K Shanmugam
Singapore
“Bank accounts are frozen when there is reason to suspect that the bank accounts are involved in illicit activities, including money laundering activities.”
“The Singapore Police Force does not track the requested data. Distinguishing artificial intelligence (AI)-generated content typically requires more detailed forensic examination which may not be necessary in every investigation and may also not be conclusive as to whether AI-generative tools were used.”
“The Building and Construction Authority’s Code on Accessibility provides baseline requirements for accessible and inclusive buildings. It stipulates a minimum width of 1.5 metres or 1.8 metres for primary accessible routes, depending on the building type.”
“The Road Traffic (Motor Vehicles, Driving Licence) Rules under the Road Traffic Act set out the scope of the medical assessment required for motorists aged 65 and above who wish to retain their driving licences.”
“When a Police report has been made, the Police will investigate to determine if a criminal offence has been committed. If there is reasonable suspicion that a case is scam-related, the Police can direct online service providers to restrict Singapore users' access to the relevant online activity under the Online Criminal Harms Act.”
“Through intelligence sharing and coordinated enforcement actions, the cross-border operation disrupted a transnational drug trafficking syndicate and downstream drug trafficking activities, with the UK arresting seven persons so far and further investigations underway.”
The complete record
Every one of 4,552 lines we hold for K Shanmugam, in date order, each linked to its source. Free to read, in full, without an account. Page 35 of 92.
“We have been talking about this very seriously for more than three years; extensively. The Select Committee heard extensive evidence in 2018 on this. The evidence, the reports that I have been referring to so far in the various annexes, most of them come from the evidence given in 2018 to the Parliamentary Select Committee. I would like to refer Members to annex F. It sets out the discussions that have taken place and the summary of the testimonies given at the Select Committee. Twenty different types of evidence – persons, organisations, including experts, gave evidence on the seriousness of the foreign threat. I will touch on some of the evidence that was given at the Select Committee. Disinformation expert, Mr Ben Nimmo, testified on the Internet Research Agency (IRA)'s various tactics, said to be controlled by Russia, tactics to boost support for Mr Trump, as he then was, and opposition to Mrs Clinton during the 2016 US Presidential Elections and to widen the divide in the US between the Black Lives Matter movement and the Police. Dr Kevin Limonier, a French cybersecurity expert, spoke of an alleged Russian HIC that tried to sway the 2017 French Presidential Elections using a combination of state media, social media platforms and bots, including by attempting to spread leaked emails on the eve of the election to discredit the Macron campaign. Experts also highlighted that Singapore has been targeted and is especially vulnerable when race and religion are used as an issue of protest potential. Dr Shashi Jayakumar said that it would be a mistake to assume that foreign HICs were not already happening.”
“It is not obvious propaganda but it conditions people to think in certain ways, particularly on foreign policy issues, often appealing to a larger racial identity beyond the Singaporean identity. In my view, this is one of the most serious threats we face. Our population, and I think most Members of Parliament, are not really aware of this. Singapore has been subjected to attacks in recent times, both cyber attacks as well as cyber manipulation. In the cyber attack in 2018, hackers targeted SingHealth’s databases and stole the particulars of 1.5 million patients, including the Prime Minister's data. Cyber manipulation, I will give a couple of examples. During a period of tension with another country between 2016 and 2017, we experienced a coordinated HIC that attempted to undermine our foreign policy position. Online commentaries and videos were uploaded by social media accounts which had lain dormant for many years. Many of these were in Mandarin and targeted our Chinese-speaking population. These contents were also widely circulated via chat apps and aimed to influence sentiments among Singaporeans. In another case, during a period of bilateral tension with a country in 2018, we saw a large spike in online comments critical of Singapore and many came from anonymous accounts. They sought to give an artificial impression of widespread objection to Singapore’s position. I will say, so far, these have been relatively low level except for the strategic move, the attempts to condition our people's thinking, which are going on. Before I deal with some of the substantive points of this Bill, let me also deal with the issue of timing. Some have said there have been no discussions, why is this Bill being put through so quickly? Have there been no discussions?”
“The Select Committee in 2018 heard one million Instagram "Likes" cost US$18; to get 100 Twitter follower likes or re-tweets costs 34 US cents; and to organise a street protest in the US through online costs about US$200,000. These details are in annex D. It also gives examples of HICs targeting democratic processes, if you look at annex D. And it is a cottage industry as well because there are reports of an active Macedonian disinformation industry. Young Macedonians have Internet access, some basic training to create fake news websites. In the final weeks of the 2016 US Presidential Elections, over 140 "fake news" US politics websites were traced to Macedonia, and these overtook mainstream news producers in their share of election stories shared on Facebook. The details are in annex E. Singapore – A few days ago, the French Military School Strategic Research Institute published a Report on Influence Operations. Singapore was among the countries featured as case studies. The report noted that there were several factors which made Singapore vulnerable: our size, hyper-connectivity, multi-ethnic and multi-religious society. The report said we were resilient through a counter-narrative of our Singaporean identity and by our swift reactions against hate speech. It concluded that we, along with Sweden, were one of the best prepared states in the fight against information manipulation and hybrid threats in general. I am not so sanguine as the people who wrote this report. Our racial and religious mix is easily exploitable by different countries and we see a steady build-up of different narratives which is being very cleverly done.”
“But anyone sensible will know that the United States, UK and Western countries have similar or, perhaps, in the case of the United States, even superior capabilities. Really, there are no angels in this game. The Washington Post reported on 11 February 2020 that a Swiss encryption communications provider had sold devices to more than 120 countries. That company was, actually secretly owned by CIA and German Intelligence. They had rigged the devices to read the encrypted communications of all the countries, 120 odd countries, that had bought the system. Reading secret, most confidential communications, of their own allies and, of course, adversaries. The story was then released years after, after everything has been done and closed. The Washington Post wrote up the exposé based on a CIA internal history of the operation in 2004. So, CIA history was in 2004; the Washington Post released the story in 2020. And they also based it on an internal oral history project by German intelligence in 2008. But everything was kept under wraps, until simultaneously published by the Washington Post and a German broadcaster on 11 February 2020. So, it has all the hallmarks of a deliberate, planned leak. Members might recall that at about the same time, a bit before that, but through that period, the US government was very seriously warning everyone about the dangers of relying on technology from China. So, basically, without embarrassment, this leak came out saying we did it, and now be careful about the Chinese. Have the Americans actually stopped? We can only guess. But it has now got to be taken as a given that this sort of thing will be done regularly and everyone will face this. It has become very easy and inexpensive to do.”
“This comprised fake persons who sought to influence US policymakers and also reporters and academics to carry their views. Some of these were, eventually, published in legitimate publications. Annex C sets out more details of reports that have identified Iran as a foreign state actor. In December 2020, the BBC reported on a vast 15-year global disinformation campaign to serve one particular country’s interests. This campaign spread over at least 116 countries, more than half of the world's countries, and targeted members of the European Parliament as well as the United Nations. It involved the use of stolen accounts and at least 750 fake media outlets, which were amplified with the help of a legitimate foreign wire service. So, you can see the use of legitimate news organisations. In February 2021, the social media analysis firm, Graphika, released a report on a propaganda coordinated network in favour of one country called “Spamouflage Dragon”, using a mixture of bots, fake accounts, stolen accounts and so on to push and amplify videos and media targeting issues, such as the safety of Western-made vaccines and discrediting the United States. A 2020 study by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute found that there has been a significant increase worldwide in foreign interference. Between 2015 and 2020, at least 38 Elections and six Referendums were impacted. The international media regularly names Russia, China, Iran and North Korea. I do not know whether these countries, in fact, did what they are said to have done. But few doubt that they have the capabilities. It is notable that the US and other Western countries are not mentioned, generally, in these reports because they are Western media reports.”
“Our 2018 Parliamentary Select Committee received evidence that Russia had targeted extremists and fringe politicians to spread propaganda, undermine support for Ukraine and cause one-quarter to one-third of the Czech population to believe that the Ukrainian government was fascist. And it resulted in the Czech government being unable to support the Ukrainians. So, the HICs managed to change Czech foreign policy. Netherlands. During the Dutch Referendum on the EU-Ukraine FTA, Russians pretended to be Ukrainians, inflamed local debates, supported by online disinformation campaign involving fake stories about Ukraine and Dutch voters, eventually, voted against the FTA. Annex B sets out some of the details. If Members were to see annex B, page 8 refers to Ukraine – look at item 3 of page 8. Item 4, the use of tools. Page 10, paragraph 6, the consequences as a result of the campaign. Page 11, the interference in Czech Republic, paragraph 2 sets out how it has been successful, that 53% of the Czechs believed there is propaganda both for and against a foreign country in the Czech public space and therefore, they cannot trust anything. That is another objective that people try and achieve: make you distrustful of everything. And page 12, interference in Netherlands. The box sets out the reference to the FTA referendum. More recently, Russia was allegedly engaged in campaigns to erode trust in the EU’s COVID-19 strategy and to spread scepticism of Western-developed vaccines. As I said earlier, Russia is repeatedly mentioned. I am repeating what others have said and Singapore does not take a position on this. Countries other than Russia are also said to have been using these strategies. In May 2019, a disinformation network was traced to Iran.”
“If Members were to look at annex A, paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4, they refer to the Russians developing a military doctrine for the Internet age. The doctrine took tactics developed by the Soviets, blended them with strategic military thinking about total war and laid out a theory of modern warfare. It specifies that its objective is to achieve an environment of permanent unrest and conflict within an enemy state. It includes harnessing the protest potential of the population of a target country, deepening the divisions within that, increasing hostility among different groups and getting them to distrust institutions. With this doctrine, the rules of war have changed. Non-military means of achieving political and strategic goals without using the force of weapons, including utilising a range of actors and tools, hackers, the media, businessmen, information leaks and misinformation, are all part and parcel of new warfare. The Russians are said to have done this. We have no way of verifying that. The following examples, which I will refer to, are based on reports. Ukraine is said to have suffered extensive intervention. Russia allegedly deployed this doctrine for many years. One example. During the 2014 protests, sensitive fault lines were targeted to paint the Ukrainian government as a fascist, racist, xenophobic junta. They claimed that Jews were being terrorised and beaten and asserted that local Jewish leaders were appealing to international bodies for help. They tried to weaken the resolve of the armed forces and the population to build popular support for Crimea to join Russia. Eventually, of course, we know Crimea was annexed. Czech Republic.”
“May I proceed as the annexes are being distributed?”
“It was an attempt to influence senior decision-makers in Government. Moving on to the HIC part of the Bill. The reasons are straightforward. Spying and subversion in another country are age-old. Using spies, agents, locals and useful idiots is all part of subversion. As technology developed, the subversion increased and adapted new technology: phone tapping, cameras, recording, microfilming and so on. Now, technology has evolved again. The Internet has created a powerful new medium for subversion. Countries are actively developing attack and defence capabilities as an arm of warfare equal to and more potent than the land, air and naval forces. It is often seen as the fourth arm of service. The Gerasimov Doctrine, named after the Russian chief of staff, identifies issues of "protest potential" in another country, uses information operations to polarise that society and incite public disorder and keeps the target country in a constant state of turmoil. Aggressors can more easily achieve their political and military outcomes. New communication tools facilitate non-kinetic forms of attack and make these harder to detect. For example, bots and digital ads can easily be bought to spread harmful information. Foreign actors can blend their activities with other authentic online users, which give readers a false sense of reality. We have an annex that sets out more details of the Gerasimov Doctrine, the new communications tools and HIC tactics used by foreign state actors. Mr Speaker, Sir, with your permission, can I ask for the distribution of a folder which contains annexes A to I that I am going to refer to? And we distribute them together, so that it is easier.”
“We do not put it in the same grandiose terms but Singapore is important for us and we take the same approach. We say it is not for the Americans to tell us what to do, as they have tried, and it is not for anyone else to tell us what to do either. This was expressed in 1973 in the President's speech and expressed in law through the PDA, which sets out rules for interactions with foreigners for election candidates, election agents and political associations. The PSP part, as I said, is based on existing legislation, the PDA, ported over. Over the years, subversion has become an even more serious issue. Modern ease of communications, increased interactions and travel have made it inevitable that traditional spying and subversion increases in scope and intensity. This is happening in Singapore and elsewhere. Just to give some examples from the last few years. In 2017, an Australian former senator apparently received donations from an individual with connections to the People's Republic of China (PRC) government. He then advocated for China's position on the South China Sea. A former chairman of a European Union foreign friendship group was sponsored flights and hotel stays by a foreign government and, subsequently, voiced views that supported that government's policies on various issues. In 2019, leaked documents revealed that the Russian government was allegedly planning to provide financial and public relations assistance to the election campaign of German politician Markus Frohnmaier, who was known to be very outspoken in favour of ending sanctions and recognising Russia's annexation of Crimea. This has also happened in Singapore. Members would be familiar with the expulsion of academic Huang Jing in 2017 for collaborating with foreign intelligence agents.”
“Thank you, Sir. Mr Speaker, I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time." This Bill covers two aspects. First, dealing with Online Hostile Information Campaigns – we call them HICs – conducted by foreign parties. I will refer to that as the HIC part. And the second part dealing with foreign interference through local proxies. The second part, I will refer to it as the Politically Significant Persons, or PSP part. The second part is about slightly more than half of this Bill. There is existing law, the Political Donations Act (PDA), and we have ported over the existing PDA and updated it. Members of Parliament will be familiar with the PDA. So, it is the PDA which has been brought into the PSP part of the Bill, with updating. I will set out the reasons for this Bill, deal with some of the concerns that have been raised and deal with the proposed amendments by the Workers' Party. My colleagues, Ministers of State Desmond Tan and Muhammad Faishal Ibrahim, will take the Members through the detailed provisions of the Bill. First, on the PSP part of the Bill. The philosophy is that our politics is for Singaporeans to deal with. We can argue, disagree, but, ultimately, it is for us to decide. If I can quote what the former Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) director James Comey told the House Intelligence Committee in March 2017, "One of the things we radiate to the world is the importance of our wonderful, often messy, but free and fair democratic system and the elections that undergird it. And so, when there is something by a foreign nation state to mess with that, to destroy that, to corrupt that, it is very, very serious and threatens what is America." The very idea of America.”
“Sir, we have checked our records. We have no such case that fits in with the description that has been given by the Member. I wanted to give her the option of giving us the best information she has but she confirms that such an incident happened that she accompanied this victim to the Police station and that she does not wish to divulge the information only because of confidentiality. Speaker and Members will know that confidentiality does not extend to not telling us which Police station. Sir, I will leave it here for now but that does not mean the matter rests. The Police will investigate this very serious matter further. The officers in-charge and the Police will interview Ms Khan and any allegations of misconduct concerning specific officers will be referred to SPF's Internal Affairs Office for further investigation. I will say to Ms Khan, through you, Sir, that, at the very least, she must remember which Police station, which year this happened and which month and some details of the number and the ages and the races of the Police officers whom she says, and she has confirmed for us, that she did see them. Thank you, Sir.”
“Sir, I do not understand this point about confidentiality. Can I ask through you, Sir, for Ms Khan to confirm in this House that everything she has told us is accurate, that she did accompany such a person and such an incident did happen?”
“Sir, I have to say that, perhaps, Mr Speaker has the power to direct answers since the matter has been raised and, through you, Sir, I ask for the direction to be given that we be told which Police station and the month; if not the date, at least the month and which Police station.”
“Sir, we are talking about the Police station. That has got nothing to do with the confidentiality.”
“Sir, I asked which Police station, which month and the identities of the officers, to the extent Ms Khan knows them.”
“So, Sir, through you, may I ask Ms Khan for those details.”
“So, can the Member – I ask the Member through you, Sir – to tell us at the very least the Police station that she went to with the victim and, if possible, the names of the Police officer or officers who attended to the victim and the Member. And if she cannot remember the names, then some details: how many officers were there, some description of them, rough age, race, male or female. Whatever details she can give. And when the Member saw the victim come out crying after her interview, did the Member bring this to the Police officers' attention? What did the Member say to the officers? How did the officers respond when alerted to the victim's reaction? And did the Member lodge a complaint about what happened, either at that time or after that? And I think the Member should be able to remember the month, the year when this happened when she went to the Police station. She told Parliament three times that this happened three years ago. Can she confirm that this took place in 2018? I should add that since we take very seriously all these points, Police has spent a lot of time searching their records since this point was made. They do not seem to be able to identify a case where Ms Khan was present with the victim. It is entirely possible that they did not note down Ms Khan's name. But it is most important that the matter is not left hanging, with doubt over what may or may not have happened. And as I have said, our focus is on the Police officers, the reputation of Singapore Police Force to help the victim and for us to find out what happened and to try and make sure that Police officers understand better, if, indeed, it happened in this way, and change their behaviour, if necessary, and for the message to go out to all Police officers.”
“Later in the debate, Ms Khan rose again to further clarify that she raised the example because it was her experience with the survivor and that the episode took place three years ago and she had been unsuccessful in getting in touch with the victim. She said this in the context that and, I quote, "consent is imperative not least to avoid re-victimisation." We take such allegations concerning the Police very seriously. Ms Khan had said that she did not want the victim to be re-traumatised or re-victimised. I understand and empathise with that and we will bear that in mind as we seek to investigate what happened, especially since a Member has raised this here in Parliament, to make sure that we know what happened and, if necessary, discipline the Police officers involved. This does not have to mean naming the victim. We will consider carefully how to protect the victim and deal with these matters sensitively. What is extremely important is that we identify the Police station, the officers involved. I have given very clear instructions to the Police that we have to identify the officers involved, get their versions, to be fair to them. What further steps are taken, depend on the facts. The Government is very serious about making sure that the Police do the right thing. So, if they have not behaved well, then we must discipline them. That means investigating what happened, identifying the officers involved. That is how we have maintained an excellent Home Team. As I have said, this does not have to mean that the victim has to be named publicly. We will consider carefully how to proceed so as not to re-traumatise the victim. And for us to take this further, we need more details.”
“Mr Speaker, Sir, I had given Mr Speaker Notice that I wanted to make a short Ministerial Statement. This relates to something that was said in the Parliamentary Sitting on 3 August 2021, this year, by one of the Members of Parliament, Ms Raeesah Khan, on the Workers' Party's (WP's) Motion on Empowering Women. Ms Khan had said that three years ago, she had accompanied a 25-year-old survivor to file a Police report against a rape and that she saw the survivor coming out crying. The survivor told her that the Police officer had made comments about her dressing and the fact that she had been drinking. Ms Khan also shared her experience with this House about going with the victim to the Police, what she saw after she had filed the report and she cited it as an example of how law enforcement needs to ensure better treatment of sexual assault survivors. My colleague, Minister of State Desmond Tan, then asked for more details about the incident so that the Government can investigate what happened. He explained that MHA takes these allegations very seriously and said that they had to be looked into to check if the case had been handled properly by the Police and that they should not be swept aside without further investigations. Ms Khan's response was that she had raised the example as it was her personal experience with the rape survivor. She also stated her belief that these anecdotes are not isolated and expressed the hope that such incidents could start further discussions about how victims are treated. She went on to say that the incident happened three years ago and she did not wish to re-traumatise this survivor whom she had accompanied.”
“All roads users, including cyclists, are required by law to use roads in a safe and responsible way. Road users who flout traffic rules and drive or ride in an irresponsible manner put themselves and other road users at risk. Parties at fault will be penalised under the law. For example, cyclists who ride against the flow of traffic or fail to conform to traffic light signals, or ride without due regard for the safety of others, may be liable for an offence. First-time offenders may be fined up to $1,000, imprisoned up to three months, or both. Repeat offenders may be fined up to $2,000, imprisoned up to six months, or both. For egregious cases which result in an accident and injury to other road users, harsher punishments under the Penal Code will be imposed. The Member has also asked about the duty of care of motorists towards cyclists who may be cycling against the flow of traffic. It is difficult to give a general response, since the law is often fact-specific, beyond stating that every road user owes a duty of care towards other road users. Members will, however, appreciate that it does not automatically mean that motorists can ignore another road user who may be in breach of the rules. For example, the fact that a pedestrian is crossing the road at a wrong place does not automatically mean that a motorist can ignore him and drive into the pedestrian and cause serious injury, when the motorist could have, in fact, stopped in time. In such cases, both parties may be liable, under different traffic rules. And civil law also has a way of apportioning the responsibilities, when claims are made.”
“YRSG matches older offenders with jobs suitable for their skill levels, physical health and personal interests. YRSG may also assign a career coach to support the ex-offender on work issues for up to 12 months after release and help him/her stay in the job. Recognising that older offenders would need additional help to improve their digital literacy, YRSG partnered the Infocomm Media Development Authority (IMDA) to roll out a customised "Seniors Go Digital" training for residents at the Selarang Halfway House (SHWH). Three sessions have been conducted since April 2021, benefiting 35 SHWH older residents. They have learnt how to use applications on smartphones for communications and access digital Government and payment services.”
“In 2019, SPS introduced the Throughcare Volunteer Framework to strengthen pro-social support for offenders, including older offenders. Various social service agencies and religious organisations collaborate with SPS under this framework. The volunteers build rapport with offenders through regular programmes or activities during incarceration and continue to support them after they are released. Befrienders play an important role in supporting and guiding offenders in their rehabilitation. Of the 173 offenders who were assigned befrienders in 2021, 41 or 24% were older offenders. In 2020, SPS collaborated with Lions Befrienders (LB) to train befrienders to communicate with and support older offenders. About 15 LB staff had volunteered to be SPS befrienders, to offer their expertise and experience in working with older people. About six months before release, Personal Supervisors will engage offenders to discuss their post-release plans. All requests for post-release accommodation assistance are referred to SPS’ Family Resource Centres (FRCs), which are staffed by social workers. Older offenders who need long-term residential care may be referred to nursing homes or welfare homes. If referred to halfway houses or shelters for interim accommodation, case-workers will work with the ex-offenders to secure long-term housing. Post-release employment and support are critical to reintegration. To promote better career outcomes, Yellow Ribbon Singapore (YRSG) prepares offenders for employment through skills training and employment assistance. In prison, nationally-accredited skills training is available to all offenders, including older offenders. Skills training is complemented by YRSG’s job placement and career coaching services.”
“Offenders aged 55 years old and above (older offenders) face similar rehabilitation and reintegration challenges as other offenders, in the areas of housing, social support, financial needs and employment. Some older offenders may also face age-related physical and mental health issues. All offenders, including older offenders, have access to rehabilitation programmes while in prison. Where there are additional needs specific to their age group, the existing programmes can be adapted to cater to them. To facilitate their reintegration into society, eligible offenders can be emplaced on Community-Based Programmes (CBP), to serve the tail-end of their sentence at their residence or approved community facilities under the supervision and support of the Singapore Prison Service (SPS). Offenders who are at a higher risk of reoffending or require more support in their reintegration, may be emplaced on the Mandatory Aftercare Scheme (MAS). MAS is a structured aftercare regime that provides enhanced community support, counselling and case management with tight supervision. Of the 4,394 offenders emplaced on CBP or MAS in 2020, 948 or 22% of them were older offenders. All offenders, including older offenders, have access to healthcare services. The Prison Medical Officer (PMO) may make referrals for offenders to continue with treatment after their release. Sufficient medication will be given until the medical appointment in the community. Offenders with mental health issues may be referred to the Institute of Mental Health for follow-up after their release. Family support is important and offenders are encouraged to maintain their relationships with their loved ones via letters and visits. For those without family support, volunteers are an important source of support.”
“All requests by foreigners for extension of stay will be assessed based on the prevailing guidelines, which take into account COVID-19-related border restrictions. Singapore has an established and longstanding policy on refugees. As a small, densely populated country with limited land, Singapore is not in a position to accept any persons seeking political asylum or refugee status.”
“These CRRTs comprise representatives from schools, businesses, grassroots, community and religious organisations in the neighbourhood. We intend to set up CRRTs in more constituencies. We will continue to press ahead with our SGSecure efforts to strengthen Singapore’s vigilance, preparedness and resilience. We appeal to all like-minded partners and the public to join us in this whole-of-society effort to safeguard our security and way of life.”
“Notably, Saefullah facilitated the travel of an Indonesian couple to Jolo in southern Philippines, where they mounted suicide bombings on 27 January 2019. The situation in Afghanistan will likely remain in flux for some time, and the resulting instability may again attract radicalised individuals. We also expect social media platforms to continue to be used in such radicalisation and recruitment. The community plays a vital role in the fight against radicalisation and terrorism. The SGSecure movement has greatly strengthened our preparedness as individuals and as a country to deal with a terror attack. In a recent survey, more than 96% of residents agreed that “All Singaporeans have a role to play in preventing and dealing with a terror attack”, with close to nine in 10 affirming that they are prepared to take action to keep the community safe and secure, for example, by reporting suspicious activities and helping others in an emergency situation. In particular, family members and friends are best placed to detect possible signs of radicalisation. Anyone who knows or suspects that a person has intentions to travel to Afghanistan or other conflict zones, or has been radicalised, should promptly alert the authorities. Just as the authorities must be well-prepared to stage a swift and effective response when an attack happens, it is equally important that the community knows how best to respond. The Home Team has worked with partner agencies to enhance the preparedness of our neighbourhoods, schools, workplaces, places of worship and community organisations. One of the initiatives is the Community Response Roundtable (CRRT), which aims to facilitate greater collaboration in crisis preparedness at the local level. We have successfully piloted it in several constituencies.”
“We are watching the unfolding developments in Afghanistan closely. While there is currently no information of a specific terrorist threat to Singapore arising from the situation there, we are concerned if it would provide fertile conditions for transnational militant organisations, such as Al-Qaeda (AQ) and Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), to regroup or establish safe havens there, in the same manner that they had exploited other conflict zones like Syria/Iraq. These terrorist groups can also be expected to propagate an ideological narrative based on the American withdrawal, to draw recruits there. Our experience with the Soviet-Afghan conflict may be instructive. The conflict drew an estimated 10,000 foreign fighters over a 10-year period from 1979 to 1989, which included several hundred Southeast Asians. Through their experience in Afghanistan, these Southeast Asian militants developed links to AQ and formed a fraternity of mujahideen (fighters). Upon their return to Southeast Asia, they continued to pursue a path of violence through membership in regional militant groups like Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and imparted their operational skills to fellow members. At least 11 Singapore JI detainees were known to have attended military training in AQ camps in Afghanistan. Upon their return, several participated in terror plots targeting Singapore, including the collaboration with an AQ operative to mount suicide truck-bomb attacks against western embassies in Singapore. In recent years, too, Afghanistan has continued to draw militants from Southeast Asia. In 2019, a handful of Indonesian ISIS militants joined ISIS-K in Afghanistan. One of them was Saefullah, who plotted and financed attacks in Southeast Asia via a transnational network while he was embedded with ISIS-K.”
“The threat of electronic surveillance by hostile actors, including through tools like Pegasus, is not new. Our security agencies continually invest resources to guard against such threats to our systems. At the individual level, to mitigate the risk of spyware and other malware, we should adopt good cyber hygiene practices, such as avoiding untrustworthy websites and not opening suspicious attachments.”
“From January to June 2021, there were 215 non-residential fires. The three most common causes, contributing to about 70% of such fires, were fires of electrical origin, overheating of food and fires due to exposure to heat sources or chemicals. There are various measures in place to minimise the occurrence of such fires. SCDF requires large non-residential premises to appoint a Fire Safety Manager (FSM) to assist the building owner in ensuring a fire-safe environment. The FSM’s responsibilities include daily checks for fire hazards, conducting fire drills to ensure that the building occupants are familiar with the evacuation plan, and educating them on fire prevention matters. SCDF also works with stakeholders, such as the National Fire and Emergency Preparedness Council, the Fire Safety Managers’ Association Singapore and the Association of Company Emergency Response Teams (Singapore), to engage the industries regularly. At such engagement sessions, professionals share best practices and lessons from past fire cases. Commercial and industrial premises with good fire safety track records are recognised at the annual Fire Safety Awards. SCDF conducts regular checks on non-residential premises and takes enforcement actions against non-compliance. Members of the public can also provide feedback on fire safety via channels, such as the Fire Safety Hotline and the myResponder App.”
“Gun parts and other dangerous items, such as explosives, are regulated under the Arms and Explosives Act (AEA). Suppliers or buyers have to obtain relevant licences from the Police to handle these items. E-commerce platforms are currently not regulated by the Police for the sale of gun parts and other dangerous items. However, MHA has introduced the Guns, Explosives and Weapons Control Act (GEWCA), which will replace the AEA when it comes into force in end 2021. Under the GEWCA, e-commerce platforms will be regulated for the sale of these items. MHA is developing the regulatory framework and consulting the industry.”
“Mr Leong Mun Wai asked me a question or suggested something, so I thought I should clarify through yourself, Mr Speaker, Sir. He said: "Prior to my post on 21 June 2021, I have not mentioned CECA and I asked the Minister Shanmugam and he did not say anything." I am not quite sure what the purport or the point Mr Leong makes, because Minister Ong Ye Kung had said during the July debate, gave chapter and verse for the various times when PSP leaders had referred to CECA. For example, Dr Tan Cheng Bock on 2 July 2020, that PSP will call for a review of the India-Singapore Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement and the canard that it allows a free movement of professionals. And others had made some statements, similar statements. Mr Leong put up his Facebook post along similar lines in June. His Motion, which we debated today, is along the same lines. All of this is on the record and I had made it clear. So, I am not quite sure what point he was making. I am not asking him to clarify, because it is past midnight. All I am saying is, the reason I did not respond to him was because the record is clear. He associated himself with all these statements unless now he is saying: well, those are racist, but you know, I did not make them. But he associated himself with them. I think we can leave it at that. That is my answer.”
“Thank you, Sir. I do not think there is going to be a reprise.”
“Can we do better? I think we ought to do better by the people who have lost their jobs or who are underemployed. Is it that our Universities have produced graduates who cannot get jobs? Over the past 10 years, nine in 10 graduates have been employed within six months after graduation, with starting salaries rising steadily. I think it is demeaning and dismissive of all the good people in our Universities and Polytechnics working hard to train our students, to say that they are producing people who cannot get employed. And it is untrue. Would Singapore be consistently ranked highly on the UN's Human Development Index if Singaporean were oppressed in the labour market, if incomes have not risen and productivity stalled? What we have is not perfect. It is not perfect anywhere in the world and we have to consistently work to improve. But it is not the picture that Mr Leong is describing. And I would say Mr Leong's views have been so completely distorted by his lack of understanding of CECA and his eagerness to attack Indians and CECA. And I would say what his party and Mr Leong are doing is one of the worst types of political opportunism – using race as a bait. Thank you, Sir.”
“Sir, I will just move on. I will just, for the record, set out exactly what was said by Mr Leong. He said and I quote: "I am deeply disappointed now ...", that these are the points that he was speaking, "...because 22 years later after Mr –" and I assume after Mr Wong's appointment in 1998, "...DBS is still without a homegrown CEO". It is open and shut. He meant 2020 and Mr Gupta was appointed in 2009. I think we can at least be honest with each other when the words are in black and white. I would say, Sir, to this House, it is not wrong that we welcome talent when people are committed enough to take up citizenship. It is wrong to have an issue with new citizens and PRs from specific countries because it is quite clear what Mr Leong and PSP were doing. It is race-baiting and nationality-baiting without beating about the bush. And that is what the words of this Motion suggest. None of this is to deny the legitimate concerns of Singaporeans. None of this is to deny that there are people who have lost jobs, that there are people in their 40s and 50s, in particular, who are very concerned and that we have to do everything we can to help them and we have to stand by with them. But I think race-baiting, nationality-baiting, putting down Motions and then coming to Parliament and saying, "well, I don't know, I don't have a view on the legal provisions", when your party has made it a point from day one to attack the legal provisions. I think none of those helped. Based on his speech, Sir, Mr Leong has painted such a dark picture of what is going on in Singapore, which really bears little resemblance to reality. Is it that locals are being pushed out of PMET jobs on a large scale? We have created over 300,000 local PMET jobs. In fact, locals take up 80% of all PMET jobs.”
“A point of clarification, Sir. I did expressly say we leave aside whatever Mr Leong may have intended. I am simply asking whether what I have said is a fair interpretation, natural interpretation of what he said.”
“Sorry, Sir, can I ask that the natural interpretation of a statement that "I have deep disappointment that DBS is still without a homegrown CEO". At a time that a naturalised Singaporean is a CEO, the normal interpretation, whatever may be the workings of Mr Leong's mind, the normal interpretation would be that he is disappointed that it is Mr Gupta and not a homegrown Singaporean. Would that not be the natural interpretation, Sir?”
“Sir, may I then ask through you, what is the meaning of the statement that "DBS is still without a homegrown CEO". We are not talking about succession plans here. I am just asking for an interpretation of Mr Leong's words: "DBS is still without a homegrown CEO".”
“Thank you. Therefore, Mr Leong has changed his mind, it appears, Sir, from last year.”
“Sir, let me make a point of clarification. None of that answers the point I made. I am quoting Mr Leong, he professed his deep disappointment when Mr Piyush Gupta was and is DBS CEO, during his maiden speech, that DBS is still without a homegrown CEO. Meaning he was disappointed that it was Mr Gupta and not a homegrown CEO. So, let us not beat about the bush. I am asking whether he continues to have those beliefs or has he changed his mind.”
“Thank you, Sir. Sir, through you again, may I ask Mr Leong to confirm – and Members of this House would recall what he said about the CEO of DBS Bank. He professed his deep disappointment that "DBS is still without a homegrown CEO". Can I ask, Sir, whether Mr Leong still believes what he said, that naturalised Singapore Citizens should not hold top positions?”
“Sir, that might be useful. So, through you, Sir, therefore I can confirm that if Mr Leong has no opinion, then naturally, he has no view as to whether the terms of CECA are negative for Singapore. I am not talking about actual implementation. We can discuss that. But since Mr Leong has no opinion, it must logically follow that as far as he is concerned, there are no provisions in CECA that he is concerned about. It must follow. May I ask for confirmation of that, Sir.”
“I should address the Speaker. Looking at the Motion, Sir, Mr Leong can fulminate as much as he wants, but it says what it says. And it says, "the provisions on Movement of Natural Persons in some free trade agreements like CECA", and that is consistent with the position that Mr Leong put forward in July and what he has said in his Facebook post and what PSP has said, that CECA allows free movement of Indians into Singapore. So, before we get all heated up, let me refer to what was discussed here the last time around. The Motion is consistent with what Dr Tan Cheng Bock had said on 3 August 2019, which Minister Ong referenced, and I quote Dr Tan, "amongst the terms of CECA, it allowed the free movement of professionals in 127 sectors to enter and work in Singapore." Mr Leong has confirmed that that is not accurate, because he says it is subject to our work pass rules, but this was what they were thinking. Minister Ong pointed out, on 7 July, the same; that Dr Tan said "...CECA is an agreement between Singapore and India to bring in to allow, I think, 127 categories of professionals to come to Singapore and be given that free hand, practically free hand to come and work here". And that is what the Motion says, "the provisions on Movement of Natural Persons in some free trade agreements". So, I mean one has got to be both honest and accurate. If Mr Leong does not know what the Motion means, if it has been drafted by someone and he has put his name to it, he can say so. But this is what the Motion says. If I may move on, Sir.”
“What is not legitimate is to try and create a racist, xenophobic, them-versus-us fervour, put down a Motion saying that the terms of CECA are wrong. And then come to Parliament and say, I do not know anything about the terms of CECA. That is doing serious disservice to Singaporeans. That is not the way Members should behave, I am sorry to say. You got to take this seriously. You got to know what your own Motion says. I am a lawyer, but you do not need to be a lawyer to know that this term, "provisions on Movement of Natural Persons in some free trade agreements", has got only one meaning. It is commonsensical.”
“The number of PMET jobs unfilled, that thousands of jobs were being unfilled, was set out in July. So, Mr Leong had said that he will study it carefully. And I think what this House is witnessing is a Motion that has been put up and Mr Leong does not know the meaning of the Motion that he has put up. Because he says "the provisions on Movement of Natural Persons in some free trade agreements like CECA". He has given no credible explanation on why CECA is singled out. He has no credible explanation as to why he refers to the provisions, which means legal provisions, the clauses in CECA, in his Motion and then asserts here that he does not know anything about the provisions in CECA. He has got no view on that. Then, he should not have referred to that. So, it is meaningless, the Motion; does not make any sense to him, let alone to us. And he says, there are too many foreign PMETs. But now he says, he does not know if there are too many and he does not know what the number ought to be. He does not tell us what further data he needs. Sir, none of this is to say that there are no Singaporeans who have lost their jobs, that there are no Singaporeans who are underemployed, that there are no Singaporeans, particularly in their 40s and 50s, who are not in a very good situation. We all know that. Those are all true. But the point is to find the right solutions. Displacement is taking place all over the world. We have tried to keep unemployment low, we have tried to create the jobs and many people have gotten jobs and we need to help those who have not got jobs, and the way to do it is to try to reskill them and bring in the right industries. Those are legitimate points to make.”
“Thank you, Sir. Can I ask, Sir, through you, I just mentioned there are 30,000 PMET vacancies. It is there. Perhaps Mr Leong can give us an explanation as to why there are so many vacancies which are unfilled in Singapore and have been unfilled for the last five years?”
“My question was a simple one. Mr Leong agreed earlier that he does not know if 350,000 is too many or too little. So, it is a natural conclusion that he does not really know if there are too many foreign PMETs here. It is basically based on what he says. Sir, can I ask through you, that he just be consistent with what he just said three minutes ago?”
“And, therefore, it follows, logically, Sir, that Mr Leong is not able to assert here or anywhere else that we have too many foreign PMETs in Singapore. That would be right?”
“Sir, based on the data that is available and I have given him this data and much of it is available in public, can I take it that he is in no position, Sir, to tell us whether it should be 350,000 or whether it should be 400,000 or whether it should be less? He has got no basis.”
“So, can I take it, Sir, through you, that Mr Leong can confirm that he does not really know how many, what should the number be?”