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1994-05-05
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2023-12-21
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un-security-council

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  1. For its part, the United States has always been the largest humanitarian donor to the historically underfunded United Nations appeal for Haiti. In response to heightened humanitarian needs, including following the August 2021 earthquake, the United States has provided more than $171 million in life-saving humanitarian assistance and early-recovery, risk- reduction and resilience programming since fiscal year 2021. We are also expanding our emergency assistance to respond to growing protection concerns, help stem the cholera outbreak and deliver essential food and other commodities to the most vulnerable communities in Port-au-Prince and throughout the country. We call on other donors to increase support during this critical period for Haiti.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9233 (2022) · source

  2. Despite that positive development, violence and insecurity remain an everyday concern for Haitians. Ongoing kidnappings, the use of sexual violence and rape by gangs, clashes between gangs and the blockage of the country’s main roads remain significant challenges. For that reason, we continue to advocate for international security support, including a non-United Nations multinational force, as requested by the Haitian Government. The United States has provided more than $90 million in security support to Haiti in the past 18 months and will continue to provide critical bilateral support. We also continue to provide life-saving aid as the Haitian people struggle to cope with a rapidly deteriorating humanitarian situation that includes famine-like conditions in parts of Port-au-Prince and the country-wide spread of cholera.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9233 (2022) · source

  3. Together with our partner and co-penholder, Mexico, we introduced the resolution establishing a sanctions regime as an important step to help the Haitian people. The United States has also placed visa restrictions on parties known to have colluded with criminal gangs in Haiti. Those steps have already begun to have a chilling effect on gang leaders and the political and economic elites that are causing and financing the ongoing crises in Haiti. But we do not plan to stop there. We will continue to target violent gang leaders and their financiers. We are identifying additional targets to nominate at the United Nations in order to halt funding to those involved in the unrest in Haiti. We are encouraged by the fact that the Haitian National Police was able to re-establish control over the Varreux fuel terminal.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9233 (2022) · source

  4. That is the first time Haiti’s private sector leaders have united to such an extent in support of a political accord and democratic institutional reforms. We appreciate Ambassador Biang’s update on the activities of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2653 (2022), concerning Haiti, and the sanctions covering the first 60 days following its 21 October adoption establishing the sanctions regime. We are pleased that four highly qualified candidates have been selected to fill critical Panel of Experts vacancies covering finance, humanitarian affairs, armed groups, criminal networks and arms. We are also grateful for the progress Gabon has made to draft working guidelines for the Sanctions Committee.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9233 (2022) · source

  5. I thank the briefers for their participation. Before I give my remarks, I would like to welcome Foreign Ministers Généus and Álvarez Gil at this meeting today, and I look forward to hearing their perspectives on the current situation in Haiti. The United States continues to work to address Haiti’s insecurity and worsening humanitarian crisis and support Haitian-led efforts to facilitate a political accord that would benefit all Haitians. We understand Prime Minister Henry is hoping for an agreement on a broad-based political accord before the end of the year. We are cautiously optimistic following the 8 December statement from influential members of Haiti’s private sector, which expressed support for a consensus-based accord.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9233 (2022) · source

  6. ATMIS forces must also reconfigure and increasingly focus on enabling Somali-led operations, and ATMIS troop reductions in June 2023 must be based on operational necessity and strategic planning by the Federal Government of Somalia and the African Union. The transition plan must take into account recent and future security gains. We emphasize the need for reporting and dialogue, as requested in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the mandate. We urge the international community to continue to work with Somalia to support the development of a truly integrated Somali security sector, the key element of a sustainable transition of security responsibilities endorsed through today’s updated resolution.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9232 (2022) · source

  7. We applaud the increased operations against Al-Shabaab led by the Somali people, the Somali federal member states and the Somali Federal Government under the Administration of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. Those operations show progress towards a Somalia-led security sector as it relates to the transition from ATMIS. We accept the necessity of delaying the first ATMIS troop reduction from 31 December 2022 to 30 June 2023, but we are concerned that slow progress in meeting mandate objectives over the past year will hamper completing the transition by the end of 2024. It is vital to seize the opportunity presented by ongoing Somalia-led operations to ensure that liberated areas are stabilized and that coordination between the Federal Government of Somalia and ATMIS is strong.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9232 (2022) · source

  8. The United States is pleased to vote in favour of extending the mandate of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). We appreciate the constructive efforts of our United Kingdom colleagues to lead the Security Council in agreeing to a six-month delay of the planned drawdown of ATMIS phase l, of 2,000 ATMIS troops. Through today’s adoption of resolution 2670 (2022), ATMIS is mandated, inter alia, to reduce the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and to support the development of an integrated Somali security force capable of assuming progressively greater security responsibility. We recognize and honour the sacrifices by ATMIS and Somali security forces and the sacrifices of personnel serving in the African Union Mission in Somalia between 2007 and 2022.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9232 (2022) · source

  9. I would like to conclude by commending the United Kingdom’s careful and inclusive approach to penholding on this resolution, which reflected the will of the Council at every turn and serves as a model for all of us.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9231 (2022) · source

  10. We should call directly for the regime to face justice for the crimes it has reportedly committed, such as strikes on a school and a concert that killed scores of civilians. We should not overlook the General Assembly’s resolution in support of an arms embargo (General Assembly resolution 75/287). And we should pursue a mechanism to prevent the flow of financial resources to the regime. Those measures are critical to ending the bloodshed. Given these realities, the United States views the adoption of this resolution as an important start to the conversation within the Security Council on Myanmar. The Council should use this opportunity to seek additional ways to support the implementation of the five-point consensus and to promote accountability for the regime’s actions. We look forward to working with all members towards those ends.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9231 (2022) · source

  11. It also expresses concern with attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure, which have killed far too many innocent men, women and children. The resolution is premised on the important role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its Special Envoy in addressing the situation in Myanmar, as well as the importance of cooperation between the United Nations Special Envoy and her ASEAN counterpart. It helps answer the call from our ASEAN partners for greater support from the United Nations and the international community. We look forward to Special Envoy Heyzer’s briefing to the Security Council on the situation in Myanmar this spring. At the same time, this resolution does not go far enough. We should directly address the regime’s severe violations of the freedom of religion and belief.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9231 (2022) · source

  12. The United States welcomes the Council’s adoption of this resolution on Myanmar (resolution 2669 (2022)). The resolution is a strong next step in the Council’s efforts to address the Myanmar military regime’s egregious behaviour. The resolution comes in response to the regime’s brutal repression and violence, which pose a clear threat to international peace and security. The regime’s actions continue to contribute to regional instability and refugee flows, impacting neighbouring States while inflicting tremendous suffering on the people of Myanmar. The resolution notes the need for the regime to respect human rights, immediately release detained prisoners, allow unhindered humanitarian access and protect minority groups.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9231 (2022) · source

  13. The start of the new year presents an opportunity for the Al-Assad regime to begin the process of healing the country that it has so thoroughly shattered. We urge the regime to make clear its support for the provision of humanitarian assistance to all in Syria, including through cross-border deliveries, and to make clear its intention to constructively participate in Constitutional Committee meetings in Geneva as soon as Special Envoy Pedersen can convene them.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9230 (2022) · source

  14. We support a Syrian-led and Syrian-owned process, and we call on the Al-Assad regime to cooperate with Special Envoy Pedersen’s efforts to reconvene the Constitutional Committee, agree to and implement a comprehensive, nationwide ceasefire, and humanely release the more than 130,000 missing or arbitrarily detained persons. We remain concerned about the continued violence and recent escalation in northern Syria, which is putting civilians at risk and threatens the progress made in defeating ISIL. We urge all parties to de-escalate immediately, protect civilians and civilian objects and uphold international humanitarian law. We welcome Special Envoy Pedersen’s convening of the ceasefire task force in Geneva last Friday and hope the resumption of this format of meetings can help ensure stability on the ground.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9230 (2022) · source

  15. This is a significant step for United Nations sanctions related to Syria and builds on significant carve-outs already within United States sanctions for humanitarian aid for the Syrian people, including the delivery of food, medicine and other aid. As we better align these carve-outs across United Nations and United States sanctions, we are making clear that our sanctions should not impede humanitarian activity or the provision of assistance to all in need. Turning to the political situation, we regret there has been no progress on the Constitutional Committee, as its work has been blocked by arbitrary demands from Russia on unrelated issues.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9230 (2022) · source

  16. We note that the applicability of this carve-out to the Security Council’s ISIL and Al-Qaida sanctions regime pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) will provide important assurances to humanitarian actors in Syria, including those delivering cross-border aid. Just yesterday, the United States Department of Treasury released a new package of general licences to implement resolution 2664 (2022) across our domestic sanctions programmes, including some of the programmes related to Syria where humanitarian authorizations did not otherwise already exist. These updates to United Nations and United States sanctions facilitate humanitarian aid while maintaining sanctions on bad actors.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9230 (2022) · source

  17. Moreover, these camps and detention facilities are targets for attack by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), underscoring the urgency to facilitate durable solutions through voluntary, safe and dignified returns and repatriations. We call on all States to repatriate their citizens from the camps and detention facilities. We welcomed the adoption of resolution 2664 (2022) and greatly appreciate Ireland’s close collaboration with us in facilitating discussions with the Security Council over the last few months. The resolution established a humanitarian carve-out to the asset-freeze measures across United Nations sanctions regimes.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9230 (2022) · source

  18. United Nations experts have provided the Council a clear and logical accounting of their planning and efforts, which have been carried out consistent with humanitarian principles. The United States has done its part, including funding early-recovery projects in all 14 governorates of Syria and encouraging the provision of cross-line aid as determined by humanitarian needs. The continued presence of thousands of third- country nationals in displacement camps and detention centres in Syria further complicates the humanitarian situation in Syria and must be addressed. Violence is prevalent in the camps, and thousands of vulnerable children are growing up in them without access to education, protection, including proper documentation, medical care and other basic services.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9230 (2022) · source

  19. Cross-border humanitarian assistance deliveries are the most cost-effective and scalable way to provide food, medical supplies and other essentials to 2.4 million Syrians who are at risk of starvation, disease and exposure to brutal winter conditions in the north-west. The United Nations cross-border operation is among the most secure and transparent anywhere in the world. There is simply no substitute for cross-border assistance. The United Nations has implemented every element outlined in resolution 2642 (2022), notably increasing cross-line assistance deliveries and continuing the nationwide implementation of early-recovery projects. The United Nations has dispatched four cross-line aid convoys in the five months since we renewed the mandate in July, almost doubling the total of cross-line missions since they began in August 2021.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9230 (2022) · source

  20. The Council recognized in July the need for cross-border deliveries of humanitarian assistance to mitigate the devastating humanitarian situation in Syria, which continues to constitute a threat to peace and security in the region (see S/PV.9089). The Council recognized in July that the need for cross-border deliveries would extend beyond 10 January. The facts that led to that decision in July have not changed. Humanitarian conditions in Syria are worse than they have ever been since the start of the conflict, as Mr. Griffiths mentioned. Some 15.3 million people will require humanitarian assistance in 2023.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9230 (2022) · source

  21. I thank Special Envoy Pedersen and Under-Secretary-General Griffiths for their briefings. We would also like to acknowledge and thank the tireless and principled work of the current co-penholders, Ireland and Norway. This is the ninth meeting of the Security Council since the adoption of resolution 2642 (2022) in July: six briefings and three informal interactive dialogues, where United Nations leaders and humanitarian officials have repeatedly described for the Security Council the scale, transparency and necessity of cross-border deliveries of humanitarian assistance. Before the authorization for cross-border deliveries ends on 10 January, the Council must confirm the extension of the authorization, as envisioned in resolution 2642 (2022). This is not a complicated issue.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9230 (2022) · source

  22. I want to close by once again reaffirming the importance of a negotiated comprehensive settlement of all remaining issues between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

    2022-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9228 (2022) · source

  23. All parties must intensify their diplomatic engagement and make progress towards normalizing their relations through a comprehensive and sustainable peace agreement. There must be a negotiated comprehensive settlement of all remaining issues. The United States remains dedicated to a sustainable ceasefire and a peaceful resolution to this conflict. We remain actively engaged bilaterally, multilaterally and with partners as we work toward that shared goal. We remain ready to facilitate dialogue between Armenia and Azerbaijan bilaterally, trilaterally and in coordination with such partners as the European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, so as to achieve a long-term political settlement to the conflict in accordance with international law, including the United Nations Charter and the Helsinki Final Act.

    2022-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9228 (2022) · source

  24. The United States will continue to call on all sides to exercise restraint, immediately cease activities that undermine the peace process and observe their obligations under international humanitarian law. Outstanding grievances between Armenia and Azerbaijan must be solved through peaceful negotiations. Negotiations are the only way to achieve lasting peace. The international community must do its part and remain engaged in efforts to diplomatically broker a lasting peace. As time has shown, there can be no one sided or military solution to this conflict. Both parties must recommit to the diplomatic process and re-establish direct lines of communication across diplomatic channels.

    2022-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9228 (2022) · source

  25. I would also like to thank Assistant Secretary-General Jenča for his briefing today. The United States is deeply concerned by the ongoing impediments to use of the Lachin corridor and the growing humanitarian implications of the situation. Let me be clear: impediments to the use of the Lachin corridor set the peace process back, undermine international confidence in this process and carry potential severe humanitarian implications. We call on the Government of Azerbaijan and others responsible for the corridor’s security to restore free movement, including for humanitarian and commercial use, as soon as possible. We are encouraged by the restoration of gas supplies to the people of Nagorno-Karabakh. Any attempt to cut off services essential to the civilian population of Nagorno-Karabakh is unacceptable.

    2022-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9228 (2022) · source

  26. I take the floor a second time to make a brief statement in response to breaking news reports from Afghanistan. We understand that the Taliban’s so-called Ministry of Higher Education has just issued a decision banning women from public and private universities. The United States condemns in the strongest terms that absolutely indefensible position. The Taliban cannot expect to be a legitimate member of the international community until they respect the rights of all Afghans, especially the human rights and fundamental freedoms of women and girls. We will continue to work with the Security Council to speak with one voice on this issue.

    2022-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9227 (2022) · source

  27. The United States supports these Afghan-led efforts towards a political dialogue. The United States has repeatedly stated that the legitimacy and support that the Taliban seeks from the international community begins with the legitimacy they earn from the Afghan people through their actions. We will continue to work closely with UNAMA to aid the Afghan people now and in future.

    2022-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9227 (2022) · source

  28. We remain steadfast in holding the Taliban accountable for their commitments to the Afghan people and the international community. We expect the Taliban to follow through with their commitments on counter-terrorism in accordance with the Doha agreement. We also expect the Taliban to allow safe passage and freedom of movement, make efforts to build an inclusive system that gives the people a voice in their political future, and take responsibility for efforts aimed at supporting economic stability. Without a serious national political dialogue among Afghans about the future of their country, we could see the re-emergence of conflict. We regularly hear from Afghans that they do not want to see a return to conflict. We also see there is an active dialogue under way among Afghans inside the country, at subnational levels and in the diaspora.

    2022-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9227 (2022) · source

  29. We have provided more than $1.1 billion in humanitarian assistance since August 2021, and we will continue to address the needs of vulnerable Afghans in Afghanistan and of those who have fled to neighbouring countries. Our humanitarian aid has been and will remain unconditional, impartial and consistent with humanitarian principles. We are proud to have championed resolution 2615 (2021) last December, which maintains sanctions on bad actors while enabling humanitarian organizations to provide urgently needed humanitarian assistance and other activities that support basic human needs in Afghanistan. We also note that this resolution maintains an oversight mechanism to mitigate the diversion of assistance to sanctioned individuals.

    2022-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9227 (2022) · source

  30. As the Taliban increasingly adopt their old practices, they move further from normalization with the international community and the recognition they desire. We remain grateful for UNAMA’s efforts inside the country, including its work to foster dialogue at subnational levels, and its urging of all stakeholders to respect human rights. We believe UNAMA is well positioned to convene key stakeholders at the local and national level, including women and civil society groups, in ways that promote meaningful dialogue with the Taliban on a range of important issues. As the world’s leading humanitarian donor, the United States has always understood the centrality of humanitarian aid to help Afghans recover from a crippling economic crisis, decades of conflict and recurring natural disasters.

    2022-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9227 (2022) · source

  31. The Taliban has restricted the enjoyment of human rights by women and girls, including their right to education, movement and peaceful assembly as well as their right to work. Many independent media outlets have closed or been heavily censored. Those who dare to speak against the Taliban are frequently detained or worse. The Taliban’s actions have caused the economy to continue to decline, and Afghanistan’s already overwhelming humanitarian needs are growing. It is not only women and girls who are affected. We have seen the reports that the Taliban have ordered judges to impose the strict interpretation of sharia law, which includes carrying out public executions, amputations and floggings. These punishments are an affront to the dignity and the human rights of all Afghans. Many Afghans continue to reject these actions by the Taliban.

    2022-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9227 (2022) · source

  32. I thank Special Representative of the Secretary-General Otunbayeva and Under-Secretary-General Griffiths for their briefings. And we thank Ms. Seraj for her very sobering briefing on the overall situation in Afghanistan. The international community should take heed of her warning about the growing threat of terrorism emanating from Afghan soil. The United States would also like to thank the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) team for its ongoing work and tireless commitment to implementing the Security Council’s mandate in support of the Afghan people and international peace and security under challenging circumstances. As we all know, the reality on the ground more than one year after the Taliban takeover is dire.

    2022-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9227 (2022) · source

  33. But let me be clear: any further steps towards MONUSCO’s eventual drawdown should be agreed upon jointly by the United Nations and Democratic Republic of the Congo officials, in liaison with civil society, and should avoid exposing vulnerable populations to further harm. A hasty withdrawal, or a withdrawal that is not linked to meaningful improvements in political and security conditions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, would only undermine the progress that the country and MONUSCO have achieved together. We applaud Special Representative of the Secretary- General Keita and her team for continuing to implement MONUSCO’s mandate in the face of great challenges, and we look forward to continuing our strong support to the Mission over the coming year.

    2022-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9226 (2022) · source

  34. Just as important, the United States applauds the mandate’s clear reiteration of MONUSCO’s obligation to protect Goma and other population centres from armed groups, either unilaterally or in support of Congolese forces. While we feel strongly that MONUSCO remains an important element of the security infrastructure of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, we recognize that it cannot remain in the Democratic Republic of the Congo forever. As such, the United States appreciates the resolution’s candid acknowledgment of MONUSCO’s challenges. And we look forward to receiving options for further adapting the Mission’s configuration.

    2022-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9226 (2022) · source

  35. The resolution will ensure that MONUSCO can continue those important functions, especially as the Democratic Republic of the Congo moves into a pivotal election period. The United States is also pleased to see the mandate’s stronger focus on strategic communications and countering misinformation and disinformation, vital functions that MONUSCO and the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo should undertake jointly. Crucially, the resolution also urges regional military actors and the East African Community regional force to coordinate and deconflict operations with MONUSCO. It also demands an end to State support for armed groups, including Rwanda’s support to the Mouvement du 23 mars. The United States urges all regional actors to heed that call.

    2022-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9226 (2022) · source

  36. The United States voted in favour of resolution 2666 (2022) so that the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) can continue its laudable efforts to protect civilians, deliver humanitarian assistance and support the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on its path towards peace and stability. As the largest single-country financial contributor to the Mission, our commitment to MONUSCO is undeniable. Beyond that commitment, however, the United States voted in favour of the resolution because it clearly maintains human rights as a priority task for MONUSCO. Human rights monitoring and reporting are critical tasks for MONUSCO.

    2022-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9226 (2022) · source

  37. I extend my apologies for taking the floor. I would like to make a couple of points that need to be made, but I will be very brief. Others have pointed out all the various actions by Iran that have an impact on international peace and security, but let me just make a couple of points. We all know that Iran’s extraneous demands are the reason that there has not been a return to mutual compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. That is a fact. It has rejected all compromise proposals. That is also a fact. Let me just simply say that the ball is not in the United States’ court. On the contrary, the ball is in Iran’s court. The meeting rose at 5.05 p.m.

    2022-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9225 (2022) · source

  38. Now, months after that initial reported violation, we learned last week that Russia has resumed using Iranian drones procured in violation of resolution 2231 (2015). On 14 December, Russia launched a swarm of Iranian-made drones against Kyiv. In the light of those new developments, we renew our call to the Secretariat to document and analyse information related to that violation. Given Iran’s increasing integration into Russia’s defence sector, we fear that there will be more violations in future. Russia may even be tempted to further violate resolution 2231 (2015) by importing complete ballistic missiles from Iran. That is not acceptable. There must be some degree of accountability for openly violating Council resolutions.

    2022-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9225 (2022) · source

  39. Russia first started using Iranian drones toward the end of last summer. Ukraine duly reported that violation to the United Nations. Other countries, including the United States, have since supplied the United Nations with additional information and analysis regarding that violation. We regret that the United Nations has not moved to carry out a normal investigation of that reported violation. For seven years, the United Nations mandate to report on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) has been clear and unquestioned. We are disappointed that the Secretariat, apparently yielding to Russian threats, has not carried out the investigatory mandate the Council has given it. We were also discouraged by the lack of coverage of those violations in the Facilitator’s report (see S/2022/937) on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).

    2022-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9225 (2022) · source

  40. That report has been supported by ample evidence from multiple public sources. Tehran has acknowledged transferring unmanned aerial vehicles to Russia, including in a public statement on 5 November by Iran’s Foreign Minister. Let me state it clearly: paragraph 4 of Annex B of resolution 2231 (2015) prohibits all countries — even permanent members of the Security Council — from transferring those types of drones from Iran without advance Security Council approval. Russia’s open violation of resolution 2231 (2015) would be of serious concern under any circumstances. But we are exceptionally alarmed that Russia is using those drones to attack Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure. What could be crueller than seeking to turn out the lights, cut off the heat and shut down the water for millions of Ukrainian families?

    2022-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9225 (2022) · source

  41. We are grateful to the United Nations for its analysis of and investigation into significant quantities of arms and ammunition being sent from ports in Iran to the Houthis in Yemen. Many of those, including anti-materiel rifles, rocket-propelled grenade launchers and anti-tank guided missiles, have been determined to be likely of Iranian origin. Those shipments undermine international efforts to support a durable resolution to the conflict in Yemen and are a threat to regional security — issues that we should all be taking seriously. A few months ago, evidence emerged of even more grave violations of resolution 2231 (2015) — violations committed by a permanent member of the Council. Ukraine reported evidence of drones of Iranian origin being used by Russia to attack civilian infrastructure.

    2022-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9225 (2022) · source

  42. Unfortunately, Iran’s actions suggest that goal is not its priority. Its conduct since September, notably its repeated and long-standing failure to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency, as well as the expansion of its nuclear programme for no legitimate civilian purpose, reinforce our scepticism about Iran’s willingness and ability to reach a deal and explains why there have been no active negotiations since then. Given that context, the full and complete implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) remains a priority. Yet we see a disturbing trend whereby the Council is turning a blind eye to open violations of its provisions. Tolerating those violations undermines the authority of the Council and gravely harms our ability to respond credibly to threats around the world.

    2022-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9225 (2022) · source

  43. For months we have been engaged in serious negotiations aimed at a mutual return to the full implementation of the JCPOA. However, Iran’s own actions and stances have been responsible for preventing that outcome. In September, a deal was within reach — one to which all the other participants in the negotiations had agreed. Even Iran appeared to be prepared to say yes until the last minute, when it made new demands that were extraneous to the JCPOA and that it knew could not be met. That was not the first time Iran’s leaders had turned their backs on a deal that was on the table and approved by all. But that last instance dashed our collective hopes for a swift, mutual return to the full implementation of the JCPOA. We have made it clear that the door for diplomacy remains open.

    2022-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9225 (2022) · source

  44. I would like to thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo and Ambassadors Fergal Mythen and Silvio Gonzato for their briefings. Seven and a half years ago, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2231 (2015) as part of the diplomacy that produced the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). All the members of the Council recognized the importance of keeping in place certain critical restrictions, including prohibitions on the transfer of certain nuclear and ballistic-missile-related technology from Iran. We are meeting at a time when Iran is taking increasingly provocative steps to enhance its nuclear programme’s capacity. The concerns of the international community are increasing. The United States is fully committed to resolving those concerns through diplomacy.

    2022-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9225 (2022) · source

  45. Along with a group of other ambassadors, I had the opportunity to see first- hand the vast potential for Israel’s normalization with Arab countries. The Abrahama Accords have the potential to bring tremendous benefits to the region, and the United States will continue to be a strong advocate of the Accords as a way to further trade, innovation, partnerships and people-to-people exchanges in the Middle East. While normatization between Israel and its neighbours is not a substitute for building peace between Israelis and Palestinians, it provides new avenues for pursuing the same and creating new opportunities to benefit the lives of Palestinians. This Administration strongly believes in the value of normalization in harnessing its potential to create a more stable, secure and prosperous Middle East for the benefit of all.

    2022-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9224 (2022) · source

  46. We also underscore the imperative of maintaining the historic status quo at the Haram Al-Sharif/Temple Mount and condemn provocative actions and rhetoric related to the holy site. We urge all sides to take further steps to improve the situation to the benefit of the Israeli and Palestinian people alike. Steps — however small — are badly needed from both Israelis and Palestinians to begin to re-establish the confidence required to live side by side. We call on the international community to support such steps. However, amid the tension and anguish over the current situation, we must also look forward. I just returned from a trip to the United Arab Emirates and Israel led by my friends Ambassador Gilad Erdan and Ambassador Lana Nusseibeh.

    2022-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9224 (2022) · source

  47. Both parties must remain committed to the idea that each people deserves to have equal measures of security, stability, justice, dignity and democracy. Unilateral actions and unhelpful rhetoric by the parties only serve to escalate tensions, fuel violence and undermine the prospects of a negotiated two-State solution. Those actions must stop. The United States was deeply disappointed in the Palestinian-led initiative in the General Assembly to request an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice against Israel. This action is counterproductive and will only take the parties further away from the objective we all share of a negotiated two-State solution.

    2022-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9224 (2022) · source

  48. The heartbreaking death of a 16-year-old, Jana Zakarneh, is yet another tragic reminder of the human cost of this conflict and the importance of all parties to work to bring about an end to the conflict. In this regard, it is imperative that the parties take urgent action to reduce the troubling levels of extremist violence fuelling instability in the West Bank. The United States expects to see equal treatment of extremists — whether Israeli or Palestinian — in arrests, convictions and punishments, as well as equal allocation of resources to prevent and investigate violent attacks. It is also vital for Israeli and Palestinian leaders to both condemn all forms of violence irrespective of the nationality of the perpetrator.

    2022-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9224 (2022) · source

  49. I thank Special Coordinator Wennesland for his briefing. The United States applauds the difficult but important role the international community plays in the pursuit of peace and stability throughout the Middle East. At the outset, we would like to extend our condolences to the family of the Irish peacekeeper killed and wish a speedy recovery to the three injured in the attack on a United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon patrol. The United States strongly supports the vital work of peacekeepers. That incident is a reminder of the cost we all bear in the pursuit of peace and the responsibility we have to those lost in its noble pursuit to make all efforts to arrest the violence — not just in Lebanon. The United States is deeply concerned by the sustained escalation of violence in the West Bank.

    2022-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9224 (2022) · source

  50. The United States supports that work and urges Libyan leaders to engage constructively in order to deliver elections, which are desperately needed to restore the credibility of the Libyan Government and the faith of the Libyan people. Special Representative Bathily has a challenging mission before him, but we want to assure him of the continued steadfast support of the United States as he helps to move the Libyan people towards elections, better governance and, ultimately, security and prosperity.

    2022-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9223 (2022) · source