the Charter allots a higher degree of legitimacy to a Security Council resolution that is adopted by consensus. Accordingly, regardless of the result of the vote, the new resolution is the law of the land.”
1999-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4084 (1999) · source
“This morning several delegations also expressed regret that it was not possible to reach consensus. But we are not convinced that all delegations were really ready to vote in favour once their concerns had been met, or that they had an interest in voting for any resolution unwelcome to Baghdad. This could explain why the many amendments incorporated into the text did not lead to a change in the voting pattern that could already have been predicted months ago. Rarely have so many concessions gone so unrewarded. The current argument for holding out for a consensus is that only if all Council members vote for the resolution will Iraq be ready to cooperate and allow the inspectors back into the country. We have never found this a very convincing argument.”
1999-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4084 (1999) · source
“In that light, we have been prepared to go along with a large number of concessions in order to accommodate other views. The current resolution is, in fact, a considerable distance removed from the British-Dutch draft of April and is actually much closer to the position of those who had made counter-proposals. However, over the past few months - that is, after the permanent five had taken possession of the drafting process - it became clear that the price for enabling Russia, China and France to vote for the resolution was a higher one than my delegation was prepared to pay. In the end, we had to accept that a consensus was not possible if we wished to remain faithful to our objective of establishing a genuine and credible reinforced ongoing monitoring and verification system.”
1999-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4084 (1999) · source
“First, Mr. President, I would like to join other delegations in thanking you and your collaborators for all you have done to make the adoption of today's resolution possible. After almost a year of profound disagreements and arduous negotiations, the Council has at last been able to find sufficient common ground to begin a new phase in its policy with respect to Iraq. The Netherlands voted for the resolution that has just been adopted because it believes that a new basis for Council action regarding Iraq is needed and because the advantages of this resolution outweigh its disadvantages. Ever since the Netherlands joined the United Kingdom in submitting a first draft for this resolution, it has been our fervent desire to see it adopted with the concurring votes of all Council members.”
1999-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4084 (1999) · source
“Miyet said that the next meeting of the Joint Military Commission would take place on 20 January, it occurred to me that it might be conceivable to ask it to step up the frequency of its meetings a little.”
1999-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4083 (1999) · source
“I can subscribe to just about everything that Ambassador Holbrooke said, especially his comments that it is not a question of whether we support peacekeeping, but when and how. That is precisely the position of the Netherlands, too. Just for the record, I would like to add two observations. First, I have not yet mentioned the fact that the Netherlands, too, is greatly pleased by the fact that former President Masire has accepted the job, and has been accepted, as facilitator in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Finally, I would like to mention the fact that the Netherlands has made approximately $200,000 available to the Organization of African Unity for the Joint Military Commission. There is no conditionality involved here, but, when Mr.”
1999-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4083 (1999) · source
“In addition, however, there is a second reason why the Netherlands feels justified in being cautious, and that is its traumatic involvement in the tragedy of Srebrenica. The Secretary- General's report on Srebrenica of 15 November contains a gruesome account of what can go wrong if military involvement is initiated without having been thought through, if peacekeeping operations are used as a substitute for political consensus and peacekeepers are told that they must use their peacekeeping tools to impose the ill-defined wishes of the international community on one or another of the belligerents by military means. Let us not make that mistake twice.”
1999-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4083 (1999) · source
“The Netherlands is spending large sums of money on Kosovo, but our significant total contribution to Africa has not been affected. Moreover, there has been no slackening in our commitment to African projects that are of special concern to the Security Council, such as our contributions to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Sierra Leone and to the Arusha process in Burundi. There has not been any diversion in the flow of Dutch funds destined for Africa. We feel that a country with our record should be seriously listened to when it tries to explain why it has certain doubts about a military involvement that is urged upon the Security Council. We are not procrastinating when we ask normal questions.”
1999-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4083 (1999) · source
“Does anyone seriously believe that the Lusaka Agreement was being observed by all parties for the first three months of its existence, and only then began to unravel due to the Council's inaction? As a representative of the Netherlands, I feel entitled to ask such questions. The Netherlands is anxious to do the right thing with regard to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but it is not helpful if we are told that the situation is simple, and that considering it to be complex can only be a lame excuse for procrastination. That is not the sort of approach that helps us overcome our hesitation. Speaking for the Netherlands, I can only say that our commitment to Africa cannot be called into question. I do not want to waste the Council's time, but let me briefly repeat what I said yesterday.”
1999-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4083 (1999) · source
“If the Lusaka Agreement is a litmus test, it is, first of all, one for the people who signed it. If the parties themselves do not fulfil their engagements, there is nothing the Council can do. In that sense, there was something disconcerting about yesterday's debate. What we witnessed in this Chamber was the emergence of the myth that it was the dilly-dallying of the Security Council that killed the Lusaka Agreement. We are not there yet. There is still hope, and we can proceed on the basis of a new resolution. But the Council has been given a stern warning. If my delegation had been given the floor a second time yesterday, we would have begged the African delegations not to delude themselves.”
1999-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4083 (1999) · source
“The drafters of the Lusaka Agreement were aware of that: precisely because of the complexity of the situation, the Lusaka Agreement may well be the only viable solution. We agree with Ambassador Holbrooke that the Lusaka Agreement is a well-drafted accord, but we have also heard him say that just about every one of its provisions is being ignored or violated. This is nothing new. On the first day that the Security Council discussed the Lusaka Agreement, we were already put under pressure with the argument that the Agreement would not last if we did not dispatch our peacekeepers right away. I vividly remember that day, because I expressed my doubt about the appropriateness of the qualification, "significant milestone", for an agreement that none of the rebels had yet been prepared to sign.”
1999-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4083 (1999) · source
“The second way of looking at the Democratic Republic of the Congo is to see a simple line of cause and effect between the Rwandan genocide and the present chaos in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Those delegations in the Council that blame other delegations for dragging their feet tend to see it that way. For them, the situation is not complex, but simple; and for simple situations, they have simple remedies: all the Council has to do is to comply with the Lusaka Agreement and send in the troops. My delegation does not believe in the second approach. We are unable to regard the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as simple. It is true that many people in the eastern part of the country have no business being there, but these intruders form an inextricable mix of friends and enemies of the Government of Rwanda.”
1999-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4083 (1999) · source
“Yesterday, my delegation had hoped to put up some feeble defence against these strident words, but unfortunately there was no time for second statements. Today we are less pressed for time, so I may be allowed to use my turn in this debate to say a few words about this matter. There appear to be two very different ways of looking at the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The first is to be baffled by the complexity of the conflict. Here we have a country with - even by African standards - has an exceptionally contorted past, from being the personal possession of Leopold II through decades of mismanagement under President Mobutu. Given that history, one can hardly be surprised that the Democratic Republic of the Congo is in such disarray today.”
1999-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4083 (1999) · source
“I would like to thank Under-Secretary-General Miyet and Ambassador Holbrooke for their statements. I wish to join Ambassador Holbrooke in reserving the right to intervene again later in the debate, in conformity with the interactive format that the British presidency has so fortunately introduced. In yesterday's open debate on Africa, almost all delegations spoke about the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Some delegations, such as that of South Africa, spoke about nothing else. Clearly, the overlapping theme of these two days of public Council debate is the implementation of the Lusaka Agreement, not by its signatories, but by the Security Council. If the Security Council fails to pass this litmus test, so we were told, it will once again have revealed its double standard.”
1999-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4083 (1999) · source
“The Organization of African Unity (OAU) took a historic decision when in 1963 it decided to accept the boundaries that African States had inherited from colonial authorities. This has left Africa with secure borders, but also with ethnically heterogeneous States. It is not for a European delegation to tell the OAU what it could do, but a logical sequel to the 1963 decision might be to help devise workable African models of multi-ethnicity. Such assistance would not be interference in the domestic affairs of its members, but an essential complement to the doctrine of inviolable borders. This would seem a legitimate suggestion in light of the fact that almost all the conflicts in Africa rage within sovereign States.”
1999-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4081 (1999) · source
“Moreover, the 5 May Agreement was curiously flawed in that it left the responsibility for law and order with Indonesia, even in the case of a ballot in favour of independence. At any rate, the determining factor was that a neighbouring country was ready to lead the humanitarian intervention. These constitute exceptional circumstances that facilitated the actions concerned. In other cases there may well be circumstances that make such actions more difficult. In Africa this may be a lack of central authority or inter-ethnic strife. Ethnic rivalry is an exceptionally intractable problem. Europe has its share of experience with it, too, but over the years the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has had some successes in combating it.”
1999-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4081 (1999) · source
“It is hard to imagine that the parliaments in the 16 NATO countries would have given the green light for these air strikes if they had not witnessed eight years of "ethnic cleansing" at the hands of Milosevic, first in the Krajina and Eastern Slavonia, then in Bosnia and finally in Kosovo. It was a unique case of political will generated by accumulated revulsion. The East Timor case was not typical either. After many years of stalemate, the international community had been greatly relieved that Indonesia, Portugal and the United Nations had finally negotiated a settlement. The anticlimax was all the greater when it then turned out that elements in the Indonesian armed forces did not hesitate to violate the agreement when the East Timorese seemed to opt for independence.”
1999-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4081 (1999) · source
“This is probably known to most people in this room, but some may argue that these 13 peacekeeping operations cannot match the scale, speed and cost of the actions in Kosovo and East Timor. Actions of that magnitude are apparently only possible in Europe or in Asia. We appreciate this argument, but we must point out - and this is the second point that tends to be overlooked - that Kosovo and East Timor are far from the norm for collective action in both Europe and Asia. The air strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were launched without a specific Security Council mandate, and even the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries that participated in them express the hope that in future such actions can be avoided.”
1999-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4081 (1999) · source
“Thirdly, we feel that we cannot really be blamed for our involvement in Kosovo. The former Yugoslavia is our backyard, and our security is at stake in that part of the world. Due to globalization, however, ever more Dutchmen are beginning to see Africa as their region as well. The days when humanitarian catastrophes in Africa were faraway occurrences that did not immediately affect us are definitely over. But those who claim that the international community stands ready to intervene in Kosovo and East Timor, while it ignores the African continent, overlook two facts. The first is that the United Nations has deployed more peacekeeping operations in Africa than in any other single region. Of the 32 operations launched between 1989 and 1998, 13 were deployed in Africa.”
1999-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4081 (1999) · source
“The notorious double standard, which is supposedly practised by us, is a big problem, and I would like to make a few observations about it. First, we agree with the French delegation that political engagement is not enough; funding remains a crucial factor. The Netherlands puts its money where its mouth is. We are spending a lot of money on Kosovo, but our total contribution to Africa has not been affected. What is going to Kosovo is new money. There has not been any diversion in the flow of Dutch funds destined for Africa. Secondly, there is no slackening in our involvement in African projects that are of special interest to the Security Council, such as our contributions to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Sierra Leone and to the Arusha process in Burundi.”
1999-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4081 (1999) · source
“Apparently we did not get it wrong when we set this trend in September. As a matter of fact, future presidencies will have some explaining to do when they do not devote an open meeting to Africa. Some African delegations will welcome this development, but others are bound to regard it as a sham, a substitute for the effective involvement that Africa so desperately needs. Our African colleagues have not yet spoken, but my hunch is that this is what some of them would like to say, and would say if they were sufficiently straightforward. Next door, in our informal consultations, we have heard plenty of statements to that effect. I hope I am abiding by the rules you have set for this meeting, Mr. President. This is an open debate, so we may react, but we may also pre-empt.”
1999-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4081 (1999) · source
“It is good to see the British presidency devote an open Council meeting to Africa. When we planned a similar meeting for our presidency in September we were not at all sure it would be a success. After all, non-permanent members, who get to chair the Security Council once or twice in a generation, are always a bit apprehensive about what they organize. Precisely because their presidency is such a rare occurrence, the pressure to turn it into something spectacular is intense, and under those circumstances it is easy to get it wrong. Against that background, we find it very reassuring that the two permanent members which, by virtue of the alphabet are called upon to chair the Security Council just before and just after the turn of the century have both decided to devote open meetings to Africa.”
1999-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4081 (1999) · source
“We hope that in his next report the Secretary-General will be able to report more progress on this aspect, as well as on the outcome of the study on the nexus between the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and a possible international commission of inquiry into human rights violations. In closing, I wish to pay tribute to the outgoing Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Sierra Leone, Ambassador Okelo, and welcome Ambassador Adeniji as his successor.”
1999-12-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4078 (1999) · source
“In reaction to the Secretary-General's urgent appeal to donors contained in paragraph 36 of his report, we wish to remind the participants in the forthcoming ECOWAS Ministerial Meeting that the Netherlands is prepared once again to extend $8.2 million in additional budget support to the Republic of Mali so as to enable this country to contribute to ECOMOG'S vital mission in Sierra Leone. We acknowledge that the primary focus at this moment should be on disarmament and the deployment of United Nations and ECOMOG personnel, but we emphasize once more that the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission must start as soon as possible.”
1999-12-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4078 (1999) · source
“As for the question of funding, we are glad to see that a number of donor countries have made contributions to the World Bank Trust Fund set up to cover the costs of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme. The Netherlands is finalizing arrangements for a contribution of $1.5 million to this fund. In paragraph 26 of resolution 1270 (1999), the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to provide it with "updates on the continued level of deployment of ECOMOG personnel". We share the Secretary-General's hope that ECOMOG will continue to play its critical role in Sierra Leone as envisaged in the Lome Agreement. In this connection, we commend Nigeria and other troop contributing countries for their vital contributions.”
1999-12-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4078 (1999) · source
“The Secretary-General rightly states in paragraph 34 of his report: "The continued violence against the people of Sierra Leone and international personnel is unacceptable and perpetrators should expect to be held accountable for their actions." It must be made clear to the rebels and their leaders that the amnesty of the Lome Peace Agreement does not extend to atrocities committed after the signing of the accord. Second, rebel leaders must continue to call upon their fighters to disband and lay down their arms. The report indicates once again that all parties must give absolute priority to the disarmament activities. The participation of 5,000 ex-combatants is a step in the right direction, but it still leaves an estimated 40,000 of their colleagues outside the programme.”
1999-12-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4078 (1999) · source
“Humanitarian access has been impeded by the deteriorating security situation. Disarmament has been proceeding at too slow a pace. It is becoming more and more difficult to describe these occurrences as isolated incidents. We call upon all rebel leaders to demonstrate their genuine commitment to the peace process in all its details. Only then can the promise of peace held out in the Lome Agreement be made a reality. First, all actions by rebels and their leaders as here described must cease right away.”
1999-12-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4078 (1999) · source
“The Secretary- General's first report on United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and Under-Secretary-General Miyet's supplementary briefing contain some positive elements but also give cause for deep concern. It is probably a coincidence that Mr. Miyet gave us all the good news in English and all the bad news in French. Although important progress has been made in the implementation of parts of the Lorne Peace Agreement and the deployment of UNAMSIL is well under way, the overall situation on the ground does not bode well for lasting peace in Sierra Leone. Violent incidents, ceasefire violations and human rights abuses have been reported with increasing frequency over the past two months. The neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian relief have not been respected.”
1999-12-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4078 (1999) · source
“I am sorry to take the floor again, but I wanted to point out that non- participation in the voting is extremely rare and that few non-permanent members have ever resorted to this extraordinary measure. My Foreign Minister, in the General Assembly, suggested that it might be useful to start looking for a way in which permanent members might express their absolutely negative attitude without being obliged to cast a veto. I had simply hoped that we were seeing an example of this procedure, in which a permanent member said no without casting a veto. I was hoping that it was this new element that we saw introduced today.”
1999-12-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4077 (1999) · source
“A longer extension would, in our view, remove the pressure, and we are strongly in favour of maintaining this pressure because we hope that the permanent five members will interpret the signal correctly and bring the comprehensive resolution back to the Council before 11 December. In this matter perhaps too much has already been said about the distinction between the permanent five and the elected ten, and I am reluctant to raise this issue once again. But I would like to point out that, in my view, an elected member could not afford not to take part in the vote on such an important issue as oil-for-food. We would never be able to explain such behaviour to the delegations that elected us.”
1999-12-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4077 (1999) · source
“Under normal circumstances we, too, would have been glad to support a regular roll-over for a new phase of 180 days. However, we believe that the circumstances are not normal. The Netherlands was a sponsor of one of the three draft resolutions that were informally submitted after the panel's exercise. At a certain point it was decided to entrust the issue to the five permanent members. We were able to accept this procedure because we felt that the permanent five members constituted the only institution that would be capable of hammering out a consensus. That was about half a year ago. Now the permanent five are under pressure from the elected members, and rightly so. Given the circumstances, we believe that a one-week extension of phase VI maintains that pressure.”
1999-12-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4077 (1999) · source
“Both nationally and internationally, the preventive impact of an effective legal system for the prosecution of human rights violations is obvious. It is in the first place at the national level that such a system should be in place and, if necessary, strengthened. For situations in which States themselves are unable or unwilling to prosecute and punish perpetrators of the most heinous crimes, the International Criminal Court has been created. The Court will also act as a powerful deterrent to potential perpetrators. The Netherlands therefore urges States to sign and ratify the Statute of the Court so that it can start functioning as soon as possible.”
1999-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4072 (1999) · source
“Article 99 had already been mentioned in passing when I drew the Council's attention to the precarious relationship between conflict prevention and domestic jurisdiction. My delegation strongly encourages the Secretary-General to make liberal use of his authority under that Article, including when the matter he wishes to bring to the Council's attention has not yet revealed its cross- border potential. The current debate is about the role of the Security Council in conflict prevention. However, given the nature of the security challenges that face us, it is evident that the Council cannot operate alone. Ideally, its political measures should be integrated with structural measures addressing the root causes of an approaching crisis, such as building democratic institutions, strengthening the rule of law and promoting development.”
1999-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4072 (1999) · source
“In view of the nature of current crises, often involving non-State actors and sometimes failed States, the Council has to be pragmatic and unorthodox as regards its tools and its interlocutors, as it was in September when it dispatched a mission to Indonesia and East Timor. When discussing the Security Council's role in conflict prevention, it is important not to lose sight of the Secretary- General's role in that field. These roles should be mutually supportive; the Council and the Secretary-General are partners, not competitors. Their joint endeavours in September to encourage the Indonesian Government to accept the deployment of a multinational force in East Timor were a notable example of effective cooperation between the Security Council and the Secretary-General.”
1999-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4072 (1999) · source