Ng Eng Hen
Singapore
“I think we try to keep this virtuous state of affairs as long as we can to make sure that we can invest steadily. Year-to-year fluctuations would occur, whether it is economic, not so much in COVID-19, but remember the Global Financial Crisis? Everybody needs to take a haircut. If you have to take a haircut, you have to take a haircut.”
“Mr Chairman, as the World around us becomes more unpredictable and changes, the more we need to keep the strongest commitment to strengthen our own defences and, if needed, we must be willing to do more. Singapore celebrates 60 years of Independence this year.”
“MINDEF will continue to work with partners to encourage Singaporeans to raise their digital literacy, develop and maintain good cybersecurity habits, protect sensitive data and guard against scams, fake news and disinformation so as to make the digital domain a safer and more secure space.”
“The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) conducts regular mobilisation exercises (MOBEX) of our National Service (NS) forces. In a silent mobilisation, NSmen are notified through their personal contact numbers. Open mobilisations include the broadcast of unit code-words through mass media.”
“In 2020, the Ministry of Defence replied to a Parliamentary Question on this matter that the relocation of Paya Lebar Air Base (PLAB) would likely occur around 2030 or beyond, after Changi Air Base and Tengah Air Base have been expanded to house the existing assets at PLAB.”
“When incidents or near-misses happen, as it did where one Hunter armoured fighting vehicle rear-ended another during Exercise Wallaby in Australia, thorough investigations are conducted and lessons learnt shared across the units.”
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“Pointedly, because of China, which they characterise as a "strategic competitor" and "rival power". The US DoD is putting that policy in practice, and moving more ships, planes, other equipment and troops to its bases in Japan and Korea, on top of the 78,000 troops already stationed there. For Australia, a record number of US Marines deployed there last year, and the US has plans to build additional military infrastructure in Australia once Congress gives its approval. With President Trump’s support for a bigger defence budget, such efforts will get a boost. What would China do? For China, the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) expansion in blue water capability, air projection, missile and space programmes have gained momentum. Its Navy is now the world’s largest naval force, at least in numbers of ships. Last year, China’s first indigenous aircraft carrier, the Shandong, was commissioned. The US’ recent statements and moves are likely to accelerate, not slow down, the pace of PLA modernisation. European powers too, some in heeding the US’ call and others independently, want to position themselves in Asia. My counterpart, French Minister Florence Parly has said that France, “is not going anywhere, because [it is] part of the region”. True to these words, France sent its warships through the South China Sea and in 2018, its Air Force conducted its largest-ever deployment in Southeast Asia since 2004, from Australia to India, to mark France’s presence in the region. The UK too has actively positioned itself in Asia. In 2018 alone, the British Royal Navy deployed three ships to the region. Last year, the Royal Navy increased its joint military exercises with the US Navy in the South China Sea. Asian countries too have beefed up their militaries.”
“00 pm At its plenary, German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier sharply criticised the US' "America First" policy and that "Great Again" was at the expense of neighbours and partners. The US wants the EU to liberalise its trade policies to buy more American goods and spend more to defend themselves. In response, some EU leaders do indeed want to reduce their dependence on the US. Just last year, French President Emmanuel Macron put it starkly, "American decisions over the last several years... have led us to rethink fundamental diplomatic and military strategy and on occasion elements of solidarity which we thought were forever inalienable". Europe is far away from Singapore, but the changes there will invariably impact our part of the world. In the Middle East, the biggest game changer is a US that is now a net exporter of energy for the first time in nearly 70 years, and less dependent on crude oil and natural gas from the Middle East than ever before in its history. For the first time too, Russia has direct access to the Mediterranean Sea, and this is a warm water port in Syria, and where it can begin to build and exert military presence there. China, Japan and other Asian countries on the other hand, are still dependent on oil from the Middle East, through the Strait of Hormuz. This is why President Trump remarked wryly, but not inaccurately, that the US was still "protecting the shipping lanes for other countries for zero compensation". The US' reaction to the next Middle East crisis will be shaped by these new calculations. The US Department of Defense (DoD) as the action arm of foreign and state policy has made it clear that our region – the Indo Pacific – is now their "priority theatre". Why?”
“Mr Douglas Foo alluded to that and Mr Charles Chong rightly put it. The very success of the SAF is that we are not tested, and indeed, that is what is said in our mission statement in the financial Budget Book – "Deterrence". Even so, to respond to a new environment of security challenges, the SAF must again restructure decisively to meet new challenges, to remain relevant, responsive and effective for our national defence. I think Miss Sylvia Lim talked about it – how the changing landscape will throw forth new threats and the SAF must be ready. I will go into the details of the restructuring required later. But first, the new environment. Members have talked about it. Mr Charles Chong, Mr Desmond Choo, Ms Sylvia Lim, Mr Vikram Nair. I agree completely with Members that along with the rest of the world, Singapore has entered a different phase in geopolitics. It is messier, less predictable and therefore, with more unseen events. The post-World War II era of 70 years, championed and spearheaded by a hyper-dominant US together with its Western liberal allies is no longer the only and main narrative. A new chapter has begun with elements of the old but also new principal actors. China is a rising global power but regional powers too are gaining strength, including Japan, India and Australia. And it is not just Asia that is fast-changing. In Europe, the trans-Atlantic alliance is evolving. When the UK government decided to allow Huawei a limited role for its 5G network, the UK dailies concluded that the US-UK relationship had become "less special". This year's Munich Security Conference theme was meant to be provocative to prompt soul-searching, but nonetheless carried more than a modicum of insecurities – the theme was "Westlessness". 2.”
“First, I think, and foremost, to give a better understanding of how MINDEF and SAF approach these questions which Members have raised. Let me start with how we think about our defence for Singapore. There is a familiar dictum in military annals – that a cardinal mistake which has led to failures has been to prepare for the next battle based on the last war. Analysts cite this specifically for the Vietnam War, where tactics that gave the US victory in Europe during World War II proved ineffective and could not overcome the guerrilla insurgency employed by the Viet Cong. Many of you would have seen the series on Netflix – a gripping documentary that underscores this cardinal mistake. Singapore, as a small nation with little reserves, if caught off guard, should heed this dictum. Mr Vikram Nair put it rightly when he says that, "We have to be ready." But, ready for what? We do not have the resources to plan for all eventualities. Instead, as Members intimated, Singapore must be keenly aware of the changing circumstances around us and how they impact us. Our region, indeed, the world, is at an inflexion point, which many Members pointed out, and it is for this new environment that Singapore must prepare itself. Internally, new military capabilities have been built and are operated by a new generation of SAF soldiers, and operated capably, I must say. And it is because of the steadfast commitment by successive Governments and the overwhelming support from Members of this House, across party lines – Members of Parliament, Non-Constituency Members of Parliament, Nominated Members of Parliament – that we have collectively succeeded in building a strong SAF that is recognised today as a modern and professional military force, capable of defending our national interest.”
“Mr Chairman, first, let me thank Members for their continued support to build a strong defence for Singapore – not only for previous Budgets, which Members have given assent but I hope for this Budget as well – and for many of the Members, for their personal commitment. Many of the Members have done their National Service (NS) and for many here, their children are doing National Service. As Mr Douglas Foo recounted, his sons. As he was speaking, I wished he had more sons and daughters to produce the next generation of NS men. The Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Finance, in his round-up speech, reminded us of what Mr Lee Kuan Yew said our obligation was. Our greatest obligation is to the future, and sitting there, listening to Members speak, I think it is virtuous. There were well-informed views about how difficult our external environment is – how fluid, how fast-changing, how it impacts us, how as a small country we have very little wherewithal in which to control our external events and even less to effect changes that come upon us – whether it is climate change, whether it is terrorism, whether it is factious politics in neighbouring countries. But equally, there was strong consensus and pre-occupation about how to build a strong national defence. There were good questions asked and rightly so about prudence, administration, about how we spend our defence dollars, how we make sure that our processes give us the maximum value and that we ensure that where we put our money is, is well chosen and sustainable for our defence budget. There are many issues and what our colleagues and I will aim to do is try to answer to the best of our abilities.”
“The Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) had already replied to Mr Ong Teng Koon's Oral Question on some of these aspects recently and they are on the record. We will, therefore, only address new queries specifically. The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) stands guided by the professional input from its panel of psychologists and psychiatrists that a more flexible and responsive monitoring system is required rather than a single item of mandatory interviews to identify those with mental health issues. Commanders at all levels are expected to engage those under their charge, including the full-time National Service (NSF) officers, through different ways, including interviews. As part of their training, all officers are also taught to identify signs and symptoms of mental and emotional distress. Soldiers are also encouraged to flag such persons for further assistance. SAF has para-counsellors in every unit and psychologists in the divisions to provide frontline support. In addition, there is also a 24-hour counselling hotline for all servicemen. These channels apply to all NSFs, including NSF officers, so that those facing mental health issues can be identified through multiple avenues for a more comprehensive mental health support and monitoring system.”
“The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) has instituted a number of measures to keep food waste to a minimum. Meals at cookhouses in SAF camps are provided based on weekly forecasts of consumption depending on the particular unit's training schedules, nutritional and caloric requirements. However, to improve forecasting accuracy and reduce wastage, an electronic meal accounting system is used to track actual consumption patterns over time so that adjustments can be made to meals provided. These measures have reduced food wastage to, on average, about 1% of meals catered from SAF cookhouses. SAF is also studying further measures to reduce food wastage, for example, ready-to-eat meals at selected cookhouses. Such meals are prepared only when required and reduce food waste that arise due to unforeseen changes in consumption. As another example, SAF has been working with the National Environment Agency to generate electricity from treated food waste in several SAF camps. SAF will continue to explore ways to reduce food waste.”
“This included a commitment to quarterly exercises to sharpen information exchange processes, as well as an updated set of suspicious contact indicators to assist investigation efforts of sea robbery incidents. Beyond regular conduct of sea and air patrols under MSP, joint training and exercises as well as information sharing strengthen understanding and collaboration to deal with maritime incidents together. The RSN's Information Fusion Centre (IFC) shares information with our neighbours on a regular basis to aid them in deterring possible perpetrators and successfully responding to sea robbery attempts. For instance, on 18 January this year, the IFC was alerted of a sea robbery incident involving a tugboat towing a barge. The information was shared via IFC with the Indonesian authorities as the incident had occurred in their waters, which led to the successful arrest of the criminals involved. On a day-to-day basis, RSN also works alongside other local maritime agencies, such as PCG and the Maritime and Port Authority through the Singapore Maritime Crisis Centre (SMCC). SMCC is a whole-of-Government setup that maintains our maritime situation picture, drives sensemaking efforts, and coordinates responses to potential maritime security threats. Nevertheless, we agree with Members that additional measures are useful to prevent the further rise in incidence of sea robbery and piracy. We want to step up deeper sharing in information and intelligence with maritime and enforcement agencies within Malaysia and Indonesia. The Maritime Security Task Force is also making plans to restructure itself, including beefing up its assets, to deal with such incidents at sea. That review is expected to be complete in the next few months.”
“The number of piracy and sea robbery incidents occurring in the Singapore Strait fluctuates considerably from year to year. For example, in the years 2014, 2015 and 2019, there were 48, 104 and 31 such incidents. But in the remaining years over the last decade, the average was around 12. It is, therefore, difficult to conclude if there will be a persistent increase from the 2019 figures alone, although our maritime agencies are monitoring this closely. What we have determined is that the tactics and modus operandi of the perpetrators remain the same, consisting of petty crime involving the theft of crew belongings, engine parts, or scrap metal. All perpetrators are based and operate outside Singapore's territorial waters and, therefore, we are working with our neighbours to share information and collect intelligence, so that Singapore can be better prepared to meet such threats. Against specific incidents, our national maritime agencies can only act in our territorial waters, which we did in two of these incidents, where the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) and the Police Coast Guard (PCG) boarded these ships to rule out any residual security risks, prior to their entry into Singapore's ports. For incidents outside our waters, Singapore has long-standing cooperation with navies and the coast guards of Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand to deal with transnational maritime piracy, robbery and other security threats. Most recently, at the 14th Malacca Straits Patrol (MSP) Joint Coordination Committee meeting, the navies of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand revised the MSP Standard Operating Procedures to enhance the region's ability to tackle sea robbery in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.”
“As demand for tickets to the National Day Parade (NDP) are much higher than capacity, the priority of allocation will continue to be for Singaporeans and Permanent Residents, as NDP is a key national event to celebrate our nation's Independence together. Some previews are also reserved for school children as part of their national education. Over the years, the NDP organising team has been expanding the overall capacity to respond to the high demand. Since 2016, a second Preview was added. Last year, the mobile column was extended into the heartlands. NDP celebrations have also been organised around the venues at the Padang or Floating Platform. These fringe and satellite activities allow tens of thousands more, including our migrant workers, to join the celebrations.”
“The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) has a support system in place to monitor our National Servicemen's (NSmen's) mental well-being and extend support to those facing challenges in their personal lives or adjustments to military life. Besides counsellors and para-counsellors, psychologists and psychiatrists, ground commanders, too, play an important role within this support system. The Platoon Commander (PC) Interview is one example. Carried out at regular intervals during Basic Military Training (BMT) and in units, this is a platform for one-to-one conversations between servicemen and their commanders. Based on our experience, it has helped our commanders to identify servicemen under their charge who are experiencing NS-related or personal problem or other mental health concern. The commanders would then extend first level advice and support or refer the servicemen for counselling or other professional interventions where necessary. Mr Ong Teng Koon asked if PC interviews can be extended to NSF officers. While regular interviews are not mandated for officers, all commanders engage their officers regularly to identify and support those who require assistance, including those with mental health concerns. Apart from these informal interviews with their superiors, the whole support network of counselling and helplines is available and accessible to officers. As part of our overall support system, there are trained para-counsellors in every unit to provide frontline counselling services as well as a 24-hour counselling hotline for all servicemen.”
“Some partial recovery of motor functions has taken place since the second surgery, but PTE Quek will require continued rehabilitation and physiotherapy for long-term recovery as well as to reduce the damage from the injury. Currently, he is able to breathe on his own, conscious and alert and able to talk with his family. PTE Quek's family was informed of the incident on the night of 18 December, and his mother was flown to the hospital the next day. His father and brother joined him a few days after. SAF personnel are also on site to provide PTE Quek and his family medical, counselling, logistical and other forms of support. The BOI will comprehensively ascertain the detailed circumstances and possible contributory factors for the incident. It will examine all existing safety processes and procedures, whether they were adhered to and recommend areas for review and enhancement where needed. Static line parachute jumps will remain suspended until the completion of the formal inquiry and only resumed when their recommendations have been implemented. A team of SAF doctors are working closely with the specialists at the hospital to monitor and assess PTE Quek’s condition. While his condition is stable now, the medical opinion is that he still needs close monitoring over the next few weeks. He will be brought back to Singapore when the specialists deem it safe to fly. All of us, of course, wish PTE Quek a continuous and progressive recovery. Our prayers and hopes are with him and his family. The Ministry of Defence and SAF will continue to extend our full support to PTE Quek and his family on his road to recovery.”
“This is the first known "static line interference" incident resulting in serious injury. To ensure that static line interference does not occur, there are established drills and safety protocols in the training manuals and Training Safety Regulations for both the jumper and the Jump Master. For all jumps, a qualified jump instructor is required to be on board the plane with two qualified Jump Masters at the exit door to check that these measures and other safety aspects are adhered to. Preliminary findings suggest that the static line was not pulled taut as required and interfered with PTE Quek's exit from the plane, causing a neck injury. Detailed investigations are underway to determine why this occurred and if adequate supervision was given during PTE Quek’s jump. Thus far, we know that PTE Quek had successfully undergone the requisite pre-jump qualifications, training drills and safety briefs prior to taking part in the series of live static line parachute jumps and the specific jump on the night of 18 December. The incident occurred during PTE Quek's fifth and final jump for the course. He had completed the previous four static line jumps successfully in the days prior to the incident. Upon arrival at the hospital, a Magnetic Resource Imaging (MRI) revealed a cervical spine injury. In the morning of 19 December, PTE Quek successfully underwent surgery to relieve the pressure on his spine. A planned second surgery on 21 December to stabilise his cervical spine was also successfully completed without complications. PTE Quek is currently still in the Intensive Care Unit for close observations. The cervical spine injury sustained by PTE Quek had resulted in neurological deficits, including weakness of his upper and lower limbs.”
“PTE Joshua Quek undertook a night static line parachute jump as part of the Basic Airborne Course (BAC) on 18 December 2019 when the training incident occurred. The jumpers' parachutes are attached to the aircraft by a cord called a "static line". As jumpers exit the aircraft, the static line becomes taut and deploys the parachutes automatically. This training activity is standard airborne training conducted by militaries to teach soldiers the fundamentals of parachuting for combat deployment. PTE Quek successfully landed within the designated landing area but sustained injuries to the neck during the course of that jump. He was attended to immediately by the Singapore Armed Forces' (SAF's) onsite medical officer and subsequently evacuated by the onsite ambulance to the nearest tertiary hospital. A formal Board of Inquiry (BOI), supported by the SAF Inspector-General's Office, has been convened by the Army for a full investigation of this incident. In the meantime, all static line parachute jumps have been suspended, pending the findings of the BOI. Without prejudicing the ongoing formal inquiry, let me now share findings from investigations thus far, with the caveat that these findings are preliminary and the BOI's report will be the final and conclusive one. The cause of PTE Quek's injury occurred when the static line swept across his neck when he exited the aircraft. This is a known risk for static line parachute training and termed "static line interference". It occurs when the line is too slack and interferes with the jumper's exit from the plane. The SAF conducts about 6,000 static line parachute jumps every year. Since its inception in 1974, SAF has graduated approximately 27,000 BAC trainees.”
“Taking reference from the recommendations of the Public Sector Data Security Review Committee, we will implement a framework to ensure that vendors protect our data well. MINDEF will also implement a tiered cybersecurity framework to ensure that vendors handling more sensitive data are subject to more stringent cybersecurity standards, which may include regular audits. As the risks will continue to evolve, we will continually monitor developments and enhance our cyber and data security measures.”
“On 10 October 2019, the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) discovered that emails received from ST Logistics contained malware, and alerted their management, whereupon ST Logistics, as a first precautionary move, blocked outgoing data and emails possibly affected by the malware. The company’s information technology team and external support teams then carried out forensic investigations to provide MINDEF with the affected data for an impact assessment. It was established on 13 December 2019 that personal data of 2,400 MINDEF/Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) personnel could have been leaked. The affected personnel were notified from 21 December 2019. In the second incident, HMI Institute discovered a malware infection in one backup server on 4 December 2019, and alerted MINDEF on 9 December 2019. With the help of a cybersecurity firm, HMI investigated the infection and ascertained the individuals from MINDEF/SAF and other organisations whose personal data were on the affected backup server. Although the likelihood of data leak to external parties was assessed to be low, the 98,000 MINDEF/SAF personnel were informed from 21 December 2019. Both incidents were confined to the systems of the vendors, and did not affect MINDEF's own systems or result in the loss of classified military information. MINDEF takes a serious view of these cases. We expect our vendors to protect all personal data that has been entrusted to them. Prior to these incidents, MINDEF had begun including personal data protection clauses in all new contracts involving personal data. We had also been working with vendors, including HMI Institute and ST Logistics, to progressively apply such clauses to existing contracts. We will further strengthen oversight of our vendors.”
“A number of our programmes are developed under the Workforce Skills Qualifications system, which ensures that the training SAF personnel receive are aligned to industry standards and, therefore, transferable. SAF also collaborates with local educational institutions on work-study programmes that enable our servicemen to translate their work experience into professional accreditation.”
“The structure for a career within the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) takes into account the need to maintain a credible defence force. Apart from leadership and management skills, SAF personnel must also be able to undertake physically demanding tasks when called upon. Based on these requirements, SAF officers and warrant officers retire around 50 years old while military experts can work till 60 years of age. To compensate SAF personnel for their shorter careers, remuneration packages are higher and pegged to equivalent civilian jobs with older retirement ages. Retired personnel can be re-employed in limited vocations that do not require the physical rigour, but this forms a small proportion of vocations within the SAF. Instead, SAF assists its retired personnel to continue with second careers. They receive support from certified career advisors in our own Career Transition Resource Centre with services, such as career coaching, networking events and job referrals. They are also provided funds and time-off under the Lifelong Employability and Advancement Programme (LEAP) to attend courses and seminars, go for job interviews, and embark on internships that can serve as a springboard into their sector of interest. These programmes have successfully assisted our personnel in their transitions as 80% secure jobs within six months of retiring from the SAF. Employer surveys show that the skills and certifications obtained by SAF personnel during their careers are well-recognised by private and public sector employers. Our personnel undergo structured training to prepare them for leadership and management roles. They are also equipped with valuable competencies in areas, such as human resource, finance, operations research and training pedagogy.”
“I attend the Beijing Xiangshan Forum regularly and, later this month, on their invitation, I will attend the 7th Military World Games Opening Ceremony and speak at the 9th Beijing Xiangshan Forum. Both China and Singapore have agreed in principle to step up defence cooperation and deepen defence ties further. To institutionalise and implement these efforts, both Ministries are actively working to conclude an enhanced Agreement on Defence Exchanges and Security Cooperation, which was first signed in 2008. Among the items considered are formalising high-level dialogues and greater cooperation between the various Services, and academic and think-tank exchanges. We also want to increase the scale of existing bilateral exercises. Looking ahead, 2020 marks the 30th anniversary of Singapore-China diplomatic relations. Both defence establishments are exploring ways to commemorate the anniversary, including through our flagship bilateral exercises – Exercise Maritime Cooperation and Exercise Cooperation – next year. These positive developments reflect the confidence and understanding of both countries towards each other, anchored on the shared goal of maintaining stability in our region through military cooperation. The Ministry of Defence and the SAF look forward to continue working with the Chinese defence establishment to build trust and cooperate in areas of mutual interest.”
“Singapore's defence ties with China are healthy and growing. The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) conducts regular exercises with the People's Liberation Army (PLA). The flagship bilateral Army Exercise Cooperation was successfully completed in Singapore this year, progressing to company-plus level exercises. The Army looks forward to Exercise Cooperation 2020 in China. When the Exercise Cooperation was held in Nanjing in 2014, I witnessed the good rapport and professionalism on both sides there. Our Navy also successfully co-organised the inaugural Association of Southeast Asian Nations-China Maritime Exercise with the PLA Navy in October last year. I visited the exercise troops in Zhanjiang and was happy to learn that they were using the Republic of Singapore Navy's platform – the Information Fusion Centre's Real-Time Information Sharing System – to provide a common situation picture for the conduct of the exercise. Engagements between the military commanders and defence officials are frequent and productive. The Chief of Defence Force conducted his introductory visit to China in September 2018 and met his counterpart, the PLA Chief of Joint Staff GEN Li Zuocheng. In November 2018, SAF's Chief of Air Force visited the Zhuhai Airshow and met Commander of the PLA Air Force GEN Ding Laihang. More recently in April 2019, the SAF's Chief of Navy attended the International Fleet Review in Qingdao in commemoration of the PLA Navy's 70th anniversary, hosted by the Commander of the PLA Navy ADM Shen Jinlong. China Minister of National Defense and State Councilor GEN Wei Fenghe conducted his introductory visit and attended the 18th Shangri-La Dialogue earlier this year, the first time since 2011 that China was represented by their Defence Minister.”
“The answer is yes. In fact, the industry has responded. For instance, certain class of drones that are by certain manufacturers have built-in software that you can key in, which incorporate coordinates of restricted zones so that the drones can never fly in. But they can be easily altered. So, you can require it and regulations will form part of our toolbox against such aspects. In the main, that will help reduce the noise. In other words, you put in those regulations and, by and large, the majority of distributors and hobbyists will comply with the rules, and that reduces the noise so that you can focus on the errant drone operators.”
“Mr Speaker, both questions are good ones and reflect the complexity of our mounting counter-responses to specific threats. So, let us take the first threat that Mr Christopher de Souza mentioned about – the sophisticated drones. There, as a whole, most militaries, including the SAF, are more confident. Because once you go beyond a certain size, whether it is manned or unmanned, your air defence systems are up. They are low flying, they try to avoid radar detection, you can have counter-offensive measures which deal with that using a different array of sensors, as well as responses. I would say the short answer is that, if the alleged components or platforms as in the Saudi attack were used, we are quite confident that we would have detected it as well as been able to neutralise it. It is the other spectrums that are more troublesome, sometimes. Hobbyist drones – how do you deal with them? It is inappropriate to use the systems that we use against large weaponised drones for them. Sometimes, it is ineffective. There, I would say that the industry is busily working because it is a global issue. Many airports can be affected as we saw in Gatwick and Changi; and our own scientists and SAF are also looking for appropriate measures that are sustainable and cost-effective. As well as against the intermediate set of spectrum that I talked about, in other words, larger sized drones, not quite as big as the ones that are used in the Saudi attack, but nonetheless can carry small arms, small ammunitions and grenades, and so on and so forth.”
“SAF is confident that these systems can protect Singapore against aerial threats from both manned and unmanned aircraft. Our air defence system is live, 24/7. I also mentioned drones in the middle part of that threat spectrum. What do we do against these? These threats are rapidly evolving and while they may not cause large-scale damage, they can cause bodily harm, undermine confidence and disrupt our society. Just imagine if grenades were dropped or suicide attacks with minor explosives were used. Against such threats, as we did in the National Day Parade or during the Trump-Kim Summit held in Singapore, SAF puts up additional sensors and counter-offensive capabilities when required during high signature events or when intelligence assessments indicate specific risks. SAF will continue to monitor threat developments and learn from all incidents that occur globally to provide appropriate responses to the spectrum of potential drone attacks that are commensurate with the level of the threat and are sustainable and cost-effective.”
“The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) and the Singapore Police Force (SPF) take the lead in defending against drones in specific areas of security concern and during major events. The SAF will assist them when called upon and when needed. Beyond these specific responsibilities by various agencies against drones in their geographic domains, SAF remains responsible for drone attacks against Singapore by would-be aggressors, especially towards key installations. For example, SAF recognises that terrorists can use drones as a form of attack. Within our region, an ISIS-linked individual had planned to use commercial drones to conduct bomb attacks in Malaysia. Singapore continues to be a target for regional terrorist groups, as demonstrated by the foiled terrorist attack on Marina Bay Sands in 2016. These incidents are sober reminders that the risks are not theoretical and we must remain vigilant. Let me go through specific enhancements that SAF has put in place over the past decade to buttress our air defences against drone attacks. First, early-warning systems. The Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) has enhanced its early warning capability with more capable sensors like the G550 Airborne Early Warning Aircraft and Multi-Mission Radars. The assets we have in place now would have been able to detect the alleged drones used in the attack on oil facilities in Saudi Arabia. After identification, these drones would be taken down by our Ground-Based Air Defence (GBAD) systems, which have now been upgraded with new platforms. The SPYDER system has replaced the older RAPIER system, and the ASTER-30 missile system will replace the I-HAWK system. Some Members, as National Service (NS)men and Ground-based Air Defence (GBAD) units, would have been familiar with the old systems.”
“In both incidents, planes were diverted and grounded which resulted in both real and opportunity costs amounting to millions to airport regulators, airlines and passengers. These simple off-the-shelf drones can be modified with some know-how to avoid detection by conventional means that most commercial airports employ. So, on one hand, very sophisticated, weaponised drones that can go up to 1,500 km; and the other extreme, toy drones that you can buy from the stores that create great impact. Between these two extremes are the class of drones that can carry simple munitions, such as grenades and small arms. For example, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) had been successful in modifying and weaponising small drones with explosives to attack ground forces and facilities. It is documented. In August 2018, drones carrying explosives were used in an attempted attack on the President of Venezuela. Taken as a whole, the security threats posed by drones are, therefore, real and the impact can be damaging, even devastating, depending on the platform used. Against this wide spectrum of threats, there can be no single counter-response. It would neither be proportionate nor sustainable to employ sophisticated assets worth hundreds of millions of dollars to take down hobbyist drones that can be bought for less than a thousand dollars. For these threats, other tools would be required, such as regulations, deterrent fines and penalties, education and working with relevant stakeholders, including the drone-hobbyist communities themselves. The Ministry of Transport (MOT) has been very busy doing that and we are passing some Bills to enhance penalties. For Changi Airport, MOT and the Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore (CAAS) deal with possible intrusions from drones.”
“Mr Speaker, to ensure that Singapore's air defences are robust to deal with drone attacks, we must draw important lessons from the recent drone attack on Saudi oil facilities and any such related incidents. Indeed, the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) monitors closely the development of these drone incidents, so that we can assess the adequacy of our defence systems and to plug gaps when identified. Over the past decade, SAF has enhanced our air defence systems against possible drone attacks. The recent Saudi attack reflects the growing and evolving capabilities of drones that are available to both state and non-state actors who mean to do us harm. Let me provide, first, the spectrum of drone capabilities that we need to protect ourselves against, before elaborating on specific defence responses. Let me start with the Saudi attack. While reports still need to be confirmed, that attack shows clearly that the range and manoeuvrability of drones have increased, depending on the reports you read, from 700 kilometres (km) to 1,500 km. These medium- and long-range drones are able to avoid radar detection and also hit their targets with great precision. Many Members would have seen the pictures after the attacks and how precise those attacks were. The Saudi attack was conducted by sophisticated weaponised drones and that represents one extreme of sophistication in terms of drone capabilities. If we take the other extreme where you have simple drones that can be bought in retail stores and that would intrude into restricted air space, but even though they are very simple devices, they can disrupt civilian or military air traffic because they pose safety hazards. The impact is not trivial, as the past incidents in Gatwick and Changi Airport showed.”
“As the Police investigations into the death of Corporal First Class Liu Kai have not been concluded, the Ministry of Defence is unable to provide a reply to the Member's specific queries.”
“The Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) initiated and promoted the Direct Reimbursement to Employers of Claims for NS Training (DIRECT) scheme, so that their National Service (NS) employees can continue to draw salaries while performing NS call-ups. MINDEF would subsequently reimburse these employers. Today, 45% of employers are on the DIRECT scheme, an increase of seven percentage points over the past three years. MINDEF will continue to improve this and other schemes to make it easier and faster for NSmen to receive their Make-Up Pay claims. In March this year, the Make-up Pay e-Service was integrated with the Singapore Corporate Access (CorpPass), which is a corporate digital identity for employers to transact securely with Government agencies online. Employers with CorpPass no longer need to have a third officer when submitting claims on the DIRECT scheme. We encourage employers to register with the DIRECT scheme using the NS Portal, which helps streamline their Make-up Pay processes for NSmen employees.”
“In planning for each NDP, the Executive Committee (Exco) strikes a balance between sustainability goals and the comfort and well-being of Singaporeans who participate and watch the event. The Exco works with the National Environment Agency (NEA) to promote more sustainable practices for each National Day Parade. Drinking water in reusable bottles was considered but not implemented as there were a lack of suppliers which can do so at an affordable cost. Instead, to reduce the use of single-use plastics, the Funpack will have a larger 750ml water bottle instead of the two bottles provided in previous NDPs. To support the Keep Singapore Clean Movement, a plastic bag is included in each Funpack to facilitate the bagging and hygienic disposal of waste. Volunteers will also be at collection points to encourage spectators to leave behind unused ponchos, LED wristbands or the Funpack itself, as well as for them to deposit recyclables such as the 750ml water bottle.”
“Under the Strategic Goods (Control) Act and Regulations, export of all weapons and ammunition from Singapore require an exit permit from the Singapore Customs. Exit permits will only be issued if such exports satisfy international obligations and commitments under the relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions and other agreements which Singapore has ratified. This includes preventing illicit trade in conventional arms, Weapons of Mass Destruction and related materials as well as prohibition of exports to named countries.”
“National Servicemen (NSmen) who have submitted their claims are paid their Make-Up Pay within 10 working days from the start of their Operationally Ready National Service activity. The primary reason for this timeline is to verify the NSmen's training attendance before payment is made, to ensure accountability in the use of public funds. In practice, NSmen are typically paid within five working days for Low Key In-Camp Trainings (ICTs) and seven working days for High Key ICTs. In some cases, a longer time may be needed to verify claim details with NSmen and their employers. We regularly review our systems and processes to make the process of claiming Make-Up Pay more efficient and convenient for our NSmen and their employers. Employers are encouraged to register with the Direct Reimbursement to Employers of Claims for NS Training scheme. Under this scheme, the employer will continue to pay the serviceman his usual pay and claim reimbursement from the Ministry of Defence.”
“Mr Speaker, again, I would not impute any new information. The COI did not give any mention that time pressure was in any way contributory to the injury or death.”
“Mr Speaker, we do not have any information why the AG did not exercise his authority to commence an inquiry into the death. He could have. Be mindful that we are training in some other country and we are subject to their jurisdiction and we have to respect their laws. Different laws apply differently to different countries. In Australia's situation, I am not sure that he had the discretion to not investigate. So, in this case, the AG decided that they would not and, therefore, we started the COI. That was not to mean that even if they did investigate, we will not have a COI. But it was now, in the Australian case, as the Member said, Gavin Chan's case, there were two sets of investigations – theirs and our COI.”
“That, indeed, is the thinking, and I thank the Member for that. It is equivalent to house-proofing when a new baby arrives. But the big difference is, remember that our equipment must function in war or in battle. If you build enough automatic stop systems, when we have to push the button and go, we have to push many buttons to start deactivating things that we have put into place. Can you do it for the training equipment? Yes. And you would remember that when we spoke about the Bionix incident, that, indeed, is what we have done. We have got buttons that somebody can stop. And we have only done it for training equipment. We know the cost of the SAF, not only in terms of resources and in money, but in persons. We take it seriously and we will design our systems to design away flaws as much as we can, always with the eye that it must not render us operationally incapable or put us at a disadvantage.”
“Mr Speaker, we take these incidents and, in fact, near misses very seriously because near misses are warning signals to us. No, there were no operational reasons why they did not comply with it. The reason given was that they wanted to get on with it. They could not wait for that few seconds, and for whatever reasons. Did they interview others to see the situation on the ground? This is what the SAF, the Army, the Artillery and the IGO asked themselves. Is this indicative of a systemic lapse? Is this prevalent? If you have an isolated incident here and there, you can fix it. And I think the sense is, and this is not widespread because this is a first such incident, when this happened, I asked how many accidents have there occurred before, major injuries. This is the first for 15 years of operation. And this is my surmising – this is nothing to do with the COI; the COI did not say this – I think NSmen or crew operators can understand when the gun is being fired and at great speeds, and if it hits you, serious injuries, so you better pay attention to the rules. But you underestimate, even at maintenance, that how can this happen? So, that just drives home the point that you have to observe safety rules that rigorously. We must not make safety rules so onerous that you cannot comply. But in this instance, it just meant a few seconds of waiting before the gun was lowered – and we measured it. I think it does not take more than 10 seconds for the gun to be lowered, to be parked, as the safety manual says, to begin your work.”
“And yet, here, you have an incident where you ignored the safety rules and something very tragic happens. So, you have to inculcate that, "Accidents do not take holidays". You have to be very careful about the rules. The rules there are written for a reason. It is tragic. If anyone of the three in the cabin, anyone of them, has followed the rules, this would not have happened. The COI has stated that clearly. It is a fact that all three ignored the safety rules.”
“Mr Speaker, those, indeed, are the questions that, as a system, and as commanders, we are dealing with. That is why we started the IGO. I spent a few years as Minister for Manpower. I set up the Workplace Safety Council during my tenure as Minister and visited a number of safety systems. This was following, if Members remember, the two incidents at Fusionpolis and Nicoll Highway. For these two incidents, we undertook a safety review, as Mr Vikram Nair has said, of the systems, we went to visit a number of other countries which have better safety records. Professionally, all the safety officers or those who have been involved with these, will tell you it boils down to culture. It is just not the articulation of rules. It is how you internalise every act to the point that you take that extra effort. You can tell people that you have to put on seat belts; you can tell people you should not use your handphone while you are driving. There is no rule that says that you should not look at your handphone while crossing the road. But you see people doing it. So, for us, we do not have that luxury to just tell people. We are an organisation; we are responsible for NSmen that are sent to us. And you have to do it in a systematic way to tighten, first of all, is it lack of knowledge or is it unclear rules or rules that are difficult to follow? If we find any of these, then you amend them. But ultimately, where we have reached is that you have to take care of yourself and your buddy; and you have to internalise this. And we found, in fact, a gap, that while we are paying a lot of attention to live firing exercises, one would think that, in maintenance, you do not have high risk.”
“Mr Speaker, I want to be careful for myself to keep to the COI's findings. I will neither impute or raise new items because we want to keep within the remit of the COI. And as I have said, separately, for prosecutorial purposes, the Military Court, the SIB and, if they decide to charge, the Military Court, will hear other findings and decide all these factors that Members of this House and others in the public might bring up. But there was no indication that communication, because of language, was an issue within the turret. It was quite clear to all three in the gun of the safety procedures. As I have said, the COI made explicit reference that they knew the safety rules, ex ante, before they went to do maintenance and while they were doing maintenance; and while the gun barrel was moved. All three were clear that no one should stand in the path of the gun barrel. And there was no indication that CFC(NS) Pang did not understand or took a longer time to understand that the gun barrel was moving into him and he was still in the path. There was no such indication.”
“They will decide if any servicemen are to be prosecuted in a military Court for offences related to CFC(NS) Pang's death. The military Court is presided over by former or serving State Court judges as Presidents of the General Court Martial (GCM). The GCM will have full access to the witnesses to independently make their own findings and conclusions on the culpability of the individuals who may be charged. The GCM need not take into account anything in my Statement in Parliament today. In the meantime, servicemen under investigation are reassigned to administrative duties and, if found to have been culpable, will be charged and punished accordingly. Mr Speaker, let me conclude now by expressing this House's deep condolences to the late CFC(NS) Aloysius Pang and his family. We know that it is a difficult time for them. CFC(NS) Pang was by all accounts a motivated and competent soldier. He was well-liked; he was trusted by his peers. He cared deeply for his fellow soldiers. The loss of a good soldier like CFC(NS) Pang is deeply grievous to us. There was an outpouring of grief from many Singaporeans as a result of his untimely and tragic demise. The SAF has updated CFC(NS) Pang's family on the COI's findings and the actions taken to deal with the lapses and prevent recurrences. MINDEF and the SAF will continue to do all we can to help his family through this difficult period.”
“(e) NSmen will be actively involved in safety reviews where they can give feedback on safety matters before, during and after each training activity, and this feedback will be incorporated into our TSR reviews. (f) Medical Officers will be required to undergo refresher training on heli-evacuation processes prior to their deployment for overseas medical support. New initiatives will also be explored to enhance their exposure to acute trauma care. We need a strong SAF that can defend Singapore. But it must and can be built up without compromising the safety and well-being of our NSmen. The SAF is committed to continue strengthening its safety systems at all levels, down to our soldiers, aircrew and sailors. I want to put on record our appreciation to the COI members who have put in much effort and time to thoroughly investigate this tragic incident. And, in that process, they interviewed more than 20 persons involved with the incident, and reviewed voluminous documents related to the event and manuals related to instructions and safety procedures. Mr Speaker, let me conclude by outlining the subsequent judicial processes to be taken. CFC(NS) Pang's death occurred in New Zealand, which therefore has state jurisdiction and not our Police or State Coroner. However, the New Zealand Attorney-General exercised his discretion not to undertake any inquiry for CFC(NS) Pang's case. Under our military law, it therefore falls on the SAF's Special Investigation Branch (SIB) with the jurisdiction to investigate CFC(NS) Pang's death. The SIB has nearly completed its investigations and will report directly to the Chief Military Prosecutor, who is a senior legal officer deployed to MINDEF by the Legal Service Commission headed by the Chief Justice.”
“When coupled with a healthy open reporting culture, we can prevent the next accident from happening as our units share with others lessons learnt from safety incidents and near misses. Another key element of a strong safety culture is team safety. Our commanders need to build a strong culture of team safety, where soldiers take responsibility for their own safety, look out for their buddies and keep one another safe during all training and mixed-crew activities. These behaviours must be ingrained into every soldier, sailor and airman so that safety rules are observed at all times. Following this incident, the SAF has also taken specific steps to strengthen personal ownership of safety and enhance safety for maintenance-related training or tasks. (a) Specifically, a Think-Check-Do drill will be implemented as a routine part of pre-maintenance task checks. As part of the drill, technicians will plan and brief all personnel of their expected roles and tasks. A dry run of team-based maintenance tasks will be conducted to ensure tight integration. The positions of E-stop buttons will be re-emphasised together with E-stop procedures and rehearsed as part of pre-ops drills. (b) Safe areas and hazardous areas will be further emphasised through bold markings on platforms as part of safety enhancements. (c) The SAF will entrench safety ownership at the team level so that it will become ingrained for soldiers to take care of themselves, their servicemen and their buddies. Safety advocates will be appointed in the units to emphasise safety and conduct checks. (d) All soldiers will be required to take a safety awareness test annually, which commanders and trainers now take.”
“The ERPSS agrees with the COI's findings on the incident, and supports the proposed recommendations raised by the COI to prevent a similar incident from occurring. The ERPSS also expressed concern about the safety lapses and weaknesses in safety culture that have been surfaced and made several recommendations that would help the SAF to build a stronger safety culture. First, it is important for commanders to exercise leadership in safety and impress upon their subordinates the need to properly implement safety policies and procedures, build a strong safety culture, and inculcate stronger safety ownership at both team and individual levels, especially among NSmen. Second, the SAF should do more to improve knowledge retention and safety awareness in its soldiers. Third, it is vital to accord the same high level of emphasis on maintenance safety, as is accorded to training safety today. Last, it is crucial to strengthen safety procedures for mixed-crew operations, which can be potentially risky if differences in practices across vocations are not properly addressed. Mr Speaker, the SAF accepts both the COI and ERPSS' recommendations to improve the safety culture. The SAF Inspector-General's Office (IGO) set up in end February this year after this incident will ensure that the recommendations are followed through. Specifically, the IGO has identified the need for the SAF to improve in three key areas: command emphasis on safety, safety as a mission outcome and team safety culture. The SAF has to ensure that there is internalisation of safety as a mission outcome across all levels of command. All commanders must adopt a zero-accident mindset and set it in the heart of their unit safety culture.”
“A reference guideline should be drawn up with details on the protocol for the management of the remains of the demised serviceman on overseas exercises." I have concluded presenting the COI's findings and now turn to the External Review Panel on SAF Safety's (ERPSS') written report on the COI's findings. Mr Speaker, I ask your permission to distribute that.”
“A safety checklist briefing before the start of any maintenance works could be introduced, with emphasis on the number of maintenance crew needed to work inside the gun. There should be continued education on compliance with the TSR and this should be incorporated into the quarterly Army Safety Seminars. There could also be a safety officer appointed during peacetime live firing exercises to oversee safety and further develop the Safety Management Plan with regard to maintenance work and the maintenance crew's interaction with the gun crew. (e) Enhance training of Medical Officers for aero-medical evacuation and pre-hospital care. Given the extended distances to definitive care – one of the principal considerations in the Medical Support Plan – the use of helicopters for casualty evacuation to a higher echelon care is a given. A familiarisation of the RSAF heli-evacuation protocols should be considered for both NSF and NSmen Medical Officers posted to this specific area of training. NSmen Medical Officers could also re-familiarise themselves with acute trauma care by being given temporary registration as observers either in the emergency and surgery departments during call-ups. (f) Improve protocols for communications within hospitals caring for injured Servicemen overseas. It may be useful to formalise arrangements between the SAF and receiving hospitals at the appropriate level in the hospital administration so that our Singaporean doctors attached to care for the injured servicemen overseas can be kept abreast of clinical developments and can contribute more effectively. (g) Lastly, formalise protocols for overseas hospitals following death of SAF personnel.”
“"(a) Enhance safety culture by ensuring that all Servicemen of the SAF and especially National Servicemen (NSmen) take personal ownership of safety. The Army safety culture should be enhanced and special emphasis should also be placed on the safety culture of the NSmen who must be equally cognisant of all safety regulations and procedures. The SAF could involve NS commanders in the review of the Training Safety Regulations (TSRs) as this will instil greater ownership by NSmen in terms of safety. A more comprehensive risk assessment for high-risk activities should be conducted, and all near misses must be reported and archived. (b) Review Standard Operating Procedures/Emergency drills. The SAF should review all SOPs and drills to ensure that there are proper procedures in mixed-crew operations. SOP for maintenance work involving gun crew and maintenance crew should be established, including hand-over procedures. Emergency drills or SOPs should be developed to educate operators on the application of E-Stop buttons during gun barrel movements. (c) Ensure compliance to TSRs, SOPs and Operator Manuals. All systems should be operated in the manner required by their design and a new risk assessment should be conducted if any part of the system is to be used differently. There is also a need to ensure that SOPs relating to the operations of the gun are complied with and operations should be halted whenever the SOPs are not complied with. Similarly, there must be strict enforcement that the equipment conditions as mandated in the maintenance manual is adhered to before the commencement of maintenance work. (d) Enhance existing training/safety support, especially for maintenance-related work.”
“When CFC(NS) Pang replied that the gun barrel would not hit him and did not move away from where he was, the ME-Tech could have ensured that CFC(NS) Pang moved away to a safe position or pressed the E-stop button. The GC shouted, "Standby, clear away" before he commenced lowering the gun barrel. At the same time, he saw that CFC(NS) Pang was not standing in a designated safe position. Instead of ensuring that CFC(NS) Pang was in a safe position before lowering the gun barrel, he thought that there was sufficient time for CFC(NS) Pang to move away as the gun barrel was lowered. If the GC had ensured that CFC(NS) Pang was in a safe position before activating the gun barrel to standby position, the incident would not have happened. From the accounts of CFC(NS) Pang's peers to the COI, CFC(NS) Pang had a positive work attitude and was very helpful to others when it came to work. He was also professional when executing his tasks. CFC(NS) Pang started his Full-time National Service in October 2008. He had attended several courses and training during his Full-Time National Service, graduating with an overall "A" grade from the Armament Basic Technician Training (Turret). He had also attended the Maintenance Vocational Training on his sixth ICT in February 2018 in preparation for Exercise Thunder Warrior. He was also professional when executing his tasks and was seen by his superiors as someone who would not cut safety corners when working." Nevertheless, the COI found that the incident was due to lapses of all the servicemen who were in the gun at the time of the incident. The COI proposed the following recommendations aimed at preventing similar incidents in the future and enhancing the safety system, which I report in full.”
“The COI also commented on factors related to but non-contributory to the incident or outcome. Before Exercise Thunder Warrior, the SSPH guns were certified Fit for Firing (FFF) in Singapore by the technicians. The guns were certified FFF again in New Zealand before the live firing exercise. It has been established that there was no mechanical fault with the gun that had directly caused the accident. The incident in this case was not due to the serviceability of the SSPH. On the post-incident medical care, the COI is of the opinion that in view of the extenuating circumstances caused by the distance and the availability of the helicopter, the medical care provided was adequate but can be improved. However, the COI is also of the opinion that this did not cause or contribute to the demise of CFC(NS) Pang. Members of this House, I have presented the COI's findings. It is sad but undeniable that the direct causes determined by the COI that resulted in the death of CFC(NS) Pang were preventable had there been compliance to safety rules. It was not for lack of knowledge of these rules or inexperience of personnel working on the SSPH gun. The COI determined that prior to the incident, all the three personnel in the gun – CFC(NS) Pang, the GC and the ME-Tech – had received adequate training to be aware that whenever the gun barrel is moved, they must be in a safe position. It was clear to the ME-Tech that CFC(NS) Pang was not in a safe position. Notwithstanding this, the ME-Tech merely told CFC(NS) Pang to move closer to him or move away, instead of stopping the gun movement.”
“There was a lack of clarity on who should be in the gun, the command and control and whether there was a need for acknowledgement before the gun barrel is moved. It is the COI's opinion that the gun commander should take command and control to supervise and execute all preventive maintenance and corrective maintenance tasks, as well as ensure safety in the gun, as stated in the SSPH Operator's Manual. However, this does not absolve the person activating the gun barrel movement of his responsibility to ensure that everyone is in a safe position before moving the gun barrel. (b) Commencing maintenance work before the gun barrel was in a locked position. The ME-Tech had commenced removing the mountings on the AHS box even before the gun barrel was in a locked position to get on with the job quickly. (c) Misjudgement of time and space by personnel in the SSPH. Both the ME-Tech and the GC had miscalculated the time it took for the flick rammer to hit CFC(NS) Pang. (d) Emergency Stop buttons were not activated to stop the movement of the gun barrel. In their state of panic when the flick rammer hit CFC(NS) Pang, both the ME-Tech and the GC acted irrationally instead of activating the E-stop buttons." The COI found "no evidence indicating that CFC(NS) Pang’s death involved foul play or was caused by any deliberate acts. However, the COI found that the incident was due to the lapses of all the servicemen who were in the gun at the time of the incident – the GC, the ME-Tech and CFC(NS) Pang". Let me repeat this because this is the final conclusion of the COI. The COI found that the incident was due to the lapses of all the servicemen who were in the gun at the time of the incident – the GC, the ME-Tech and CFC(NS) Pang.”
“Although the GC had shouted, "Standby, clear away" and the ME-Tech had told CFC(NS) Pang to move closer to him or to move away from the path of the gun barrel, both the GC and the ME-Tech did not ensure that CFC(NS) Pang was at a safe position before the gun barrel was lowered. The GC also did not adhere strictly to the SOP for lowering the gun barrel. Although the GC had shouted, "Standby, clear away" before lowering the gun barrel, he should have waited for CFC(NS) Pang to be in a safe position before moving the gun barrel to the standby position but this was not adhered to. This requirement is provided in the SSPH Operator's Manual, "that no person should be in the travel path of the barrel or the rammer tray". The GC and the ME-Tech also did not activate the E-stop buttons when the barrel was being lowered. (b) Non-compliance with the Maintenance Manual for the SSPH Technicians. It is clearly stated in the Maintenance Manual for SSPH Technicians to ensure that before they embark on the maintenance work to replace the interface card in the AHS in this case, that the gun must be in a parked position with the gun barrel locked. On the day of the incident, the ME-Tech did not ensure that the gun barrel was in a locked position before replacing the interface card. Instead, the ME-Tech had started to dismantle the mountings on the gun even though the gun barrel was not in a standby or locked position." The COI opined that a combination of the following factors contributed to the cause of the incident: "(a) Lack of coordinated safety control procedure between the gun crew and the maintenance crew during maintenance work on the SSPH.”
“These were the detailed events as determined by the COI that led to the serious injuries and untimely death of CFC Pang. The COI opined that "the precipitating cause of the incident was due to the lowering of the gun barrel without ensuring that everyone was in their safe positions: (a) CFC(NS) Pang was standing in the path of the moving barrel and not in a safe position prior to the gun barrel being moved. (b) CFC(NS) Pang did not move to a safe position, despite receiving warning that the gun barrel was going to be moved to a standby position. (c) The ME-Tech did not ensure that CFC(NS) Pang moved to a safe position, despite knowing that the gun barrel would be moved. (d) The GC proceeded to move the gun barrel, despite noticing that CFC(NS) Pang was not in a safe position. (e) Both the GC and the ME-Tech failed to press the E-stop buttons to halt the movement of the gun barrel." The COI determined that there was non-compliance with the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and safety breaches. "These breaches have contributed to the cause of the incident and are preventable. (a) Non-enforcement of the Safe Positions in the SSPH. The Gun Detachment Commander, ME-Tech and CFC(NS) Pang did not follow the strict requirement that everyone must be in the safe positions during the movement of the gun barrel. Safe Positions 1, 2 and 3 in Members' handout. The ME-Tech was standing slightly away from the Ammo Loader's position, which is Safe Position 3, and CFC(NS) Pang was standing in the path of the gun barrel.”