Sir Bernard Jenkin
MP for Harwich and North Essex · Conservative · United Kingdom
“Despite long and historic disagreements between successive UK Governments and Israel, it has remained a steadfast ally in counter-terrorist efforts to keep our people safe in this country. We are now embarked, it seems, on a full diplomatic dispute with Israel and tit-for-tat expulsions of diplomats.”
“I would very much have liked to have discussed the medical devices questions arising from the Bill. The Minister made an incredibly short speech about that important matter. It is quite clear that these provisions are part of the covert dynamic alignment with the EU and the covert rejoin agenda being pursued by the Government.”
“I am as keen as anybody to get on with discussing the Health Bill, but this topic is too serious an opportunity to miss, given that the hon. Member for Leeds Central and Headingley (Alex Sobel) has raised such important issues. I really commend his speech and his initiative. Everybody should read it.”
“The Minister shakes her head, but she is yet to give a good reason as to why this measure is in the Bill. When we had an Adjournment debate in July with the then Minister for patient safety, the hon.”
“The chief executive of the CQC is wantonly conflicted in terms of looking after the safe space, so he cannot be the one left in charge of that function. The real point here is that we are missing the opportunity to save so much money. Governments keep having public inquiries.”
“I asked the Minister, in a letter I sent her after the debate in July, to give us the information on how much the transfer of all this would cost. Nothing has arrived. I never had a reply to the letter. Of course, the Government have changed the Minister and the new Minister for patient safety, the right hon.”
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“By that stage, the Government were in a Catch-22 situation. If they denied Carillion access to any public contracts, it would have been a further signal to the market that this company was going down and it would have put at risk all the other public sector contracts it held. Also, in that case, the risk was shared by two partner companies, which signed in blood that they would take over any risk of each or any of the companies going bust. The Government have not suffered any loss as a result of that contract.”
“I totally agree with the concept that these contracts become too big to fail, and therefore, as I will explain, it becomes an illusion that the Government have transferred risk to these companies. These companies are a private sector extension of the public sector, and the public sector still carries the risk.”
“Public service procurement cannot be done in the dark, cannot be done without evidence and cannot be done without the Government knowing what they are trying to outsource. It cannot be done on the cheap, and the public must be able to see that. In conclusion, unless the right steps are taken and the right lessons are learned, a company very similar to Carillion, holding contracts of enormous public worth, could collapse again and all this will happen again. The public want companies that deliver public services better to reflect public-service values. Such companies are part of the public service, and if they do not demonstrate those values, they should not get the money.”
“It was to ensure that there was public trust in outsourcing, and in the Government’s capacity to do so, that Carillion was awarded contracts after it published a profit warning and after it had made other worrying sounds to the Government. That a company in the process of going bust should be awarded yet more contracts, giving it access to yet more taxpayer money, does raises the questions brought up by the hon. Member for Inverclyde (Ronnie Cowan) earlier. PACAC calls for the Government to re-examine how they assess contractors’ viability. Shareholders are prepared to take a far higher risk than the risk the Government should be prepared to take with public services and public money. The Government should publish their rationale for their decisions.”
“PACAC remains concerned that the Government are still taking a much too transactional approach to contracting and the management of contracts. It is vital not only that staff with commercial skills work alongside those within Government with other skills such as costing, IT and project management, but that those in the Government who manage the contract feel that those in the private sector are partners and collaborators. There should be trust and co-operation; it should not be an adversarial competition. When the Government make the decision to outsource a service, and when they accept bids from companies seeking to win the contracts for those services, it is crucial that the process of doing so is evidence-based and transparent.”
“It subsequently became apparent that, under the rather arcane public accounting rules, if such a change is made, the whole of the debt becomes public sector debt and is shown in the public sector borrowing requirement, so the Government said, “Oh, well, we’ll split it 70:30”. Therefore the Government now collect only 30% of the proceeds from refinancing a PFI contract. That is daft. It is the Government giving away public money just to satisfy silly public accounting rules. It should stop. There are also issues concerning churn among civil service staff that make the management of public contracts difficult. Reports have highlighted the “insufficient continuity of staff” over the lifetime of a contract. On this front, the situation has been improving, but there is a great deal to do.”
“That motive can also be seen in the refinancing provisions for PFI, which allow the balance sheet to look better at the expense of the public finances. It gets even worse than that. With private finance 2, it was decided that the proceeds of refinancing PFIs should be split between the contractors and the Government. After a school has been built and it is in the process of being managed, a lot of the risk has been carried, so the scheme can be refinanced at a lower rate of interest. It was decided that the benefits of that lower interest rate should be split 50:50 between the Government and the private sector. That was not the case with the original PFI scheme.”
“All this data should be published, as public confidence will not be strengthened without far more openness and transparency about how public contracts are let and managed. Nowhere is that more apparent than with private finance initiatives. The ostensible purpose of PFIs was to take advantage of the expertise of the private sector in providing privately-financed infrastructure projects and buildings. However, despite having more than 20 years to research and form an evidence base, the Government were unable to justify their claims about the efficacy of PFI. In fact, in their testimony to PACAC, the Government claimed that PFI brought “discipline and rigour” to projects. But, while giving evidence, the chief executive of the civil service revealed that the real purpose is to make the public balance sheet look better.”
“There is also a lack of a central database for outsourcing contracts, meaning that systematic analysis of outsourcing throughout the whole of Government is difficult at best, if not impossible. Nowhere is there an understanding of how much public service risk is being carried by each company, across all of its contracts and across all Departments. Without that kind of understanding, the Government are unable to prove the basic premise behind all forms of Government outsourcing: that the private sector is capable of providing a better service for better value. The basis for the claims made by the Minister who wrote the article in The Times earlier this week is data that is now some 20 years out of date.”
“We received evidence from the Cabinet Office that just since 2016 the Government have renegotiated at least £120 million-worth of contracts in that way, including the Ministry of Justice’s flagship “Transforming Rehabilitation” scheme. The cost to the Government of the work necessary for the renegotiation itself is yet unknown. PACAC found that the Government do not have a strong evidence base about when and whether to use the private sector, or whether such use will be more successful than using the public sector. This is what we call the decision to make or buy. The Treasury Green Book sets out a process that should be gone through when deciding whether to make or buy a service—whether to do it in house or put it out to contract—but we found no evidence that that was well understood or indeed followed.”
“” Representatives from the National Council for Voluntary Organisations said that, on average, “large charities lose 11% on each contract they have with the government.” There is something rather unpleasant about Government milking charities to subsidise public services, but that is, in effect, what is happening. Instead of recognising that the focus on cost damages the ability of companies to meet the terms of their contracts and discourages innovation, the Government have taken a different approach. In some instances, they forgo performance penalties available to them, in essence declining to enforce the parts of the outsourcing contract that are designed to maintain the high standards of the service being provided, at the agreed price. In others, the Government have renegotiated the terms of some contracts.”
“simply because the customer is desperate for the saving.” Such bidders would then seek to renegotiate the price afterwards. There are examples of all this going badly wrong. The Government, who are frequently the dominant purchaser in these markets, have great power to dictate prices to contractors. Professor Gary Sturgess, of the Australia and New Zealand School of Government—and why did we abolish our National School of Government and so have no equivalent institution?—told PACAC that companies were “stupid to have gone ahead and entered into contracts... but this is a Government supply chain.”
“We received evidence from organisations and businesses in the sector that the Government have been “driven by price exclusively”, leading to a reduction in fees paid by up to 25% to 30%. Some people put it more bluntly. Rupert Soames, the chief executive officer of Serco, told us that “in the four and half years that I have been running Serco I know one occasion” when Serco had won a contract despite not being the lowest bidder. A survey conducted by the CBI revealed that 98% of businesses responding said that something other than “service quality” was the main reason why Government contracts are awarded. There are obvious problems with an undue reliance on price in the contracting process; industry leaders were concerned that “fudges” would “allow technically poor but cheap bidders to continue...”
“That is in part driven by the decision to use contractual models such as payment by results that involve risk transfer on a huge scale. If the Government cannot assess the services they are trying to outsource, they simply cannot make an accurate calculation of a fair cost for the outsourcers, yet they tend to pretend to do so. In those circumstances, passing the risk on to contractors is unacceptable and, as we have seen, proves counterproductive, particularly if the Government are unable or unwilling to make a serious assessment of what is at risk when a company delivers public services. PACAC found that the relentless drive to bring down costs has been among the most damaging factors.”
“I agree, but unfortunately I think that the Government have fed that addiction. The pressures of austerity and the hunt for savings have encouraged the Government to try to get prices down and to be blind to the risks they are transferring to the private sector, resulting in the sickness of the sector. As I will explain, there is a misappreciation of the risks that private shareholders are prepared to bear, compared with the risks that we should be taking with public services and public money. As I have said, the Government sometimes write into contracts that companies must accept the risk that the Government have got their own data wrong. An analysis disclosed by Serco found that this practice had taken place in 12 of the company’s recent procurements.”
“May I say to my right hon. Friend how much we are looking forward to the publication of the White Paper on Thursday? Will she undertake to publish the White Paper that was set aside—the White Paper that was months in drafting by DExEU under the leadership of my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) ?”
“Madam Deputy Speaker, do you suppose that the Scottish National party would be calling so many Divisions this evening if it was Scotland that was playing an important football match?”
“Perhaps the Committee on Standards in Public Life will conclude, in the same way as the Government, that there is no need for any significant change, but I think the matter deserves scrutiny. One detects a kind of squeamishness in Whitehall among Ministers and senior officials, whom this question directly affects because they will soon, in their careers, be leaving public office and moving to the private sector. One detects that there is a reluctance to confront this issue, perhaps for the worst of reasons, which rather undermines public confidence in the system as it exists today. I am afraid it is an ineffective and poorly trusted regulator, which is probably worse than no regulator at all.”
“Governments have failed to address our concerns and public trust in the system has continued to decline. To restore public trust, it is crucial to stamp out not only impropriety by senior Ministers and officials, but the appearance of impropriety. ACoBA, although well intentioned, lacks the resources and structures to achieve that. I hope the Government will pay attention to this. I do understand that this is a very difficult matter to address. The Committee on Standards in Public Life, I believe, should be having a look at this. As the Government consider the appointment of the Chair of the Committee on Standards in Public Life—I may have a role in that —I hope that it will be made clear to the new Chair that this is an issue that should be looked at.”
“I am very disappointed that in their response the Government rejected all but some minor procedural recommendations and even denied the seriousness of the problems we are confronting in the House of Commons today. We agreed with ACoBA when it said there should be a single collated list of decisions taken by Departments and agencies so that at least the self-regulated departmental aspect might be more exposed to public view. The Government rejected even this minor suggestion. PACAC—and before it the Public Administration Select Committee—has returned to the subject of ACoBA and will keep returning to it, because the system remains ineffective and fails to command public confidence. The problems it is supposed to address have only escalated over this period.”
“This might have been for perfectly understandable reasons. Our report made a number of recommendations that would improve the confidence ACoBA commands but crucially without recourse to a statutory system. These related to the availability of data for those below the threshold for ACoBA review, the transparency of the lobbying process and the need for ACoBA to be adequately resourced. Crucially, underpinning all this, we concluded that there needed to be a clear statement of values and a clear setting out of principles to be talked about, taught and discussed, to inform and guide behaviour and to make it clear when behaviour falls below those standards.”
“Significantly, as Chancellor, he had introduced the Taxation of Pensions Act 2014, which materially benefited BlackRock. Our report made no comment on Mr Osborne’s conduct, except to document that he had taken up the appointment, but it raises questions about how effective the system of regulation is, because it does not inspire public confidence. He complied with the business appointment rules for former Ministers, and ACoBA considered his case, but because the current process commands so little confidence, its decision to approve the appointment has been questioned, and it has done little to enhance his reputation to have ACoBA as a protection. Among Mr Osborne’s other post-ministerial appointments is his editorship of the Evening Standard , a position he accepted without waiting for ACoBA to reach a decision at all.”
“Freedom of information requests in 2012 found that more than 3,500 former senior military officers and Ministry of Defence officials had been approved for arms company jobs since 1996. There might be nothing intrinsically wrong with those appointments, but the failure to have any sanction over them results in a lack of public confidence. In the absence of a robust system of regulation, high-profile cases, such as that of the former Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, threaten public confidence in the integrity of government. I make no comment about Mr Osborne, but after leaving government he accepted a post with the BlackRock Investment Institute, part of the investment management company the BlackRock Investment Group. As Chancellor, he had had contact with BlackRock and its competitors in the field.”
“Evidence shows that ACoBA is simply not being taken seriously. Frequently, applicants have taken up their role before ACoBA has considered their case and made any recommendations, and sometimes these recommendations are simply ignored. We were told that too many former Ministers and officials viewed ACoBA as a rubber stamp before pursuing a lucrative corporate career that might be perceived to conflict with their previous public responsibilities. Departments take responsibility for those below ACoBA’s threshold, but we were told that monitoring was inconsistent and some agencies failed to publish the required data completely. There is evidence that this can result in too close a relationship between certain Departments and the companies working in related industries.”
“It makes a recommendation only when an appointment has been accepted, and does not make ex ante stipulations about the types of employment an individual may or may not engage in. It therefore relies on individuals coming to it for advice or with an application. It has very little capacity to investigate those who do not do so or to monitor non-compliance. We were told that ACoBA found that LinkedIn was a more comprehensive source of the employment histories of former officials than the disclosures of those officials themselves. With resources failing to keep pace with ACoBA’s increased caseload, this embarrassing state of affairs is unlikely to change, meaning that a body intended to improve public trust in government will have to continue to trawl social media for vital information.”
“However, civil servants in lower grades can still have significant influence in areas where potential conflicts of interest could arise, such as policy development or procurement decisions. Some may have had senior responsible owner roles, where they have taken responsibility for the management of substantial projects with sizeable budgets, and the private sector finds such experience very valuable. With the increasing interchange between Whitehall Departments and the private sector, this problem is growing. Putting the problems of scope and propriety to one side, ACoBA simply lacks the powers to allow it to do its job effectively. As the advisory part of its name suggests, ACoBA cannot prevent an individual taking up an appointment, and it has no power to sanction anyone who ignores its recommendations.”
“Furthermore, independent members also hold senior posts in the sorts of companies in which those applying to ACoBA may well be seeking to gain employment. There are notable examples of when these independent members have failed to recuse themselves, despite what would appear to be obvious conflicts of interest when considering cases. Moreover, for lower grades of civil servant—their applications are managed not by ACoBA, but by their own Departments or agencies—what is known as the revolving door is essentially self-regulating. It is not impossible that civil servants, knowing any precedent they set by judging on a particular case might have an impact on their later careers, could unintentionally or otherwise approve appointments that perhaps deserved more scrutiny.”
“A number of these problems are institutional, deriving from ACoBA’s structure and the practical realities of how it must function. I wish to make it absolutely clear in this debate that I am not making any personal criticism of the chair or any members of ACoBA. The committee comprises both political appointments and independent members. However, despite Baroness Browning, its chair, telling PACAC that she wanted “every bus driver and hairdresser…to apply” to be an independent member of ACoBA, its composition remains dominated by the great and the good. This is unsurprising given that the criteria for the role include senior level experience in the civil service, the military or business, which is hardly something possessed by most bus drivers or hairdressers.”
“There was also a change to retrospective applications, which are no longer accepted. Having to make a decision after a contract had been signed and an appointment taken up was seen as a possible constraint on ACoBA’s scope to advise, because how could it advise on something that had already happened? The updated rules also allowed Departments to continue to pay former officials and special advisers who are required to observe a quarantine period before taking up their new roles. ACoBA has stated that whether or not this pay is available, it will not affect its decision. PACAC, which I chair, has concluded that ACoBA is a “toothless regulator”. There are serious problems with the system as it currently operates.”
“The ministerial code requires former Ministers, for two years after leaving office, to consult ACoBA about any employment or consultancy they are looking to take up. ACoBA may recommend that an individual wait for up to two years before taking up a specific appointment, or that they do not undertake types of work falling into specific categories up to the two-year limit. However, the business rules themselves are largely procedural: they do not make explicit when or how former Ministers or officials can or cannot legitimately make use of their prior experience. In 2014, the rules were updated so that only officials at director general, or equivalent, and above now need to apply to ACoBA. Senior grades below that level are now managed by individual Departments and agencies.”
“The business appointment rules exist to prevent the conflicts of interest that can arise when former Ministers, special advisers or officials—especially those with high-level Government experience—are looking to take up appointments in the private sector. I am afraid that there are rightly public concerns when senior officials move directly into sectors over which they had until recently had control and influence, including suspicions that the decisions they took may have been influenced by the hope or expectation of future employment or that a future employer could use official information that they had access to. The Advisory Committee on Business Appointments—or ACoBA, as it is known for short—is appointed by the Government to advise on the implementation of these rules.”
“PACAC has defined its overriding purpose, to quote from our website: “to conduct robust and effective scrutiny in order to help create conditions where the public can have justified confidence in public services/government.” In that context, just before the election, PACAC published a new report on ACoBA, entitled “Managing Ministers’ and officials’ conflicts of interest: time for clearer values, principles and action”. In this House we do not work for ourselves. Our system of government relies on the principle that we who are intertwined with power act only when it is in the public and national interest. The vast majority of public servants do their best, and I certainly understand that.”
“It is the role of the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee to oversee the UK’s changing constitution and the efficiency of the civil service and the machinery of government. Within that, PACAC covers matters of ethics and propriety in Whitehall, overseeing the work of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, the ministerial code, the special advisers code, the civil service code and the work of the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments, which oversees the rules governing departing Ministers and Crown servants when they take up outside appointments.”
“I beg to move, That this House has considered the Thirteenth Report of the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, HC 252, Managing Ministers’ and officials’ conflicts of interest: time for clearer values, principles and action, on the role and effectiveness of the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments (ACoBA); notes that ACoBA regulates applications for business appointments by former Ministers and civil servants who have recently left the public sector; believes that ACoBA is an ineffectual regulator which fails to inspire public confidence or respect; expresses concern that the Committee’s inquiry revealed numerous gaps in ACoBA’s monitoring process with insufficient attention paid to the principles that should govern business appointments; agrees that failures of consecutive governments to address ACoBA’s deficiencies have damaged public trust in politics and public institutions and led to repeated scandals; calls on the Government to bring forward major reform by introducing a principles-based system to ensure that individuals act with integrity and behave according to those principles; and further calls on the Government to fund independent checks by ACoBA across all Government departments and executive agencies to reinforce those principles.”
“I am most grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his tribute, but may I echo the comments of the hon. Member for Inverclyde (Ronnie Cowan)? We really do owe much of our work to the persistence of our absent friend, the hon. Member for Newport West (Paul Flynn), who has always contributed and motivated the Committee on this matter.”
“My hon. Friend knows that the PASC report of 2012 recommended a statutory scheme. In this later report, having listened to the Government’s objections about the cost-effectiveness of a statutory scheme, we invited the Government to produce a cost-benefit analysis, which indeed even the chair of ACoBA said would be a good idea. However, the Government have declined to produce even a cost-benefit analysis of having statutory rules, or enforceable rules of some kind. Will she revisit that recommendation and look at the question of a cost-benefit analysis? We are constantly told that rules would have a very negative effect on the public sector, but there is no evidence to support what she is claiming—although I understand that there is a perfectly legitimate concern.”
“My hon. Friend is being very patient, but unfortunately for her she has a lot of time. If she is going to refuse a cost-benefit analysis, will she at least accept this? ACoBA seems to be very preoccupied by what candidates might do after they have left the public sector in the context of their employers, and it often puts a lobbying ban on the person moving into the private sector. What regard should ACoBA have for the fact that the lobbying has already probably taken place and the granting of employment is just the implicit reward for having been lobbied when the candidate was working in the public sector? No regard seems to be paid to that potential conflict of interest in the way the ACoBA rules are applied.”
“Resolved, That this House has considered the Thirteenth Report of the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, HC 252, Managing Ministers’ and officials’ conflicts of interest: time for clearer values, principles and action, on the role and effectiveness of the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments (ACoBA); notes that ACoBA regulates applications for business appointments by former Ministers and civil servants who have recently left the public sector; believes that ACoBA is an ineffectual regulator which fails to inspire public confidence or respect; expresses concern that the Committee’s inquiry revealed numerous gaps in ACoBA’s monitoring process with insufficient attention paid to the principles that should govern business appointments; agrees that failures of consecutive governments to address ACoBA’s deficiencies have damaged public trust in politics and public institutions and led to repeated scandals; calls on the Government to bring forward major reform by introducing a principles-based system to ensure that individuals act with integrity and behave according to those principles; and further calls on the Government to fund independent checks by ACoBA across all Government departments and executive agencies to reinforce those principles.”
“I invite the Minister to reconsider that particular recommendation. I appreciate the opportunity to raise these matters this afternoon. They will not go away, I am afraid—they will be back, unless the Government take action. Question put and agreed to.”
“You must not: take up any post outside the public service in business or [commercial] organisations operating in areas where you have been directly responsible in the previous [currently] two years for any form of contracting, procurement or regulation.” We believe that that would provide a framework for people to think about what they are doing in the public service and at least some basis for discussion about how we expect people to behave. Sadly, leaving a Government Department, whether as a Minister, official or member of the armed forces, and, in time, finding oneself in related work in the private sector, has become something of a way of life. It is the new normal. Unless we can find a way of providing reassurance about such behaviour, we will finish up with a statutory system in the end.”
“Our recommendation is quite simple, and it is that these words should be included: “You must: take decisions in the public interest alone; never allow yourself to be influenced in contracting, procurement, regulation or the provision of policy advice, by your career expectations or prospects if you leave the public service; always report to your line managers any offers of jobs or other rewards, or any informal suggestions of such rewards, that may have, or be reasonably seen to have a bearing on your role as a public servant; take particular care in your relations with former colleagues who may seek to influence your decisions as a public servant.”
“The advisory committee could tell someone that they could not possibly take a certain job because of what might happen, but nothing would ever appear in the public domain to indicate that that person had no moral compass of their own. Let them go and take advice from a lawyer about how the rules would be applied, but once they have applied to ACoBA, let it be transparent that they have applied. Let us find out what sort of person they are and whether they are applying for a job in a way that should not be allowed. My second point is more about principles. In paragraph 105 of our report, we recommend a change to the civil service code, which should also be made to the ministerial code.”
“I am grateful for the attention that my hon. Friend has given this matter. I know that it is a matter over which to agonise, because it contains a lot of dilemmas. She has put forward extremely powerfully all the countervailing points about how to attract people into the public service and how not to punish them in the afterlife for giving up the salary and perks of the private sector to work in the public service, and so on. The Minister has also talked a lot about processes and transparency, and I suggest that there is one process that would really open this up. That process would involve applications being published at the outset. I know that this is an advisory committee and that people go there for advice, but it really is ridiculous that they can go there on a fishing expedition.”
“Does not every instance of people being scared to speak out and relatives finding it too difficult to complain underline the importance of the Healthcare Safety Investigation Branch, which the Secretary of State has established? I remind him that I am chairing the Joint Committee of both Houses that is carrying out prelegislative scrutiny of the draft Health Service Safety Investigations Bill. When we report on 24 July, will my right hon. Friend undertake to bring that into law as quickly as possible? That will afford the safe space that people need to report such matters without fear or favour.”
“I am most grateful to my hon. Friend for raising that part of the A120—from Horsley Cross to Parkeston— which is vital for the economy of north Essex and is crumbling, as he says. However, I believe the Government should be able to say something this afternoon about the Highways Agency activity on that bit of the road and the resources that will be committed to it in the short term, if not the long term.”
“I am extremely grateful to the hon. Lady. Will she just give an assurance that the Labour party supports the dualling of the A120 all the way from Colchester to Parkeston, which is a stretch of road that is long overdue for dualling?”
“Thank you, Mr Speaker. May I join my right hon. Friend in remembering the anniversary of the Grenfell fire and commend her for the way she has established the inquiry looking into that tragedy. May I testify to her, having met victims of the Grenfell fire, as she has, that they are showing growing confidence that the findings of that inquiry will be what they want, to make sure that such a thing never happens again? That is a testament to my right hon. Friend’s personal courage and persistence in making sure that the inquiry was not blown off course by the understandable anger that immediately followed the tragedy.”
“I am bound to say that there is a certain amount of pots and kettles in all this, and if the Labour party is genuinely seeking a consensus, it could provide the Government with an assurance about how a new boundary review might proceed. I hope such conversations are going on. For example, to use a new boundary Bill as a Christmas tree for things that the Labour party would like to its electoral advantage would undermine confidence in that consensus, but conversations should be happening. That would be better than this rather scrappy debate, which does not serve this House’s reputation well.”
“However, that would not be a democratic disaster. Democracy would still work and people would still vote intelligently in their constituencies, but we would be failing in our duty to provide a fair democratic system that commands the public’s confidence. I rather lament the partisan division that has opened up over the boundary question, and we in the Conservative party must share a measure of responsibility for that. An arbitrary limit of 600 was set in order to “reduce the cost of politics”, but—let’s face it—there was something of an electoral gimmick in that proposal and it did not command confidence. The 5% variation between the size of constituencies that we included in our legislation was extremely controversial, and we have lost some of the consensus around boundary reviews that I used to see in my earlier years in the House.”
“Member for Manchester, Gorton (Afzal Khan)— “could provide such an opportunity.” The purpose of that recommendation was simply to draw the House’s attention to the position that we are in. The Government are in danger of leaving the House of Commons with Hobson’s choice when it comes to the timetabling of a vote on the boundary review, which will be in September or October, because it will be very late indeed—if not impossible—to legislate for an alternative boundary review. Nevertheless, it is entirely plausible that the House will vote down the 2018 boundary review. On 17 February 2000, Oasis were at No. 1 and Tony Blair had not yet been Prime Minister for three years. If somebody born on that day was elected in 2022, they would be younger than the data used to formulate the boundary review.”