Ng Eng Hen
Singapore
“I think we try to keep this virtuous state of affairs as long as we can to make sure that we can invest steadily. Year-to-year fluctuations would occur, whether it is economic, not so much in COVID-19, but remember the Global Financial Crisis? Everybody needs to take a haircut. If you have to take a haircut, you have to take a haircut.”
“Mr Chairman, as the World around us becomes more unpredictable and changes, the more we need to keep the strongest commitment to strengthen our own defences and, if needed, we must be willing to do more. Singapore celebrates 60 years of Independence this year.”
“MINDEF will continue to work with partners to encourage Singaporeans to raise their digital literacy, develop and maintain good cybersecurity habits, protect sensitive data and guard against scams, fake news and disinformation so as to make the digital domain a safer and more secure space.”
“The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) conducts regular mobilisation exercises (MOBEX) of our National Service (NS) forces. In a silent mobilisation, NSmen are notified through their personal contact numbers. Open mobilisations include the broadcast of unit code-words through mass media.”
“In 2020, the Ministry of Defence replied to a Parliamentary Question on this matter that the relocation of Paya Lebar Air Base (PLAB) would likely occur around 2030 or beyond, after Changi Air Base and Tengah Air Base have been expanded to house the existing assets at PLAB.”
“When incidents or near-misses happen, as it did where one Hunter armoured fighting vehicle rear-ended another during Exercise Wallaby in Australia, thorough investigations are conducted and lessons learnt shared across the units.”
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“An SAF medic attended to Corporal Lee to bring down his core temperature and he was evacuated to the camp's Medical Centre where body-cooling measures and treatment were instituted by the SAF medical team there. He was taken to Changi General Hospital (CGH) and warded in the Intensive Care Unit (ICU). Unfortunately, Corporal Lee's condition deteriorated and he passed away on 30 April 2018 at CGH, about 12 days after his admission. Following the incident, the Army declared a safety timeout for all training and also specifically reviewed training that posed risks of heat injuries. During the timeout, commanders were reminded of the importance of safety measures which include hydration regimes, temperature-taking regimes, management of the work-rest cycle – I will explain what this means – and identification of personnel who could be at greater risk of heat injuries. These are currently in place; these are preventive safety measures against heat injuries. While the SAF has not had any death from heat stroke since 2009, heat injuries do occur each year. We are at risk. We are a tropical island, hot and humid. In 2010, the SAF convened a workgroup, which included many external experts, to address this specific problem. This workgroup recommended clinical practice guidelines that were endorsed by MOM and the then-Singapore Sports Council. These guidelines formed the regimes which I have just mentioned against heat injuries and they include mandatory water parades before, during and after a training activity. We take temperature before the training and any soldier with a temperature above 37.5oC is not allowed to train. In addition, we take the recorded ambient temperature.”
“The SAF has followed up and also implemented additional training for armoured vehicle commanders on uneven terrain. Training safety regulations (TSRs) have been tightened to limit exposure of the body of the vehicle commander to waist level when executing certain operational tasks. The SAF has also implemented drills for day-to-night and night-to-day transitions and this includes NVDs and other night fighting equipment on the checklist which need to be in working order. Wearing seatbelts is enforced, with disciplinary actions taken against those who have not done so. Sergeant Chan’s death was classified as a training-related incident and compensation offered to the family. Sergeant Chan’s parents accepted the honours of a military funeral. The Armour formation paid their last respects to a dedicated commander whom they are proud to call one of their own. Sergeant Chan was a good soldier. Let me now turn to CFC Dave Lee. To investigate Corporal Lee's death, all the processes that I have described for Sergeant Chan, the COI, police investigations and Coroner's inquiry are yet to be completed. His death was about two weeks ago. I will only share information from our own internal investigations. When Members have clarifications later – and I encourage you to ask for clarifications – I will share what we have, with some caveats, that the COI and the independent Coroner's inquiry, if held, and the Police investigations will have to come to their own facts. On 18 April this year, Corporal Lee displayed signs of heat injury after completing an eight-kilometre fast march in Bedok Camp.”
“He re-mounted the Bionix, sitting on the top edge of the vehicle commander hatch and told the driver to open his hatch and switch on the vehicle’s headlights so that they could reverse away from this area. Unfortunately, as they were doing so, the vehicle overturned on the steep embankment. The three other soldiers in that Bionix did not suffer any injuries. The COI concluded that Sergeant Chan’s injuries resulted from him being thrown out of the vehicle as it overturned, causing his demise. The Queensland coroners’ report agreed that this was the cause of this event. The report said, “…in the circumstances I find that Sergeant Chan died when he was ejected from the vehicle which he was directing. It is unfortunate that he took the decision to position himself with a significant portion of his body outside the vehicle.” The coroner's report continues, “…the incident is none other than a very unfortunate accident due to the nature of the difficult terrain and the operation then being performed.” Arising from their investigations, the Queensland police found no basis to charge any person. The COI also found no negligence, foul play or misconduct, but recommended that the SAF review its training safety regulations on the position of the Armoured Fighting Vehicle Commander, so that the vehicle commander is able to execute the overturning drill, which means that he is able to drop quickly into the vehicle. If he cannot do this, because you are much better protected inside the vehicle than out, the vehicle must stop. The COI also recommended stronger compliance and checks on night vision devices (NVDs) and to enforce the wearing seatbelt rule for passengers when the vehicle is moving.”
“The medical and safety coverage provided was found to be timely, adequate and proper. In addition, the COI conducted interviews with SAF soldiers at the exercise to piece together the chronology of events that led to the Bionix overturning. The mishap occurred during night training for Bionix units. For Members' information, Armour units do this regularly, because they have to become proficient to fight at night or under conditions of poor visibility. That is something that they must learn to do. Safety lapses were identified by the COI. First, the night vision device (NVD) of 3SG Chan’s vehicle was not working. They have issued a night vision device which allows them to see in darkness, but it was not working. It is needed if armoured vehicles are to move at night. Without the night vision device, armoured vehicles can move but only with the driver's hatch open and headlights switched on for better visibility. That is in the training safety regulations. However, according to the driver, Sergeant Chan felt that the headlights “would give away their position to the enemy” and decided to continue training without headlights. Accounts from his platoon mates to the COI attest to Sergeant Chan's strong motivation and high standards of performance during training. Sergeant Chan was zealous in his training and probably wanted to complete the night mission assigned to their armour unit. Unfortunately, in the darkness, the vehicle entered an area with a steep incline and boulders. At that point, Sergeant Chan stopped the vehicle, dismounted to assess the surroundings and found that a boulder was blocking the vehicle.”
“The commander instructed the driver to turn the steering wheel in an attempt to gain traction when suddenly the vehicle dropped down over the rock rolling sideways before coming to rest further down the slope. Sergeant Chan was ejected from the vehicle and suffered significant injuries. Life support was commenced at the scene before he was airlifted to hospital where he was later pronounced deceased. The police investigation established that there was no defect with the vehicle, and there was no suggestion that the driver was doing anything other than reversing very slowly, and at the specific direction of Sergeant Chan. The police considered that it was likely that the incident occurred because of the commander’s decision to reverse on a slightly different path down the hill and that his choice to be positioned with part of his body outside the vehicle exposed him to greater risk of injury. The Singapore Armed Forces recommendation is only the head and shoulders be outside the turret of the vehicle during operations. The police considered it was a very unfortunate incident whilst deployed in difficult terrain in ‘black out’ conditions. It was noted by the police that the driver was driving in compliance with SAF policy at the time of the incident, and under the specific instruction from Sergeant Chan.” These are the findings of the Queensland authorities. The Committee of Inquiry here, appointed by the Armed Forces Council, corroborated from their own investigation the findings by the Queensland authorities. The COI further determined that Sergeant Chan and his platoon mates were sufficiently trained and qualified to participate in the exercise. They had no mental and physical conditions that could have affected their fitness to participate.”
“This report from the coroner was provided to 3SG Chan's parents. 3SG Chan's parents have given us permission for it to be distributed to Members of this House, except for the post-mortem findings which are redacted out of respect for the privacy of 3SG Chan and his family. The Queensland coroner’s report provides the circumstances leading to the death of 3SG Chan as a result of multiple injuries sustained from motor vehicle trauma. I will read excerpts, which Members can follow in the distributed report. “On 15 September 2017, Sergeant Chan, who was participating in 'Exercise Wallaby', an annual unilateral training exercise conducted by the Singapore Armed Forces at Shoalwater Bay Training Area in Queensland died after the infantry vehicle (known as the Bionix) he was commanding rolled and he suffered significant injuries. The police conducted an investigation into the circumstances of the incident. The police found no defect with the infantry fighting vehicle. The police found from scene evidence and witness information, that its path forward was halted due to an obstruction. Sergeant Chan, who was commander of the vehicle, gave orders for the driver to reverse slowly down the hill. The commander who was stationed in the turret, with his upper body clear of the vehicle structure, was giving instructions to the driver directing him to reverse and where to reverse. All confirmed that the driver was continuing to reverse slowly, and in accordance with the commander’s instructions, when the vehicle traversed over a flat granite rock for about 4 metres before the vehicle became stuck on a large boulder, holding up the vehicle undercarriage.”
“We treat each training related death with utmost seriousness. We deal with it at the highest level within the SAF and MINDEF. The Armed Forces Council (AFC) convenes an independent Committee of Inquiry (COI) to examine thoroughly the circumstances leading to the incident. It is a four-member team chaired by a senior civil servant from outside MINDEF and includes a senior doctor from the public sector. The COI has full powers. It can access all relevant information, access any personnel, haul them up to investigate the circumstances leading to death and they will determine events or persons that contributed to the event, to the death and make recommendations to rectify any lapses found. Separately from the SAF and MINDEF, the Police conducts parallel investigations and the Coroner may decide to hold a public inquiry. Let me first share the detailed findings for the late 3SG Chan for which all investigative processes have been completed, including those by the Queensland authorities because the incident occurred in Shoalwater Bay and, therefore, governed under the laws of Australia. Speaker, with your permission, I would now like to ask the Clerk to distribute the report from the Queensland coroner.”
“But achieving zero fatalities can only be achieved with constant vigilance, no lesser. Because on any given day, thousands of National Servicemen run around in challenging conditions, they move vehicles on air, land and sea, in Singapore and overseas. In the SAF, modern military platforms travel at high speeds and our exercise tempos are very quick. Our Terrexes can move at 100 kilometre per hour. Our armoured vehicles can move at 70 kilometre per hour. All of us recognise the higher risks in military training because even for mass civilian activities, whether it is marathons, swims or cycling events, fatalities occur. We read about them and they occur for a variety of innocent reasons. But we must design our safety systems and enforce them so that training deaths within the SAF can be eliminated. It is a difficult goal to achieve, to get it right every time, whenever a platoon or company that goes out on exercise, whether it is day or night. But we must constantly improve the rigour of our safety systems to reach that goal because, if we do not, it may mean another precious son lost to a family. Members in the House – Mr Dennis Tan1, Mr Henry Kwek2, Mr Vikram Nair3 and Mr Ganesh Rajaram4 – have filed questions on two recent NS deaths within the SAF and on general matters related to training safety. I propose to address their queries in this Statement. Here, I want to beg the House's indulgence and patience. I will give details as much as we know. In September last year, 3SG Gavin Chan died when the Bionix vehicle he commanded rolled over. And in April this year, CFC Dave Lee died from complications of a heat stroke. Both were serving their full-time NS: 3SG Chan had served for one year and eight months; CFC Lee for four months.”
“Speaker, Sir, first, let me thank the Leader and Members of this House for allowing me to make this Statement on National Service (NS) training deaths in the midst of the debate on the President's Address. I have requested to do so to address the concerns of Members here and the public over this matter. And I think we are right to be concerned as every NS death should be treated with utmost seriousness, whether it is in Parliament, the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) or the Home Team. Any death among SAF soldiers or Home Team personnel is grievous. These are our security forces who serve this nation with loyalty, commitment and pride. They keep us safe, they defend our island home, often in challenging and dangerous circumstances knowing the risks to themselves. Especially painful is when young National Servicemen who are serving their full-time NS, die. All of us feel it acutely. This House offers our deepest condolences to the families of 3SG Gavin Chan, CFC Dave Lee and, from the Singapore Civil Defence Force (SCDF), CPL Kok Yuen Chin. We know that no words can replace their loss. We grieve together with them even as we honour the memory of their precious sons who served and sacrificed for our country. The SAF and Home Team will continue to assist their families as best as we can. Commanders on the ground fully recognise this heavy responsibility of keeping every son of Singapore safe during their NS training, whether it is in the two years that they come full-time for intensive training, or each time that they are called after that. We must strive hard for zero training deaths because any death is one too many. And I believe it can be done, even as National Servicemen train realistically and effectively to protect us and defend Singapore.”
“SAF will also seek out more opportunities to train with the armed forces of Malaysia and Indonesia, to build stronger trust and people-to-people ties. Ultimately, Singaporeans are responsible for our own defence. Our strongest weapon against external forces is our unity and resolve to protect our way of life and keep Singapore independent and sovereign. No amount of tanks, planes or ships – no matter how sophisticated the systems we build – can make up for a divided nation. In this new era, where hybrid warfare can be waged first through cyberspace before any physical means, potential aggressors will seek to turn one Singaporean against another to weaken our social compact. More than ever, Total Defence is needed and every Singaporean has to play his or her part to safeguard Singapore. Only together can we continue to keep Singapore safe and secure for another generation.”
“As the Chairman of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) and ADMM-Plus in 2018, we aim to: (a) enhance regional counter-terrorism cooperation; (b) improve the region’s capability to respond to chemical, biological and radiological threats from terrorist groups and rogue actors; and (c) develop practical confidence-building measures and codes for unplanned encounters in the aviation and maritime domains, to reduce the risk of miscalculation and de-escalate tensions in the region. ADMM was inaugurated in 2006. It is the highest defence consultative and cooperative mechanism in ASEAN. The ADMM-Plus was inaugurated in 2010 and includes the 10 ASEAN member states and eight Plus countries, namely, Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Russia and the US. As a small city-state, it is vital to shape an open and inclusive regional security architecture where the interests of all countries are protected. Platforms, such as the Shangri-La Dialogue, the ADMM-Plus Experts’ Working Groups, as well as the Five Power Defence Arrangements, all help to promote multilateralism and inclusiveness. SAF also contributes to international efforts to deal with transnational threats. Bilaterally, MINDEF has deepened relations with defence partners through initiatives, such as a new naval exercise with the US Navy and a new Naval Bilateral Agreement with India. Cooperation with Australia is progressing steadily as we commence construction of facilities to support more SAF troops to train in Queensland in 2019. We will strengthen our ties with China and deepen military-to-military ties between SAF and the People’s Liberation Army.”
“MINDEF will strengthen our cyber defence through the newly established Defence Cyber Organisation and SAF Cyber Defence Group. As with kinetic defences, SAF will train and use qualified Full-Time National Servicemen (NSFs) and also grow its partnerships with local Institutes of Higher Learning to build a strong and capable cyber defence force. In 2017, Singapore celebrated the 50th anniversary of National Service (NS) and showed its overwhelming support for this vital strategic institution that ensures our survival. MINDEF and SAF will not take this support for granted. Instead, we will redouble our efforts to optimise the experience, contributions and potential of our NSmen. By making use of technology, SAF has reduced the physical demands of selected NS vocations, such as Security Troopers, allowing more servicemen to be deployed to vocations that they were previously ineligible for. MINDEF will also continue to take into consideration the interests of NSFs when assigning their vocations. This approach has allowed for more effective and meaningful deployment of our servicemen and encouraged them to take greater ownership of their NS roles and responsibilities. Singapore will continue to work closely with our neighbours and regional partners to enhance regional stability and address common security challenges.”
“Through both physical and virtual threats in cyberspace, attackers have more avenues to disrupt and destabilise Singapore. In response, SAF will develop new fighting concepts and leverage technological advancements to increase our effectiveness and ensure more efficient use of manpower. For example, the Aerostat surveillance systems, Littoral Mission Vessels, and the Next-Generation Armoured Fighting Vehicles, supported by an advanced and secure communications network, have enabled SAF to be a tightly connected and flexible military force, capable of deterring the spectrum of potential aggressors. The Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) and SAF are dealing directly with the regional terrorist threat, which is at an all-time high. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and ISIS-inspired groups in our region are building up military-level capabilities and firepower, augmented by the return of battle-experienced fighters from the Middle East to our region. The siege of Marawi in 2017 was a key example, which required the joint efforts of the Philippines armed forces and its homeland security forces to dislodge militants from the city. SAF will work closely with the Home Team to ensure an effective and coordinated response to any terrorist threat. Exercises, such as NORTHSTAR and HIGHCREST, will be stepped up in scale and complexity to build interoperability. More SAF and Singapore Police Force servicemen will undergo joint security operations training at the SAF’s Island Defence Training Institute. We are also working with other countries under a “Resilience, Response, Recovery” framework to strengthen our responses to prevent, deal with, and recover from terrorist attacks in the region.”
“A strong Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) safeguards Singapore’s security, Independence and sovereignty. Without security and stability, we cannot achieve economic or social progress. However, the security landscape Singapore faces today is more complex. Asia’s military spending has already surpassed Europe’s since 2012. Many countries in our region are modernising their militaries against a backdrop of rising nationalism, unresolved maritime and territorial disputes, and persistent threats from terrorists and cyberattacks. Intensifying United States (US)-China competition, uncertainties in the Korean Peninsula, greater contestation in the waters and airspace around Singapore, and the continuing threat of terrorism, can potentially disrupt the peace and stability of our region. These are the known threats. But just as potent are unexpected events that can change the status quo. The wider array of security challenges has placed more demands on SAF, even as our manpower pool shrinks. Defence spending will also have to take into account a mature economy with slower projected growth in the future and other needs from an ageing society and infrastructure spending. We can approach these challenges with confidence as steady investments in defence over the years have built a strong SAF that is able to deal with a broad spectrum of threats. More importantly, Singaporeans are united in their resolve and support to maintain a strong military and Total Defence. We recognise that new threat scenarios have evolved. Less advanced militaries and even non-state actors can now acquire sophisticated technologies and weaponry that used to be the domain of professional militaries.”
“That is the kernel of the idea behind the Changi Regional Humanitarian Centre. It came about because we recognised that after Cyclone Nargis, after Nepal, the first two to three days after an incident occurs are where you have the least coordinated response, even if all the resources are there. So, for instance, if you remember the typhoon in the Philippines, we sent a C-130. The reason they were under-utilised was that there were no air command and control facilities. Only the Americans could because I think they had their aircraft carrier and they were able to control the airspace. So, even though our C-130s were sent there, they could not be deployed optimally. We set up this to coordinate military responses. But as Prof Fatimah Lateef rightly points out, humanitarian agencies include the whole ecosystem of civil groups, of UN groups. So, we have expanded it and linked up with the UN. We have linked up with other humanitarian organisations and I think we had one or two equivalents of table-top exercises to, say, if something happens, whom do I contact? We offered for these civil groups, these volunteer groups, to be physically based in Changi, if they can spare. This is an ongoing effort. We just have to keep increasing our contacts, increasing our efficiency and when the next crisis strikes, I think Singapore can play a more definitive role and contribute more.”
“Our imagery analyst teams − the Member asked what they were deployed there for – to identify financial strongholds that ISIS troops had been using and help the coalition eliminate these, if you like, financial warehouses. We are now deployed with other troops, the Australians and some other troops, for which there is joint protection and we can call on them. But there is camp security. I visited our troops last year and was satisfied that, to the extent possible, there is perimeter protection. In the event of an incident, there will be measures to respond to that. In fact, when I was there, it just so happened that they were responding in a simulated scenario to an attack. The Americans were there, the Australians were there, our chaps were there, and they mobilised the hospitals and then, for how to guard the vicinity. I think that is about as much as I can say for all the questions but let me just summarise. We understand what this mission is about. We have to keep terrorism at bay. We have to keep at it. This is a long battle. We dealt with the threat after 9-11, Bali bomb blast and joined other forces in Afghanistan. With ISIS, we are now in Iraq. When will it end? When can we pull back? I do not know. Somebody said "Communism without divine intervention, without God, took 50 years."”
“Our SAF personnel who go there recognise that these are threats but we, systemically, identify the threats. So, for each mission, we would have a needs-and-threats assessment team that goes down to the ground, that speaks to the commanders, that maps the terrain, that maps the risks and the team will come up with an assessment. Then, not only the elements that are required to fulfil the operations – we will talk about that because the Member asked about it – but the protection is necessary. You can minimise it but you will never completely eliminate it. How long will it last? For Afghanistan, our deployment lasted 10 years. Against ISIS, it has been relatively shorter, I think since 2014. But for us to not continue to contribute when the more significant gains have been actually taking back Iraq, I think it is not within our character and not within our mission imperative. There is no mission creep. The central mission is so that ground zero for the export of terrorists must be eliminated as we did in Afghanistan. Just imagine if we said, "Well, the rest of the world can go about it but we don't worry about Afghanistan." If the problems there gain momentum, we will suffer. For Iraq, for ISIS, we have a much more vested interest because there were foreign fighters from Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore who were there. So, there is no mission creep. It is very clear. It is to help now. It shifted to another phase. The first phase was actually the most difficult − to recover territory, to rid ISIS of their resources, of their ability to increase their resources to export terrorism. While our chaps were there, we were very useful.”
“Mr Chairman, those were good questions and very relevant ones. What is our threat assessment when we send SAF troops to missions? We must never prepare to send people if you think there are no risks, because there are always risks. We only send them when the risks are necessary to protect Singaporeans and Singapore. So, whether we send them to Afghanistan, whether we send them to Iraq, whether we send them to the Gulf of Aden, even when we send them to Timor-Leste − peacekeeping operations − we have casualties in peacekeeping operations. We do this because, at the core, you are protecting Singapore's interests. So, for Afghanistan, we understood that if we did not deal with terrorism at its source where Al Qaeda influence was the greatest, you would basically just be responding to waves and waves of terrorists that are being radicalised – they are being trained, they are being exported from ground zero as it were. And it worked. We were in Afghanistan for 10 years, Mr Pritam Singh recollected accurately. Whether it is imagery analysts, or weapons locating radar, we made a contribution. We identified even hotspots for the coalition and the terrorist threat disappeared for now. I say "for now" because we are keeping a watch on Al Qaeda cells and there is every possibility that there can be a resurgence. Against ISIS, we made significant progress. I think just two or even three years ago, if you just look at the geographical map, the areas in which ISIS strongholds controlled, were a majority of Iraq and Syria. But now, it has shrunk. So, there are a few last strongholds, if any. But the numbers are much smaller. So, we have made progress. How do we prepare servicemen for these threats?”
“After all, the probability of conventional conflict is perceived to be remote. Recognising that NS is premised on the need for national defence, can MINDEF elaborate on the role that NS plays in Singapore today and its importance, given prevailing geopolitical conditions? SAF Manpower”
“That Members of this House voted for Budget 2018 yesterday, sends a strong signal to our own people and to the world. In doing so, we have kept faith with what we were entrusted with by previous generations – a strong SAF able to ensure our independence and protect Singaporeans. But that a strong SAF was not built or maintained by happenstance or even good intentions. For each generation, it will require a conscious, deliberate decision. It will require sacrifices to commit resources and of themselves. Previous generations took that hard decision. As Mr Lee Kuan Yew said to SAF officers at a Temasek Society dinner in 2012, “From the day we started, I knew that we needed a strong SAF and I believe that still remains today. Without a strong SAF, there is no economic future, there is no security.” The Members of this House who voted for the Budget yesterday united themselves with this belief and the resolve of the Pioneer Generation. If each generation reaffirms and renews its commitment, then a strong SAF will continue to keep Singapore safe and sovereign with a secure future for another generation. [Applause.] Role of NS Assoc Prof Dr Muhammad Faishal Ibrahim: Mr Chairman, since its introduction in 1967, NS had served as the backbone of the SAF and has been instrumental in deterring potential adversaries and establishing the bedrock of peace for Singapore over the last 50 years. Potential adversaries know that when they want to attack Singapore, it is a fight against all of us. The political atmospherics in the region have waxed and waned over the years. As we now enjoy warm and friendly relations with all our ASEAN partners, some segments of our society have questioned if NS remains relevant in this context.”
“Both the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) and RSAF conducted bilateral exercises in Guam for the first time last year, flying with US Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) and exercising across the full spectrum of anti-submarine, anti-surface and anti-air warfare with the US Navy. With China, we will build on the positive momentum from the visit of Chinese Defence Minister Chang Wanquan early this year and we have deepened ties with the People's Liberation Army (PLA). With India, we concluded a Navy Bilateral Agreement and we will increase maritime security cooperation between our countries, especially around the Andaman Seas. For Australia, we will construct SAF training facilities in Queensland, due to begin in 2019. We will build strong partnerships, but all of us here know that, ultimately, we, Singaporeans, must be accountable for our own defence. When we are dependent on others, we have failed. Our NSmen will be better trained through new facilities in the SAFTI City and in Australia. With continued investments steady, year after year, which Members of this House approve, SAF will continue its transformation onwards. The next-Gen SAF will use game-changing technologies and new fighting concepts. On the ground, they will operate unmanned, autonomous systems, to multiply their forces. Our skies will be better protected with advanced weapons systems. We recently added our Aérospatiale Terminale (ASTER)-30, which are here. Our territorial waters and sea lines of communications will be better secured with manned and unmanned vessels alike. That is the vision. That is what we are investing in, and we will be equipped to deal with ever-evolving cyber threats. Mr Chairman, let me conclude.”
“Mr Jessica Tan, Mr Low Thia Khiang, Mr Pritam Singh, thank you for affirming that what we decided as ADMM Chair this year is important. We said that there will be three areas: first, counterterrorism; second, confidence-building measures and code for unplanned encounters at sea and in the air; and third, chemical, biological and radiological threats. That was really precipitated because of the Korean Peninsula instability, and most countries are not prepared for those kinds of threats. As Members pointed out rightly, CUES has been accepted. What is the possibility of a CUES for air being accepted, is a tough one, I agree. But if we can do it across 18 nations, I think that will send a very strong signal. So, we will try. We will at least start the ball rolling and see whether we can get consensus from the 10 ASEAN countries and the Plus-eight. I think we can achieve that. I think among some of them, they will be more willing. And if we can talk to them and say, "This works for you", I think we would have done a significant contribution. Some asked about the exercise, Mr Low and Mr Pritam Singh as well, whether we are practising CUES. Indeed, we are. We do not even have to wait for the China-ASEAN Maritime Exercise. We are going to do it with all 18 ADMM-Plus countries – practise CUES, because they have agreed collectively to adopt CUES and practise it in our exercise in 2019. And in 2018, I suspect, this year, with China, it may be in undisputed waters, so there would not be a chance to practise it. The Member asked whether the meetings of the ADMM-Plus will be yearly. Indeed, it will, from this year onwards. They have agreed and Singapore will be the first to host these annual meetings. With the US, we have achieved new milestones.”
“What is a Smart Airbase? For example, it will use drones to perform runway damage assessment. Members will notice, for instance, at the recent Air Show, it is beautiful to watch, and people clap in glee, but after the fighter planes take off or land, we have to do visual checks to make sure that the commercial planes can come in, too. Same thing for each take-off; you have to do visual checks because even small debris make a difference. We can use drones to perform runway damage assessment and respond to other intruding drones. We want to make it more efficient by leveraging automation for aircraft maintenance and using sensors for pre- and post-flight aircraft checks. I think it is achievable and we are doing trials to achieve that kind of Smart Airbase. The Navy is integrating data from all agencies. The maritime environment is a different environment from the air. There are lots of moving parts and different agencies. We want to gather data from all sources, construct better algorithms to detect anomalies and then pre-empt, say, possible terrorist threats from the sea. For surveillance, we want to use cameras with smart sensors with automated surveillance. We do not need a man in the loop, or a man in every loop, to say, “this vessel is behaving in a different way from other vessels”. So, just alert you, so that when the man in the loop makes a decision, you respond. We do not need manned vessels for some scenarios. Unmanned vessels will soon be used for patrols and underwater surveys. All these give us hope that we are moving towards an SAF that is just as, or even more effective, but can use less manpower. We agree wholeheartedly with Members here who pointed out that we cannot do this alone. We have to join other partners or other countries.”
“LMVs are much more capable than the Petrol Vessels but will cost less. Why? Because they have less crew, they are more efficient to maintain. The RSAF’s aerostat, our big balloon – yesterday, there were some discussions about floating balloons – let me just say that when SAF floats balloons, it is there to stay, and it is meant to be up. Our aerostat achieves continuous aerial surveillance, just like a plane with radar, but saves about $29 million a year. It is a jolly good idea. SAF upgrades existing equipment, where possible, to avoid buying new platforms. Our first instinct is not to buy, but to upgrade. And that is what we did for our whole fleet of Leopard Tanks and Chinooks. We must harness new technologies, as Dr Teo Ho Pin pointed out. Because even if you chose to give us more money in exchange for manpower, we cannot do it. We just do not have the manpower. We recognise that as an inherent constraint, and we started to deal with it, I think, probably one or even two decades ago, in terms of redesigning our systems, in terms of maintaining our systems. Let me give Members some examples. Dr Teo Ho Pin mentioned that the older ORNS, those in their 60s, would not be so adept. We are not planning to induct them into our Armed Forces, because their liability ends at 40 to 50. Thank you for the idea, Dr Teo. We will consider it. Of those who are in our Order of Battle (ORBAT), there are some examples. Instead of soldiers conducting surveillance from observation towers, the Army will build unmanned towers to watch over Jurong Island and the surrounding waters. Those towers will watch 24/7 in all-weather conditions, and it will reduce the total number of soldiers required by a third – a significant number. RSAF is moving towards a Smart Airbase.”
“It attracted 260 white-hat hackers, all bona fide, and improved our systems at relatively low cost. We have shared lessons with other agencies, like the Government Technology Agency (GovTech) and the Cyber Security Agency (CSA), and the results are encouraging. I do not think it is a one-off. It may not be an exact mould, but we will think of these ways to crowdsource. For the Internet, we can do it; we can crowdsource and actually leverage off that connectivity. As Members have pointed out, we will build up a cyber force with more SAF regulars and full-time staff. We will also use NSmen. This year, we will take in the pilot batch of full-time National Servicemen (NSFs) under the Cyber NSF Scheme. For those of you who have friends, children or children of friends who are interested and suitable, tell them about this. For those interested and suitable, we will offer them regular contracts of varying durations. If they accept, we will also invest more on training them. We will also set up a cyber defence training and exercise infrastructure to train them. So, this is long term, needs a long-term plan, and we have begun. Mr Teo Ser Luck asked how we can be prudent in spending, and he is spot on. We know our resources are limited. We have to be prudent, but we will not compromise. SAF will not compromise our defence capabilities but we have found ways to optimise resources. We want to stretch every dollar, where we can. We have used innovation and better work processes. SAF saved $200 million last year, the highest in the last four years. I think we can do more. For instance, our new LMVs will cost around $65 million less for the whole fleet to maintain across their lifetime. They replaced the Patrol Vessels.”
“Dr Lim Wee Kiak asked about the growing cyber threat, indeed, a transnational threat with effects that could be devastating as physical attacks, whether it is power grids, whether it is financial grids, whether it is hospitals, and so on and so forth. At the whole-of-Government level, Deputy Prime Minister Teo chairs our Coordinating Inter-Ministerial Committee, the Security Policy Committee. But at the Ministry level, we are responsible for our own Ministries as well as the ecosystem in which that Ministry is in charge of. Members have asked who the attacks come from, how often and whom they are targeted at. I think Members can guess at the answer. The attacks are conducted by freelancers, as well as organised state and non-state actors. Senior MINDEF and SAF leaders, as well as departments handling sensitive information have been deliberately targeted, for example, by "spear-phishing". Those of you in information technology (IT) will know what this is. 11.00 am In other words, you get innocent-looking emails addressed to you, but it contains malicious software. If you click on the attachment, or sometimes even when you click on the email – I do not think they have reached a stage where you look at it and the malicious software might come. They have not succeeded, but they will keep trying. As we do in the physical arena, MINDEF adopts a multi-layered approach to cyber defence, including the ultimate step of physically separating sensitive systems from the Internet. Internally, there is a system – we do not want to talk to you, please do not come in. Sensors monitor internal networks 24/7. We have "red teams” which are testing for vulnerabilities. Mr Zainal Sapari asked about our Bug Bounty programme. Thank you for affirming it. I thought it was a good idea.”
“US Secretary of Defense James Mattis wrote to me recently to ask Singapore to commit more resources for the next phase of consolidation after our hard-won victories. Cabinet has approved for Singapore to maintain our commitment to counterterrorism globally, for our own interests. I am announcing today that the SAF will further deploy troops to Iraq later this year. We will send SAF troops to help train Iraqi Security Forces to counter improvised explosive devices, as well as in tactical weapons and combat tactics. As Assoc Prof Fatimah Lateef suggested, we need to work with ASEAN on counterterrorism, and some others have pointed that out too, including Mr Pritam Singh and Mr Low Thia Khiang, especially because the risk of foreign fighters leaving Iraq and Syria has gone up. So, paradoxically, as the problem there diminishes, they run away; and they come back, whether it is Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines or even Singapore. The Philippine Special Operations Command came to Singapore last December for a two-week professional exchange and our offer to the Philippines Armed Force to use our unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for surveillance remains open. Deputy Prime Minister Teo, when he visited Philippine leaders, reiterated that offer, too, recently. SAF stands ready to join the Sulu Seas patrol when invited. As ADMM Chair, we recently proposed a counterterrorism framework – there were many programmes but we felt we needed a comprehensive framework and we devised the 3Rs – the equivalent to reading, writing, arithmetic. Rather, it is "Resilience, Response, Recovery", to coordinate our responses to prevent, deal with and recover from attacks.”
“In the span of a year, we have trained some 18,000 servicemen for homeland security and we started the new institute called the Island Defence Training Institute. I have talked about Singapore Armed Forces Training Institute (SAFTI) City last year. When completed, it will allow our soldiers to train more realistically for homeland security and counterterrorism because it will be a different Pasir Laba that you and I were used to. Buildings, I do not know how high you can build it, but at least higher than what we have now, and to teach them how to fight in that kind of scenario. Members rightly pointed out that we have to do more with other Government agencies to respond to these terror threats. We are working together with the Police's Frontline Policing Training Centre. We will conduct joint training and equip NSmen with the skills to perform these homeland security operations. At sea, various agencies are coordinated, whether it is the Navy, Police Coast Guard, Maritime and Port Authority (MPA) or Immigration and Checkpoints Authority (ICA), so that we keep our waters safe. But as much as we prepare at home, Singapore needs to be part of the international effort to deal with terrorism at its source. That is a sound strategy because, if you do not do that, you are just dealing with the problem too late and you allow the problem to mushroom. We did that against Al-Qaeda, from 2007, in Afghanistan, after which the threat has dissipated for now. Our SAF troops have been deployed in Iraq since 2014 against ISIS and with considerable progress. The coalition effort, led by the US, has taken Iraq back from ISIS control.”
“When I share these lessons, I say these are salutary lessons that we must voraciously imbibe, because someone else has paid to learn them. That is the cheapest cost to any country. We intend to keep our defence spending steady despite countries around us spending more and against wide-ranging security threats. But we have to prioritise and focus and optimise our resources. Some Members have asked about counterterrorism – Assoc Prof Dr Muhd Faishal, Assoc Prof Fatimah Lateef. SAF takes terrorism very seriously, so much so that we have to reorganise, train and equip differently. Members have pointed out, including Dr Teo Ho Pin, how we now train. We have the capacity to train 18,000 SAF NSmen for homeland security. We learned very valuable lessons from Marawi, another painful lesson that someone else learnt. So, we went there. We absorbed the lessons. I made a trip, Deputy Prime Minister Teo made a trip recently, where they found out and they admitted that they underestimated the problem, both the number of fighters and how well they were equipped. The terrorist fighters there were equipped. Snipers had good weapons, heavy machine guns, and they even had anti-tank weapons. The terrorists conducted urban warfare against soldiers and policemen of the Philippine authorities who were not trained for that kind of fight. That is why it took five months for the Philippine armed forces and homeland security to dislodge the militants from that city. And this, after many lives lost and the city devastated. I think the bill they have recently estimated will cost about US$2 billion. This is just one small city. The experiences there confirm that SAF is on the right track in building up our counterterrorism capabilities.”
“President Macron, to his credit, believes it should be done, but they have to up their defence spending by 40%. I have not calculated how much it affects their defence spending. I think France now spends €34 billion. It would have to go up to €50 billion, an increase of €16 billion in seven years. Not only a 2% increase in GST would help; probably a 3%, 4% or 5% hike in GST just to pay for the increase in defence spending. Germany, even with its troubled past, is now asked by the European Union (EU) states to do more militarily. That debate is over. I have attended the Munich Security Dialogue, as Defence Ministers in Singapore have, for the past decade or more. And, at that time, there was almost a schizophrenia. "We think we want Germany to do more but with your troubled past, maybe you should not do more." That debate is done. Germany, you must do more. But after 25 years of cuts to the German defence budget, the German military – the Bundeswehr – is underfunded, with entire weapons systems unusable, because they either lack spare parts or have been poorly maintained. By the German government's own assessment, less than half of Germany's submarines and planes are operationally ready. The platforms are there but only half can be activated. When the Aceh tsunami occurred, we activated three of our four Landing Ship Tanks (LSTs). It happened on Boxing Day – no way you could have had prior warning. On activation, all moved – 75% of the assets of that particular platform. The fourth was in the Gulf, as Deputy Prime Minister Teo has reminded me. So, all four were out. If we had to send another one, we would have to borrow it. The Bundeswehr will need many years to modernise its platforms and make up for lost time.”
“Two crucial lessons learnt from our experiences as well as that from negative examples from other countries who went the other way, and they are: first, the best time to prepare for trouble is during peace; second, in the long run, steady investments into military capabilities maintain peace through deterrence and result in more effective outcomes. It is actually the most efficient yield for defence investments. In other words, even if you spent the same dollar amount over a defined period and one was gentle and smooth, and the other went up and down, the most effective yield is continuous steady investments, and I will tell Members why, by examples, which many European countries have learnt in bitter ways. I recently spoke of how Lithuania did away with NS after the Cold War, but has now to reintroduce it following the annexation of Crimea. But it may not be possible. Just think – one Defence Minister decides, "alright, National Service is no longer necessary". The same one, or a few years later, another one decides, "let us reintroduce it". Is it possible? Certainly not in time to deal with an imminent crisis. Denmark announced in October last year that it would now increase defence spending by 20% over the next five years. You can quickly appreciate the pain it will cause their population that the Finance Minister of Denmark would say, "I have to raise Goods and Services Tax (GST) by 2% just to pay for my defence." Painful. France, even a bigger problem. It unveiled a bill last month that would increase its spending on its armed forces by more than 40% by 2025 because Europe has now got threats. People are asking France and Germany, who are the two largest powers, to do more. They are going to up it.”
“So, let us see the next slide – what is the defence spending by countries around us? I have chosen just to focus on ASEAN but I think probably the same can be said of Asia, ex ASEAN and Singapore, and even more. Figure 2 shows that we had kept pace with ASEAN spending until about 2006. In the last decade, our ASEAN neighbours have been spending more. These are nominal absolute spending. In the last decade, our ASEAN neighbours have been spending more to modernise their defence capabilities even as their economies grew. The gap between Singapore's spending compared to the rest of ASEAN has increased, but Singapore need not increase its defence spending radically now to play catch-up. Do not worry. We do not have to do it. As I have said in this House previously, we can maintain the SAF's capabilities with a defence spending that roughly keeps pace with inflation of around 3%-4% increase each year. And even for the next decade, MINDEF does not foresee any spike in defence spending. Obviously, this will not apply if there are exigencies or unexpected scenarios. For instance, if there is a terrorist attack or if the security environment deteriorates, our agencies will have to spend more to protect Singaporeans. And after the next decade, I think it would be prudent for the Government of that day and this House to reassess the security threats and the military spending, and the capabilities of other countries and plan ahead. So, if Members can remember and are still in this House 10 years hence in 2028 and beyond, please remember this gentle admonition, sound out warnings if you think necessary, for those of you privileged to be in this House.”
“It went beyond our wildest imagination that SAF troops and assets, as Mr Teo Ser Luck pointed out, were helping in Hurricane Harvey in Texas and, before that, Hurricane Katrina; or could be deployed as peacekeepers in Timor-Leste or against terrorism in Afghanistan and Iraq; against pirates in the Gulf of Aden; and in humanitarian efforts in Aceh and Nepal. Who would have thought of it when SAF was started more than 50 years ago? 10.45 am Yes, we will continue to do this because the partnerships forged from playing our role internationally are important in dealing with transnational threats that affect our own security. We are not playing "good guy", to be honest. It raises our stakes, our value to others who want then to help us as we deal with transnational security threats. It has been the steady investments in defence spending that enabled these achievements by a strong SAF, both locally and internationally. This is a Committee of Supply (COS) debate. So, I think some details of actual financing are appropriate. We have handed out, with your permission, Mr Chairman, charts and these are also shown on the screens. The first figure shows our defence spending for the last 30 years. First off, in blue, is the percentage of Government expenditure – how much MINDEF spends as a part of Government expenditure. At our height, you will notice that we spent almost a third of every dollar the Government spends. But with the SAF modernised and doing more with people and technology, defence spending, as a proportion, dropped substantially, starting around a decade ago. It is now about 19% of Government spending. So much for Singapore's spending, but defence must always be seen in perspective. What you spend is never as important as what everyone else spends.”
“We did not really own them. We leased them from the Singapore Flying Club. Today, we have a comprehensive fleet of fighter, transport, surveillance aircraft and ground-based air defence systems that protect our skies 24/7. And when I say that, it means that we have pilots on standby. Because after 9-11, we took that threat seriously. If there are planes that come to us unplanned, our fighter planes are mobilised. It takes a while to get mobilised, so our chaps are there. From time to time, we gently guide errant, sometimes, lost pilots, down to the field. But you never know when there might be a real attack, just like 9-11. Our Navy started with two wooden hull boats, probably sinkable if attacked. We now have a modern Navy of Littoral Mission Vessels (LMVs), frigates and submarines that protect our waters and maritime hub. The commitment of previous generations to build up a strong SAF was not merely through words or aspirations. It required substantial financial resources from the Government and the people. But that was not the only and, in fact, not the most precious resource they had to give. They gave of themselves, as every Singaporean male, as every male MP in this House who has done NS, has done so, through NS, with the full support from family and employers. The results of that unequivocal commitment are plain for everyone to see – to Singaporeans, to our neighbours and, indeed, globally – an SAF today that is able to defend Singapore, but beyond that, an SAF that has contributed to global security. As Mr Vikram Nair said, how do we show that we are a valued partner?”
“" I cannot say it as harshly as Mr Lee because that generation lived through difficult times. It is just unnatural for us, but when he says it, and when the Pioneer Generation says it, it is so authentic. Harsh words for harsh times, but ever so necessary. Not only for that generation, but I think for every generation. So, listen to that clip again this year. With that deep conviction and sacrificial commitment, we, today, have a modern and professional SAF. From two infantry battalions – which, if you read Mr Lee's memoirs, were still under Malaysian command even after we separated – we now have an Army, combined arms divisions, fully manned and able to move at short notice. Earlier this year, you may or may not have noticed, we activated a mass mobilisation exercise (MOBEX). There was not much fanfare. In fact, it may have gone unnoticed. But in a few hours, we were able to rapidly assemble and equip 8,000 men, moved munitions to them, we used new ways of doing it. Many Members here are NSmen and had gone through MOBEX. As they went to the counters, these were automated counters, where a camera takes a picture of you, recognises you, issues you a slip to say which company and platoon you go to, and what your role is, and what weapons you need to draw. But you actually do not have to draw the weapons because, at the same time, when it is activated, we did not cheat, we activated both sides, from our ammunition storage facilities, they are activated. And they pushed weapons, platforms, to meet up with the men. Within a few hours, 8,000 men. No mean feat anywhere. That should give a lot of confidence to Members in this House and Singaporeans outside. The Republic of Singapore (RSAF) commemorates its Golden Jubilee this year. But when it started, we had two Cessnas.”
“Should we continue to put defence spending as a priority? Because, after all, we have had peace for 50 years and more now. Our relations with our neighbours are good on all sides. We have formed strong partnerships, as Members have pointed out, with major powers. How much should we invest in building a strong SAF and how much can we afford? The answer to these questions by previous generations was plain, as it was unwavering – defence was a top priority and they would invest heavily into building a strong defence, a strong SAF, no ifs or buts. But let me make one fact clear. Past generations did so even when there were many competing needs. We talked about our rising needs but, past generations, as a Third-World country, in Singapore, our needs then were dire and everywhere – houses, schools, hospitals, roads, public facilities, jobs – all in short supply. Because our military capabilities at Independence were next to nothing, the Government of the day had to make hard decisions – every dollar spent on building up the military was a dollar taken from other needs. And yet, they paid the price to build up a strong SAF. Why? Mr Lee Kuan Yew and the Pioneer Generation, who lived through Singapore as a British colony, under Japanese occupation and as part of Malaysia, held a deep conviction on self-determination through a strong defence. At the National Day Parade (NDP) which Members here attend, we replay a particular clip of Mr Lee Kuan Yew. It is a very stern admonition and, in this coming NDP, I invite you to listen to it again. It was uttered in 1967 when NS was introduced, "If you, who are growing up, do not understand that you have got to defend this, then I say, in the end, we will lose. Other people will come, smack you down, take it over.”
“Mr Chairman, let me thank the Members for their continued support to build up a strong defence for Singapore by voting for the financial policy of the Government yesterday. This debate and the next on the Presidential Address after Parliament reopens are crucial. For this debate, as expected, any proposed tax increase will attract attention. If it did not, we would be in a different world, a surreal one. But astute Members of Parliament (MPs) have pointed out that the financial Budget is but a means to an end. Indeed, apart from the financial scrutiny of Government spending and revenue, the debates will set strategic directions for Singapore over the next 10, 20 years and beyond. And these core issues are addressed at a crucial juncture, as we transit to a 4th Generation (4G) leadership that must forge support from a generation of Singaporeans with perspectives and memories significantly different from the Pioneer Generation, and even that of their parents, because they were born when Singapore was First-World and they did not experience the Third-World Singapore. As we deliberate on these key issues, we have to decide what we must never let go, lest we weaken the foundations of our growth, and what we must change to keep relevant with the times. Those decisions from these two debates will affect every Singaporean, young or old, right or wrong. Every Ministry, therefore, including and, especially defence, which takes up a large share of Government spending, must deal with these core issues. That is the core debate. Mr Vikram Nair captured the essence when he asked of my Ministry what are our security plans in the face of wide-ranging threats and risks, and if our defence spending is adequate and sustainable. He used the word “existential” twice. And he is correct.”
“As part of the 3rd Generation Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) learning transformation, the SAF uses digital learning tools via its LEARNet platform, which allows National Servicemen to access online training content for self-directed learning. National Servicemen who need to access LEARNet for e-learning will be provided with the necessary electronic devices. For instance, recruits in the Basic Military Training Centre (BMTC) are issued tablets to access e-learning modules on weapon handling and individual field craft during their Basic Military Training. As these devices are provided, there is no need to use their own personal electronic devices to access the online training materials, and hence no subsidy is provided. NSmen from low-income households who require financial assistance to purchase electronic devices can benefit from the Infocomm Media Development Authority's Home Access Programme. Under the scheme, eligible families are provided with home Internet access and basic computing equipment, such as a tablet, at subsidised rates.”
“For SAF personnel working in camps that have both Green and Red Zones, less than 10% of the population disable or sandblast the camera lens of their mobile phones because (a) the majority of the Servicemen operate within Green Zones; (b) Servicemen with camera smartphones may choose to deposit their phones in locker facilities before entering Red Zones; and (c) some Servicemen prefer to use non-camera smartphones. For the remaining Red-zoned camps, about three-quarters of the Servicemen disable their camera on the smartphone and the remaining one-quarter prefer to use a non-camera smartphone. These smartphones are subjected to security checks and verifications.”
“The security zoning system was introduced in September 2012 to allow Servicemen to carry camera-equipped mobile phones into the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) camps to facilitate the use of information technology, whilst protecting the security of sensitive information in SAF premises. Under the security zoning system, camp complexes are divided into Red and Green Zones. Our Servicemen are allowed to bring in camera-enabled mobile phones into Green Zones while no camera-enabled devices are allowed into Red Zones. Unauthorised photography and videography remain prohibited in both zones. Our Servicemen are briefed on the importance of maintaining information security and are aware of the need for individual responsibility to abide by the requirements. SAF has progressively refined security zoning in SAF camps and premises, balancing the need for security with greater flexibility for Servicemen. The security zoning has worked well and has not compromised security. Since 2012, we have consolidated spaces involving sensitive and classified information into Red Zones, while allowing Servicemen who work in the less-sensitive Green Zones greater flexibility to use their camera-enabled mobile phones. On 1 March 2016, further revisions were made to enable Servicemen to bring tablets and laptops into Green Zones. For Red Zones, camera-enabled mobile phones whose camera functions have been disabled in compliance with the SAF's standards are allowed.”
“Those are very pertinent questions and not theoretical at all. We saw what happened in the Mumbai attack, and there are many scenarios. If we had, for example, pre-emptive information that a particular ship was carrying either illegal cargo or had malignant intent towards Singapore, it could amount to boarding the ship or keeping it under close surveillance. There are various scenarios played out. This is what MSTF does in its exercises, if you have kept up with the number of exercises that we have had at sea, various scenarios are played out, whether it is cruise ship, whether it is cargo, and what kind of scenarios may result, including hostage-taking. They are varied to the extent possible. The planners, our security agencies and, together with the other agencies under SMCC, do play out these scenarios. We have, over the years, stepped up the level of exercises, and there is a certain level of competency. I do not want to give the false impression that all attacks can be mitigated. If there are suicide attacks, sometimes, it is difficult to stop them. But this is a situation where we continue to look at the scenarios, continue to exercise, continue to anticipate.”
“In the case of the USS John S McCain and the Alnic MC, both were detected in our waters off Pedra Branca. The RSN vessel RSS Gallant, which was patrolling our waters, had also established communications with the foreign warship as part of standard procedures. Likewise, for the case of the dredger JBB De Rong 19 and tanker Kartika Segara, both were detected and identified prior to their collision that took place within Singapore waters off Sisters’ Island. In both these incidents, none of the ships was designated as potential threats to security, and correctly so. As such, in compliance with standard protocols, they did not require close monitoring by MSTF. And by the rules of navigation under the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, the master and crew of the vessels involved were responsible to guide their ships safely through. The various parties involved in the collision will now have to investigate what went wrong and what remedial actions to take, if necessary. The Transport Safety Investigation Bureau is also conducting an investigation and has announced that it will make the findings public.”
“Also, as part of the WoG efforts, the RSN's Maritime Security Task Force (MSTF), which the Member asked specifically about, feeds its information to SMCC. This information is obtained from monitoring close to a thousand ships passing through the Singapore Straits each day, through a network of sensors, such as coastal surveillance radars, electro-optic devices and RSN ships on patrol. This surveillance is continuous both in the day and at night. The MSTF's key focus is on potential threats to Singapore. This is what Mr Vikram Nair alluded to, while the MPA watches over the navigation of ships in our waters. For both purposes, the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea mandates the use of the Automatic Identification System (AIS) to identify ships at sea. This AIS, however, does not apply to warships. For ships that are not required or have not complied with vessel identification, their presence can still be detected via our network of coastal surveillance radars and electro-optic devices. On a daily basis, MSTF conducts threat evaluation for every vessel calling into Singapore's ports or transiting through the Singapore Straits. MSTF does this by deploying analytic tools to build profiles of each vessel based on attributes, such as their voyage, owners, crew and cargo, as well as additional data shared by Government agencies. MSTF would then decide the appropriate operational responses, which include, for example, closer monitoring, escorting or even boarding the ship to mitigate the threat. Let me now move on specifically to the two recent incidents asked about by the Member. With regard to the two recent incidents which resulted in collisions, our sensors had detected and identified the vessels involved in both the collisions.”
“Mr Speaker, ensuring maritime security for our ports and surrounding waters is of high priority to Singapore. This is because disruption to sea traffic along the Singapore Strait will impact not only our local economy but also globally as half of the world’s total annual sea-borne trade and 70% of Asia’s oil imports pass through our waterway. As the Member also highlighted, terrorists can target ships in our waters or attack from the sea, as they did in the Mumbai incident in 2008. In dealing with terror threats at and from the sea, Singapore adopts a whole-of-Government (WoG) approach to ensure a comprehensive coverage of varied scenarios as well as coordinated responses. This approach led to the setup of the Singapore Maritime Crisis Centre (SMCC) in 2011, which brings together the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN), the Police Coast Guard, the Singapore Civil Defence Force, the Immigration and Checkpoints Authority, the Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore (MPA), and Singapore Customs. SMCC maintains a comprehensive maritime situation picture, shares information among the agencies and coordinates responses to deal with potential threats. SMCC leverages technology to analyse information, detect suspicious patterns, and cue relevant agencies to investigate and take action. Let me provide two examples. In 2015, for example, SMCC detected a potential Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) sympathiser who was on board a tanker calling into Singapore. That individual was barred from entering Singapore. In another case in 2016, SMCC received information about a hijacked tanker. This information was shared with the Indonesian authorities as the vessel was in their waters. This led to the ship’s rescue, and, in that case, the hijack was not linked to any terror intent.”
“As the Member has suggested, the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) is, indeed, utilising e-learning, including through websites, to better equip all Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) and SAF personnel, including National Servicemen (NSmen) for training in counterterrorism. The e-learning training programme is structured to be comprehensive, with a number of modules to be rolled out progressively. E-learning modules will gain wide acceptance if they are functional, useful and easy to use. Making it compulsory is neither an enlightened approach nor effective to facilitate learning. The SGSecure application is not a core part of the SAF's counterterrorism training package nor compulsory for NSmen to download. However, in support of the Ministry of Home Affair's nationwide efforts against terrorism, MINDEF and SAF personnel are encouraged to download the SGSecure application so that, like other residents, they can receive important alerts or provide information to the MHA authorities during major emergencies.”
“Pamphlets used during the NDP rehearsals contained errors in the Tamil translation. Investigations revealed that the original Tamil translation submitted was correct but errors were made by printers of the pamphlets. Unfortunately, some pamphlets with errors had already been distributed to the audience prior to the discovery. The NDP Executive Committee (EXCO) has apologised publicly for this mistake. The error arose because the pamphlets were not proof-read after printing and before distribution. This step has been incorporated as standard procedure for all translated texts in NDP materials. Additionally, the NDP EXCO will also ensure that the publishing companies it engages are equipped with the necessary and reliable computer software for correct printing of different languages.”
“I do not think they can be as proficient as the average policeman because that is not what they do every day but, at least you have that. And also, in the change of our assets, how we are equipping for that, we have mentioned that. But at the community level, Mr Gan's question is: how do you ensure that we can protect at the precinct level? And I think that is not only for NSmen who are from the SAF, Home Team or SCDF which they have some level of training. I think that is where many of our community exercises are now dealing with it − emergency preparedness, where you bring in communities and you have to respond. Because the problem with small group and lone wolf attacks is the rapidity of these attacks. And you have to deal with the situation before formal security agencies can mobilise. I think there is great scope and need for our community agencies to come together. I know that many Members, including myself, have been doing this − bringing community leaders and saying, "When we have an attack, can I depend on you for these resources? Can I depend on you for this? Can I depend on you to calm the community down, to speak to the community?" And I think we need to continually do that.”
“Mdm Speaker, let me thank the Member for that question. It is an important one. I think there are clear roles that security agencies should do because that is the primary responsibility and we have to have community groups. Let me deal with the first. As members of the security forces, I think the public rightly expects the Home Team, the SAF − whether they are National Servicemen or Regulars − to be able to protect Singaporeans. But we have to train them. You cannot just say, "Well, go and protect Singaporeans." And that was the essence of launching the IDTI. I mentioned this institute and you may have seen footages yesterday in the news. It is not easy to tell someone with arms and, sometimes, you are worried that, "If you think this person is going to harm somebody else, if he is a terrorist, neutralise him." Because you can make the wrong judgement. In a tensed situation, the outcome can become very negative. You have to put them through training. The better trained they are, the better they are equipped, the more confident they are. So, in the IDTI, we are training 18,000 National Servicemen every year to do the rudiments. You have basically video simulation screens which are life-size and moving targets − which means people, some are "hostages" and you also have "terrorists". And if they make the wrong decision, in an instant, they will know it. You have to get them used to that. We have various simulations on how to do a proper search, which, traditionally, they were not trained for because the Home Team is better at it. And we recognise that. But in the event that you have multiple attacks and you need the resources of the SAF, then at least, at the very least, you have them trained at the basic level.”
“Let me answer the second question first. So far, the contributions to the Philippines do not lend themselves to that sense of a multinational effort because there is no central or prime mover for that. It very much depends on what the AFP says it needs and the relationships that the Philippines have with other militaries and other countries. From what we know, a number of countries have been reported to be helping the Philippines, such as the United States. The Chinese have also contributed. If you consider the Trilateral Maritime Patrol in the Sulu Seas, which the Philippines does with Malaysia and Indonesia, then Malaysia and Indonesia. Members may have read that Malaysia also mobilised a humanitarian plane, under the auspices of AHA, which is the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management. And that is from our reports. We have good relations with the AFP and there is good personal contact between myself and Secretary Lorenzana. And we thought that it was right for Singapore to assist because, if this problem becomes entrenched and it gets worse, cities in ASEAN will bear the brunt and will be subject to attacks if these terrorist cells become entrenched there.”
“That is why I talked about a joint system now, a Command and Control Information System, which both the Home Team and the SAF now use, which was developed by DSTA so that you share the same picture and that makes a lot of difference, as well as having an understanding of when you can divide out responsibilities, when you can actually come together. So, I would say that there is a clear recognition that we need to exercise more often together and, indeed, we have. I mentioned the joint counter-terrorism exercise. I talked about also an exercise in the maritime domain with different agencies. So, we are aware of this need to coordinate and integrate our responses, not only of our security agencies, but of our community groups. Because, as I have said, while our security teams and security agencies can exercise, what we need to pay attention to is the aftermath of attacks. And, Madam, I think that is a whole-of-society response.”