Alice-Mary Higgins
National University of Ireland · Independent · Ireland
“We are signing up to be customers of liquefied natural gas - potentially fracked gas, potentially coming from a country that is busily fighting against climate action and trying to fast-track our route to destruction. We will be doing that every year in the budget and every day in the terminal.”
“We are not getting solid measures on those safeguards. The other safeguards we have, which are our planning laws and climate laws, are being either fast-tracked or suspended. We are suspending the existing safeguards and are not putting hard safeguards into this Bill, and we are being asked to go on faith.”
“Nonetheless, I have some practical questions. We need a little more on what the emergency is because it is not sufficient to say we will deal with it then. The emergency is the ground on which the Minister of State is asking for the normal planning process and the climate Act to be suspended. We need to know what the emergency is.”
“It should happen only after all relevant market-based measures have been implemented. Those market measures should include the demand-reduction strategies that are eligible under N-1, including demand reduction by large energy users, and should have been implemented, exhausted and proven insufficient.”
“Sure there is detail in it but the key issue is that what he is asking of the Oireachtas, which is to agree to it being built, is on the argument of there being an emergency. It should be very clear what the emergency is. I mentioned previously that the committee said our N-1 obligations could be met through demand management.”
“It comes from real places with real communities that are immediately and terribly impacted by fracking, as well as having an impact on the atmosphere that surrounds our beautiful planet, which we are destroying. As the Minister of State said, it impacts not just on business but on the liveability of large portions of this planet.”
The complete record
Every one of 1,900 lines we hold for Alice-Mary Higgins, in date order, each linked to its source. Free to read, in full, without an account. Page 3 of 38.
“It is not "real-world conditions". It is the real world, with testing on real people. It is important to be very clear that this is about testing not just any AI systems, but those identified as high-risk AI systems, on real people. We are back to the "move fast and break things" piece. They are moving fast, trying stuff out and breaking things, but in these cases, the things that may be broken are people, their lives and their life chances. That is the experimental space we are in. That is the space being facilitated by this section, and it is why we will be opposing it. As well as opposing it, we have also proposed a few amendments to try to safeguard against the mass of potential damage of this kind of reckless provision. Again, this is where the tension comes in. Are we experimenting in these real-world conditions?”
“Paragraph 7(a) of Annex III outlines high-risk AI systems that may be tested in relation to asylum, including polygraphs. What the section provides for is the approval of the testing of AI lie detectors in real-world conditions. This is one of the most discredited technologies, yet we are going to have AI operate it. It is an experimental mechanism that gets everything wrong all the time. AI hallucinates and has sycophantic tendencies. These are all things about AI that make it one of the most problematic and discredited mechanisms to operate in real-world conditions on vulnerable people, including asylum seekers. It is dystopian. What this section provides for is the testing of these systems. This could have a massive impact on freedoms and civil liberties. "Real-world conditions" is a weird way of describing reality.”
“I move amendment No. 55: In page 34, line 18, after “60(4)” to insert the following: “and has clearly established how a risk management system referred to in Article 9 will be implemented”. Section 48 outlines the provisions for the testing of high-risk AI systems in real-world conditions. We are out of the sandbox now and into real-world conditions. We oppose this section. We have also offered a number of significant amendments to it. As I will outline, the provisions in the section are highly concerning. High-risk systems that might be permitted for testing in real-world conditions under this section include AI systems used in law enforcement, the administration of justice, biometrics and access to education and essential services like healthcare.”
“I move amendment No. 54: In page 33, after line 37, to insert the following: “(3) Personal data shall not be processed under this section without a Data Protection Impact Assessment having first been undertaken.”.”
“I move amendment No. 53: In page 33, after line 37, to insert the following: “(3) The personal data of a child shall not be collected or processed for the purpose of developing, training and testing certain AI systems in a sandbox.”.”
“I move amendment No. 52: In page 33, between lines 34 and 35, to insert the following: “(a) consulted with prior to the establishment of the sandbox in relation to those aspects of the sandbox relevant to data protection,”.”
“I move amendment No. 51: In page 33, between lines 31 and 32, to insert the following: “(2) Any personal data intended to be processed subject to subsection (1) shall first be effectively and sufficiently anonymised so as not to relate to an identifiable person.”.”
“I move amendment No. 50: In page 33, between lines 31 and 32, to insert the following: “(2) No personal data for the purposes outlined in subsection (1) shall be used without the permission of the data subject.”.”
“54 seeks to ensure there is an appropriate governance structure. It is in line with what the AI Act has called for, namely effective mechanisms to identify if there are high risks to the rights and freedoms of data subjects. Doing the data impact assessment beforehand is what allows us to comply with the AI Act and the requirement to identify risks. We do not want to identify risks after the fact. The data protection impact assessment is the mechanism we have for that. These are good faith amendments to ensure the sandbox delivers what it is hoped it will deliver.”
“The role of the Data Protection Commissioner should come in before the data is taken and processing has begun. The amendment would ensure privacy and data protection safeguards would be built into regulatory sandboxes at the development process, preventing privacy risks and rights risks being overlooked in the design stages. That would help build public confidence in what the Government is trying to do with sandboxes, that AI innovation and so forth. Amendment No. 54 seeks to ensure any personal data lawfully collected for other purposes that is used in the training of an AI system would be subject to a data protection impact assessment, as I mentioned. The Minister of State has stated that the purpose of the Bill is to put in place governance structures necessary to implementing the AI Act. Amendment No.”
“52 imposes an obligation on the AI office to consult with the Data Protection Commissioner before an AI regulatory sandbox is established, insofar as the sandbox involves issues related to personal data. This encourages early engagement on privacy and data protection matters, as opposed to addressing these issues only after the sandbox is operational and data has been repurposed and processed. We need to consult beforehand, not just after we have scraped the data and are already using it. As drafted, the Bill empowers the Data Protection Commissioner in a supervisory capacity after the sandbox is operational. While I welcome the supervisory role for the commissioner, it should be there before the fact. The data impact assessment and all of that piece should be beforehand.”
“If it is about European competitiveness, why are they letting giant US tech companies and commercial entities set the agenda and get you to lower the bar so they have more access to European markets and European companies, which invest and do the work of trying to do good technology , are at a disadvantage? That is a side point on competitiveness. There is a question of privacy. That is the basic that we are looking for here. When people's data is being repurposed, they should be informed of that and should be given a right to object. That is a stronger reading of the GDPR for which we have not even pushed in this amendment. I am just pointing out that is my view. Amendment No.”
“That is why strong regulations, such as the GDPR, fostered areas where if we were genuinely competitive and Europe was genuinely looking to be competitive - I am going to sidetrack for one moment on the competitiveness we hear about - we would be looking to have those high standards to set the benchmark for all the technologies that are operating within Europe, which is a huge market, so that then companies within Europe that meet those high standards will have a competitive advantage. I sometimes hear about the competitiveness agenda and then I see the Commissioners going into rooms with Exxon Mobil, Microsoft and all the rest.”
“That is a core consideration. You should not be able to recognise anyone from their data. As I say, there is a constitutional imperative, leaving aside anything else. The other piece is that we should be with the spirit of the GDPR, which was a high watermark for Europe. We hear about innovation and competitiveness. The GDPR was one of the great fosterings of innovation. It is what forces good innovation so that the products and technologies fit with society's needs and rights. That is good innovation. It is not just about money maximising. That is not the only form of innovation. It is also about making things better.”
“This applies to direct or indirect identification. Carried out effectively, such anonymisation can assist in the privacy rights of individual data subjects. We must bear in mind that we also have our constitutional imperative on privacy here in Ireland. The anonymisation can allow the data controllers to achieve the balance between the right to privacy and other interests. This is an additional safeguard, but to be frank, it is a minimum safeguard because the core of the GDPR is not just your right to privacy. It is not a privacy piece. It is about your right to ownership of your data and your right to decide what it gets used for and does not get used for. There is often a misnomer when people talk about data protection. They say that the data is anonymised. The anonymity is an essential, and should be a safeguard in these sandboxes.”
“However, the AI Act is allowing, and we know the AI omnibus Act continues this, the repurposing of personal data in controlled regulatory requirements, subject to certain safeguards. In this context, the Bill proposes that personal data gathered for other purposes may be processed to support the development, training or testing of AI systems. Our amendment seeks to introduce an additional privacy safeguard that will require that any repurposed personal data being processed in sandbox conditions must first be anonymised so it can no longer be linked to an identifiable individual. We know that data is considered anonymised when the data subject cannot be identified or is not identifiable having regard to all methods reasonably likely to be used by the data controller or other persons to identify the data subject directly or indirectly.”
“Personal data that was given for one reason can just be grabbed up and sucked up and used for the testing of certain AI systems in the sandbox environment. The AI regulatory sandboxes are controlled environments where developers and researchers test new AI systems under the direct supervision of the regulatory authorities. The Bill empowers the new AI office to establish the regulatory sandboxes in which new technologies can be tested in real-world scenarios. They are subject to oversight. The idea is that we are going to ensure the technologies comply with legal fundamental rights and ethical standards. The GDPR generally prohibits the use of personal data for a new, secondary purpose, unless that purpose is compatible with the original reason for collection.”
“I will speak the rest of our amendments in this section. They seek to use the discretion to prevent the data of children being used to develop AI systems, including commercial AI systems, in a sandbox. It is the same thing we have been looking for since 2018 but now the dangers are even more acute. Amendment No. 51 relates to the processing of repurposed personal data for the development, training and testing of certain AI systems in a sandbox environment. On personal data being given for a particular purpose, going back to that issue under the GDPR, you own your data. This new dilution, which we know is in the AI omnibus Act, makes a carve-out for AI training as a reason that personal data can be used. That should be hugely opposed.”
“It is that there is a hellish room where horrible stuff is happening. That is the other fundamental problem. Part of the things happening in that room are based on the commercial exploitation of children's data, the building of profiles and the kinds of algorithms that target it. They should have been part of Commissioner McGrath's measures but were not sufficiently included in terms of tackling the issues of algorithms. We now have another shot. We have another area. We have another sandbox. This is why I was concerned about the transparency in the register. When you create these boxes, there is concern around what is happening in them. The Minister has the opportunity and the right under the regulation to explicitly exclude children's data from what is going to be happening in the sandbox. This is to be strongly considered.”
“Government Members voted with us on it. There is not a monopoly on caring about that issue. It went into the Act but was not commenced for technical reasons, etc. Nothing happened then for years and years. There is now a high-profile thing about under 16-year-olds going on the Internet but the real problem is that companies are commercially using children's information. They create products. You can buy advertising that is targeted at children. You can sandbox products that are designed to commercially target children or use children's data in a commercial way. That is the problem. The business models of tech companies are based on the exploitation of children's data. That is the bigger problem. It is not whether children can access the hellish room where all the horrible stuff is happening.”
“That is why I sometimes take it with a grain of salt when I hear people saying it is terrible where children and companies are concerned and the fact, for example, that Grok is available to children. It is not just the availability. We made this point back then, almost a decade ago. It is not solely about children accessing these services. It is the idea that children's data is used for commercial purposes. The specific requirement was that children's data could not be used commercially for micro-targeting and the development of profiles. We were told at the time there was not a definition of "micro-targeting", or some other excuse was given for non-commencement. I urge the Minister to revisit that issue. There is a cross-party mandate from the Oireachtas. The Seanad agreed and voted with us on that amendment.”
“There has been a strong focus on the question of access to the Internet for children and all of that. We had that debate in 2017 and 2018 when the Data Protection Act was going through. This is an important point. At the time the Data Protection Act was going through, Senator Ruane and I put forward a new section, which, rather than focusing on the child and the child's access to the Internet, focused on the practices of the companies that operate on the Internet. We put forward an amendment at that time explicitly stating that the personal data of children should not be available to those companies for use for commercial purposes. That is basic. Here is the thing: that amendment passed. It went into the Bill. It was a part of the Bill but that section was never commenced.”
“I move amendment No. 49: In page 33, line 29, after “purposes” to insert “other than the personal data of a child,”. Amendments Nos. 49 to 53, inclusive, seek to ensure that the personal data of a child shall not be collected for the purposes of developing, training and testing AI systems in a sandbox. Article 59 does allow for the training of AI systems in a sandbox, however, paragraph 3 of Article 59 also allows for member states to develop national law which excludes the processing of certain kinds of personal data. Those are choices that can be made at a national level. Our amendments seek to utilise this discretionary power to prevent the personal data of children from being used to develop AI systems in a sandbox. That is a very minimal piece.”
“There must be a proper process whereby the regulatory system itself will determine who is going to lead on the adjudication, having the oifig as a fail-safe if that decision becomes difficult, along with the useful insight of fundamental human rights bodies such as IHREC and others, who may be there to have a perspective. This is a very good-faith attempt by Senator Stephenson to ensure that we do not end up with breaches falling between stools and not being properly acted upon or ambiguity as to how they are being brought forward. Is the Minister of State interested in the co-operation forum the Senator has proposed in good faith, or an alternative mechanism to ensure that we do not end up with gaps or a situation where those making the breach can almost choose where they are going to be adjudicated from?”
“Crucially, the amendment seeks to ensure that adjudication of decisions, processing and enforcement are happening and that we do not end up with people being sent from pillar to post or, in the worst scenario, something akin to forum shopping from those who may be the subject of investigation, surveillance or adjudication, where they would be able to choose to go with this market surveillance authority rather than that one. It is crucial that there is a clear pathway that ensures that action is being taken, and that we do not have a number of different potential authorities wondering who will take the lead and how it will be led forward, ending up in a limbo. It is also important that those who are being adjudicated on do not get to choose who they want to do the adjudication because of a lack of a clear process.”
“Where two or more market surveillance authorities receive a complaint relating to the same potential breach of the Act, they will determine between themselves who the lead market surveillance authority will be. They will then appoint an authorised officer who will be responsible for liaising with the other relevant market surveillance authorities regarding the case. Under subsection (2), should the relevant market surveillance authorities fail to agree the lead market surveillance authority within 14 days, the matter will be referred to oifig IS na hÉireann, which will appoint a lead market surveillance authority. The fundamental rights bodies have been inserted again into this.”
“It is looking to establish a co-operation forum that would include representatives of the market surveillance authorities, the fundamental human rights bodies, and oifig IS na hÉireann, to meet a minimum of once per quarter to discuss issues including, but not limited to, the assignment of complex adjudications, co-operation strategies, means of information exchange and other issues relevant to the enforcement of this Act and, implicitly so, also to the enforcement of the regulation. It is at the discretion of oifig IS na hÉireann as the case may be in terms of experts who may be summoned to give evidence regarding a matter before the co-operation forum.”
“(2) Where two or more Market Surveillance Authorities receive a complaint relating to the same potential breach of this Act they shall determine between themselves the lead Market Surveillance Authority who shall then appoint an authorised officer and shall be responsible for liaising with the other relevant Market Surveillance Authorities regarding the case. (3) Should under subsection (2) the relevant Market Surveillance Authorities fail to agree the lead Market Surveillance Authority within 14 days the matter shall be referred to Oifig IS na hÉireann which shall appoint a lead Market Surveillance Authority.”. This is an amendment put forward by Senator Stephenson.”
“I move amendment No. 47: In page 32, between lines 31 and 32, to insert the following: “Co-operation forum 45. (1) The Office shall establish a co-operation forum which shall include representatives of Oifig IS na hÉireann, Market Surveillance Authorities and Fundamental Human Rights Bodies, to meet a minimum of once per quarter and to discuss issues such as but not limited to— (a) assignment of complex adjudications, (b) co-operation strategies, (c) means of information exchange, and (d) other issues relevant to the enforcement of this Act, at the discretion of Oifig IS na hÉireann as the case may be experts may be summoned to give evidence regarding a matter before the Co-operation Forum.”
“I move amendment No. 44: In page 32, between lines 11 and 12, to insert the following: “(d) a copy of the fundamental rights impact assessment for every high-risk AI system deployed by a public body;”.”
“Where we step up for our colleagues in Europe is by taking our role as the centrepoint for digital and AI regulation really seriously and dealing with it transparently. I will leave that with the Minister of State. She said these Bills will be back. It is before the summer now. I genuinely appeal to her to show leadership on this not just for Ireland but for all of our colleagues across Europe.”
“Maybe that will get taken up legally or politically in Ireland but maybe it will get taken up in one of the many other countries where the companies headquartered here operate. It would allow individuals in France, Luxembourg and Sweden to point to a really problematic practice that one of these big companies has which was found in a fundamental rights impact assessment to be a problem for fundamental rights and maybe take it up locally. That is the duty of Ireland. I have listened so many times to the people who want us to spend a bazillion on arms and all the rest of that hype and playing our part when it comes to cyberattacks, etc. This is it; this is the cybersecurity bit; it is here. The fundamental role of Ireland stepping up is not us buying a couple of tanks or joining in any wars of interest.”
“I am saying to the Minister of State to look to the register, look to making transparent and available not just the bits it wants to let her know about but anything that is in the public interest, and look to that question of the impact assessments on fundamental rights. These are public bodies that are meant to serve the public. They are meant to be doing this assessment for the public in relation to these systems and that information regarding the assessment of the impact on the fundamental rights of the public should be public. If companies have something to hide in that, then they need to change their practices. One of the first solid measures we can do to ensure companies start delivering on fundamental rights is that, if they know if they come out poorly from an assessment, everyone is going to see.”
“That is a process that has to happen in respect of fundamental rights. That is required under the regulation. Why would we not share that information? In what realm would we not share the fundamental rights impact assessment? If I said the information generally on the register that is in the public interest should be shared in the public interest, I cannot see any argument why the assessments done in relation to fundamental rights and their impact on them would not be in the public interest to share. If we are going to say commercial sensitivity trumps clarity on the impact on fundamental rights, done in an objective way in respect of this assessment, then I do not accept that and I do not think the public will accept it.”
“We have looked for full public accessibility. I urge the Minister of State, in her role, to think about even a compromise in terms of information that is in the public interest, because otherwise we are in a dangerous space. The Minister of State said it is complementing a wider transparency framework, but this is where the core information is going to be. That piece about fundamental rights impact assessments at a minimum needs to be looked at. People's digital rights are one thing, as is the general data protection regulation, GDPR, but there are also those core fundamental rights and the human rights we have. Article 27 of the AI regulation refers to "deploying a high-risk system" and that public body deployers "shall perform an assessment of the impact on fundamental rights that the use of such system may produce".”
“When the scandals break, if it turns out that the red flags for those scandals were sitting inside this register and not being looked at or examined, that is going to be a reckoning as well. I urge the Minister of State to say that this is public information and, even if she does not accept the full wording of our amendment that any of such information that there is would be publicly accessible, which is what I want to see, then at a minimum, that any information that is in the public interest should be made accessible. As we are having Committee and Report Stages rammed together, we cannot go into that nuance, but that would allow you to balance your commercial or other data protection interests while any such information that is going into this register that is considered to be in the public interest would be made publicly available.”
“There are protections on certain commercial interests but we can choose what we are going to prioritise here, and I say to the Minister, who is someone I really respect and who I wish was in a different brief, frankly, because I know she comes with a strong community and cultural background that is about society, that we need to not make this be a black box. We cannot have it that the AI register is just something that happens as a little conversation between the regulator-promoter and the companies. It is dangerous and anti-democratic. It is going to lead to regulation that does not work and it is going to lead to corporate capture to an even greater degree.”
“This is a time when AI is at a make-or-break, with many people pointing to the emperor's new clothes factor in that it is not very financially secure, but we are looking at embedding it, when wild risks are being taken and when we have seen from some of the companies that are championing and leading on AI intensely anti-democratic language and direct statements of their intentions to interfere in democracy. The very minimum we can do is ensure the public gets to see what is happening. I do not think it is okay to leave it on the basis of we will work with the industry for a while and, down the line, we will see if there are certain elements we might make accessible to the public in a way that protects confidentiality and commercial and data interests. Why are commercial interests being given such a high rating in this?”
“It is the public who said certain kinds of data are personal, that they can see that it is personal and how it is being used. This has happened before. Now we have this new system, this register, and on the idea of it not being public-facing, the Minister of State said it might happen in time, but we are at a crunch point now. This is when the massive scale-up is happening and the gazillion new data centres, which, absurdly, are being allowed to use up all of our electricity and water to such a crazy degree, are happening. It is a time when Ireland is embedding itself in this with a huge vulnerability.”
“That is what led the position where, instead of having to opt out, people need to opt in to cookies. All of these were steps take by those who championed the issues. If we go into this new AI era, which is seeking to embed itself in everything and everywhere, where there are countless new factors even recognised as high risk and if we do not have transparency about the problems and issues and we do not have transparency as to how fundamental rights are being implemented and enforced and checked, it will not only be very worrying in terms of the outcomes for the public, but it will also be deeply disempowering for the public, who have been the actual watchdogs in terms of rights and standards. It is the public who started shouting about Grok. It is the public who led the way on opt-outs and opt-ins.”
“Sadly, it is not the case that Ireland has, through its governance mechanisms, led the way in zealously delivering the highest possible standards and interpretations in respect of those regulations. Now we have the new AI regulations. Ireland is in a core position, yet again, because so many of the largest tech companies are located here. The public got on board. It was a glorious moment in terms of GDPR because there was a new recognition of rights. It was like this incredible push-back against the idea that people are just the subjects, the serfs or chattel, to be pushed through a commercial model. It said that people own their own data. The public embraced that and said what they were not happy with. They led in this regard. That is what gave meaning to GDPR.”
“What has led to actual rights and the actual enforcement are the really important citizens' rights, public rights and rights of the individual that were set out under GDPR. These were largely championed by individuals. It has been civil society groups and groups like Digital Rights Ireland. It has been those who have taken class action cases against big tech companies. It has been those who have highlighted and publicly scandalised their own experiences of the inadequacy and sometimes abusive practices they have encountered in their engagements with big tech companies. What has driven action in this area has been civil society and public champions.”
“I do not really see how section 62 satisfies our requirement in respect of fundamental rights impact assessments for high-risk AI systems because the section deals with the reporting of infringements and the protection of reporting persons. I am not sure if I perhaps misheard what the Minister of State was implying. The complaints mechanisms are set out at that point. The fact is that Ireland's record on enforcement applied to large technology companies is relatively poor. This has been criticised and called out by others in Europe. It has led to situations where European data protection authorities have had to step in when they felt it was not being addressed properly in Ireland. I am passionate about GDPR. There are key parallels and predecessors here that need to be looked at.”
“The issues here are the same issues that have been highlighted before and concern the excessive control by the Minister in relation to the functioning of a body that should be independent. We previously highlighted that the Minister will get to determine certain elements. The Bill as drafted provides that the strategy statement would be submitted to the Minister. These amendments provide instead that it should be prepared in the form and manner that the office sees fit. They are trying to strengthen the independence of the office and the commission would, as soon possible after the publication of the strategy statement, make sure that it is laid before the Oireachtas. They would ensure that there is transparency in relation to the strategy statement and the Houses of the Oireachtas would have sight of that strategy statement as well.”
“It is unfortunate that the Minister of State was not able to accept those ones. What safeguards is the Government going to put in place tackle these issues?”
“There is an issue if that information is being disclosed potentially to commercial operators because the desire is to promote and foster AI innovation. If they are given commercially sensitive information to support their innovation, that is a problem in itself. However, it is a problem if a consultant who has not had to go through a process in relation to conflict of interest, and who is not under this Bill properly bound by conflict-of-interest measures, is in a position to disclose that information. That is the problem. As the Minister of State described it, it remains an issue. It is an example of some missteps being made at the earliest stage of this new body, which will affect both its ability to deliver proper regulation and public confidence in its operation. That is why we were looking to have safeguards put in here.”
“Where there is a potential clash is between commercially sensitive information and AI innovation and the idea that you can disclose commercially sensitive information for the purposes of promotion of innovation in AI. Put those two pieces together. That is the problem. The problem is the function - we have talked about the functions of the body - and the information. Regarding the idea that this could inadvertently affect school programmes, it will not because they do not involve commercially sensitive information. It is the CEO and the staff of the office who have commercially sensitive information. Those who benefit from that potentially commercially sensitive information are commercial operations.”
“I do not agree that our proposal would interfere with the educational pieces because in the Minister of State's response, she described how there is a narrow definition of what is confidential information that explicitly includes commercially sensitive information. Somebody who is hired to do an educational programme is not going to accidentally come into the commercially sensitive information and I do not see them using commercially sensitive information. They are not coming under the definitions of the kind of information. There is not a question that they are dealing with these kinds of pieces. The other purposes the Minister of State described do not map onto it.”
“This is a particular concern. The promotion function is very different. The core tension in this body is that, on the one hand, it is meant to be a regulatory body and, on the other hand, it is literally being given a promotional role, which we know has been described by the predecessor body as involving the financial interests of this sector as an overriding national imperative. That is a direct tension. On the one hand, it is the body responsible for ensuring that standards that have been set out collectively at European level are met and, on the other hand, it is pursuing the national imperative in terms of business promotion in this area. That is a real tension and that is why it is appropriate that we pick out that particular function of promoting AI innovation and literacy.”
“I ask the Minister of State to address these concerns and look to the disclosures measures. If she accepts either of these approaches to try to close that gap and indicates what checks and balances will be in place with regard to the operation and function of consultants by the office, I might accept that.”