YouSaid · the spoken record

Wood

lines on the record: 630
first: 1994-05-05
most recent: 2023-12-21
sittings or episodes: 107
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“I thank Special Envoy Huang Xia for his informative briefing. I also welcome the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission and appreciate the advice to the Security Council he outlined this morning. Today’s meeting comes at a critical moment for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the broader Great Lakes region. Just last month, the Council travelled to Kinshasa and Goma. Two weeks ago (see S/PV.9298), Special Representative of the Secretary-General Keita provided an update on the critical contributions to, and sacrifices for, peace made by the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.”
2023-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9307 (2023) · source
“Iran has also transferred unmanned aerial vehicles to Russia, a fact that Iran’s Foreign Minister acknowledged in public statements on 5 November. Russia is using these drones to attack Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure. Let me state it clearly: resolution 2231 (2015), specifically Annex B, paragraph 4, prohibits all countries, even permanent members of the Security Council, from transferring these types of drones from Iran without advance Security Council approval. The most effective and obvious path towards peace and reducing risk of illicit diversion of arms would be for Russia to end the war that it started and withdraw its forces from all of Ukraine’s sovereign territory. We once again urge Russia to do so, and to do it now.”
2023-04-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9301 (2023) · source
“Russia has proposed that it would supply captured weapons to separatists in eastern Ukraine. These statements and actions are dangerous and irresponsible. Russia has also turned to rogue regimes to try to unlawfully obtain weapons and equipment to support its military operations. In November 2022, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea delivered infantry rockets and missiles into Russia for use by the Kremlin-backed Wagner Group, and we know Russia is actively seeking to acquire additional munitions from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Such arms transfers from the Democratic People’s Republic to Russia directly violate Security Council resolutions. These actions, particularly by a permanent member of the Security Council, are deeply disturbing and serve only to fuel Moscow’s brutal war of aggression against Ukraine.”
2023-04-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9301 (2023) · source
“The United States continues to work closely with Ukraine to establish and implement procedures to mitigate the risk of illicit diversion of weapons and military equipment. The Government of Ukraine is committed to appropriately safeguarding defence equipment and accounting for its transfer. We welcome the Ukrainian Government’s formation of a commission in 2022 to strengthen the monitoring of donated military equipment just this summer. Russia, on the other hand, has never let facts interfere with its false narratives. In a blatant effort to discredit Ukraine and weaken international support for Ukraine’s self-defence, Russia continues to spread disinformation about diversions. In fact, the greatest risk of illicit trafficking comes from battlefield capture of weapons by Russia and pro-Russia forces.”
2023-04-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9301 (2023) · source
“We assess the risk for potential illicit diversion of weapons when evaluating any proposed defence transfer anywhere in the world and take proactive steps to protect United States defence and dual-use technologies and prevent their diversion. We also carefully assess the risk of battlefield loss, particularly in complex environments. Let us now focus on the most conspicuous such environment today, Ukraine. We must not pretend that the conflict in Ukraine is a matter of weapons-export systems. Ukraine was invaded, and it has every right to defend itself, which is reflected in the United Nations Charter, and the international community has every right to continue its long-standing support for Ukraine’s defence. This equipment provides important support to Ukraine, and Ukraine has a strong incentive to protect it.”
2023-04-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9301 (2023) · source
“For over two decades, the United States has assisted other Governments in developing and adopting the necessary laws, regulations and policies to control the import and export of conventional weapons. We do this because we know that transparent laws and regulations allow countries to work together to hinder the illicit proliferation of these weapons. Our own policy on international arms transfers is laid out in our conventional arms transfer policy, which was updated earlier this year and is a matter of public record. Even with strong laws and wise policies in place, there are inherent risks of weapons capture and illicit diversion on the battlefield in any armed conflict. The United States takes these risks very seriously.”
2023-04-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9301 (2023) · source
“First, let me begin by thanking Mozambique for an outstanding presidency in March. I was pleased to be able to participate in the Security Council trip to the Democratic Republic of the Congo during the Mozambican presidency, and we appreciated Mozambique’s deliberate approach to its work in that role. Russia, on the other hand, began its presidency by trying to justify kidnapping Ukrainian children. Today’s meeting is a thinly veiled effort to portray Russia as a responsible actor in arms control, attempting to obfuscate the reality that it launched an unjustified armed invasion of its neighbour. Despitethecircumstancesthatbringustothe Security Council Chamber, I thank the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs for her thoughtful and thorough briefing today.”
2023-04-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9301 (2023) · source
“We are in full compliance with our obligations under the NPT, including article VI — which was raised here. Any suggestions that the United States is in violation of that Treaty are patently false. And the countries that raise that issue need to read the NPT — and the negotiating history of the NPT — which I have read several times. I therefore fundamentally reject that charge. My last point is that we are here to address specifically Russia’s deployment, or planned deployment, of nuclear weapons in Belarus, which is a fundamental threat to international peace and security. And our Russian colleague has not explained in full what is going on with that potential deployment. We therefore call on Russia to adhere to its international obligations with regard to arms control.”
2023-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9300 (2023) · source
“Russia at no time fundamentally objected to the arrangements that NATO already had in existence. It signed and ratified the Treaty. It was only after its invasion of Crimea that it decided to look for a reason to get out of the Treaty, or to at least accuse the United States in essence of violating the NPT. And so, for nearly four decades, we heard nothing from Russia about nuclear sharing. So it is quite strange how, after all those years, Russia decided that it had no problems with it until after its invasion of Crimea. I therefore want to be clear about the issue of nuclear sharing, because it is quite important. The issue of NATO nuclear sharing, as I said, was an issue that was discussed during the negotiations for the NPT. The United States has not violated, and will not violate, the NPT.”
2023-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9300 (2023) · source
“We worked very hard over the years — myself and a number of my colleagues — to try to convince Russia to come back into compliance with the INF Treaty. In 2017, Russia finally admitted the existence of that missile, but said that it was not outside the INF Treaty range. After much deliberation internally and with allies, the United States decided that Russia was in material breach of the INF Treaty and therefore subsequently took a step to withdraw from the Treaty, which was extremely unfortunate, but we felt we had no choice but to do that. I just wanted to make sure the record was clear on that. With regard to the issue of nuclear sharing, that is an issue that was discussed, as the High Representative mentioned, back in the negotiations in the late 1960s with regard to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).”
2023-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9300 (2023) · source
“I apologize for taking the floor again, but I need to respond to some charges that were levelled against the United States by the representative of the Russian Federation. Frankly, there are too many ridiculous charges to respond to. Russia has totally distorted the facts surrounding the unfortunate demise of several treaties, but I will address just a couple of issues that I think are fundamentally important and that were raised. Regarding the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty), the United States engaged Russia back in 2013 and made clear that it had evidence that Russia was in violation of the INF Treaty through the deployment of a non-INF-range missile called known as an 9M729. Russia denied the existence of that missile.”
2023-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9300 (2023) · source
“Russia should immediately cease escalatory rhetoric around the potential use of nuclear weapons. Any use of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons in Ukraine would have severe consequences for the maintenance of international peace and security and would fundamentally change the nature of this war. And any use of nuclear weapons would break the record of non-use of such weapons, which has held for nearly 80 years. We also call on the Lukashenko regime to cease its complicity in Russia’s war against Ukraine. And we again call on Russia to de-escalate, starting with the cessation of its war of aggression against Ukraine.”
2023-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9300 (2023) · source
“No other country is increasing nuclear deployments in Europe or issuing implied threats of use. No country is threatening Russia or threatening President Putin. Putin’s war against Ukraine is one that the Kremlin could end in a moment if it chooses. That it deliberately chooses not to is telling, as are the actions of those who would criticize Ukraine for defending its sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence. In the light of the international community’s overwhelming support for peace, as demonstrated by last month’s General Assembly vote (see A/ES-11/PV.19) on a just and lasting peace, we call on Russia to reconsider its intentions to forward-deploy nuclear weapons to Belarus and once again call on Russia to withdraw its troops from Ukraine.”
2023-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9300 (2023) · source
“In the face of those violations, it is unfortunate that some on the Council have chosen a policy of ignoring Russia’s aggression against the Ukrainian people by refusing to acknowledge Russia’s dangerous actions or condemn its violations of the principles of the United Nations Charter. Those who have chosen that path enable further violations by Russia, exacerbating the conflict and moving us all further away from peace by turning a blind eye to the cause of this conflict, which is Russia’s armed invasion of Ukraine. No legitimate path to peace can stem from a refusal to recognize the facts. No other country is inflicting such damage on arms control or seeking to undermine strategic stability in Europe. No other country has raised the prospect of potential nuclear use in connection with the war in Ukraine.”
2023-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9300 (2023) · source
“Since then, Russia has strayed even further from the implementation of its arms control obligations, with its purported suspension of participation in the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. Not only was that legally invalid, but it demonstrates an increasingly disturbing trend of Russia’s reliance on nuclear weapons and provocative nuclear rhetoric to intimidate those prepared to help Ukraine provide for its legitimate self-defence. The Kremlin is attempting to manipulate the spectre of nuclear conflict to help win its illegal war against Ukraine, while it further tramples on the Charter of the United Nations.”
2023-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9300 (2023) · source
“Putin’s continued disregard for his promises to his friends, for Russia’s international obligations and commitments and his willingness to sacrifice strategic stability to achieve his goals in Ukraine is a risk to the Council’s agenda regarding the maintenance of international peace and security. It was Russia’s decisions that led to the termination of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 2019. Through its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia has further contravened its commitments under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum. Last year it was Russia, and Russia alone, that decided to block consensus on a final document at the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.”
2023-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9300 (2023) · source
“The Lukashenko regime paved the way for Putin’s decision on 25 March by enacting a series of constitutional changes in February 2022, against the will of most Belarusians, to enable Russia’s stationing of nuclear weapons in Belarus. Indeed, Russia appears willing to break its promises whenever it suits President Putin’s interests. Less than a fortnight ago, President Putin committed, in a joint statement with China, to effectively reduce the risk of nuclear war and cynically stated that “nuclear-weapons States should refrain from deploying nuclear weapons abroad and withdraw nuclear weapons deployed abroad”.”
2023-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9300 (2023) · source
“It would not be necessary to supply Ukraine with defensive weapons and equipment if Russia had not launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. And now, through completely irresponsible rhetoric and continued disinformation, Russia seeks to escalate its unprovoked war against Ukraine rather than to seek peace. President Putin’s 25 March announcement noting intentions to forward-deploy nuclear weapons to Belarus is not about nuclear burden-sharing. There are no credible defence-related reasons for Russia to station nuclear weapons in Belarus. Lukashenko continues to provide material and logistical support to Russia’s military and for months has parroted Russia’s irresponsible and false narrative of provocation.”
2023-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9300 (2023) · source
“Viewing the Kremlin’s announcement in the context of the totality of Russia’s behaviour, it becomes quite clear that that announcement has nothing to do with an ammunition type — one that, by the way, has been in use for decades and that Russia itself possesses — rather, it has everything to do with the Kremlin’s attempts to limit and deter international security assistance for Ukraine’s defence of its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. The reality is that the Kremlin does not want Ukraine to possess the capability to defend itself against Russia’s tanks. But let us recall a simple, immutable fact: Russia’s tanks would not come into contact with those armour- piercing munitions if Russia’s tanks were not within Ukraine’s sovereign territory in the first place.”
2023-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9300 (2023) · source
“I thank the High Representative for her informative and sobering briefing this morning. It is unfortunate that this meeting was necessary today, but President Putin is escalating Russia’s dangerous and destabilizing behaviour by threatening to deploy nuclear weapons in Belarus. He has once again reminded the world of his disregard for international law, including the Charter of the United Nations. Russia’s suggestion that that intended deployment is somehow justified because of the use of armour-piercing ammunition is ludicrous. To state the obvious: armour-piercing ammunition is in no away analogous to tactical nuclear weapons.”
2023-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9300 (2023) · source
“That report will provide valuable insight into the Government’s capacities and enable the international community to assist in the prevention of small-arms trafficking and diversion. The United States offers its full support to Special Representative of the Secretary-General Keita and her team as they execute their mandate amid increasingly difficult circumstances. MONUSCO will not resolve the conflict on its own, and no one should expect as much. But supported by, and in coordination with, the Nairobi and Luanda processes, and alongside the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, neighbouring States and the United Nations, MONUSCO can play an important role. I thank Ms. Keita for her commitment to bringing peace to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the broader Great Lakes region.”
2023-03-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9298 (2023) · source
“I remind the authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo of their responsibility to work closely with the United Nations leadership to fulfil those benchmarks so that MONUSCO can safely and responsibly withdraw at an appropriate time. The Democratic Republic of the Congo and the United Nations country team must work together to ensure that essential functions, including promoting human rights and ensuring accountability, continue before, during and, most important, after that transition. Similarly, we remind the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo of the Security Council’s request for a confidential report on weapons- and ammunition-management efforts following the Council’s easing of sanctions in December of last year.”
2023-03-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9298 (2023) · source
“In that very difficult environment, MONUSCO has been working to carry out its mandate, including providing limited logistics support to the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as officially requested. I was encouraged to learn that CENI had been closely coordinating with MONUSCO. That partnership will help to enable a timely and comprehensive voter registration process in preparation for elections later this year. The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo should ensure free and fair elections in accordance with constitutional deadlines. MONUSCO and the Democratic Republic of the Congo also continue to work together on the Mission’s benchmark-driven transition plan.”
2023-03-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9298 (2023) · source
“While in Kinshasa, I called on officials of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to denounce hate speech, hold individuals accountable for inciting violence and correct such damaging narratives. I repeat those messages today. We also remain deeply troubled by the increasing number of attacks by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Sham-Democratic Republic of the Congo, also known as the Allied Democratic Forces, and the Coopérative pour le développement du Congo against civilians. The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its regional and international partners cannot neglect that ongoing violence.”
2023-03-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9298 (2023) · source
“The United States has long been concerned by the collaboration of the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo with armed groups in the east, especially the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda. Just as we stated on numerous previous occasions, we reiterate our call on the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to fully professionalize its security forces and immediately end cooperation with armed groups. It has become very clear that the level of disinformation and hateful rhetoric directed towards Rwanda, minority groups and MONUSCO is increasingly putting civilians and peacekeepers in harm’s way.”
2023-03-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9298 (2023) · source
“The United States calls on all parties to act expeditiously to meet those commitments in full. The United States reiterates its call on Rwanda to end support for the United Nations-sanctioned Mouvement du 23 mars (M-23) and urges Council members to consider how that kind of support runs afoul of the existing sanctions regimes. We remind all States of the importance of the territorial integrity of States as one of the founding principles of the Charter of the United Nations — something that the Security Council is working hard to protect. That is not to imply that Rwanda is solely responsible for the conflict. Rather, the M-23 and Rwanda’s actions have escalated an already troubling humanitarian and security situation.”
2023-03-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9298 (2023) · source
“I thank Special Representative of the Secretary-General Keita for her briefing today. I also thank her for hosting the Security Council during its visit to the Democratic Republic of the Congo earlier this month. The visit gave us not only valuable insight into the important work of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), but also a deeper and more sobering understanding of the deteriorating humanitarian and security situation in the east. The United States welcomes the initiative and commitment of regional partners, specifically those participating in the East African Community-led Nairobi process and the Luanda process, and we recognize the modest progress made to date towards the implementation of the commitments agreed in prior communiqués.”
2023-03-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9298 (2023) · source
“I would just say to my Russian colleague that, instead of asking questions about the United States and its views towards critical infrastructure, it needs to ask itself about what it is doing in Ukraine and whether that shows responsible behaviour with regard to critical infrastructure.”
2023-03-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9295 (2023) · source
“Typical of the Russian playbook is to always pose a question without really having any intent. First and foremost, I do not read Seymour Hersh’s articles. And frankly, the United States does not base its policies, or responds, simply to charges by an individual journalist. Let me just say that the charges that have been made by Russian officials about supposed United States culpability for carrying out these attacks are just flat-out wrong, plain and simple. I would just submit to my Russian colleague that, instead of playing politics with such an important issue as this, Russia should deal with the question of critical infrastructure and responsibility. Again, I point to the fact that Russia has no credibility when it comes to the issue of protecting critical infrastructure. Just look at what it is doing in Ukraine.”
2023-03-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9295 (2023) · source
“My apologies for taking the floor, but I need to respond to points that were made by the representative of the Russian Federation. As has been mentioned, ever since the attacks took place Russia has claimed that the United States was responsible for carrying them out. With those comments, it was very clear that Russia was not interested in an impartial investigation. It had already decided who the culprit was. Russia was simply playing politics. The three countries that have launched investigations are concerned about what is happening to infrastructure around the world. We need to let those investigations play out. I think it is a positive sign that Russia is showing concern about a threat to critical infrastructure, particularly that piece of critical infrastructure.”
2023-03-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9295 (2023) · source
“We cannot allow Russia’s continued spurious allegations to distract the Council or unnecessarily divert the Organization’s scarce resources from other pressing matters deserving of the Council’s attention and resources. If Russia were truly committed to protecting civilian infrastructure, it would demonstrate that through its actions. Russia’s claim to be concerned about the sabotage of critical infrastructure belies the fact that Russia is relentlessly attacking its neighbour. It is striking cities and towns across Ukraine, damaging and destroying residential areas and medical facilities. Russia’s attacks against Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure have left millions displaced, without power and in need of humanitarian assistance. Russia’s calls for accountability today ring hollow.”
2023-03-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9295 (2023) · source
“Over the course of many rounds of consultations, Russia failed to provide any credible new information to justify a United Nations investigation at this time. I repeat that Russia has consistently sought to advance a political agenda based on unfounded accusations and predetermined culpability. Russia’s decision to call for a vote on a draft resolution that has such little support should make us all question what its true intent is. United Nations resources for United Nations investigations should be preserved for scenarios in which States fail or are unable to carry out genuine, impartial investigations. That is not the case today.”
2023-03-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9295 (2023) · source
“The competent national investigations by Sweden, Denmark and Germany are proceeding in a comprehensive, transparent and impartial manner. As many Council members have said, they must first be allowed to conclude. That is why we did not support this draft resolution and abstained in the voting today. We must ask why, despite having failed to make its case to the Council, Russia still chose to bring this draft resolution to a vote. It is difficult to accept Russia’s posturing that it seeks only an impartial, independent investigation. Let it be clear, for the record, that the first draft of Russia’s draft resolution clearly implicated the United States based on mischaracterizations of statements made by United States officials. The first draft criticized the investigations of other Member States.”
2023-03-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9295 (2023) · source
“Let me begin by reiterating our deep concern regarding the sabotage that took place on the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 pipelines in September 2022. The United States categorically refutes Russia’s unfounded allegations levelled against us in relation to that act of sabotage. The United States was not involved in any way. As we have said previously, the international community cannot tolerate any deliberate actions to damage critical infrastructure. However, let us be clear on what Russia’s draft resolution (S/2023/212) was and what it was not. It was an attempt to discredit the work of ongoing national investigations and prejudice any conclusions they reach that do not comport with Russia’s predetermined and political narrative. It was not an attempt to seek the truth.”
2023-03-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9295 (2023) · source
“The Group of Experts is one of the most effective tools at our disposal in supporting the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), and it will be crucial to clarify its responsibilities so it can engage fully in the activities that are clearly outlined in the Committee’s mandate. The possibility that weapons of mass destruction may be acquired and used by terrorists or other non-State actors remains one of the greatest threats we have to international peace and security. Resolution 1540 (2004) is one of the few established, authoritative international instruments in place to address those threats, and the 1540 Committee remains a vital tool for ensuring that the resolution and its implementation are as strong and effective as possible.”
2023-03-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9293 (2023) · source
“Another key feature of resolution 2663 (2022), intended to encourage implementation, is the sharing of technical guides that States may find useful when implementing resolution 1540 (2004). The United States fully supports making such information available so that Member States can draw on it, and we look forward to participating in upcoming discussions on the topic. We also look forward to improving transparency in the 1540 Committee by adopting much-needed updates to its internal guidelines to account for and describe the activities to be undertaken by the Committee’s Group of Experts, as required by resolution 2663 (2022).”
2023-03-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9293 (2023) · source
“Accordingly, we further welcomed resolution 2663 (2022), which the Council adopted on 30 November to renew the mandate of the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts. In that resolution, the Security Council also tasked the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts with increasing their outreach to Member States and other stakeholders in order to address those gaps, including by hosting open consultations with all States Members of the United Nations and other stakeholders and encouraging States to develop voluntary national action plans and participate in voluntary peer reviews. We look forward to actively participating in the Committee’s efforts to pursue that outreach.”
2023-03-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9293 (2023) · source
“I thank Ambassador Pérez Loose for his informative briefing. We congratulate Ecuador on its chairmanship of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and Ambassador Pérez Loose on the excellent leadership he has shown during his tenure. The United States fully concurs with the Chair’s assessment that resolution 1540 (2004) remains a vital component of the global non-proliferation architecture for preventing non-State actors from gaining access to weapons of mass destruction. While much progress has indeed been made, we should also highlight the results of the 1540 Committee’s comprehensive review, completed on 30 November 2022, which found that gaps in implementation remain.”
2023-03-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9293 (2023) · source
“We are happy to see all Council members re-endorse that and look forward to continuing our work to address the threat posed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s unlawful weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes.”
2023-03-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9292 (2023) · source
“We discussed several proposals prior to the majority decision to seek a technical rollover. They included concerns about leaks, the inner workings and composition of the Panel of Experts and improving the process of receiving regular assessments from the Panel on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s ballistic missile advancements, such as through briefings or incident reports. Although we could not come to a decision on a package that would address all those concerns, we look forward to continuing discussions on those important items through the Committee’s regular business. The mandate renewal resolution reaffirms what multiple resolutions have determined — that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security.”
2023-03-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9292 (2023) · source
“The United States would like to express its appreciation for today’s renewal, for an additional year, of the mandate of the of the Panel of Experts of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006). We are pleased to see resolution 2680 (2023) re-authorize the mandate of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Panel of Experts, which provides credible, fact-based, independent assessments, analysis and recommendations bearing on the implementation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-related Security Council resolutions. That work has never been more important in the light of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s unprecedented number of provocations. And we are pleased to see resolution 2664 (2022) — co-penned by the United States and Ireland — being applied to the work of the 1718 Committee.”
2023-03-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9292 (2023) · source
“The chronic violence highlights the urgent need for the implementation of the Juba Agreement for Peace in the Sudan, including the full deployment of the Joint Security-Keeping Force in Darfur, inclusive security-sector reform and comprehensive, inclusive and transparent transitional justice processes.”
2023-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9289 (2023) · source
“For that process to succeed, the parties must foster an environment conducive to the participation of all stakeholders so that they can freely express their views without fear of retribution. Furthermore, all Sudanese citizens must be protected from violence in any form. Full respect for freedom of association, expression and peaceful assembly is vital. We have consistently condemned violence against peaceful protesters and their unjust detention, and we renew our call for those responsible to be held accountable. Turning to Darfur, we note with concern that the security situation remains extremely volatile and dangerous and that tensions and violence have increased in other regions.”
2023-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9289 (2023) · source
“We call on all the parties to put the Sudan’s national interests above narrow political ends and urgently and constructively engage with one another to reach a final political agreement that realizes the Sudanese people’s continued calls for freedom, peace and justice. In support of that, and recognizing the fragility of democratic transitions, the United States will promote accountability for spoilers, whether military or political actors, who attempt to undermine or delay the Sudan’s democratic progress. We continue our support for the Sudanese-led process in close coordination with the trilateral mechanism. We urge all the parties to engage in good- faith dialogue and ensure that women, young people, displaced persons and representatives from all over the Sudan have an opportunity to participate in shaping their country’s future.”
2023-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9289 (2023) · source
“I thank Special Representative of the Secretary-General Perthes for his very thoughtful briefing. Reaching a final political agreement on a new civilian-led transitional Government is essential to ending the Sudan’s political crisis and addressing its urgent political, economic, security and humanitarian challenges. We acknowledge the significant work done in phase two of the framework agreement process and urge the parties to capitalize on it by swiftly finalizing an agreement on a new civilian-led Government and interim constitutional arrangements that will enable the Sudan to resume its democratic transition. We acknowledge that the military leaders have reiterated their willingness to withdraw the military from politics.”
2023-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9289 (2023) · source
“It is clear that there is much work to be done in order to continue to learn from our experiences in security sector reform and to strengthen the practice of security sector reform as a tool for international peace and security.”
2023-03-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9285 (2023) · source
“We support the recommendations in the Secretary- General’s report for the United Nations to conduct security sector reform assessments in cooperation with national and international partners in order to inform planning, monitoring and evaluation of security sector reform efforts. The report highlights useful examples of joint planning in which strategic partnerships have provided a solid foundation for long-term sustainable security sector reform and governance efforts. We commend such collaboration and fully support the Secretary-General’s recommendation to further strengthen it. We also take note of the many opportunities for capacity-building highlighted throughout the report.”
2023-03-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9285 (2023) · source
“Similarly, deferring those tasks to newly established mechanisms or technical bodies also appears to reduce the timely development of durable security arrangements. Experience shows us that these processes take longer and are less successful than processes that outline longer-term national security architecture arrangements upfront. The third key theme is the importance of developing strategic partnerships, integrated and joint planning processes, joint assessments and more transparent cooperation and coordination among partners working in the security sector reform and governance space.”
2023-03-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9285 (2023) · source
“As the Secretary-General said, demonstrable human rights compliance is a key indicator of the professionalism of security forces and the exercise of responsible command. Without it, security sectors will not gain the trust of populations. The second key theme is the need to address the governance of the security sector and the necessary security sector reform during early phases of United Nations engagement, as well as the real risks that come with rushing or deferring long-term agreements on security sector reform in governance. As the Secretary- General’s report points out, leaving security-related disputes unresolved and putting in place temporary arrangements that are doomed to fail only undermines and delays long-term reform efforts.”
2023-03-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9285 (2023) · source
“The United States fully supports the Secretary-General’s focus on ensuring the meaningful participation and representation of local communities, women, young people and civil society in the development of national security strategies and plans. We recognize that local security mechanisms and practices can provide viable entry points for building trust with local populations and encouraging cooperation with State security institutions. Locally driven civil and military consultative mechanisms, such as those cited in Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia after peacekeeping transitions, can also play a critical role in sustaining and strengthening reform efforts in transition contexts. We endorse the importance of putting human rights-focused and gender-responsive approaches at the centre of engagement in security sector reform.”
2023-03-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9285 (2023) · source