YouSaid · the spoken record

Wane

lines on the record: 246
first: 2016-11-18
most recent: 2023-08-28
sittings or episodes: 15
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“Although they are subject to divergence among members of the political class over their relevance and modalities, it is clear that the implementation of the Assises nationales recommendations, which will go well beyond the transition period, would go a long way to supporting a more stable Mali. Following the conclusion of the Assises, on New Year’s Eve, the Malian authorities conveyed to the Chair of ECOWAS the Assises outcomes along with a projection for the holding of presidential elections at the end of 2026. On 5 January, the ECOWAS Mediator was dispatched to Mali for further consultations, after which Mali reverted with a revised proposal for the holding of elections at the end of 2025. As outlined in their communiqué, the ECOWAS Heads of State and Government found the proposed timetable to be unacceptable.”
2022-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8945 (2022) · source
“The summit followed the previous meeting of the regional leaders, on 12 December 2021, in Abuja, as well as Mali’s confirming that it would not be able to meet the deadline for the holding of elections on 27 February 2022 and pledging to revert to ECOWAS by 31 December with a revised electoral calendar following the completion of the Assises nationales de la refondation. The Assises, as you may recall, Madam President, were billed as a forum that would create broad political consensus on the future direction of Mali, notably through institutional reforms. Held between 11 and 30 December at the local and national level, the Assises nationales produced extensive recommendations on institutional and governance reforms.”
2022-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8945 (2022) · source
“Mr. Wane: I thank you, Madam President, for the opportunity to brief the Security Council on the situation in Mali since the release of the Secretary-General’s report (S/2021/1117) and his letter (S/2022/8). As you have both documents before you, Madam, I will focus my briefing on more recent updates, progress and challenges. Over the weekend, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) held an extraordinary summit to take stock of the steps taken by Mali towards the holding of elections and a return to constitutional order.”
2022-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8945 (2022) · source
“For our part, I would like to assure the Council that MINUSMA will continue to assess and recalibrate its approach in order to adapt to the evolving situation and better support the Malian people’s aspiration for democracy, peace and stability.”
2021-10-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8893 (2021) · source
“Despite our collective efforts and those of the Malian protagonists, the reality is that the security situation has unfortunately, continued to deteriorate and the crisis is deepening. That said, hope is not lost. We have an opportunity to reflect together and develop a common understanding of the situation we are facing, revisit what we have been working on together so far, and further clarify our respective roles and responsibilities, including ensuring greater accountability on the part of all actors involved. I am convinced that if we adopt this approach, we can provide a vision shared by Mali and its partners, which would form the basis of an even more coordinated international strategy to help restore security, promote inclusive dialogue and complete the transition, as well as the full implementation of the 2015 Peace Agreement.”
2021-10-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8893 (2021) · source
“Moreover, through my good offices and in conjunction with ECOWAS and the African Union representatives in Bamako, we will continue to advocate for constructive dialogue among the Malian stakeholders in order to arrive at political consensus on the way forward, while also working to ensure a greater synergy of efforts between Mali and its partners towards the shared goal of return to constitutional rule and the promise of lasting stability. (spoke in French) Finally, I would like to say that what the Council heard from the Malian authorities during its visit should also be seen as a plea for a shared vision on how to put Mali back on a path to peace and stability.”
2021-10-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8893 (2021) · source
“In the light of the current challenges facing Mali, it is critical that Mali’s partners, in support of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), make renewed efforts to help the Malians foster consensus, both on the reforms to be undertaken and on the conditions for the holding of credible elections that would mark the return to constitutional order. For its part, MINUSMA is already providing substantive support to electoral management bodies through the Organization’s integrated electoral team, comprised of relevant Mission components, the United Nations Development Programme and UN-Women, and is prepared to provide holistic support to other ongoing processes.”
2021-10-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8893 (2021) · source
“As they have indicated to the Council, the transition authorities hold the view that improving the security situation and initiating some fundamental reforms, including operationalizing the single electoral management body and responding to their people’s aspirations to better governance, accountability and justice, are key to the holding of credible elections and ensuring that the return to constitutional rule and stability is not short lived. In that respect, we must note the annual revision of the electoral roll, launched on 5 October, the ongoing work on the draft electoral law and the issuance of three decrees concerning the Assises nationales de la refondation, including its terms of reference and appointment of members to be involved in oversight and organizing committees.”
2021-10-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8893 (2021) · source
“I also note the recent signing of a convention for the 16 projects elaborated as part of the sustainable development fund, as well as the steps being taken by the authorities to involve the signatory movements in the institutional reform process. Moreover, the signatories are now more open for international mediation — under the leadership of Algeria — to play a more active role, including through arbitration. The transition has reached a critical stage.”
2021-10-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8893 (2021) · source
“However, in recent weeks there have been some encouraging developments. Earlier this month, the Government tabled a forward- leaning proposal on DDR, most notably the integration of 13,000 combatants of the signatory movements before the end of the year and the integration of an additional 13,000 over the next two to three years. In our view, this is a significant step forward in a process that has largely been at a standstill for the past six years. The international community should welcome that proposal and encourage the parties to engage in good- faith discussions, including by convening the envisaged high-level decision-making meeting in order to agree on a way forward. In the meantime, the accelerated DDR, for which 1,800 of 3,000 combatants have been integrated, should be completed without any further delay.”
2021-10-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8893 (2021) · source
“In central Mali, MINUSMA is supporting Government efforts to finalize a comprehensive strategy for the stabilization of the centre while enhancing its protection-of-civilian efforts. The strategy is expected to focus on the fight against radical groups and to prioritize reconciliation, as was done recently in Ogossagou, the return of State authority, the provision of basic services and the strengthening of the resilience of the local populations, including women and youth. I commend the Government of Mali for the commitment displayed towards the development of that strategy. Regarding the 2015 Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation on Mali, progress has been frustratingly slow on the key provisions as they relate to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), institutional reforms and development in the north.”
2021-10-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8893 (2021) · source
“Those gaps include medium- utility military helicopter units, forward surgical teams, infantry quick reaction force units and aerial intelligence-collection assets, manned or unmanned, without which our effectiveness in delivering on our priority tasks will continue to be severely constrained. I therefore renew my call on countries in a position to do so, to help mobilize the required resources to make MINUSMA even more fit for purpose. Although I have spent some time on detailing the military and security response to the crisis in Mali, it should be clear that the answer cannot be purely military. It can never be emphasized enough that addressing insecurity in Mali also requires a political response.”
2021-10-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8893 (2021) · source
“Indeed, all of these activities are being undertaken with our current resources alone. It is in that context that the Secretary- General recommended an augmentation to our operation, including additional assets such as attack and utility helicopters, and it is up to the Council to decide on the way forward, taking into consideration the concerns of our Malian host. Meanwhile, let me insist on the fact that, irrespective of numbers, significant gaps remain in requirements for enabling capabilities, which are critical to ensure greater mobility and flexibility of the existing MINUSMA uniformed component.”
2021-10-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8893 (2021) · source
“We are also holding our ground in Mali’s far north, with our camps in Aguelhok and Tessalit, and doing so under difficult conditions. These efforts have been recognized by the Malian authorities and have reassured the population, especially in central Mali. We are also doing our best to support the Malian authorities in their efforts to address the deteriorating security situation. Between May and October of this year alone, we have responded to many requests for support from the Government of Mali and the Malian Defence and Security Forces for rations, fuel, ground and air transport and engineering services, among others. Support for medical and casualty evacuation provided by the Mission have also proved crucial for the Malian Defence and Security Forces in their operations across the country. However, we are overstretched.”
2021-10-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8893 (2021) · source
“These include the conduct of daily patrols in the circle of Douentza, in central Mali, to prevent attacks by terrorist armed groups against villagers; patrols along main roads to ensure freedom of movement and deter further terrorist attacks on key infrastructure, including bridges; and the stationing of a temporary operating base in Ogossagou, in central Mali, to prevent further violence between local communities. This temporary operating base has also enabled the civilian components of MINUSMA to undertake mediation and reconciliation activities, which culminated, a few weeks ago, in the signing of a comprehensive peace agreement between 12 villages that provides for the free movement of people, the resumption of livelihood activities and the return of social services.”
2021-10-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8893 (2021) · source
“The Mission operates under robust rules of engagement and uses all the means at its disposal to implement its mandate, including in coordination with the Malian authorities and other international partners. The Mission has also significantly adapted to the evolving and highly complex threat environment in Mali to protect civilians, including in the centre of the country. Today we conduct our operations with more tailored units, including explosive-ordinance disposal teams, quick reaction forces and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. We have also established temporary operating bases and launched long-range reconnaissance patrols.”
2021-10-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8893 (2021) · source
“Against that backdrop, the Government seized the opportunity of the Council’s visit to clearly express its concerns and priorities. Various Government interlocutors highlighted the deteriorating security situation as the main concern for the average Malian — a concern I have heard time and again, along with a plea for the delivery of basic services, during my own interactions with local communities in Gao, Menaka, Mopti, Douentza, Bandiagara, Aguelhok, Tessalit and, most recently, Timbuktu, where I was on Monday. They also insisted on the need for profound political and governance reforms to create the conditions for credible elections and lasting stability. In that context, it is needless to reiterate that MINUSMA remains crucial in Mali.”
2021-10-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8893 (2021) · source
“We confront a context marked by increased insecurity in northern, central and, now, in parts of southern Mali and a worrisome humanitarian situation, with 4.7 million people in need of humanitarian assistance and some 400,000 internally displaced persons, half of whom are displaced in the central region of Mali. Attacks targeting both Malian and international forces, including MINUSMA peacekeepers, have continued unabated. Just yesterday, our camp in Aguelhok came under indirect mortar and rocket fire. Six projectiles were fired at the camp by unknown assailants, two of which landed inside the camp. Luckily, there were no casualties or damages. In addition, political uncertainty persists, as Mali grapples with the completion of the ongoing transition.”
2021-10-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8893 (2021) · source
“Allow me to thank members for this opportunity to join the Security Council in assessing the situation in Mali. First of all, I would like to express my appreciation for the Council’s visit to Bamako last week, which not only underscored the Council’s continued support for Mali at this critical juncture but also demonstrated its unwavering support for the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). The tribute paid to the 243 fallen MINUSMA peacekeepers was a stark reminder of the sacrifices made over the past eight years in the quest for peace in Mali. The tribute also enhanced our resolve to ensure that every one of those lives lost was not in vain. (spoke in English) As members heard at first-hand during the visit, the situation on the ground remains extremely challenging.”
2021-10-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8893 (2021) · source
“That would be failing the Malian people, who deserve better. As challenging, desperate and frustrating the situation in Mali is, I was encouraged by the resolve of the Malian women, men and youth whom I met during my visits to the regions. They genuinely care about their country. They are proud of their cultural heritage and rich history, and they are determined to forge a better future for themselves and their children. That should be leveraged wherever possible to expedite the way out of the crisis. Let us focus on building their resilience and continue to support their legitimate quest for a more stable and peaceful future for their country.”
2021-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8794 (2021) · source
“The encroachment of violent extremism on many Malian communities presents a serious setback, as many extremist groups violate the rights of women and seek to remove them from the public sphere altogether. Finally, Mali is vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change and diminished resilience. That is poised to further intensify resource competition and exacerbate conflicts. That is why Mali’s partners should be encouraged to do more to support the Government in addressing that daunting challenge. Let me conclude by underscoring the need for the continued support of the Security Council and the international community more broadly. Mali is at a critical juncture, and we cannot allow it to slide into further instability, with far-reaching consequences for the subregion and beyond.”
2021-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8794 (2021) · source
“That will entail strengthening coordination within the Mission, with the United Nations country team and other multilateral and bilateral partners, in particular ECOWAS, the African Union and the European Union. That is another principle that must be obeyed, and that will be done in close coordination with other United Nations presences in the subregion and beyond. Achieving greater representation of women in political and economic decision-making processes is another aspect that is essential. I was impressed by the resilience of the women I met in the field. They were engaged, specific in all their concerns and requests and action-oriented. There is still a long way to go to achieve more effective participation so as to ensure that their interests and experiences are adequately taken into account and considered.”
2021-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8794 (2021) · source
“A coordinated and coherent vision by the transitional Government and stronger presence of the State are indispensable for MINUSMA’s peacekeepers to be effective. MINUSMA is also committed to fostering a more people-centred and action-oriented approach. I am convinced that placing people at the centre of the way our operations are planned and implemented will make them more accountable, locally grounded and effective. Ultimately, we will be judged by the impact we have on the lives of the people who suffer most and those we are here to serve. MINUSMA is only one part of a much larger international response. Consequently, leveraging partnerships is critical to ensure that Mali receives all the support it needs.”
2021-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8794 (2021) · source
“The implementation of the plan will benefit in some areas from the establishment of the mobile task force, which is a core part of the MINUSMA adaptation plan, which is now partially operational. It has already enabled the conduct of an integrated MINUSMA mission to Tessit, with Government participation, which was greatly appreciated by the local population. A unit of the mobile task force is also scheduled to deploy in Sector North to reinforce MINUSMA peacekeepers in areas at risk. The 60-day plan is based on several key guiding principles; the most important being Malian ownership and leadership. Achieving progress in the implementation of the Peace Agreement and the political transition requires ownership by Malian leaders across the spectrum and buy-in from the communities. That is particularly important for central Mali.”
2021-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8794 (2021) · source
“In keeping with its mandated strategic priorities, concrete initiatives were identified to expedite the implementation of key provisions under the peace agreement and to facilitate a more inclusive political transition process and agreement on the prioritization and sequencing of key reforms. We also developed an action plan for central Mali, where civilians are most at risk, which I will launch in Mopti tomorrow. The plan is called An Ka Barokè — which means “let’s talk together” — and focusses on promoting political engagement to stabilize the centre, enhancing the protection of civilians, fostering community engagement, social cohesion and reconciliation, and facilitating the return of State administration and services, while strengthening the resilience and participation of women and youth.”
2021-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8794 (2021) · source
“Where they live, there is little or no State presence, and the Mission is seen as the only provider of security and other basic services. MINUSMA is clearly making a tangible impact, even if not everyone is aware of what is being done on the ground. But it is also clear that MINUSMA is not in a position to meet all the expectations of the local populations. That is why the Mission will have to step up its strategic communication efforts to ensure a better understanding of its mandate and its own limitations. Following my assumption of duties in MINUSMA, the Mission developed a 60-day plan outlining priority action to be implemented by the end of the Mission’s mandate, on 30 June.”
2021-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8794 (2021) · source
“The testimonies of the representatives of the local authorities and civil society in Aguelhok, Tessalit, Kidal, Mopti, Douentza, Gao and Menaka confirmed that the multitude of political, governance and security challenges is driving human suffering. While Bamako is the centre of political attention and political engagement in the capital will remain essential, the Mission’s efforts need to be field- focused. Insecurity and the lack of access to education and water and other basic services were identified as major challenges impacting the lives of Malian people outside Bamako. At the same time, all my interlocutors in the region expressed appreciation for MINUSMA’s contribution. Most of them urged MINUSMA to do more. Indeed, expectations are high. That is understandable.”
2021-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8794 (2021) · source
“Its impact on the everyday lives of people is devastating and continues to take a heavy toll. At the first Cabinet meeting, the Prime Minister reaffirmed that improving security remains a top priority for the transitional Government. There are now more displaced Malians than during at the peak of the crisis in June 2013. Many of them live in very difficult conditions, and reports of human rights violations are deeply disturbing. Almost half of the schools in Central Mali are closed, mostly due to the threat of armed groups. In some areas marked by the presence of violent extremist groups, school closures are as high as 84 per cent. Since my arrival in Mali on 5 May, I have visited all MINUSMA’s main field offices.”
2021-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8794 (2021) · source
“They also reiterated their commitment to working with the signatory armed movements to the Algiers process, who are represented in the new Government, with a view to doing everything in their power to accelerate the implementation of the Algiers Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali. (spoke in English) Those commitments now need to translate into urgent and concrete action, which requires the constructive contribution of all Malian stakeholders. The time has come for Malian leaders to rise above partisan politics and personal interests and work together in earnest to address the crisis in the interest of their country and its future. MINUSMA’s support will remain critical in that regard. That is all the more necessary as the security situation in northern and central Mali remains of the utmost concern.”
2021-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8794 (2021) · source
“I would also mention that the ECOWAS mediator, former President of Nigeria Goodluck Jonathan, has been actively involved in efforts to ensure the implementation of the decisions taken, with the support of the local follow-up committee, of which the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) is a member. In that connection, the ECOWAS mediator visited Mali on 8 and 9 June, where he met with the follow-up committee and the new transitional President and Prime Minister The transitional President and the Prime Minister reassured that they would respect the transitional calendar, which envisages elections by February, and that neither the President nor Prime Minister would run for office.”
2021-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8794 (2021) · source
“Colonel Assimi Goïta was sworn-in as President of the transition in Bamako on 7 June. One the same day, he signed a decree appointing the head of the Mouvement du 5 juin-Rassemblement des forces patriotiques, Mr. Choguel Maïga, as Prime Minister, who announced the formation of a new Government, on 11 June, made up of 28 members, among them six women, by which women make up 21.42 per cent of the new Government. These events occurred nine months before the end of the agreed transition period. Immediate action is now required to initiate critical reforms and lay the groundwork for a credible electoral process. That entails an inclusive approach, strong Malian ownership and, of course, political compromise. The steadfast support of international partners will also remain vital to ensuring the success of the transition.”
2021-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8794 (2021) · source
“As Council members are aware, the coup was condemned by the Heads of State and Government of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), meeting in Accra on 30 May, and by the African Union Peace and Security Council, meeting in Addis Ababa on 1 June. Both organizations suspended Mali from their respective membership. ECOWAS reaffirmed the need to respect the transition time frame, including the date set for the presidential elections, namely, 27 February 2022. ECOWAS called for the immediate appointment of a civilian Prime Minister and reiterated its earlier decisions that the transitional President, the Vice President and the Prime Minister should not, under any circumstances, be candidates for the elections aimed at restoring the constitutional order.”
2021-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8794 (2021) · source
“I thank you, Sir, for the opportunity to brief the Council on developments in Mali and the evolution of the situation in that country. The report of the Secretary-General before the Council (S/2021/519) provides an update on the situation on the ground, marked by continued insecurity in northern and central Mali and the ongoing threat of terrorist attacks affecting other parts of the country. I briefed the Council in a closed meeting on the events leading up to 24 May, when the President and Prime Minister of the transitional Government were overthrown. Allow me to briefly recap events since then.”
2021-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8794 (2021) · source
“All that is needed is genuine political will to halt military operations, peaceably negotiate and make the compromises necessary to achieve sustainable peace in the country. I would also urge the Security Council to pronounce itself in that regard. It is critical that the leaders and all other stakeholders in South Sudan hear the international community's unified demand of what is expected of them in the interests of their own people.”
2017-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8030 (2017) · source
“However, it cannot be a substitute for a negotiated peace agreement, which, ifimplemented in good faith, can silence the guns, end the conflict and enhance the potential for the national dialogue to play a part in consolidating long-term sustainable peace and ensuring true ownership by all South Sudanese stakeholders. As has been repeated many times here in the Chamber, the conflict in South Sudan is a man- made one for which the leaders of the country bear a direct responsibility. The dire economic situation and continued conflict there have combined to generate a dangerous and precarious situation for its citizens, but the same leaders can also bring the country back from the brink of the abyss.”
2017-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8030 (2017) · source
“Two weeks ago, the Government of South Sudan and the African Union Commission agreed, at the technical level, on the text of the legal instruments for the establishment of the court. They will now submit the legal instruments to the Ministers of Justice and to the senior management of the African Union Commission for their consideration and approval. The United Nations Office of Legal Affairs continues to support that process. The national dialogue could make a significant contribution to improving the political environment through an open discussion of critical national issues. Participants and observers attest to open debate even within the steering committee.”
2017-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8030 (2017) · source
“Machar, Thomas Cirilo and Lam Akol, yielded little, as those actors either refused to receive visiting national dialogue delegations or objected to the viability of a national dialogue as a vehicle for achieving an inclusive political settlement. We have been informed that their opposition is not directed against the need for such a nation-building exercise, but against the conduct of the dialogue in advance of, or as an alternative to, an inclusive peace process. On the other hand, the participation of some civil society and faith-based groups, both in the steering committee proceedings and in the seminar I mentioned, is a positive development. Meanwhile, some progress can be reported in the negotiations related to the establishment of the hybrid court for South Sudan.”
2017-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8030 (2017) · source
“Following the national dialogue secretariat's request for technical assistance, UNMISS has been coordinating with other United Nations entities and institutional partners to assist with needs and the support required. In that regard, support was provided to a steering committee inception seminar, during which participants acknowledged a better understanding of the challenges associated with ensuring inclusivity, confidence-building and the actual implementation of the process in the prevailing environment. However, the national dialogue continued to be criticized for its lack of inclusivity. The national dialogue steering committee's outreach to key opposition figures outside the country, including Mr.”
2017-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8030 (2017) · source
“Although President Kiir and his Cabinet members expressed reservation about the inclusion of some people in the dialogue process, in particular Riek Machar, there was an acknowledgment that sizable communities cannot be left out of the process just because they were led by, or supported, a particular individual. Political attention in Juba appeared squarely focused on the national dialogue process and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement reunification, on which Special Envoy Haysom will report. While the national dialogue has made some progress, achieving key enablers for a credible process, such as inclusivity and a free and secure environment, remain a challenge.”
2017-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8030 (2017) · source
“Of particular concern were the six major looting incidents of warehouses and trucks in transit, leading to the loss of 670 metric tons of food meant for vulnerable communities in Eastern Equatoria, Lakes, Upper Nile and Wau. Humanitarian actors were also denied access, both by Government and non-State armed actors, to several critical areas. The Under-Secretary-General of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Mr. Lacroix, visited South Sudan from 1 to 3 August. During his visit, be met with President Salva Kiir and key Government officials. He reiterated to all his interlocutors that there was no military solution to the conflict in South Sudan and that inclusive and credible political processes were the only way forward.”
2017-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8030 (2017) · source
“Those incidents directly affect humanitarian operations, which consequently have an impact on the most vulnerable of the population in dire need of assistance. In the month of July, 136 access incidents were reported by the humanitarian community. That is the highest number recorded in any one month since December 2013. Of those 136 incidents, 49 involved violence against personnel and assets, once again illustrating the increasingly dangerous and risky environment in which humanitarian actors operate. In a persistent trend, letters threatening violence against aid workers from different ethnicities have also continued. Incidents of looting also spiked during the month of July, with 15 incidents reported across the country.”
2017-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8030 (2017) · source
“Unfortunately, the expected ceasefire remains elusive, as military operations continued during the reporting period, mostly in the Upper Nile part of the country. While efforts by the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) to take Pagak, the de facto headquarters of the Sudan People's Liberation Army-In Opposition (SPLA- IO), initially succeeded, fighting around Pagak and along the corridor to Majang continues, while civilians in the area remain displaced, including refugees heading to Ethiopia. Further north, clashes resumed between the SPLA and the SPLA-IO in Kaka, on the west bank of the Nile. Insecurity also continued in the Equatorias, including long main roads. UNMISS has enhanced its presence in Torit and continues intensive patrolling to and around Yei in response to persistent threats to civilians.”
2017-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8030 (2017) · source
“Let me say that the Secretariat could not agree more with his assessment and the calls on the Security Council to express itself strongly, unanimously and unreservedly in support of his efforts and those of the region as a whole, including the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)-led Revitalization Forum. More than ever before, there is a need for continued and close coordination among IGAD, the African Union, the United Nations and the broader international community to ensure that we leverage our collective influence to bring an end to the suffering of the civilian population and help put South Sudan on a more positive trajectory. The security situation in the country is a cause for serious concern, as it has been over the past few years.”
2017-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8030 (2017) · source
“I am pleased to confirm that, following the active engagement of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. David Shearer, and his team with Government officials over the past two weeks, those misunderstandings have been cleared. In commemoration of the second anniversary of the signing, on 25 August 2015, of the South Sudan Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, the Chair of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, former President Mr. Festus Mogae, declared yesterday that little meaningful progress had been achieved in its implementation. President Mogae will shortly explain the challenges he faces and his efforts to revitalize the process, which Special Envoy Haysom actively supports.”
2017-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8030 (2017) · source
“Mr. Wane: I am grateful forthis opportunity to brief the Security Council on the Secretary-General's 30- day report and on the overall situation in South Sudan. The deployment of the Regional Protection Force (RPF) is under way and, since the submission of the report a week ago, there have been no significant updates on the deployment process. The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) continues to engage the Government on a regular basis in order to expedite the deployment. Enhanced cooperation with the Government will be critical for the RPF to complete the process and fully implement its mandate. As has been reported, some misunderstandings arose with the Government surrounding the accommodation of the advance party of the Rwandan contingent of the RPF to Juba.”
2017-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8030 (2017) · source
“The establishment of the G-5 Sahel foint force has the potential to make a significant contribution to the efforts already under way to stabilize the region. Once again, I congratulate the member States of the G-5 for the Sahel for the considerable efforts they are making. The success of the force will depend upon both the deepening of this regional partnership and the relevant political framework, and the determination of the G-5 for the Sahel member States to achieve its operationalization, as well as the unflagging support of of their international partners. The United Nations will remain ready to contribute to that partnership and to efforts aimed at supporting this initiative. We welcome the proposal to submit a written report on those efforts in October, as called for in resolution 2359 (2017).”
2017-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8024 (2017) · source
“The joint force can make a significant contribution to the stabilization of the Sahel region, in synergy with other existing initiatives. In order to better coordinate and refocus the attention of the United Nations system on the Sahel, the Secretary-General recently established an Executive Committee working group on the Sahel, chaired by the Deputy Secretary-General, which has already begun to meet. Lastly, in order to better support and promote regional ownership, it is important that the deployment of the joint force be part of the African Union's Peace and Security Architecture. The Nouakchott process could be an effective tool to that end. We hope that, as the force's concept of operations matures, it will receive the support and cooperation of other countries in the region.”
2017-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8024 (2017) · source
“In order to fully take advantage of that opportunity, it is important that other aspects of the causes of instability in Mali and in the region be addressed simultaneously. Addressing the root causes of instability in the Sahel requires going beyond military action and tackling the governance gap, chronic poverty and unemployment, climate change and financing for development; it is also necessary to address cross-border crime. I should also like to emphasize the primacy of politics and the need for a political strategy to guide the activities of the joint force so as to ensure that they are aligned with the Malian peace process and other regional initiatives. Resolution 2359 (2017) calls for the prompt and effective implementation of regional strategies by the States members of the G-5 for the Sahel and their international partners.”
2017-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8024 (2017) · source
“Fourthly, with regard to the rules of engagement, it should be noted that the success of the force will depend upon the support of the people. It is therefore essential to ensure strict compliance with international humanitarian law and human rights law, including implementing measures to mitigate the impact of military operations on civilians. Among other things, the latter implies the establishment of appropriate mechanisms for the handing over to the competent authorities of persons arrested by the joint force, including minors, and the sharing of information on arrests and detentions. The G-5 Sahel joint force presents a unique opportunity to respond to regional challenges through a regional approach.”
2017-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8024 (2017) · source
“First of all, it is important to respond to the enormous needs, not only in terms of funding and funding mechanisms but also with regard to force generation, training and equipment, tactical support, intelligence and communications technologies, medical evacuation capabilities and providing protection for the force as well as the camps. Secondly, the potential impact of force-generation efforts on subsequent operations and on MINUSMA's posture must also be considered carefully. Thirdly, certain aspects of the legal framework, such as modalities pertaining to the right of pursuit beyond the limits of each each zone, must be better defined and require additional agreements among the States members of the G-5 Sahel.”
2017-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8024 (2017) · source