Alice-Mary Higgins
National University of Ireland · Independent · Ireland
“We are signing up to be customers of liquefied natural gas - potentially fracked gas, potentially coming from a country that is busily fighting against climate action and trying to fast-track our route to destruction. We will be doing that every year in the budget and every day in the terminal.”
“We are not getting solid measures on those safeguards. The other safeguards we have, which are our planning laws and climate laws, are being either fast-tracked or suspended. We are suspending the existing safeguards and are not putting hard safeguards into this Bill, and we are being asked to go on faith.”
“Nonetheless, I have some practical questions. We need a little more on what the emergency is because it is not sufficient to say we will deal with it then. The emergency is the ground on which the Minister of State is asking for the normal planning process and the climate Act to be suspended. We need to know what the emergency is.”
“It should happen only after all relevant market-based measures have been implemented. Those market measures should include the demand-reduction strategies that are eligible under N-1, including demand reduction by large energy users, and should have been implemented, exhausted and proven insufficient.”
“Sure there is detail in it but the key issue is that what he is asking of the Oireachtas, which is to agree to it being built, is on the argument of there being an emergency. It should be very clear what the emergency is. I mentioned previously that the committee said our N-1 obligations could be met through demand management.”
“It comes from real places with real communities that are immediately and terribly impacted by fracking, as well as having an impact on the atmosphere that surrounds our beautiful planet, which we are destroying. As the Minister of State said, it impacts not just on business but on the liveability of large portions of this planet.”
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“The Minister says he has new legislation coming, but will his new biometric identification legislation be narrowed to when biometric information is compared to databases of names that are made up of letters and not biometric information? Named individuals is not the category. Let us talk about things that are biometric. Some of the things that are biometric are "physical, physiological or behavioural human features". Those are biometric pieces of information. That is what the Minister is proposing to compare under biometric analysis through "automated recognition and categorising of instances of physical, physiological or behavioural human features", and that they would be compared in respect of other instances of the particular unidentified individual. There is identified and unidentified.”
“The Minister did not address in his response this newly invented narrowing of the frame to "a database of one or more named individuals". A database of named individuals being one half of the comparison is not biometric identification under the EU law. The EU law is comparing biometric information with biometric information and what the Minister has just described is this different activity. It may be a worthy activity. Maybe the Minister could take this activity of comparing biometric information with a database of named individuals and give that a name. Maybe we could give that a new name. Maybe we could call that "biometric name alignment checking" or whatever we want, but that is a different and very specific, narrower activity. It is extremely important that the Minister start getting this right.”
“I hate to say that the Minister and I are not in agreement. I do not believe there is a difference, or any substantial difference, between biometric analysis, as the Minister defines it in this Bill, and biometric identification, as it is defined in the EU law. They are actually almost exactly the same. What the Minister describes under biometric analysis and what is described under biometric identification in the EU law are the same. Where there is a difference is between the Minister's definition of biometric identification in this legislation and the EU definition of biometric identification. The Minister is defining biometric identification differently to the EU AI Act. That is quite an extraordinary thing to do.”
“I urge the Minister to accept these changes to the definition in order to allow us proceed to have a real conversation about biometric identification rather than sidestep into a conversation about biometric analysis, which is apparently fine and does not need safeguards to the same degree at all.”
“Diluting it in this way is really damaging, not just in the context of the collective challenge we have in properly addressing the uses of AI in an ethical fashion internationally but also with regard to the public's confidence that they are seeing justice in the round at work. The Minister and I may disagree on biometric identification and its uses, as well as some of the other aspects of the law and all that, but let us begin the conversation from point at which we are using language in a way that is meaningful, accurate and comes with understood ramifications and safeguards.”
“It was not that she and I had different definitions of biometric; it was the fact that there is a definition of biometric in the GDPR and that she, her Department and the Government seemed to believe that if they avoided referring to it, the definition in question would not apply. The Minister will recall that I referred to the difference between hiring Biometric Card Services to produce social services cards and hiring Security Card Concepts Limited to do it. We are dealing with law, particularly European law, and its application here to issues crucial to effective democracy and the accountability of our institutions, as well as the delivery of justice in the round and the balancing that was attempted in the creation of the definition of "biometric identification" at EU level and of the appropriate safeguards.”
“Recital 17 of the AI Act outlines that as long as there is a comparison of biometric data with other source material containing biometric data, it is considered a process of biometric identification regardless of the technology, processes or types of data used. The Minister might clarify why he does not want to go with the definition of "biometric identification" contained in the AI Act. Is it because it is far too close to the definition being applied to the made-up concept of biometric analysis? I said this when I engaged with the Minister on Committee Stage. I had a very long journey in respect of a previous process with the former Minister, Regina Doherty, in relation to biometrics and attempts to create fantasies about what is and is not biometric data. Ms Doherty simply stated that we had different opinions.”
“Amendment No. 3 replaces the definition of "biometric identification" proposed by the Minister with the wording on biometric identification that is used in the EU AI Act, which at no point refers to databases of named individuals. That is just a concoction that has been created to try to make a narrower and different version of biometric identification and to state that we will apply all the rules and safeguards - the things that were weighed up very carefully over a long period at European level - but only in the much narrower set of circumstances we have chosen. Again, the definition in the Bill is very narrow and is not in line with the AI Act. A reference database is not required to contain the names of particular individuals.”
“The exact example the Minister gave us is explicitly described as an example of a post-remote biometric system under the recital to the EU Act, namely, CCTV footage compared with the footage of those on a bus, pictures of video footage generated by closed circuit television cameras or private devices that are being generated not with the purpose of seeking out a particular individual but that are being generated and then are being compared. As such, amendment No. 1 clearly outlines and makes clear that biometric analysis involves the use of biometric identification systems. Amendment No. 2 is consequential on amendment No. 1 and removes the line which states that biometric analysis "does not include biometric identification". You cannot make international law go away by literally stating in a Bill that it does not apply in this country.”
“Looking to the examples again, the Minister stated that biometric analysis could involve a garda looking at CCTV footage and comparing a person with one who committed an assault and considers it to be the same person who gets off the bus. This fits the definition of a post-remote biometric identification system as outlined in Recital 17 of the AI Act which refers to: material, such as pictures or video footage generated by closed circuit television cameras or private devices, which has been generated before the use of the system in respect of the natural persons concerned.”
“It is interesting to note there is one area where a little bit of a differentiation is allowed between things that you are doing immediately and things that you are doing at a slight time delay. What is made clear in the examples used about that is the examples used are of CCTV footage, of video footage. The video and CCTV footage the Minister seems to think are somehow not the databases that are meant by the AI Act, are very clearly anticipated and understood to be relevant databases. It is a database if it is a bank of recordings of persons on a bus that have been taken that day. It is a database if it is footage captured on CCTV. If those two are being compared then you are comparing biometric data with biometric data in another database.”
“It is worth noting that elsewhere in the Act, which we will come to shortly, the same examples as the Minister used are clarified, such as somebody breaks a window and is caught on CCTV and then gets on a bus, and it is noted that it seems to be the same person. That is what the Minister described as biometric analysis. However, that is biometric identification. That is comparing the biometric information of somebody, their appearance and such factors, and comparing it with other biometric identification. That is biometric identification. Having it be a named database is not what the AI Act at EU level talks about or looks for because names are not biometric. They are relevant information. They are not biometric information.”
“Recital 17 of the EU Act clarifies that The notion of 'remote biometric identification system' referred to in this Regulation should be defined functionally, as an AI system intended for the identification of natural persons without their active involvement, typically at a distance, through the comparison of a person’s biometric data with the biometric data contained in a reference database, irrespectively of the particular technology, processes or types of biometric data used. That does not say biometric identification is comparison with a database with a list of names in it. That is not what it says. It refers to a "reference database".”
“That is why we have done that in this amendment. I hope that will be supported. In regard to amendment No. 3, biometric identification as the Minister defines it in the Bill, is basically something inserted which was not in the AI Act. For biometric identification, the Minister is now saying that biometric identification is when you compare data with a database of named individuals. That is not what the AI Act describes as biometric identification.”
“Truly, if a line must be inserted to state "This is not biometric identification" at the end of the definition, that is to acknowledge that all the signs point to it being biometric identification, because what was repeatedly described by the Minister on Committee Stage as identifying unidentified persons is a process of identifying. If it is a matter of comparing biometric information with other biometric information and concluding that that seems to be the same person, then that is biometric identification. The Minister then referenced that if we were trying to correct the definition of biometric analysis to make it clear that it encompasses and reflects biometric identification as understood by the AI Act then really we should be challenging the definition of biometric identification that is also in the Bill.”
“Under the EU AI Act, when biometric identification is being conducted, there are requirements in terms of judicial approval and other safeguards. However, those do not apply when it comes to what is being described by the Government as biometric analysis. The definition of biometric analysis that is in this Bill is so close to the activity of biometric identification under the EU AI Act that a line had to be inserted stating that we have just described something that sounds very like biometric identification but we are just going to put a line in at the end that says this is not biometric identification.”
“I do not believe there was an attempt to create a separate category called biometric analysis at that time, unless Ireland attempted to create a separate category of biometric analysis when the Act was being drafted. The Minister might clarify that point. Effectively, it seems the Minister is trying to use this term to distinguish the use of biometric technologies under this Bill from the use of biometric technologies as outlined in the AI Act and use that renaming of the activity as a way to sidestep the obligations, safeguards and guardrails that are outlined in that European legislation. Subsequent sections of the Bill, for example, allow for flexible use of the technology and of biometric analysis without adequate safeguards and the necessary judicial approval for use.”
“In regard to amendments Nos. 1 to 3, inclusive, we are attempting to bring this Bill back in line with the protections and the safeguards outlined in the EU AI Act. As we described on Committee Stage, the Government is using a novel term it has made up, namely, the term "biometric analysis". It is preparing codes of practice and regulations around the use of this brand new term and category of thing. However, when we look at it, the activities being planned for require biometric identification systems which are categorised as high risk AI systems under the AI Act. Biometric analysis is not a term used in the European legislation. It is not captured by the regulations within that Act.”
“There is also the concern with regard to criticising or challenging states engaged in colonial action, be it historic or contemporary. Can the Minister of State assure us that there is no danger for persons who are rightly protesting in that regard? For example, people may say that they do not wish to destabilise the existence of states, but they may not wish to support the existence of illegal occupations by states or others. People will say such things in protest. Where is the line going to be? What protections are in place? In fact, all I see in the Bill are dilutions.”
“Are we going to get to a point where we are removing the historical and, in some cases, contemporary battles against colonialism? These changes require the replacement of provisions that protect protest and strike action in the 2005 Act. The protections in the 2005 Act specifically on protest and strike action are diluted in this legislation. The 2005 Act made it explicit that they would not be considered relevant in terms of the Schedule of offences. This legislation, however, merely states they are not evidence of bad intent on their own. That is a massive dilution of the right to protest and strike, which was previously protected. I would go into further detail on section 6, which amends section 5 of the principal Act. These are specific and serious concerns.”
“It is why we should not be diluting or risking those dilutions because terrorism is incredibly serious and we need to be tackling it properly, rather than muddying the word to the point where it is abused as an instrument of control by the Government. The definition includes acts committed inside and outside of the State. Others have made this point in the context of the glorification or praise or celebration of terrorist activity. What is meant by that? Does 1916 come under it? Does the commemoration of our historic actions come under it? We heard recently that the Haitian team taking part in the World Cup was told to remove the picture it had showing the battle in which Haiti overturned slavery. It had to be removed from the football strip.”
“I will make four or five other points. The Bill also expands section 4A, which deals with public provocation to commit terrorist offences. It includes the offence of publishing a statement that “glorifies (including by praise or celebration) a terrorist activity”. What is meant by that? In the UK, we saw the Palestine Action act involving the Filton 4 activists. They were sentenced as terrorists for criminal violence, but we know they were just holding a sign saying, "I support Palestine Action". Is that glorifying? They were arrested for literally holding a sign saying they support those who have taken direct action in protest. That is that muddy piece between protest and terrorism.”
“We have situations where aeroplanes carrying arms to contribute to international breaches of international law are moving through our airports. Will the person who writes a protest sign on the gates be charged with not just criminal offences, but terrorism charges potentially? Indeed, it will now no longer solely be about those who commit these actions but also those who say, "I feel like going down there and writing it on the walls". Will that be coming under it? These are not hypothetical questions because we have seen what has happened in the United Kingdom with the absurd and obscene weaponisation and use of terrorist legislation in relation to persons who are clearly not - when we go back to the core definition of terrorism - creating terror in any sense. They are merely inconveniencing government.”
“On occasion, that protest action has included something that could be determined as damage to property or criminal damage. That is not to say that criminal damage is not a concern or should not be prosecuted appropriately. When it is vandalism or criminal damage, let it be prosecuted as such. What I am worried about is that someone who sprays graffiti with a message saying, "No to the extra airport terminal” or whatever else could not only be charged with criminal damage but also a terrorist offence, as their goal was to try to affect the actions of the Government. Let us talk about those who rightly protest against the use of our airports to breach international law. We have breaches of international humanitarian law and known war crimes taking place.”
“Rather, they must only potentially suggest they might do some of the actions listed under the Schedule of offences, and then these intentions will be interpreted by the courts. It is always a very vague piece when we are looking to interpret intentions. What does “compelling a government or an international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act” mean? We all do that all the time. We take all kinds of actions. The word “unduly” is doing heavy lifting in this regard. It is not clear what will be meant by that. We all campaign and protest with the aim of persuading or compelling governments or other organisations to take action. We have all chanted “Pass the occupied territories Bill”. People have protested looking for SNAs in their schools. People have taken all kinds of actions.”
“The offences outlined in the Schedule to the Bill include criminal damage, that is, damage to property. These are listed as offences that could end up under the terrorism definition when they are committed with the intention – it is not the effect they have but, rather, the intention of the offence – of seriously intimidating a population; unduly compelling a government or an international organisation to perform or abstain from performing an act; seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a state or organisation. That sounds fine but this is combined with the fact that people do not have to do any of the actions any more under the offences.”
“I, too, want to signal a number of concerns in respect of this legislation. I believe, especially now on Second Stage, that the burden or obligation of proof is on the State. It must show us how these are not going to happen. It is not just for us to say that there may be inadvertent consequences because if they are warned about and action is not taken, then they are not inadvertent. What measures will the State take to ensure that instances, such as those we have seen with regard to Palestine Action and other abuses, will not take place? I will highlight a few key concerning features of the legislation. The Bill expands the definition of terrorist activity to include threats to commit the offences listed in the Schedule, a Schedule which can be added to at any point. That is another concern.”
“Rather than strengthening the confidence such victims would have in a system that has consistently failed them, which leads to an extraordinary level of under-reporting and under-prosecution of this kind of offence, we are in fact driving them further away from the seeking of justice. A complete ban on the use of counselling records is something the committee sought. It is a matter that will reflect very poorly on us in the future. It will have a chilling effect on justice. The Minister will not be surprised to hear that we will strongly oppose those elements on Committee Stage.”
“I will signal what is perhaps the most crucial issue, namely, the disclosure of counselling records. It is unacceptable that people would be asked to choose between healing and justice. The Minister knows that the joint committee focused intently on this issue. Members talked about the traumatic impact the disclosure of a person's counselling records can have on survivors of sexual violence. We talked about the decisions people make. We know how many people fail to seek justice in relation to sexual abuse and violence. We have a crisis of confidence among victims of sexual violence in the system.”
“If there is deployment of members of the Defence Forces, there are concerns about how that is going to align with Ireland's human rights obligations. That is the kind of teasing out that could have been done with the proper scrutiny of this issue in both committees. I also note the intention signalled to introduce amendments on the removal of face coverings. I note there are a number of reasons, including reasons of health and religion and the protection of privacy, where persons may wish to wear a face covering. There are already powers under section 5 relating to disorderly conduct, threatening behaviour and failure to comply with a direction to address behaviours that are problematic, but if simply having a face covering becomes a matter in itself, then there are very significant concerns in relation to that.”
“Part 5 allows for gardaí to arrest and seize property from individuals they suspect may be subject to an extradition request without a warrant. It very substantially extends the period they may be held in detention before any certificate would come from the Minister. There is concern in relation to that. Concerns have been highlighted about the provision of aid to the civil power, including the use of the Defence Forces. The point was well made that this is something the defence committee should have had the opportunity to examine. We do need to think about it in terms of scenarios whereby, for example, we know there will be an increase in public assemblies and demonstrations during Ireland's Presidency of the Council of the European Union.”
“In a number of instances in the UK studies have shown disproportionate use of incapacitant sprays against minority communities in prisons, including Black, Muslim and disabled prisoners, which has the effect of normalising the use of violence against particular groups within the prison environment. There is a huge amount to be examined there. Simply allowing for it without proper measures in terms of monitoring and reporting risks a disimprovement at a time when the situation has been improving somewhat, in that the Irish Prison Service notes there has been a decrease in physical assaults by prisoners and aggressive and threatening incidents fell by 8% last year. Tools are being used that need to be deployed and the proposed benefit of this is something that, at a minimum, requires proper monitoring and regulation.”
“Again, it is in keeping with the idea of Ireland being a place where the majority of gardaí are not equipped with weapons. It is about policing by consent and with buy-in from the community. That is something which should be valued and weighed very carefully. While the introduction of the spray is maybe with an eye to ensure greater safety in prisons, if we look at other jurisdictions, it does not seem to have positively impacted the level of violence in prisons but it has often negatively impacted and destabilised relationships between prison officers and prisoners.”
“There are, therefore, elements that are positive and need to be teased out. It is good to see them moving forward. However, there are also really concerning components that need and, in some cases have not had, full, detailed evaluation. There are provisions that may seem to be small but are significant, like Part 2 in terms of the incapacitant spray for prison officers, which I am going to come back to in a moment. That is there without any appropriate provisions for monitoring and reporting on the use of it. Senator Ruane, who was part of the scrutiny of this, has recommended a provision around a human rights analysis of how that is used. I note that Ireland is one of the few countries where prison officers do not use this spray and rely on capacity to manage and de-escalate conflict without the use of force or violence.”
“Everybody supports critical infrastructure, but we were told that if we wanted to support it, we had to accept dilutions of the climate law which were in the mix as well. There are positive elements with this Bill that I acknowledge and welcome, which I am sure we will tease out. I want to recognise the work of others which led to this work. It is welcome that the Bill, in Part 15, includes provisions to disregard historical convictions for homosexuality. I recognise the work of a former Member of this House, Fintan Warfield, on that issue. The Bill addresses, in some sense, the provisions around sex for rent. I acknowledge that the Labour Party and others have really led in relation to this issue. It also includes practical provisions, such as those in relation to street furniture.”
“This kind of amalgam involves things that people really want, and may have pressed for over a long period, being placed alongside something that is known to be controversial and, in some cases, deeply problematic for those same advocates. There is a practice as well - not solely here, as we have seen it at European level as well - of introducing omnibus Bills in which vast amounts of law are untangled at the same time. It creates challenges and issues in terms of proper scrutiny and proper decision-making. It may seem clever or convenient, but it does not make for really good laws that have very strong and clear parliamentary mandates. Rather, people feel painted into a corner. Another recent example of this was the Critical Infrastructure Bill.”
“I would not agree that gathering as many pieces together and moving them forward at once is actually a good approach, especially when it includes components it has been signalled may be introduced that have not had the proper pre-legislative scrutiny. I recognise that miscellaneous provisions legislation is a mechanism that has been used in the past, but I worry in general about the stretch of this. It worries me when elements that are known to be deeply controversial are being added into Bills that are long awaited. It reminds me of a move towards the American approach whereby attack drones and tax cuts get put in the same Bill as school meals and access to hospital equipment.”
“We need to tackle those, especially as Ireland is already vulnerable on this given our sad exposure to complicity in relation to dual-use goods. This is one dual-use area where we absolutely need to draw a red line. I thank the Minister of State and all who spoke in support of the Bill.”
“Ireland being strong on this and showing leadership on it cannot wait two, three or four years while we see the vulnerable of the world used as laboratory targets. I welcome the offer of engagement and I accept it. The Minister of State mentioned the new definition and the components that make it up. The technological components are in the new definitions. It is not the same as dual use, solely. It is where those components are the building blocks and have been shown to be the building blocks. The Minister of State described it herself. It is a building block to build these weapons and we need to legislate against the building blocks, rather than simply say, "We sent you the Lego and you put it together into an autonomous weapon gun".”
“I urge that the security strategy reaffirm the position on cluster munitions and landmines, to which, sadly, some of the SAFE funding has gone. We become complicit in spending money collectively at European level if that money goes to these weapons and we allow Horizon money to be invested in their development or allow industry supports to AI that allow the industry to develop these weapons. We do not want that money to be spent and that momentum to occur while we are waiting to progress the international treaty. That is why it matters that Ireland, as a neutral country, goes into those negotiations saying that while we want international action, we have a national concern and national action which we want to be reflected in the collective European decisions.”
“We cannot afford to have inaction from Ireland or even just to wait for the international processes at UN level when the decisions that are fanning the flames of this process are being made. I will highlight four issues. While Ireland has the Presidency, the multi-annual financial framework, which is going to give a huge amount of money to military and defence spending, will be negotiated and decided. The new European security strategy will be negotiated. Ireland is hosting a European conference on AI in September. The Horizon funding will negotiated. What we do not want is for all those decisions to get made without any governance framework around military use of AI and autonomous weapons. We do not want money being directed that way.”
“Not only am I open to my Bill being amended as it progresses, but if there is an international treaty that takes two or three years, we cannot be in a lacuna in the meantime. This is different. We were told these weapons would make everything more precise. More than 20,000 have been killed by the most advanced targeting technology in the world and it chose to allow the killing of 20,000 children. What we have increasingly seen is that these weapons do not allow target selection to be narrowed; what they do is around expansion. It is effective, not in the sense of narrowing what is done, but in the sense of "maximum lethality". That is the industry phrase. It describes 1,000 deaths where, in the past, there could have been 100 or 50 deaths. That is the context.”
“The fact that the targeting was of a military target does not excuse someone because it may have been a military target on a road shared with civilians. There are huge nuances and questions in this regard. Those definitions matter and need to be teased out but it needs to be done from a position of ambition and strength. We do not wait to see what falls out; we go in to shape what is going to come out of that process. If what is shaped from the process in terms of the conventional weapons is not ambitious enough, then Ireland will need to lead on a global treaty. Ireland will also need to lead, if that treaty process is too prolonged, by taking national action, which can then be amended.”
“In this case, there is something different from the nuclear non-proliferation treaty negotiations, which occurred in a context where nuclear weapons were not being used every day. The reason there is a particular urgency with this is that we know these treaty processes take time. I am very happy to work on the definitions as we come through it, but we also need to be strong in pushing those definitions. There are huge, dangerous areas of wiggle room here. What will meaningful human control mean in the final definitions? Will that be diluted? As regards the idea that there may be certain areas where it cannot be used in compliance with international humanitarian law, what will that mean in effect? Will it deal only with the targets or those contexts that we have talked about? Will it deal with the inadvertent contexts?”
“In the background, we know that if there is a failure to move forward on this issue and bring it within the remit of the conventional weapons treaty as an international instrument because, which requires consensus, there will be pressure, rightly, for action through a stand-alone global treaty. There has already been pressure in the resolutions passed by the General Assembly of the United Nations. That process is under way and it is my belief that Ireland will go into that process and those discussions stronger in a context where we can say national legislation has been discussed and that the Government is, rightly, under pressure as a result of ambitious national legislation.”
“I thank the Minister of State for her response and congratulate her on her appointment. I am glad the Government is not opposing this Bill. I am very happy to continue to engage. Stephen Reid, the drafter of the Bill, who I thank, is also very keen and willing to engage. In bringing this Bill forward, we are very much aware of the international process and the timeliness of the Bill. I reject the suggestion that it is not timely; it is extremely timely. A couple of crucial points are coming, with the discussions of the group of government experts taking place in September and the meeting in November on the conventional weapons treaty, at which it will be decided whether action will be taken.”
“We lose track of who can be blamed, and even what happened because some of these systems operate with such a black box that there is not only a lack of understanding about what should be done but also a lack of understanding of what happened. In that regard, we need that understandability. At this time of this arms race, I urge that Ireland show leadership, support this Bill and be a strong driver of the push, internationally and at national level, for a prohibition on these arms and weapons. I look forward to the Minister of State's response.”
“I thank Professor Luke Moffett from Queen's University Belfast who has done great work on this issue and also on warification. These kinds of weapons cannot identify a boat on which people are waving a white flag or making radio communications that they are shipwrecked. In Gaza, drone operators could not identify World Central Kitchen vehicles because they were using infrared and the organisation's logo did not show up. Those who make an attack cannot necessarily see that a children's school bus is coming up right alongside their target because they are focused on their target. This is what happens when we lose human control. After the loss of control, as Pope Leo mentioned, comes the idea of political responsibility and accountability being lost.”
“One of the crucial aspects of the processes that are under way is definitions of meaningful human control. In my Bill, I make it clear that someone sending an instruction to what kind of targets they would like is not meaningful human control and does not satisfy that standard. There is a huge danger that we will move to the so-called bias, where 20 seconds are given to press the button. Crucially, machines cannot make those complex ethical choices. Under the law, military commanders have to judge the necessity and proportionality of each attack. They have to distinguish between civilians and military targets. That means not only understanding the weapon systems they are using but understanding the context in which they are used. That context and those consequences cannot be properly reflected if we move towards autonomous weapons.”
“Fundamentally, machines do not recognise people as people; they simply recognise them as a set of patterns or pieces of data to be processed. It is one of the most essential dehumanisations applied to the most vital decision, which is whether a human lives or dies. If this goes to the area of machine decision making, there are risks to other areas of our lives such as the question of exacerbating existing inequalities. What we know from many algorithmic areas and areas where AI has been applied is that it absorbs and amplifies prejudices and discriminations. For example, I mentioned Maven. In certain contexts, its accuracy drops below 30%. In relation to policing, we know that AI measures that have targeted and strongly impacted minority groups, in particular, ethnic minorities. Alienation has been shown to lower the threshold to war.”