K Shanmugam
Singapore
“Bank accounts are frozen when there is reason to suspect that the bank accounts are involved in illicit activities, including money laundering activities.”
“The Singapore Police Force does not track the requested data. Distinguishing artificial intelligence (AI)-generated content typically requires more detailed forensic examination which may not be necessary in every investigation and may also not be conclusive as to whether AI-generative tools were used.”
“The Building and Construction Authority’s Code on Accessibility provides baseline requirements for accessible and inclusive buildings. It stipulates a minimum width of 1.5 metres or 1.8 metres for primary accessible routes, depending on the building type.”
“The Road Traffic (Motor Vehicles, Driving Licence) Rules under the Road Traffic Act set out the scope of the medical assessment required for motorists aged 65 and above who wish to retain their driving licences.”
“When a Police report has been made, the Police will investigate to determine if a criminal offence has been committed. If there is reasonable suspicion that a case is scam-related, the Police can direct online service providers to restrict Singapore users' access to the relevant online activity under the Online Criminal Harms Act.”
“Through intelligence sharing and coordinated enforcement actions, the cross-border operation disrupted a transnational drug trafficking syndicate and downstream drug trafficking activities, with the UK arresting seven persons so far and further investigations underway.”
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“Various falsehoods – that the French Constitution had been nullified in 2016 by the then-Prime Minister; that President Macron was going to sign France’s sovereignty away at the United Nations (UN) conference; a million Germans had protested increased fuel prices, that President Macron wrote to Paris police to use force against the protestors and so on. And during the protests, misinformation in Yellow Vest Facebook groups and pages reached over 105 million views and four million shares in five months. Images were falsely captioned as bleeding Yellow Vest protestors and then they were used to make the claim that media and government were hiding police brutality and violence against these protestors. During the 2016 US Presidential Election, disinformation came from foreign operatives. But in the mid-term elections, such campaigns were more domestic. Americans were targeting other Americans, using the same strategies that are said to have been introduced by the Russians. Sometimes, activists worked with foreign states. The SC Report has pointed out that state actors have formally coordinated with, co-opted other private-sector actors, including private industry, civil society organisations, fringe movements, volunteers who ideologically support their cause. The SC Report also mentioned an Asian country, it did not name it. It is said to have an online cyber army and volunteers who promote the government’s policies and attack those who criticise those policies. Social media has also enabled hate to thrive. Falsehoods are often centrepieces of hate propaganda and, over the past few years, people have used online falsehoods to promote anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim prejudice.”
“They pretended to be real Americans, amplified the falsehoods that originated from these websites, targeted echo chambers with claims that Mrs Clinton wanted to apply Sharia law in the US, that Mrs Clinton was actively arming the terrorist group Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The foreign agents also infiltrated other social media movements to spread falsehoods on both sides of issues – they were agnostic about that – and to create more divisions. They amplified the falsehoods and widened the divides. So, the political ground became fragile, fraught and conducive for foreign agents to operate. So, the experiences of these two countries show how, through a combination of falsehoods and digital technology, the foundations of democratic societies are severely attacked. Falsehoods are used to undermine public trust, which is the cornerstone of our infrastructure of fact. They are used to divide and polarise, tearing the social fabric. And democratic discourse, accommodation and compromise become very difficult. In these conditions, the political centre becomes hollowed out and people are driven to extremes. If you take France, the Yellow Vest movement, at the centre of the movement are these "Anger Groups" on Facebook. They are online hubs for falsehoods. They appeared almost a year before the street protests began in Paris. In the lead-up to the protests, falsehoods were used to increase the sense that the system was failing and turning against the people.”
“And the researchers that compiled the fake stories that had been debunked by fact-checking websites found that these falsehoods were shared about 38 million times, leading to around 760 million engagements with the content. And the false narratives were driven by the people who identified with the homegrown alternate-right movement. They largely sought to denigrate the establishment, attack Mrs Clinton's campaign. Also at play: sophisticated foreign information campaign that sought to influence the outcome; undermine democratic institutions and the democratic ideals. There was the conspiracy theory that Mrs Clinton and other top Democrats were part of a child paedophilia ring operating out of a Pizza restaurant in Washington DC. Sounds completely crazy. Utterly unbelievable if you think about it. The rumours began on Twitter, spread to other websites and online forums. Claims got louder, hacked emails from Mrs Clinton's campaign were distorted to support the conspiracy theory. An American man showed up at the Pizza restaurant to "self-investigate" and he brought a gun along with him. People demonstrated in front of the White House declaring that the theory was real. The falsehoods helped to create an alternate reality, one where a "deep state" existed within US institutions, which was conspiring against the American people and, if you are a part of this echo chamber, you would be told that then-President Obama was colluding with the UK spy agency to spy on Mr Trump. Mrs Clinton was linked to a mysterious explosion that killed one of her employees. And the 2018 Florida school shooting was really a secret government operation. Foreign agents infiltrated, exploited this alt-right movement using fake social media accounts.”
“In this town, the EU was funding a £350 million regeneration project, a £33 million college for further education, which had 29,000 apprenticeships for young people to learn a trade, a £77 million road improvement scheme and a £30 million railway line. The town had one of the lowest immigration rates in the country. It was in Wales, which was a net EU beneficiary. But when Caroline interviewed the people in the town, she discovered the existence of an alternative reality. People believed the town was sending more money to the EU than it was receiving. The EU had not only done nothing for the town, it had also brought a huge immigration problem, including from Turkey. The Welsh town had been a leftwing Labour stronghold. Yet, the people were repeating information usually found in rightwing newspapers. She discovered that they were getting their information or misinformation from targeted digital ads on Facebook. One of the most controversial claims in the UK during the referendum was that the UK sends £350 million a week to the EU. Not only plastered on buses but also run as digital ads aimed at specific groups of voters. The UK Statistics Authority said the figure was likely closer to £136 million per week. Despite the corrections, a 2018 King's College London study found 42% of the people who had heard this claim believed it to be true and 22% were unsure. Only 30% correctly believed that it was false. For a referendum that may have irreversibly altered the course of British history, these are serious consequences. In the US as well, falsehoods and lies have been spread on a massive scale. A study from Stanford University shows that, on average, each American adult read about three false stories in the months leading up to the 2016 US elections.”
“A large part of the foreign-linked content related to refugees and immigration. False stories. Stories of illegal migrants attacking women, concocted. But these falsehoods were used to create an alternative reality. If you believed them, you would believe there was a conspiracy by the ruling elite to turn the UK and Europe into a Muslim caliphate. Muslims were campaigning for Sharia law to govern the UK, the Mayor of London, a Muslim, was sponsoring them and, in the UK, there are areas where Sharia law dominates and non-Muslims cannot enter. Sounds outlandish. Who will believe? The British are very sensible people. But even the British fell for it. In 2018, YouGov did a survey of over 10,000 people, so it was a substantial survey. Thirty-two percent believed the falsehood about "no-go" areas under Sharia rule in the UK. Forty-nine percent of those who voted to leave the EU stated that this was true. It also created a permissive environment for hate. In the month after the referendum, there was a 41% spike in hate crimes and the majority of crimes were motivated by race, including crimes against migrants. Brexit altered the course of British history. It was one of the most important events in their recent history. A massive falsehood campaign may well have affected the outcome. An investigative report in The Guardian by a British journalist, Caroline Cadwalladr explained. She went to a town in Wales that probably received more EU funds than any other town and which still voted to leave the EU. Sixty-two percent of them voted to leave.”
“The SC found that in several countries, both local and foreign, civilians had spread falsehoods for political causes, affecting both their own countries and other countries as well. Example again – far-right, nationalist groups, promoting more extreme politics. Domestic alt-right in the US used falsehoods, drove major false narratives during the 2016 US presidential elections. More recently, in 2018, in the Brazilian presidential elections, local far-right groups coordinated a network of fake social media accounts, spread misinformation in support of rightwing candidates. Populists use lies to attack institutions, invoke divisive rhetoric. They use conspiracy theories to explain complex issues in simple terms and trying to make people believe them. Truth then becomes completely irrelevant. Even the most extreme lies which we might think people will normally dismiss, become believed and it impacts very badly on public life. British historian and journalist Anne Applebaum said this about populist movements: "They don’t require belief in a full-blown ideology...most of them don’t deploy propaganda that conflicts with everyday reality. And yet…all of them encourage their followers to engage, at least part of the time, with an alternative reality." In the UK, falsehoods were spread extensively during the EU Referendum. Immigration was a key issue. I spoke earlier about false claims in traditional media about Turks, Turkey and Brexit. Digital advertisements were also run by the Leave EU Campaign that Turkey was joining the EU, 12 million Turks would in that event move to the UK, if it remained in the EU. Foreign interference was also at play. Fake foreign-linked accounts posted more than 45,000 messages about Brexit in the 48 hours during the referendum.”
“False article: protestors were paid to protest against Mr Trump; retweeted by the Trump campaign; 20 million Amish people had committed to vote for Mr Trump, turned up in Google News, had 750,000 page views in two days. He made $10,000 a month from Google AdSense. He was opposed to President Trump but targeted conservatives with his fake stories because he found it more profitable. A BuzzFeed news investigation found a network of at least 43 websites, which together, published more than 750 fake news articles – a small study. All of them used Google AdSense to earn digital advertising revenue. Towards the end of the 2016 US presidential elections, a small town in Macedonia became well-known as the registered home of at least 100 pro-Trump websites filled with sensational falsehoods. Macedonians experimented with different target audiences. Fake stories could gain the most traction amongst Trump supporters, they found. Sometimes they wrote their own articles, but often would just reuse falsehoods from alt-right websites in the US. In the four months leading up to the elections, one young Macedonian earned nearly US$16,000 from the two websites he ran. For five or six hours of work, he could earn about $1,000 a month. So, as Samanth Subramanian, a reporter with Wired, said, "This is the… disturbing heart of the affair: that the Internet made it so simple for these young men to finance their material whims and that their actions helped deliver such momentous consequences." Third category, deliberate individual actors. You had foreign state actors; you had people doing it for money; now, people who do it deliberately, and groups.”
“A Swedish defence agency said false information about subjects, such as NATO, immigration and terrorism, are spread "on a daily basis in Sweden." In many of these countries, trust is being eroded in institutions, populism is on the rise. Since Russia’s name had come up in the media, the SC invited Russia to help us and the Russian Embassy very helpfully sent us a letter that Russia is also very concerned about fake news and has been a victim of fake news. So, we have no doubt that Russia takes this matter very seriously. Next, apart from foreign state actors, commercial profit is another dimension. Digital advertising models have turned websites into virtual real estate. So, value depends on the attention attracted, with every click, every view, digital ad revenue is earned. This business model has created an attention economy, content that stokes fear and anger are good for attracting attention. Falsehoods can help people earn large sums of money and have political impact. In the US, an American named Paul Horner set up at least 20 fake news websites. Some used deceptive uniform resource locator (URLs). It tricked readers into thinking that they were mainstream sources like ABC News or Cable News Network. He was prolific. He used his websites to publish fake stories, stoke partisan engagement, claimed that they were satirical, said he assumed people would fact-check. But many did not, and they were fooled. Some examples of his falsehoods: during a government shutdown, President Obama used his own money to keep open a government-funded Muslim culture museum. Fox News reported the story as a fact, before retracting it.”
“Volunteers who fought against Ukraine said they were motivated because of these supposed atrocities. Consequences? Loss of sovereignty, part of territory, loss of lives. If you take the Czech Republic, disinformation operation by a foreign country was used to turn domestic sentiments in favour of a foreign state’s geopolitical goals. One objective was to make people believe that the US was responsible for the influx of Syrian refugees into Europe and the conflict in Ukraine. The disinformation appears to have had some impact. In 2016, 50.2% of Czechs believed that the US was responsible for Syrian refugees coming to Europe, 38% believed that the Ukrainian crisis was caused by the US and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). So, it was done to weaken Czech support for NATO and Ukraine. Take Germany. If it can happen in the UK and if it can happen in Germany, I believe it can easily happen here. A girl fabricated a claim that she had been assaulted by three Middle Eastern migrants. Foreign media outlets reported on that widely, suggesting it was true, specifically from one country. Reports were then spread on social media. The Berlin authorities investigated, confirmed the girl’s claim had been fabricated. But falsehoods were circulated online that the police had failed to follow up on the case. Thousands demonstrated on the streets to "expose" the government’s attempts to cover up the crimes perpetrated by the refugees. That same year, a far-right populist party made unprecedented gains in the regional elections and most of its support came from the same minority constituency as the girl who made the rape claims. Sweden.”
“A national security expert from Latvia, Dr Janis Berzins, said that the notion of a broken social contract is the main vulnerability exploited by foreign adversaries. In his words: "It is easier for the adversary to achieve its objectives if the society of the state being attacked believes that their country is a failed state that does not care for the interests and needs of the population, and the loss of current statehood will bring better living conditions." Singapore is a specific and vulnerable target for some very precise reasons. It has military superiority in this region – experts said this. That superiority in conventional military forces means it will be futile to start a war with Singapore. And, therefore, militarily weaker countries will then focus on other means to weaken Singapore, sap our will from inside, create deep internal divisions and keep us in a permanent state of internal dissension. The evidence is that this is already happening. The SC heard it. We know it is happening even though we do not come out in public and say it very openly. It is happening to sap people’s support for the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF), for defence, to try and shift Singapore’s foreign policy as well. These are not issues that we should dismiss lightly. Just assuming we go on the basis of the evidence that was presented at the SC, it has happened elsewhere and I will give Members some evidence of how it has happened. Take Ukraine. A foreign country, which the SC did not really name, used falsehoods to build a narrative that the Ukrainian government was fascist and corrupt. It spread online falsehoods about atrocities being carried out against a particular community in Ukraine. For example, that Ukrainian soldiers had crucified a child, which was later debunked.”
“The attack using falsehoods on social media comes from several sources: (a) foreign countries using information warfare; (b) profit-driven actors; (c) deliberate actors, for political ends; and (d) people with prejudices, seeking to harm other groups. The SC noted this. So, let us look at some sources of falsehoods. First, foreign countries. There is a military doctrine that has been developed for the Internet age. General Gerasimov, Russia’s military Chief of Staff, there is a doctrine named after him called the Gerasimov Doctrine. Basically, he says, the "rules of war" have changed. Non-military measures, including information operations, they can be harnessed to, in turn, harness what he calls the "protest potential of the population". What does it mean? Information operations can target and create internal opposition as a "permanently operating front" throughout the target country. These non-kinetic military measures, in many cases, can exceed, as his doctrine says, the power of force and weapons. Even though military or overt violent measures are not being used, the target states’ national sovereignty and security are threatened and violated. In this way, the lines between war and peace have now blurred and wars no longer have to be declared. Security experts gave evidence to the Select Committee. Dr Shashi Jayakumar said that in modern information warfare, "seeding internal opposition within the target country is extremely important." And he said that "technological tsunami" has given aggressor states the ability to "subvert individual slices" of the target country in a manner unthinkable just two to three decades ago.”
“" A critical reason for this remarkable achievement, and I quote Davies again, is "something so ubiquitous, so ordinary, that we scarcely ever stop to notice it: trust.” This is the trust that when public institutions – the Government, the media and other institutions – share a piece of information with the public, they do so honestly. Trust in public institutions is a cornerstone of the infrastructure of fact. The belief in the authenticity of the source, whether it be the media, the Government, experts or other authoritative sources, makes society accept facts. Authenticity, of course, has to be earned, maintained. And if a usually trusted source is not telling the truth, there must be avenues to expose and there must be consequences. So, that rigour helps in maintaining authenticity. People will then believe that if it is said, it is likely to be true. And if not true, it will be exposed. These are amongst the foundations on which modern societies are based. They are bigger than the government of the day. They are bigger than any political party. This is about the basic structure of society New media has been heavily exploited to batter this infrastructure of fact which, in turn, weakens trust in public discourse, in institutions, in democracy itself. I will now set out how falsehoods have been weaponised to attack the infrastructure of fact, to destroy trust, and to attack societies. New media is an information superhighway. It has got many by ways, links to different groups in society, and to everyone. It has now been used to send out on an industrial scale, falsehoods, to mislead people. Broad sections targeted, but also specific groups targeted, and individuals are targeted.”
“Many societies, including ours, are pluralistic and diverse, with competing interests and identities, with religious diversity as well. Various interest groups – non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and other associations are there. Each pursues its interests, causes and passions. Such diversity is never easy to navigate. It can give rise to instability and conflict. James Madison, one of America's founding fathers, argues that the "factions" in a diverse society cannot be controlled. Only the effects of such factions can be countered. Decision-making with diversity is not always easy. And a key foundation of a democracy is public discourse. Ideally, public discourse will help citizens understand complex policy issues. It will guide policymakers to make optimal decisions. It will shape differing viewpoints and expand common ground. But public discourse can only take place when there is free and responsible speech. The prerequisites for national conversations are a common vocabulary, an underpinning of facts and that provides a platform for accommodation and compromise amongst diverse voices in society. A critical piece of infrastructure in these conversations is fact, and the infrastructure of fact. Like public infrastructure, society depends on it. It provides society with a shared reality. This is necessary so that we can have diversity without conflict, and public participation while still getting decisions made. Without it, our political system will malfunction. William Davies, the English sociologist and political economist has said, and I quote, "The fact that millions of people are able to believe the same things about reality is a remarkable achievement, but one that is more fragile than is often recognised.”
“Forty-four percent of those who voted to leave the EU believed the system was failing, and held fears about at least one major societal issue, compared with 20% of those who wanted to remain in the EU. Populists used these fears as ammunition to feed the crisis of trust in institutions. And 2016 saw populist movements make major gains. The Eurasia Group said populism is a force in US politics. And in Europe, populist political parties are getting close to or are in government positions in several countries. Populism also reigns in some Latin American countries and has gained footholds in Asia. And the assessment by the Eurasia Group is that populism is "likely to intensify and spread over the coming decade, weakening governments and de-legitimising political leaders as a consequence." The result will be a set of unyielding, centrifugal forces, creating a global environment described by the Eurasia Group as "the most dangerous it has been in decades". This is the serious situation that faces many countries, and we will face it as well. That is why I referred to Gotterdammerung earlier. Many issues: inequality, inequity, political system failing to deliver, traditional media, new media, the impact leading to loss of trust and to populism. We have to avoid this trajectory, which means we have to deal with each of these issues. This Bill is an attempt to deal with one part of the problem: the serious problems arising from falsehoods spread through new media. And to try and help support the infrastructure of fact and promote honest speech in public discourse. It is an important part, even as we work on the other aspects. Now, I turn to falsehoods and new media.”
“I spoke about inequality, inequity, political systems not delivering results, media abusing its power, new media being abused. I have sketched out the first three. New media is the subject of this Bill. I will come back to it and deal with it in greater detail. But let me first complete the larger point on the consequences of the four aspects coming together. Members can then see what happens when you do not deal with the very real dangers of these developments. In an active democracy, the foundations include trust, free speech and the infrastructure of fact. The four elements I referred to, have combined, like a battering ram, to damage, destroy these foundations. When people lose trust, when they lose faith, when there is no proper public discourse, when infrastructure of fact is damaged, then democracy, societies are at serious risk. Populism will then rise. Violence will rise, particularly towards the minorities, the weak. The ability of countries to face challenges will be weakened. The crisis of trust in many countries has opened wide the doors to dangerous, destructive politics, populism. Populism both exploits and deepens the loss of faith in the system, making it harder for institutions to correct and to find solutions. Gallup has said, and I quote, when people hold "low trust in government and low or static expectations for their future lives", support for populist, anti-establishment politics increases. A politics that can – and has, in some countries – destroy democracy and replace it with corruption. The 2017 Edelman Trust Barometer drew a direct link between the lack of trust in public institutions and these populist movements.”
“Steven Barnett is a prominent parliamentary advisor and Professor of Communications in the UK. He said, "In the lead up to the June 23 EU referendum, British mainstream media failed spectacularly. Led, inevitably, by the viscerally anti-EU Daily Mail, Sun, Daily Express, Telegraph, most of Britain's national press indulged in little more than a catalog of distortions, half-truths and outright lies. It was a ferocious propaganda campaign in which facts and sober analysis were sacrificed to the ideologically driven objectives of editors and other proprietors." The Pro-Leave Camp in the UK – The Daily Mail, The Daily Express, The Sun, The Daily Telegraph – combined readership of 28 million, used sensational headlines; outright lies. Sunday Express said "12 million Turks would move to the UK" if Turkey joined the EU; a complete falsehood. Later, it admitted it was inaccurate Government on the one side; people on the other; media is intermediary. If the media regularly trade in lies to attack the Government without basis, this happens – trust in government goes down. Institutions will be severely damaged. And the media can destroy institutions. An example of a great institution that is being savaged is the UK Courts, among the best in the world. I have spoken about this in the House previously. I do not wish to go into it but I have, in the attachment, set out how the British media have severely damaged the British judiciary. [Please refer to Annex 1.] Traditional media holds power over society's information. It has the ability to influence minds and viewpoints. When media acts responsibly, it serves democracy. When they do not, it damages democracy. So, in many countries, traditional media has played a big role in the loss of trust.”
“When asked why, Murdoch reportedly said, "When I go into Downing Street, they do what I say; when I go to Brussels they take no notice." Murdoch has since denied saying it, but the City Editor of The Times, Hilton, has stood by his account of what Murdoch said to him. Kevin Rudd made the point that "Murdoch made Brexit possible because of the position taken by his papers." Not just Murdoch's papers; others as well. And, with your permission, Mr Speaker, may I display slides on the LED screen?”
“As he was being ousted, Turnbull said, and I quote, "The reality is that a minority in the party room, supported by others outside the Parliament, have sought to bully, intimidate others into making this change of leadership that they are seeking". Kevin Rudd, another former Prime Minister, was also ousted by the media. He wrote a scathing article and he said Murdoch ran a campaign to destroy his government in the 2013 elections. Murdoch's papers began to attack Rudd because Rudd planned to build a National Broadband Network that would be good for Australia, but Murdoch's cable monopoly would face greater competition. So, Rudd was ousted. Rudd described Murdoch as "the greatest cancer of the Australian democracy". And I quote, "A political bully and a thug who for many years has hired bullies as his editors. The message to Australian politicians is clear: either toe the line on what Murdoch wants or he kills you politically." He described, and I quote, "a cowering, fearful political culture across the country" – fear of personal repercussions, if you have challenged Murdoch's interests, and said that Murdoch's print media had "a disproportionate impact on setting the day's overall agenda", using a "masterful conflation of 'opinion' with 'news'." Such media environment, of course, erodes trust in government. If you look at Britain, the baleful influence of media in British politics is well-documented. Look at The Guardian report in 2011. It said: "Blair 'paid court' to Murdoch, securing Murdoch's patronage", Murdoch gave Blair the power to shut out detractors, used his newspapers to help Blair beat down his rival, Brown. Brown, on the other hand, used the Daily Mail as a platform. And Murdoch was opposed to the European Union (EU).”
“So, the US, Australia, the UK, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden and other countries, the percentage of people who say that it is "essential" to live in a democracy has fallen significantly, especially amongst the young. Less than one-third of Americans below the age of 35 say it is absolutely important to live in a democracy. From 1995 to 2017, the share of French, Germans and Italians who favoured military rule, went up more than three times. From 1995 to 2014, the share of Americans who favoured military rule, rose 2.5 times, from one in 16 to one in six. Imagine that – one in six in America. So, the desire for an upending of the status quo has serious consequences – destabilisation, with global effects. Democracy itself is under serious threat. It will be very unwise for us to just watch and do nothing because it can sweep us over very quickly. I believe we are at one of those crucial turning points in history. It may not quite be Gotterdammerung, but a turn for the worse. This weakening of democracy and institutions has been powered by a series of contributing factors, and I will mention two: media and new media. First, the media. Media has, in other countries, played a highly corrosive role, in eroding trust in many ways. In Australia, media played a major role in the ousting of former Australian Prime Ministers Kevin Rudd and Malcolm Turnbull. Media attacked Turnbull savagely and regularly because the media owner did not agree with Turnbull's government policies, in particular, on climate change. And media became an active participant in politics and decided outcomes.”
“In the US, the average salary of a chief executive officer is 354 times the average salary of a worker. In the UK, on the eve of Brexit, the UK reached its wealthiest position in modern history. Yet, in the previous two years, the overall wealth of the poorest 20% of UK households declined by 9%. It is a global problem. Seventy percent of people live in a country that has seen a rise in inequality in the last 30 years. It is estimated that by 2030, the richest 1% could own two-thirds of the global wealth. So, that is one part – inequality. It is a very serious issue, and it is an issue in Singapore as well. Second, the political system is not delivering. In absolute terms, living standards in most countries have risen, compared with previous generations. But absolute figures are just one part of the picture. You have to look at the reality of people's lives. People's lives are not improving. Three indicators amongst many: social mobility, the quality of public education, jobs. Social mobility in the world's richest countries has stalled since the 1990s. Just a couple of examples. As of 2018, in the UK, it took five generations, or 150 years, for a child from the bottom 10% in terms of income to reach the average national income. In France and Germany, it took six generations, 180 years. In the US, the public education system, the serious deficiencies have been documented. And low investments in public education is one reason for lower social mobility. So, people lose faith in democracy as a whole. People give up. They give up on governments. They do not think governments can deliver.”
“In Europe, the percentage of Europeans who trust their national governments has fallen from 36% to 29% over the last 10 years. There is a decline in nearly all countries in Europe. In the United States (US), a research centre's study shows public trust at "near historic lows". In 2019, only 17% trust the government. The percentage of Americans with a great deal of confidence in the courts, 16%; 45% do not have much confidence. In the presidency, 19%; 54% do not have much confidence. Americans have the least confidence in Congress – their parliament. 8% have a great deal of confidence; 71%, not much confidence. Trust in other public institutions is also falling – in the media, the medical profession, the legal profession, many others. It is all borne out by data. Singapore, in comparison so far, is okay. We were first included in the Edelman Trust Barometer in 2011. Trust in Government has been good. We are in the top "Trust" category and the Government is one of the most trusted institutions in Singapore. Trust in Government in 2019 is at 67 points, compared to the global average of 26 countries at 47. Trust in mainstream media, we are seventh out of 26 countries. But we cannot ignore the global risks, and we are likely to be impacted by the same forces. Loss of trust in America has been described by the Wall Street Journal as "not merely a problem, but a crisis". It speaks to a loss of trust in the political system as a whole and in democracy itself. What has led to this loss of trust? I highlighted four factors amongst several. Let me touch on them briefly. First, rising inequality and inequity in many parts of the world. If you take the US, the top 0.1% of US households hold the same amount of wealth as the bottom 90%.”
“And this is not something to be taken lightly. The very seriousness of what we are facing, what many countries in the world are facing, has to be understood. Not just this legislation, but everything that we are going to do as a Parliament, as a Government, as a society, hereafter, has to be seen in the context of what is happening. First, trust. Trust in institutions is important for society’s well-being and prosperity. Institutions deliver public goods for society: the Executive, Parliament, the Courts, the Army, the Police, and other institutions like the media, healthcare system, banks, the professions and universities. Institutions are the building blocks of democratic societies. People depend on institutions to deliver economic and social benefits. Institutions play a crucial stabilising role. They serve to manage diversity, hold communities together and keep extremist politics at bay. Institutions, in turn, depend on trust and legitimacy to work, to persuade the public to make sacrifices for the common good and to encourage societies to cooperate and come together to solve problems, to implement policies successfully, to take action for society’s benefit, and to steer countries through crises. When people lose trust in institutions, it creates a vicious cycle. Studies show, for example, low trust in the medical system has an impact on public health – management of disease outbreaks. Take law enforcement: perceived legitimacy of the Police is crucial to effective law enforcement. We can give examples in all sectors, but the basic point is that when trust in institutions is lost, society suffers, everyone suffers. What is the situation in many countries in the West, in many countries? In Western democracies, trust in governments is falling significantly.”
“This Bill is an attempt to deal with some of these very real, serious risks which all societies face. But at the same time, in a carefully considered manner, with the Government deciding that we should come before the House and put forward something that, in a way, cuts down on the existing powers. And put forward a new Bill that actually restricts the Government's powers compared with today, but focused on online falsehoods. And voluntarily, compared with existing legislation, say, if the House agrees, let us give greater oversight to the judges, and let us make it much faster. So, that is the true nature of the exercise. But the Bill is not a silver bullet. It cannot address all the issues. And I will ask Members to bear with me as I set this out because it important for both Members and the public to understand the big picture before we can understand why this Bill is necessary. The SC dealt with a part of the issue, but if Members take one step back, what is the fundamental problem in many countries today? It is really a serious loss of trust in governments, in institutions both public and private, including the political system, the media, the professions, businesses, financial institutions and so on. What is the reason for the loss of trust? Several factors; I will mention four. First, inequality and inequity. Second, political systems not delivering. These developments have been aided by at least two other factors: the way traditional media has been behaving; and second, the effect of new media. This loss of trust, in turn, has led to destructive populism in many countries, with serious consequences for democracies. I will ask Members to bear with me as I explain each because what we are facing is a very serious situation across the world, and we will face it.”
“I do not think anybody in this House would say we should not cover Internet intermediaries based outside Singapore. If we had taken this alternate approach, the powers would have been broad and there would be less judicial oversight. Issues that have been raised – facts versus falsehoods, public interest, Ministerial action – there would be no amendments needed for the legislation; can rely on existing legislation. Members can, therefore, see that if we had relied on existing legislation with the appropriate amendments, and if you map that against issues that have been raised in public – facts versus falsehoods, public interest and Ministerial action to take down – there would have been no need to amend. If we had taken that approach, the result would have been a blunt instrument with none of the calibration that the Bill proposes or the extent of judicial oversight, which is also going to be made speedier under the current proposals. So, the BA was essential at its time to achieve the objective of that Act. It provides a balanced framework applicable to all forms of broadcast content. The Bill, on the other hand, was fashioned to deal specifically with falsehoods that can be spread online with incredible speed, in a targeted manner, and to address such falsehoods with speed, with proportionality, and with the Courts given greater powers. That is why the Bill is preferable. That explains the background. What is the need and the rationale for the Bill? What are the substantive reasons for the Bill? To understand that, we need to look at this larger context. Trends around the world affecting the very foundations of democracy, seriously impacting on societies, affecting the free flow of ideas, honest discussions and strangling the marketplace of ideas.”
“After the SC process, we decided, let us have new legislation with a narrower set of powers than under existing legislation, focused on online falsehoods, with remedies that are more calibrated and provide for greater judicial oversight over executive action, designed specifically for the Internet rather than rely on existing legislation, and to deal specifically with online falsehoods, rather than the broader areas that are covered under the BA. An alternate approach was entirely possible which would be to rely on existing legislation with slight tweaks and add subsidiary legislation. If we relied on existing legislation, what we want to achieve under this Bill can be achieved as follows. First, rely on the BA as it is now for correction directions, takedown directions, general correction directions and demonetisation, to some extent. Section 16 of the BA allows IMDA to direct a licensee to "take such action" with regard to content as it considers necessary to comply with the Act. So, that would be the BA. And then, you have subsidiary legislation under the BA which can be passed, with account restriction directions, declaration of online location, advertising levers. Then you move on to the existing class licensing scheme which can also be amended through subsidiary legislation to cover provision of content by individual publishers and clarify that Internet intermediaries like Facebook and Google are also covered. So, all of this could have been done under subsidiary legislation. The only thing, and the only thing that would have required a statutory amendment would have been one point under the BA, that is, to the territoriality provision to include Internet intermediaries based outside of Singapore. But that really is not in dispute.”
“According to the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (POFMA), the Bill, on the determination of falsehoods, the Court oversight is by way of direct appeal. That was a considered decision by the Government. The process will be made fast and inexpensive for individuals. Other exercise of Government powers under the Bill, judicial review will be available, as is the law now. So, whatever concerns there are about the Bill, they cannot logically be increased by this Bill. Lawyers will know, when you have a narrower Bill and the facts come within the narrower Bill as opposed to the broader law, in general, the narrower Act will apply. So, in fact, that represents the narrowing of the current position. Sir, as Members speak, I hope the debate will be based on an understanding of the current position, and I will do that by putting a series of questions. Does the current law already criminalise transmission of falsehoods? The answer is yes. Does the Bill take a narrower position? The answer is yes. So, these arguments about definition of fact, these concerns cannot be new. We had similar provisions all this while with less judicial oversight. So, how does the Bill increase the concerns? Second, takedown, corrections, are they possible now? The answer is yes. Third, can a Minister order takedown now? The answer is yes. Fourth, can a Minister order takedowns on broader grounds than under the Bill? The answer is yes. Fifth, does the Bill give greater judicial oversight? The answer is yes. Having said that, Members can then ask, if the powers are narrower in essential respects, why is the Government introducing this legislation? Why not just rely on existing legislation? The existing legislation, with broad powers, have been in place for some time.”
“IMDA can also require a licensee to carry any correction as directed. The second point: powers under the BA are exercised by the Minister today, and there is no direct appeal to the Court. It is only by judicial review. The third point: public interest. The definition under the current law is wider, and the grounds for taking action are also broader. Any statement, whether true or false, factual or opinion, if it is objectionable against public interest, national harmony, can be ordered to be taken down, subject to judicial review. The Bill is much narrower. The fourth point: falsehoods. How do you define? Dealing with falsehoods is not new. Section 45 of the Telecoms Act criminalises falsehoods transmitted over the Internet and other modes. And the Courts have long had to deal with the question of falsehoods in the law of torts, contracts, criminal law. Section 45 of the Telecoms Act was repealed yesterday, subsumed under the Miscellaneous Offences (Public Order and Nuisance) Act (MOA) and the Penal Code. The relevant provision of transmitting falsehoods is now under section 14D of MOA without any change; it has just been transported over. Some of the discussions by those opposed to this Bill fail to consider what the SC report has said, and seem to be without an understanding of the existing position. Let me now deal with the second point. It is not just narrower in scope but it also gives greater judicial oversight compared with the current law. Existing powers on takedown of objectionable material; the Government responses to be carried; other orders to be made; what oversight does the Court have today? It is by judicial review.”
“So, from 1996 to 2019, after 23 years that you have had the Class Licensing Scheme, takedowns were used mostly for sites and services with pornographic content, solicitation of sex, sex chats, religiously-offensive content, extremist content. Most people in the street do not even know of the Broadcasting Act (BA) or other legislation and no impact on what they have been saying. The powers under the BA have been used judiciously and discussions had carried on as before. The arguments made in 2013 against the changes are similar to the arguments that are being made now, and I will explain that later. They also have no connection to reality. I will now make the point that the Bill provides for a narrower set of powers, compared with powers that the Government already has. This is an important point when we make philosophical arguments in this House. Earlier, I sketched out the existing powers and I have said the Bill is narrower in essential respects because it only applies to false statements of fact. In addition, it must be shown that the falsehoods are against public interest, which is set out in some detail in the Bill. The four aspects of the Bill that have been commented upon by those who are opposed are: (a) takedown of material; (b) takedown can be ordered by Ministers; (c) definition of public interest; and (d) definition of falsehoods. I will deal quickly with all four. The current position, if Members compare the first point, the BA is broader on the types of material that can be taken down. The Bill is narrower. IMDA can direct licensees to remove content. It has the power to impose further obligations on licensees through their licensing conditions to correct falsehoods or shut down fake accounts.”
“Some of these powers have existed since the 1960s. Others were added on subsequently with the development of technology. Laws had been updated; many of these powers also apply to online material. The Internet revolution took off in the 1990s. 1996 – the Class Licensing Scheme under the Broadcasting Act for Internet Content Providers was put in. The Internet Content Providers (ICPs) are automatically licensed. All have to comply with guidelines under the Class Licence Conditions and the Internet Code of Practice. IMDA has power to take down content that goes against "public interest, public order, national harmony", amongst other grounds. In 2013, the then-Media Development Authority (MDA) put in place a new individual licensing scheme for news websites which report regularly on Singapore; and also required online news sites to remove within 24 hours content which was in breach of standards and post a performance bond of $50,000. The new regime harmonised the legal framework for online news sites with the framework for traditional news providers. At that point in 2013, Members will recall, some persons created the "Hands Off My Internet" movement; "Free My Internet" Rally in Hong Lim; some painted doomsday scenarios, how there was going to be a "Chilling effect on Free Speech", death of free speech and so on. Online statements were circulated to take a strong stand against the licensing regime; online petition as well. All of that had little to do with the truth. Prior to the 2013 regulations, online news sites already had to comply with the same content standards, so there was no change in content standards. Post 2013, discussions online carried on as before.”
“My colleagues Minister S Iswaran and Senior Minister of State Edwin Tong will deal with the key provisions of the Bill and how they implement the SC's recommendations. Minister Ong Ye Kung will speak on the universities. My colleagues Zaqy Mohamad and Sun Xueling will also speak, in addition to other Members. First, the powers that the Government has under existing legislation. They are wider than what is proposed under this Bill. As we consider the Bill, the first question is: what are the Government's powers under the existing legislation? What can the Government do about objectionable material now? In essential respects, existing powers are wider than those proposed under the Bill. Let me turn to the current legislation. We can refer to the Broadcasting Act, Telecoms Act, various other pieces of legislation. Collectively, they give the following powers. They allow orders to be made for the takedown of any material that is objectionable on grounds of public interest. The statements do not have to be factual or false. They can be true, they can be opinions, they can, nevertheless, be ordered to be taken down under the current laws. Two, current laws also criminalise the transmission of false or fabricated messages, including on the Internet. Licensed newspapers, broadcasters, including on the Internet, can be required to carry clarifications, other content. The Ministers can order to restrict financing, technical support, to offending websites and restrict their reach; can block offending websites and access to objectionable material. Section 16 of the Broadcasting Act allows the Infocomm Media Development Authority (IMDA) to direct a broadcasting licensee to "take such action" with regard to content as it considers necessary to comply with the Act.”
“Sir, this Bill comes after a long process of public consultation beginning on 5 January last year. Green Paper by the Ministry of Law (MinLaw) as well as the Ministry of Communications and Information highlighted the serious nature of the issues, the significant impact in other countries. On 5 January, we asked Parliament and Parliament did so appoint a Select Committee (SC) to examine four broad issues. The SC then held public hearings. It received 169 written representations from a broad cross-section of society. The SC then prepared a detailed 279-page report – many of the issues which have been raised since the Bill was first tabled in Parliament, repeat the points that were canvassed quite extensively during the SC hearings; points like falsehoods and how to define them and differentiate them from opinions; the possible different decision-making models like executive powers, independent body, Courts; and other such points. Some of the discussions since the Bill has been tabled have not considered what the SC has said or the evidence that had been presented, and the balancing between the different interests that the SC had to do. I hope the discussions in this House will be better informed by reference to the SC's report. Sir, in this speech, I will first explain the existing powers in law for dealing with objectionable material and contrast that with the powers under the Bill; second, why the Bill is being brought before this House now; third, the need and rationale for the Bill; fourth, new media and the weaponisation of falsehoods; fifth, deal with some of the concerns that have been expressed; and finally, conclude.”
“Thank you, Mr Speaker. Mr Speaker, Sir, I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time." With your permission, Mr Speaker, may I ask the Clerks to distribute the handouts?”
“From 2014 to 2018, there was a total of 42 fires involving kitchen exhaust ducts (KEDs). The fires mainly occurred at food establishments within residential areas, such as coffee shops and hawker centres. The main cause was poor maintenance of the ducts, causing grease to accumulate and which ignited during cooking. The Fire Code, which is administered by the Singapore Civil Defence Force (SCDF) under the Fire Safety Act, as well as the Singapore Food Agency's (SFA's) Environmental Public Health (Food Hygiene) Regulations, requires KEDs to be maintained regularly. SFA and SCDF take a stern view against non-compliance. Over the last five years, a total of 270 enforcement actions were taken against premises owners or occupiers who did not comply with regulations related to KEDs. To educate the public, SFA and SCDF have produced advisories, posters and brochures on the fire safety aspects of KEDs and distributed them to stallholders.”
“The Liquor Control (Supply and Consumption) Act, introduced in 2015, prohibits alcohol consumption in all public places between 10.30 pm and 7.00 am. Stricter hours are imposed in designated liquor control zones, that is, Little India and Geylang. As of 31 March 2019, around 4,500 breaches have been detected since the coming into force of the Act in 2015. The trend has been improving, from around 1,200 per year in 2015 and 2016, to under 800 in 2018. The Police do not track the number of complaints relating to alcohol consumption in public places. However, the decrease in the number of breaches over the years suggests the number of such complaints has similarly reduced. Our assessment is that liquor-related law and order issues are under control. There is no need to further restrict alcohol sale and consumption at this juncture, including at Housing and Development Board neighbourhood estates. The Ministry of Home Affairs and the Police will regularly review these policies, taking into consideration public feedback as well.”
“The Police do not track the number of accidents involving pedestrians who were using their mobile phones when the accident occurred. The use of mobile phones is but one of many activities that can cause pedestrians to be distracted while crossing roads. Other examples include reading a book, listening to music through headphones and earphones, or talking to another person. It is not practical to try to legislatively prohibit pedestrians from engaging in such activities. A better approach is to foster good road safety habits and personal responsibility. In this regard, Traffic Police (TP) conduct regular outreach to educate the public on the dangers of distracted crossing. An example is the "Use Your RoadSense" initiative. As part of this initiative, TP uses traditional and social media to disseminate advisories on safe road-use, such as staying alert to one's surroundings when crossing the road. Since 2014, the Land Transport Authority (LTA) has installed "LOOK" road markings at zebra crossings, to alert pedestrians to road crossings ahead and to remind them to look out for oncoming vehicles.”
“This allowed him time and space to brainwash many Sri Lankan Muslims into carrying out the attacks, including some prominent and well-off members of the community. Singapore has zero tolerance. We will continue to be strict about hate speech and radical ideology and will deal with their purveyors. Finally, the criticality of racial and religious harmony in society. Sri Lanka has gone through years of turmoil because of racial and religious tension. Up till 2009, Sri Lanka was embroiled in a decades-long civil war between the majority Sinhalese and the minority Tamils that killed more than 100,000 people. More recently, there had been riots between the Sinhalese Buddhists and the Muslims. Now, the Catholics and Christians have been targeted. This is very sad. If any attack were to succeed here, we must not allow it to seriously affect the racial and religious harmony which we have painstakingly built up over 50 years, and which has been a cornerstone of our peace and progress. Our racial and religious harmony did not come about by chance, and it should never be taken for granted. It is fragile and can all too easily be shattered, not just by distrust in the aftermath of a terror attack, but by careless and irresponsible words and expressions during times of peace. Nor should we believe that no one will be offended and allow offensive speech or hate speech in public discourse.”
“The Police will work closely with them to enhance the security of their premises. These include installing hostile vehicle mitigation measures, closed-circuit television (CCTV), deployment of security officers for checks on persons and belongings, and even structural hardening against bomb blasts. As for places of worship, the Ministry of Culture, Community and Youth (MCCY) has distributed a security advisory to them. Later this year, MCCY will also be introducing the SGSecure Community Network Crisis Preparedness Accreditation Scheme for religious organisations. Under the scheme, MCCY will produce and disseminate checklists and resource guides that will help them improve their crisis preparedness. It is also important that the general population be prepared against the terror threat. If they react appropriately, they will stand a better chance of survival, and perhaps even prevent the attacks in the first place. As part of SGSecure, we sensitise Singaporeans to identify and report suspicious items and behavior, to "Run, Hide, Tell" when the attacks are in progress, and to help fellow Singaporeans who are injured with "Press, Tie, Tell". The Sri Lanka attacks are another clear example of the need to act decisively and firmly against radicalisation, whether online or on the ground. The leader of the attacks, Zahran Hashim, had been preaching messages of hate against non-Muslims for a period of time. The group he led was not large, but he was able to use social media to spread his message to a wider audience. Despite his active propagation of messages of hate, neither Zahran nor his group were picked up. And his messages of hate were not stopped.”
“The Easter Sunday bombings in Sri Lanka was one of the most horrific terrorist attacks since 11 September, leaving more than 250 dead and 500 wounded. There were no Singaporeans among the casualties, and we do not know of any Singapore Permanent Residents who were injured either. However, a Singapore-based British lawyer, Anita Nicholson and her two children Alexander and Annabel, were killed. We are deeply saddened. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has been working with our Honorary Consul-General in Colombo to monitor the situation closely and to help Singaporeans there. There are several lessons. First, international cooperation is crucial to combating terrorism. In the lead-up to the attacks, it was reported that the Sri Lanka authorities had received information from foreign counterparts. Unfortunately, it appears that not enough was done to follow up on the information. In our region, security agencies regularly share intelligence for our common fight against terrorism. Such collaboration has helped to thwart many plots and attacks. Second, the importance of security forces being able to respond swiftly when attacks occur. In periods of heightened threat, Police will step up deployment at places with high human traffic and at sensitive locations, such as places of worship. We are ramping up the number of Police In-Situ Reaction Teams deployed on the ground at areas with high footfall, such as Orchard Road and Marina Bay, to provide quick response. They are highly trained to deal with terror incidents and complement the existing Emergency Response Teams and Rapid Deployment Troops. Third, it is important to have strong support from building owners to adopt enhanced security measures.”
“Between 2016 and 2018, there were about 200 reported accidents involving personal mobility devices (PMD) that resulted in injuries to another person. Each case is different. The amount of time taken to investigate hence varies and depends on a number of factors, including the availability of evidence. We do not have information on the average amount of compensation ordered by the Courts to be paid to victims.”
“The new offence will also cover cases where a person unlawfully accesses databases or recordings that contain intimate images. That is also in clause 120. We are also introducing a new offence: procurement of sexual activity by deception relating to two types of conduct. First, the use of sexually protective measures; and second, the presence or absence of sexually transmitted diseases. In some countries, cases have emerged of men agreeing to use a condom but secretly removing it before or during sex. It is known as "stealthing". In these cases, the quality of the consent provided by the victim would be compromised by the deception. We have identified, and also if men, usually men, mislead their partner on their sexually transmitted diseases, that is also covered. We have identified these two types of deception because they carry serious risks to the victim and represent a greater violation of the victims’ sexual autonomy. You can refer to clause 119. We will continue to assess whether there is a need to expand this offence to cover other circumstances in the future relating to consent. Mr Speaker, Sir, these enhanced penalties and new offences created will help to better protect vulnerable victims, victims of sexual crimes and reflect our commitment to protect such persons. The amendments we are making today strengthen our laws. They will help ensure that Singapore continues to be a safe home for our people, particularly women, children and vulnerable persons.”
“The proposed maximum imprisonment terms for the observance, possession and making of such "voyeuristic recordings" are now going to be two years if the Bill gets passed. That is double the current maximum one-year punishment for the offence of insulting modesty under section 509. There is, I think, a clear need to deter the proliferation of voyeuristic recordings. So, distribution of voyeuristic recordings will attract a higher punishment – a maximum imprisonment term of five years if you go around distributing these. The Court may also impose a fine and caning for these offences. Members may refer to clause 120. We have also introduced a new offence to criminalise sexual exposure which is commonly known as "flashing". There has been prevalence of this – persons intentionally sending unsolicited pictures of their genitalia over social media or via messaging platforms. That will be criminalised. Penalties for this offence will be enhanced where the victim is below 14 years old. Distribution or threat to distribute intimate images – we will introduce a new offence for distribution, threat to distribute, colloquially known as "revenge porn". Intimate images could become widely shared on platforms, and it may be impossible to completely remove them, and they have the potential to cause great harm to the victim. The offence will exclude images, such as caricatures or cartoons of a person performing a sexual act. So, a lewd caricature of a person may amount to harassment, but not something that could be mistaken as an "intimate image" of the person depicted. The maximum penalty for this offence would be imprisonment of up to five years, with the option of fine and caning. Where the offence is committed against a person below 14 years old, imprisonment will be made mandatory.”
“Recently, there has been spotlight on these offences because of the incident in the National University of Singapore involving Nicholas Lim. These offences are currently dealt with under "Insult of Modesty" in the Penal Code and the Films Act. The current laws, in my view, do not adequately address the range of offences involving voyeuristic recordings and the distribution of such material on the Internet. So, we propose to introduce specific offences involving "voyeurism" which will define the offending behaviour and provide for adequate punishments. The proposals, Members know, as I said earlier this afternoon, well pre-date the incident involving Nicholas Lim. In fact, the Bill was tabled in Parliament before that incident became public. It was before the incident took place as well, in terms of working on it and drafting. We have also introduced a presumption. Where the accused person has made a recording of another person doing a private act, or of their private parts, it will be presumed that the person being recorded or observed did not consent to the observation or recording. Sometimes, there are evidential challenges because you can find the images, but you cannot identify who the person is. This will get over the legal burden, and the presumption will be that there was no consent. The accused can then say why there was consent. The new offences will criminalise "Peeping Tom" behaviour, making of voyeuristic recordings, distribution, possession of, or gaining access to such recordings. Also, modifying any part of a building's structure to make voyeuristic recordings will also be criminalised specifically. This was recently reported in the international media as being a very serious issue in South Korea.”
“Any person who is in Singapore and commits these offences against a child overseas, and any person who is overseas and commits these offences against a child in Singapore, those are in clause 120. Next, child abuse material which depicts fictional children. This is dealt with under section 292 of the Penal Code. The offence criminalises sale, distribution, exhibition, production of obscene material. Possession of such material is not criminalised under this provision. We want to enhance punishments under section 292 when the obscene object depicts minors below 16 years old. The maximum punishment is sought to be increased from three months to two years of imprisonment. And a new offence criminalising possession, distribution, importation, production of child sex-dolls will also be introduced. These refer to anatomically accurate dolls or robots with features which resemble a minor below 16 years old. These dolls are produced and used overseas. We are prohibiting them because of the concern that they may reinforce tendencies which can then develop into actual harmful acts towards children. Next, technology has facilitated the commission of sexual offences, such as voyeurism, "cyber-flashing", distribution of intimate images often referred to as "revenge pornography". And there has been an increase in such cases. These offences are currently criminalised under the Films Act and the Penal Code. We want to create specific offences in the Penal Code to provide proper framing for such offences and adequate punishments. Voyeurism involves observation or recording of someone doing a private act without the person's consent. Some of the more commonly known forms of voyeurism include "up-skirting" and "down-blousing".”
“When it is between boyfriend and girlfriend, and they are of a certain age, very young, and it is not exploitative, it should not come within these provisions. Covering the spectrum of predatory behaviour allows us to intervene early to ensure that our children are protected before the offender has time to meet them and prepare them, and commit additional, more serious sexual offences that could cause, of course, greater physical and psychological harm. Next, child abuse material. I said in this House last year that we were looking into drafting specific laws against child abuse material. Apart from sexual abuse, some children are physically abused; they are tortured as well. Terrible harm is caused to these children who are used in the production of such material. We must do what we can to protect them. This does not happen much in Singapore, but we are going to make this extraterritorial in some ways. We have criminalised the spectrum of offences to deal with every person involved, from consumers to the producers of such material. So, we will also cover realistic depictions of children, meaning depictions which so closely resemble that of actual children, such that if an ordinary person looks at the depiction, they cannot tell whether this is real or a depiction. Inclusion of these realistic depictions of children will prevent an accused person from arguing that a depiction is computer-generated when, in fact, it involved an actual child. The offences of using or procuring a child for child abuse material, and production of child abuse material, these will be made extraterritorial. The offences will cover Singaporeans and Permanent Residents who commit such offences overseas. Of course, it will cover them if they do it here as well.”
“What are these relationships? They involve an adult who is in a position of responsibility, authority or influence over the minor. It will include teacher-student; doctor-patient; and parent-child. Where the relationship between the accused person and the minor is not in this list, the Court can still find that a relationship was exploitative based on its assessment by reference to the first part of the definition. So, if you look at clauses 113 and 121, those are set out. I will now turn to predatory conduct against minors. The amendments and new offences take into account developments in technology which have enabled predators to increase their number of victims and the speed at which they can groom minors. We are seeking to lower the threshold for the current offence of sexual grooming. We are reducing the required instances of prior conduct from two to one, and we will lower the age floor of the offender from 21 to 18 – clauses 116 and 117. New offences will be introduced: sexual communication with minors – I spoke about this earlier – and showing a minor a sexual image. I spoke about this earlier. Also, sexual activity in the presence of a minor – clause 117. So, this will allow us to criminalise predatory behaviour like Joshua Robinson's, including asking minors to send him nude images. There will be, of course, other types of conduct, like sexual experimentation amongst young persons. It is not the intent of these new offences to target these groups of persons. The intent is to prevent predatory conduct. The Attorney-General's Chambers (AGC) will, of course, have to exercise prosecutorial discretion in determining whether it is in the public interest to prosecute.”
“First, in considering whether the accused is in a relationship that is exploitative of the victim, the Court will be required to consider the age of the minor. The younger the person, that is the victim, the more susceptible to influence he or she will be. Second, the difference in age between the accused and the minor. A large age difference may result in the victim viewing the accused as an authority figure, allowing the accused to exert significant influence over the victim. Third, the nature of the relationship. If the accused initiates sexual communication or activity, it is likely that the intention of the accused, particularly if it is done very early in the relationship, was to make use of the power imbalance in the relationship to exploit the victim for his sexual gratification. Fourth, the degree of control or influence exercised by the accused over the minor. The greater the influence by the accused over the minor, the more the minor's will may be considered to be compromised. The use of violence or coercion by the accused will be considered to be amongst the indicators of control or domination over the victim. So, in short, a key factor in determining "exploitation" is the presence of a power imbalance between the accused person and the minor. There are other jurisdictions which take a different approach. For example, the UK and some states in Australia have an exhaustive list of relationships; sexual activity between adults and minors in such relationships is prohibited. We have adapted this as the second part of the definition of "exploitation". A list of specified relationships has been included in the law. Where these relationships exist between the accused and the minor, there will be a rebuttable presumption that an exploitative relationship exists.”
“Joshua Robinson was eventually sentenced to imprisonment for having sex with minors because both girls were under 16, making and possessing obscene films, and showing an obscene film to a six-year-old girl. I think Members will agree that getting the two 15-year-old girls to send nude photos should itself be criminalised, and showing an obscene film to a six-year-old should be treated with more severity by a separate category of offence. So, I said at that time that we needed to look at criminalising some parts of his conduct, which were not caught at that time, and increasing the penalties as well, to ensure that people like Joshua Robinson will be dealt with more severely through higher penalties. So, the new offences, under the rubric of "exploitative sexual activity with minors" will deal with sexual predators who exploit young people. The age of consent for sexual activity is 16 years old, but there are situations where slightly older minors, those between 16 and 18 years old, may be exploited for sexual gratification by persons who are in relationships of trust with the minor. In such cases, the young person's consent – and we are talking about 16 to 18 years – is, in my view, compromised. We are, therefore, introducing offences involving sexual exploitation of minors of age 16 or above but below 18 where sexual penetration is involved, where sexual grooming is involved, and where sexual communications are involved. For sexual exploitation offences by persons in relationships of trust with minors who are below 16 years of age, we will enhance the existing penalties, and we will peg them to those for non-consensual sexual penetration. There are two parts to this definition of "exploitation".”
“The Court needs to determine the steps the accused person could have been reasonably expected to have taken to prevent the abuse of the vulnerable victim. Under the amendments, Daniel Nasser's abusers, the very people who were supposed to protect him, could be liable for the new offence of causing death by sustained abuse, and causing or allowing Daniel’s death. Now, I will turn to the area of sexual offences. There are amendments to better protect minors and there are amendments creating new categories of sexual offences. First, minors. Members of this House may remember the case of Joshua Robinson. He was 39 years old, he met two 15-year-old girls on social networking sites. He pressured them to send him nude pictures of themselves and to meet up to have sex with him. Currently – and some Members might find this surprising when they think about it – asking for and receiving nude images by consent from a 15-year-old is not an offence today. He also filmed their sexual encounters. When his house was raided, they found obscene films, including more than 300 films of child pornography. After he was arrested and released on bail, when he was on bail, Joshua Robinson showed a six-year-old girl explicit videos of his girlfriend performing a sexual act on him. At present, that is not a separate category of offence. It will have to come within the rubric of showing an obscene film. But I think Members will agree that we should criminalise it separately and clearly, rather than treating it as just showing an obscene film. I think the action and acts are heinous in themselves, beyond the showing of the film.”
“But, otherwise, if you stood by and you allowed a child to be abused in this way, you can be charged. The United Kingdom (UK) and Australia have similar offences. A case from the UK is illustrative of the kind of situation we are thinking about. Let me refer to R v Ikram from the UK, where a 16-month-old, that is, a year and four months, boy died. He was living with his father and his father’s female partner. The boy suffered 21 different injuries within 48 hours before his death, including a fatal fracture to the left femur. It occurred within 12 hours prior to his death. It was established that only the father and his partner were present during the period when the fatal injury was inflicted. The father had been absent for around two hours. Both defendants were charged for murder, and both claimed they did not to know how the injuries were sustained. In Singapore, under our proposed amendments, the father and partner both can be charged for causing or allowing a young child's death. So, Members can look at clauses 83, 104 and 171. There have been some feedback and concerns that persons who are themselves victims of abuse could, nevertheless, be held liable for their inaction by "failing to protect" a vulnerable victim or "causing or allowing the death of a vulnerable victim". For example, a husband violently abuses his wife and his children. The concern is that the abused wife may herself be found liable under this offence if she did not intervene to prevent her husband from abusing the children. This is even though she may not have really been in a position to intervene. That should not be the case. The clauses in the Bill require the Court to consider past or present experiences of those of the accused persons of abuse as well.”
“He was abused by his mother and her live-in boyfriend over a period of at least five weeks. They kicked and slapped him almost every day. They stomped on his chest. The autopsy found 31 external injuries on Daniel. The Court said the couple had inflicted harm "in a ruthless and unrelenting manner". In such serious cases of abuse which leads to the death of the vulnerable victim, Members will find it odd, but lawyers will know, it is not easy to convict the offenders of murder. The reason is that it is difficult to show that they had the requisite mens rea, that is, the mental elements that were present to meet the requirements for the conviction for murder. I think we have to take a strong stance against such abuse. I refer to clauses 83, 104 and 171. The first two offences – "causing death by sustained abuse" and "failure to protect" – will cover persons who owe these victims a duty of care. Who are such persons? Persons who have custody, care or charge of the victims. They have a responsibility to protect those under their care from harm. Members can refer to clause 83. The third new offence is "causing or allowing the death of a vulnerable victim". Victims, as I described earlier, are children, domestic workers and other vulnerable persons. The offence deals with situations where two or more persons were in a position to cause the death of the victim but both deny they were the ones who caused the ill-treatment. In such cases, it is very difficult to prove in Court who committed the abuse and who permitted the abuse. Currently, when there is this sort of ambiguity, both could get acquitted, while there is a dead child. This is not right, I think. Deaths resulting from natural causes or accidents will not be covered.”