YouSaid · the spoken record

Wane

lines on the record: 246
first: 2016-11-18
most recent: 2023-08-28
sittings or episodes: 15
sources: un-security-council

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“In that connection, the Mission is finalizing a protocol with the Malian defence and security forces to define the modalities and scope of this support and the coordination of operations in the north and centre of Mali. Fourthly, these measures, in conjunction with MINUSMA's core mandated tasks in support of the extension of State authority across Mali, will be a further contribution to enable the Malian authorities to proactively address security challenges, including through G-5 Sahel force, as well as to enhance governance mechanisms and accelerate the implementation of the peace agreement. (spoke in French) Although the developments I just referred to attest to the political will of the States members of the G-5 for the Sahel to operationalize the joint force, significant challenges remain and a number of issues need to be addressed.”
2017-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8024 (2017) · source
“Secondly, in addition, existing coordination mechanisms between MINUSMA, the French forces, the Malian defence and security forces, the European Union (EU) Training Mission in Mali and EUCAP Sahel Niger will be adapted to accommodate the joint force in order to facilitate information-sharing. The Mission is also preparing the deployment of liaison officers to and from the G-5 Sahel. Thirdly, further and as per resolution 2359 (2017), MINUSMA is providing logistical and strategic support, within existing resources, to the Malian defence and security forces with a view to accelerating their redeployment to the northern and central parts of Mali.”
2017-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8024 (2017) · source
“Given the complexity of the issues to be addressed and the multitude of stakeholders in the region, resolutions 2359 (2017) and 2364 (2017) urge the joint force, MINUSMA and the international forces to ensure adequate coordination and information-sharing on their operations, within their respective mandates. Allow me here to highlight a few additional points. First, MINUSMA is currently prioritizing the establishment of a common post in Mopti, in line with its political and security mandated tasks in Central Mali, which will also allow close coordination with the first focus area of the G-5 Sahel, starting in October.”
2017-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8024 (2017) · source
“The planned meeting, to be hosted by the German and French Defence Ministers in Berlin in September, will provide an opportunity to further explore options for the support of the start-up of the joint force, to be followed by a planning conference, as requested in resolution 2359 (2017), later this year. While generating pledges and contributions to meet the requirements of the joint force will be critical, the setting up of transparent, coordinated and effective funding will be equally as important. We understand that, in terms of what was pledged by the European Union, efforts in this respect are already under way. I also urge G-5 Sahel member States to swiftly make good on these pledges so that they can be utilized for the further operationalization of the joint force.”
2017-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8024 (2017) · source
“Their joint contribution of â‚¬50 million, in conjunction with the European Union's pledged contribution of â‚¬50 million, as announced by Commissioner Mogherini during her visit to Bamako in June, and France's logistical and financial contribution to the force worth â‚¬8 million, brings the total to â‚¬108 million, or 25 per cent of total requirements as currently defined the amount of money needed for the force to be fully operational. The G-5 Sahel countries, with the support of international partners, have undertaken a technical review of resource requirements, which may lead to a better delineation and fine-tuning of the initially projected financial needs.”
2017-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8024 (2017) · source
“Out of this amount, approximately â‚¬234 million are projected for initial investments, â‚¬110 million for operational costs and â‚¬83 million for personnel-related costs. As Council members will recall, resolution 2359 (2017) bestows the primary responsibility for resource mobilization on the G-5 Sahel member States. In this light, I should like to applaud the commitment of the G-5 Sahel member States to pooling their resources and contributing â‚¬10 million each to the budget. Given the domestic economic challenges facing the G-5 Sahel countries, these pledges are particularly laudable.”
2017-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8024 (2017) · source
“The operationalization and force generation for Sectors East and West headquarters, including the deployment of one company per sector to attain initial operational capability, is scheduled for spring 2018. Sixthly, the generation of105 provostpolice officers, who are expected to fulfil judicial policing functions and to contribute to addressing transnational organized crime, as well as of a small civilian component, which is expected to be composed of three advisers to the Force Commander on human rights, humanitarian and development issues, is ongoing. Lastly, the budgetary requirements to fund both the start-up of the joint force, including initial investments in infrastructure, staffing and operations in the first year were set at â‚¬423 million.”
2017-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8024 (2017) · source
“Thirdly, in terms of staffing, General Didier Dacko of Mali was appointed Force Commander of the G-5 Sahel force in June, and has begun assembling his team in the force's provisional headquarters in Bamako. Fourthly, the force's permanent headquarters in Sevare is currently being equipped and is projected to attain initial operational capability by the end of August. Fifthly, immediate priority in terms of operations will be given to the Central Sector, along Mali's borders with the Niger and Burkina Faso, where the force is planning to conduct coordinated operations in October. These operations will build on existing trilateral efforts of Mali, Burkina Faso and the Niger in the Liptako- Gourma triangle.”
2017-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8024 (2017) · source
“First, efforts aimed at the development of the normative framework that would allow a swift operationalization of the joint force have been made. Key strategic documents - such as the concept of operations, the command architecture, a preliminary budget and a memorandum of understanding on extraterritoriality - have been adopted by the G-5 Sahel Comite de defense et de securite and endorsed by the African Union Peace and Security Council, and the scale and scope of the force and its operations have been further defined. Secondly, a two-phased approach has been agreed. The joint force is set to initially conduct cross-border operations in three strategic sectors, and subsequently to consolidate and enhance bilateral and multilateral cooperation among the G-5 Sahel member States.”
2017-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8024 (2017) · source
“The creation of a joint force to address terrorism and transnational organized crime threats, including through the conduct of cross-border joint military operations, demonstrates regional ownership of regional challenges and is an acknowledgment that these will require collective action and unity of purpose. As such, it bears the potential of significantly contributing to the stabilization of the Sahel region, and in turn facilitating MINUSMA's implementation of its mandate. Since the decision taken by the G-5 Sahel Heads of State in February to create ajoint force of 5,000 military, as well as police and civilian personnel, important steps towards its implementation have been undertaken. I should like in particular to highlight the following.”
2017-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8024 (2017) · source
“The situation is dire, and time to identify and implement solutions is, unfortunately, running out. Allow me here to acknowledge and value the contribution and sacrifices made by so many African countries to peace operations on the continent. The countries of the G-5 Sahel are undertaking tremendous efforts, in multiple theatres across vast and inhospitable terrains and with limited resources, to improve security in the Sahel and to counter violent extremism and drug and arms smuggling, including in the fight against Boko Haram, and elsewhere in the region. Against this backdrop, the strong determination and commitment of the G-5 Sahel member States to share the responsibility to collectively tackle these challenges head on and to protect civilians in their respective territories, as underlined in resolution 2359 (2017), is commendable.”
2017-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8024 (2017) · source
“Worst of all, however, are the consequences borne by the civilian population, which suffers from intimidation and violence and bears the brunt of inadequate or non-existing social services, which this insecurity negatively affects. In Mali, the number of State officials present in the northern part of the country has decreased by 10 per cent compared with last year; persistent threats by extremist groups targeting schoolteachers, students and parents resulted in the closure of 178 secular schools. This erosion of State authority provides a fertile breeding ground for violent extremist and terrorist groups. The countless numbers of young people in the Sahel facing job insecurity and even chronic poverty could all too easily fall prey to these groups.”
2017-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8024 (2017) · source
“In Mali, attacks by violent extremist groups on national security forces, international forces and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) remain a sad reality and hamper the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, one of the key elements for the stabilization efforts in the region. Their activities know no borders, and time and again we have seen vicious attacks also in neighbouring countries and in the broader region. This past weekend was marked by the heinous attacks in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, and on MINUSMA camps in Douenza and Timbuktu.”
2017-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8024 (2017) · source
“Mr. Wane: It is my pleasure to address the Security Council and to provide a briefing on the activities of the Group of Five for the Sahel (G-5 Sahel) joint force, including on its operationalization, as well as on the challenges encountered and possible measures for further consideration, as requested by the Council in resolution 2359 (2017), two months after it welcomed the creation of the joint force. The cross-border dimension of the terrorist threat in the Sahel region, as well as the serious challenges posed by transnational organized crime and its links with terrorism, continue to pose a serious threat to stability, prosperity and growth in the Sahel region.”
2017-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8024 (2017) · source
“A change in behaviour is long overdue for the sake of the people of South Sudan, and the pursuit of political objectives through violence, which continues, unfortunately, to exact a heavy toll on the people of South Sudan, should not be allowed to continue.”
2017-07-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8008 (2017) · source
“I would therefore encourage the Security Council to, once again, express its full support for the IGAD-led process and to urge all South Sudanese stakeholders to embrace that process as a genuine opportunity to restore peace in the country. In conclusion, I would like to underline the critical importance ofthe unity ofpurpose ofthe region, as well as unity between the region and the rest of the international community, and the need for all concerned members of the international community to send a strong message to the South Sudanese stakeholders that the current status quo is unacceptable and unsustainable.”
2017-07-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8008 (2017) · source
“That is critical in order to ensure that the national dialogue is not displaced or rejected by the opposition and does not lead to more disputes, fighting, fragmentation and displacement in the country. I stress that President Mogae, the Chairperson of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, will brief the Council on the implementation status of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan and on the proposed revitalization process led by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and endorsed by the IGAD Summit. The success of that initiative will definitely depend on the extent to which the Government and the opposition embrace it and commit to its full implementation. That IGAD initiative is an important development that requires active international support, including from the Security Council.”
2017-07-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8008 (2017) · source
“We understand that he has now been released, but clearly all those actions point to the need for the South Sudanese authorities to make more sustained efforts towards creating an environment that is conducive to the conduct of a credible national dialogue. With respect to the national dialogue, we believe that every effort should be made to ensure that the process is inclusive and transparent, takes place in a free and secure environment, has clear outcomes that complement the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan, and is supported by a sufficiently broad political consensus from all of the political forces in the country.”
2017-07-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8008 (2017) · source
“On 17 July, two republican decrees were issued, replacing six members of the Sudan People's Liberation Army in Opposition of the Transitional National Legislative Assembly, who are linked to Riek Machar, with members who are aligned with First Vice President Taban Deng Gai, and that certainly further excludes a key constituency of the peace process. On 18 July, the websites of two important media outlets were blocked after they criticized the Government and, once again, that raises questions about the respect for the freedom of expression. On 10 July, the national security services arrested the Director General of the State-run South Sudan National Broadcasting Corporation.”
2017-07-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8008 (2017) · source
“The aim of the offensive seems to be to capture opposition-held areas all the way to Pagak. Similarly, clashes have continued between the Sudan People's Liberation Army in Opposition and SPLA troops near Torit in Eastern Equatoria, where UNMISS has recently had to reinforce its presence owing to heavy fighting in the area. Obviously, the nature of those operations ran contrary to the unilateral ceasefire declared by the Government. Secondly, the Government has publicly expressed its commitment to creating an environment conducive to the national dialogue and that is, of course, to be welcomed and encouraged. At the same time, there have been recently certain decisions that undermine those commitments.”
2017-07-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8008 (2017) · source
“As a matter of priority, we must overcome such challenges, if we are to make the most of the opportunity created by the deployment of the RPF in Juba and put the country back on the path towards sustainable peace and stability. First, I would like to say a few words on the security environment, which remains extremely volatile. Clearly, South Sudan is in need of an effective and credible ceasefire. Since the Government announced the declaration of a unilateral ceasefire in June, there have been worrisome reports of active military operations in Greater Equatoria and Upper Nile states. On 7 July, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) received a credible report that the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) has moved towards Mathiang in Upper Nile, after which heavy fighting was reported.”
2017-07-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8008 (2017) · source
“Mr. Wane: I am grateful for the opportunity to brief the Security Council on the Secretary-General's report on the situation in South Sudan. I will restrict my remarks to updates on the political and security situation received since the circulation of the report on 18 July and will provide some additional considerations. As far as the deployment of the Regional Protection Force and the status-of-forces agreement violations are concerned, I do not have much more to add to the report that was recently shared. However, allow me to emphasize that, while the Regional Protection Force continues with its process of deployment - we do expect some progress with the arrival of the Rwandan and Ethiopian units in the next two months - the peace process in South Sudan continues to face a number of challenges.”
2017-07-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8008 (2017) · source
“The successful implementation of that reconfiguration, however, requires the full support and cooperation of the Government of the Sudan and its institutions, including to ensure that there is no administrative or security vacuum in the areas that will be vacated by UNAMID. It is also important to continue to work closely with the country team on issues related to land, the search for durable solutions for internally displaced persons, transitional justice and reconciliation. I will conclude by pointing that out that it is more necessary than ever that we continue ourjoint efforts to allow for the achievement of peace and security that the people of Darfur desire so greatly.”
2017-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7969 (2017) · source
“The armed movements attempted to reassert their military presence in North and East Darfur in late May and early June, but remain unable to conduct sustained military operations in the face of the military of the Sudanese Government. In response to intercommunal conflict during the migration season, Government authorities at both the local and federal levels, as well as community leaders, supported by UNAMID, undertook preventive measures and endeavoured to reduce the impact of the difficulties encountered, thereby contributing to reduced Violence as compared to recent years. Finally, I would like to say that the reconfiguration of UNAMID is an important milestone towards the completion of its mandate.”
2017-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7969 (2017) · source
“With regard to intercommunal conflicts, the work of the Mission should prioritize those intercommunal conflicts, which have the potential to cause the highest number of casualties, and derail national political processes, while a stronger partnership with the country team is also required to address issues related to seasonal migration and the extension of rule-of-law institutions throughout the territory. I would like to highlight that the developments I mentioned earlier continue, of course, to be true since the conclusion of the strategic review. The level of armed hostilities is significantly lower than in previous years.”
2017-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7969 (2017) · source
“I would indicate, however, that the report recommends that its priorities be adjusted slightly. In terms of the political process, a stronger focus should be put on the effective implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, which, as I pointed out earlier, is now incorporated in the Constitution and contains useful provisions to address the underlying causes of conflict and to create peace dividends for the population in Darfur. Activities connected with the protection of civilians in the greater Jebel Marra area, in collaboration with the humanitarian country team, will revolve around physical protection and emergency relief, whereas in the rest of the Darfur states civilian- protection activities will focus on livelihood issues and issues related to the police and the capacity to promote the rule of law capacities.”
2017-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7969 (2017) · source
“This concept - which includes the closure of 11 team sites, the opening of one temporary operating base in G010, in the Jebel Marra area, and the withdrawal of the military from another seven team sites out of a current total 36 - would enable the Mission to bring the troop ceiling down to eight battalions, from the current number of 16 battalions, or to 8,735 troops, while the police ceiling will be brought down to 2,360, from a current total of 3,403. This would represent a reduction of 44 per cent and 30 per cent, respectively, of the military and police authorized ceilings. (spoke in French) The Mission's priorities still address the main issues at stake and make it possible to contextualize the tasks UNAMID should undertake and where it has the most value added.”
2017-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7969 (2017) · source
“In View of the that, the joint report proposes a two-pronged approach combining peacebuilding and peacekeeping tasks. Most parts of Darfur require a more peacebuilding- oriented approach, while in the Jebel Marra area and its vicinity the Mission's efforts would focus on traditional peacekeeping tasks and on addressing the emergency attention arising from the insecurity in the area that prevents internally displaced persons from returning.”
2017-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7969 (2017) · source
“Yet, as illustrated by an internally displaced person population of 2.7 million, a number of crucial grievances at the origin of the conflict and key issues related to its aftermath are still to be addressed. While security in the State capitals has improved, challenges in other parts of Darfur remain. This is due mainly to the activities of militia groups, unresolved intercommunal disputes over land and other resources, the prevalence of weapons and crime, coupled with the inadequate capacity and effectiveness of the rule of law institutions. At present, UNAMID deals with two sets of issues that are both related to the root causes of the conflict: first, the continued instability in the greater Jebel Marra area and the displacement in the Vicinity; and secondly, intercommunal violence.”
2017-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7969 (2017) · source
“The report notes that, over the past three years, the armed conflict that gave rise to the deployment of UNAMID has markedly changed, following a successful military campaign by the Government, which reduced the rebellion to a small presence of the Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid in Western Jebel Marra. The number of intercommunal and security incidents has also decreased as a result of the efforts of the Government and community leaders, with the support of UNAMID. In parallel, with the conclusion of the national dialogue and the inclusion of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur into the Constitution, progress has been made on the political front.”
2017-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7969 (2017) · source
“Since then, significant developments in the Sudan and the wider region have taken place, and these require that UNAMID adjust to new realities. With this in mind, the Secretary-General recommended, in his letter of28 October 2016 to the President ofthe Security Council (8/2016/915), that ajoint African Union-United Nations strategic review of UNAMID be undertaken, in close consultation with the Government of the Sudan, in order to provide detailed recommendations to the Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council on the Mission's priorities and configuration. The review took place from 5 to 17 March 2017, and the joint African Union-United Nations recommendations were consulted with the Government of Sudan and interested parties. I would like to briefly introduce the main elements of the proposed reconfiguration.”
2017-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7969 (2017) · source
“Mr. Wane: I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for this opportunity to brief the Security Council on the situation in Darfur. On this tenth anniversary of the Council's decision to deploy the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), I would like to draw the attention of Council members to the joint recommendations of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on the reconfiguration of the Mission, as submitted in their joint special report on the strategic review of UNAMID (S/2017/437). A decade has elapsed since the Secretary-General, in his letter dated 5 June 2007 (S/2007/307), proposed the mandate and the structure of UNAMID to the Security Council.”
2017-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7969 (2017) · source
“While the United Nations has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the African Union is one of our most important partners in confronting common challenges in Africa. It has also expressed a willingness to play a role in, and has put efforts into, building the peace and security architecture. The path to the future is therefore one of innovation, creativity and pragmatism. Let me once again sincerely thank Senegal for having convened this meeting and also thank the members ofthe Council for their continued commitment to a stronger partnership between the United Nations and the African Union in our joint efforts to address the peace and security challenges confronting us on the African continent.”
2016-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7816 (2016) · source
“The tendency has often been to highlight the challenges rather than innovative mechanisms for cooperation, but it is, rather, such innovation that we need to encourage and spur in order to circumvent these challenges. Whatever the challenges in the cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union, and this is my final observation, there is in fact no alternative to a stronger partnership. There is now a clear recognition of the fact that no single organization can effectively address on its own the increasingly complex, multifaceted peace and security challenges of today, as noted by the Secretary-General in his report dated January 2012. Our only option is to overcome these challenges.”
2016-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7816 (2016) · source
“Having worked with the Office in Addis Ababa in connection with my former responsibilities at the African Union Commission, I can testify to the quality and the strength of the contribution that the Office is making to the relationship between the African Union and the United Nations. Whatever efforts can be made to enhance the capacity and resources ofthe Commission are of course welcome steps towards a stronger partnership between the two organizations. It may sometimes seem simpler for each organization to work on its own given the obstacles that may surface as soon as concrete steps towards closer cooperation are contemplated.”
2016-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7816 (2016) · source
“On 18 July, the Secretary-General welcomed the historic decision taken by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union in Kigali, setting out concrete steps towards self-reliance, particularly in relation to the AU peace and security budget. Today's debate is an opportunity for Member States to initiate a response. In so doing, they will enhance the role of the United Nations and strengthen the regional response. For our part, we in the Secretariat will continue to work closely with the African Union so as to generate, as much as possible, harmonized approaches between the Secretariat and the Commission. For this purpose, we will naturally rely on our Office to the African Union, which I should like to commend for its central role in strengthening the partnership between the African Union and the United Nations.”
2016-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7816 (2016) · source
“This, in our view, reinforces the calls made several times in the past by the Council and by the African Union Peace and Security Council to seek ways to ensure predictable, flexible and sustainable financing for African Union peace support operations authorized by the Security Council. In his report dated 2 September 2015 on the future of United Nations peace operations (S/2015/682), the Secretary-General commended the African Union's commitment to self-reliance, including to financing 25 per cent offuture African Union peace operations. He then urged Member States to give urgent consideration to how the United Nations can respond to that initiative.”
2016-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7816 (2016) · source
“As of July, African States represented 20 of the top 30 contributors ofuniformed personnel to United Nations peacekeeping operations. Approximately 50 per cent of all uniformed peacekeepers come from African Union member States. This brings me to my third point. The complexity of the current conflicts in Africa and the trends observed highlight the need to strengthen further the United Nations operational cooperation with and in support of African Union peace support operations. In doing so, we ought to be pragmatic and results-oriented, driven, as we should be, by the imperative to respond to the needs on the ground, assist countries and shattered communities to turn the page of violence and conflict, and consolidate peace where it has been achieved.”
2016-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7816 (2016) · source
“I wish to draw the Council's attention to the fact that two out of the five concluding observations from the report relate to the need for the United Nations to adapt to the increasing complexity of the security challenges that the international community is facing, particularly in Africa, either in its own interventions or in support of African Union peace support operations. I would like to cite several statistics to illustrate the importance of Africa for peacekeeping, and vice versa. Nine out of 16 of the United Nations peacekeeping missions are deployed in Africa. Those missions alone account for 83 per cent of all uniformed personnel and 86 per cent of the financial resources approved for United Nations peacekeeping missions.”
2016-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7816 (2016) · source
“In assessing the 13-year history of cooperation at the operational level, the September report (8/2016/809) entitled "Report of the joint African Union-United Nations review of available mechanisms to finance and support African Union peace support operations authorized by the United Nations Security Council" provides Member States with the first comprehensive account of mechanisms used in the past and still readily available, as well as more general concluding observations on key lessons learned.”
2016-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7816 (2016) · source
“That has included experiences relating to transitions from AU operations to United Nations peacekeeping operations, such as in the Central African Republic and Mali, the joint management of hybrid operations in conjunction with the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, and through providing logistical support packages funded through assessed contributions to African Union-led missions, such as the African Union Mission in Somalia.”
2016-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7816 (2016) · source
“In an innovative move, AU Peace and Security Council experts will be hosted later this month here at Headquarters by the Secretariat for a familiarization visit, with a View to forging better knowledge and understanding of its internal processes. My second point follows logically from the partnership to its operational dimension. In that regard, I would like to mention the considerable progress made in the area of operational support, as was already been highlighted by the report (see S/2015/446) of the High- Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations. For more than 10 years, strong cooperation between the African Union and the United Nations on planning and supporting peace operations has become the norm.”
2016-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7816 (2016) · source
“The relationship between the Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council is also of primary importance. I note that both Councils now meet annually in New York and Addis Ababa. While further harmonization of efforts could be still further encouraged, it is unanimously acknowledged that there are plenty of areas of common interest for the African Union and the United Nations to work on together. The Secretariat and African Union Commission have also enhanced their cooperation at the strategic level - through the Joint Task Force, which meets twice a year, and through the annual desk-to-desk meetings, the next one of which is scheduled for December in Addis Ababa. That also includes monthly director-level video tele-conferences and daily working-level interactions.”
2016-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7816 (2016) · source
“Ladsous addressed the Security Council during the open debate (see S/PV.7694) last May to measure the progress achieved in strengthening the partnership in the area of peace and security on the continent. That debate took place on the tenth anniversary of the beginning of annual consultations between the Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council. The Secretary-General has repeatedly underscored that strengthening global and regional partnerships is absolutely critical, especially in Africa. His report (S/2016/780) on the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union, which Special Representative Haile Menkerios will present shortly, is testimony to the mutual efforts made over the years towards building the strategic relationship between the two organizations.”
2016-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7816 (2016) · source
“In the context of my new functions at the United Nations, I am grateful to be able to contribute towards strengthening that partnership. Once again, I thank, you, Mr. Minister, for having taken the initiative of convening this very timely meeting. (spoke in English) Iwould like to begin by making several statements of fact. First, the cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union on peace and security is not new and has grown into a strategic partnership - a stronger partnership based on an innovative and forward- looking reading of Chapter VIII of Charter of the United Nations. Today's debate will, without any doubt, contribute to that partnership. Mr.”
2016-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7816 (2016) · source
“On behalf of Under- Secretary-General Herve Ladsous, I would like to thank the Senegalese presidency for convening this very timely discussion. I must also admit, as a former staff member of the African Union Commission, where I worked for over 20 years, that I feel particularly honoured and grateful to be able to brief the Security Council on a subject of vital importance not only for Africa but also for our system of collective security. It is an issue on which I have been working diligently throughout my entire career within the African Union (AU), and obviously I feel strongly committed to the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union, because I firmly believe that there is no alternative to a close partnership between the two organizations.”
2016-11-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7816 (2016) · source