Sir Bernard Jenkin
MP for Harwich and North Essex · Conservative · United Kingdom
“Despite long and historic disagreements between successive UK Governments and Israel, it has remained a steadfast ally in counter-terrorist efforts to keep our people safe in this country. We are now embarked, it seems, on a full diplomatic dispute with Israel and tit-for-tat expulsions of diplomats.”
“I would very much have liked to have discussed the medical devices questions arising from the Bill. The Minister made an incredibly short speech about that important matter. It is quite clear that these provisions are part of the covert dynamic alignment with the EU and the covert rejoin agenda being pursued by the Government.”
“I am as keen as anybody to get on with discussing the Health Bill, but this topic is too serious an opportunity to miss, given that the hon. Member for Leeds Central and Headingley (Alex Sobel) has raised such important issues. I really commend his speech and his initiative. Everybody should read it.”
“The Minister shakes her head, but she is yet to give a good reason as to why this measure is in the Bill. When we had an Adjournment debate in July with the then Minister for patient safety, the hon.”
“The chief executive of the CQC is wantonly conflicted in terms of looking after the safe space, so he cannot be the one left in charge of that function. The real point here is that we are missing the opportunity to save so much money. Governments keep having public inquiries.”
“I asked the Minister, in a letter I sent her after the debate in July, to give us the information on how much the transfer of all this would cost. Nothing has arrived. I never had a reply to the letter. Of course, the Government have changed the Minister and the new Minister for patient safety, the right hon.”
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“We will need to continue to live up to the 2% commitment that all NATO members agreed to at the summit in Wales. If we will not do that, which countries will we have to rely on for our security and for the future of world peace, stability, freedom and democracy around the world?”
“That is evident from the failure on a spectacular scale in Iraq and Afghanistan, and in the emergence of a more Soviet-style leadership in Russia. Putin pursued a brutally repressive war in Chechnya and then tested his revived military capability in the invasion of Georgia. The subsequent diplomatic stand-off was resolved only when President Sarkozy of France made a unilateral visit to Moscow and effectively conceded permanent Russian annexation of the Georgian provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Perhaps that led to his later boldness. We have seen the Arab uprising lead to chaos in the middle east, not the spreading of democracy that we had hoped for. It is clear that we live in a world where soft power must still be sustained by hard power.”
“In the globalised and technological world of today, we need to think of defence in wider domains such as economics, trade, aid, cyberspace, technology, industry, media, communications and even politics, and throughout the whole sphere of global society. For each nation to be effective in international statecraft, we need to act collectively where we can, which is why we Europeans must be prepared to commit national resources to defence, to harness our potential together, and to join with other global allies, or we will find that we have failed to provide for our own security. That brings me to the absolute primacy of NATO. The idea of a happy new world order, which some still seem to believe we can enjoy, is disappearing before our eyes.”
“We need military capability in order to be peacekeepers. What we possess changes how potential adversaries perceive us because of what we can or might do in response. Defence is not just about having the armed forces to match the particular military threats that we can see or imagine. Defence policy is about how we decide what military capability we need to possess in order to help shape the world to be more as we want it to be, rather than subject to the will of those who seek to take unfair advantage, or to disrupt that. These days, defence policy extends beyond the traditional domains of land, sea and air, as was so ably described by my hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border (Rory Stewart).”
“All that we require potential adversaries to know is that we can and might use it, if circumstances arose that would make that expedient. That is how we influence the global strategic environment. The same applies by degrees to all military capabilities that nations, or groups of nations, possess that can inflict harm or disadvantage on adversaries who threaten our interests or global security. The mere possession of military capability is not a threat to international security. The lack of it on our part, in the face of those who do have it and have the intention of using it, is the threat we confront today. Money spent on our capability is not wasted if we never use it. It is an indication of our will—our determination to succeed in our aims of promoting international security and the rule of international law.”
“Yes, and it should not be forgotten that our subscription to the EU is also written into legislation, and that we are not allowed to change that. I am thinking of asking the Library to speculate on when our contribution to the European Union will overtake what we spend on defence. The question is what role defence plays in shaping the kind of world we want. We need to possess and be able to deploy the capacity to discourage, or even to retaliate against, those who would disrupt that. Opponents of the maintenance of our minimum nuclear deterrent systems in the UK and France often assert that they are a waste of money “because they are never used”. Actually, our nuclear deterrent is used every hour of every day of every year.”
“If we are talking about accountability, what we need is an organisation that is accountable for investigating clinical incidents in the NHS, whether they are down to particular local problems or broader systemic problems—by which we mean not that that is an excuse for what goes wrong; rather, it is so those systemic problems can be put right. I therefore very much welcome what my right hon. Friend has mooted will be the task of Sir Mike Durkin: to look at how that capacity can be developed, in the same manner, perhaps, as the air accidents investigation branch of the Department for Transport.”
“I thank my right hon. Friend for his statement and Dr Bill Kirkup for his excellent report. Let me reassure him and the House that the Public Administration Committee is also preoccupied with the failings of the parliamentary and health service ombudsman in the conduct of these cases. I, too, have met James Titcombe on many occasions and have been extremely impressed by his extraordinary commitment to making sure that he is heard so that so many others can be heard. May I also point out that the report reeks of the confusion that exists between CQC and the PHSO about what their respective responsibilities are?”
“Does my right hon. Friend agree that the lesson of the cold war is that we secure peace through strength? I very much welcome this intervention, but we in the west must decide whether we are going to indicate our resolve to deter Russian aggression or not. Will he remind our American allies, whom I very much welcome as part of this initiative, that it was the sailing of their sixth fleet into the Black sea that stopped the invasion of Georgia in its tracks? When are the Americans going to come to this initiative with force?”
“12. What discussions he has had with (a) the Haven project in Colchester and (b) NHS bodies in north Essex on the need for continuing funding for support for people with moderate to severe personality disorder.”
“I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for taking such a close interest in the matter, and for the visit paid by the Under-Secretary of State for Health, my hon. Friend the Member for Central Suffolk and North Ipswich (Dr Poulter). Although I understand the huge cost pressures on the CCG, may I invite my right hon. Friend to study the Enable East report, which made a different recommendation on how the unit should be treated? It would be sad to close the leading example among 11 Department of Health pilots, when all the other 10 are being kept open as the lessons learned are so valuable.”
“7. What plans he has to improve the effectiveness of his Department in co-ordinating planning and implementation across Government Departments.”
“During the inquiry that we conducted on future challenges facing the machinery of Whitehall, we found that, so far, the Government have been very good at imposing departmental spending limits, but there is a capability deficit when it comes to cross-departmental financial planning and management. How do the Government propose to address that?”
“I commend my right hon. Friend for his statement and thank Sir Robert Francis for his excellent report, which, as the Secretary of State knows, goes to the heart of the Public Administration Committee’s inquiry into clinical incident investigation. It comes as no surprise that we still have severe problems in the NHS. Perhaps the “freedom to speak up” guardian role needs to provide complete legal protection for people speaking up, immunity from freedom of information requests so that the information and the names cannot be exposed maliciously, and the capacity to investigate what is reported to them on a completely independent basis. We look forward to his giving evidence to our Committee.”
“Will my right hon. Friend describe what he thinks a successful outcome to the French and German-led talks with Russia would look like? Would it involve the de facto partition of Ukraine, and how would that be anything else than a permanent reward for Russian aggression?”
“I am pleased that my right hon. Friend is going to see Sir John Chilcot in front of the Foreign Affairs Committee. Would he ask him about the role of the Cabinet Secretary? It is suggested by some, as we heard earlier from my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis), that somehow he is irrevocably conflicted, even though he is only negotiating what might be published, not what the inquiry can see. Will my right hon. Friend put that question to Sir John, so that he can fairly say whether he feels that the Cabinet Secretary has been obstructing or not? I suspect not.”
“I will commit the sin of asking a question in the House to which I do not know the answer. Why is it called Maxwellisation? We used to talk about Salmon letters.? Is this process different or more protracted, and is it an opportunity for lawyers to extend the process for which they are paid?”
“As the inquiry is not a judicial one, do its findings have the legal immunity required to protect the authors of the report from judicial proceedings if they publish something defamatory or deeply unfair? Is that part of the reason why the process is taking longer?”
“I wrote: “Currently all the elements for protracted insurgency warfare exist, though there is every opportunity to prevent the situation deteriorating.” There was an inability to get anyone to hear this message in Government and, I confess, even some in my own party—this was the Government’s problem, not our problem. It is the same kind of truth blindness to which my hon. Friend the Member for Gravesham (Mr Holloway) referred in the British political establishment, in the civil service, among the political leaders.”
“Of all the speeches that we heard on that fateful day when we voted to go to war, his was the most disturbing. I chose the word “quagmire” because I remembered him saying that we were entering into a quagmire. We had done our best to satisfy ourselves from the Opposition perspective that there was plenty of planning. It is true that there was plenty of planning in Washington, but the problem was that the Americans had more than one plan. They had a Rumsfeld plan and a State Department plan and there was a competition between the two of them over which should be implemented. But neither plan was based on any proper understanding, depth of assessment or analysis of what we were going to find when we got in there, which is why it became evident so quickly that we were facing a disaster.”
“I came back from Iraq shortly after the invasion, having been on a shadow ministerial visit to Basra and had a comprehensive briefing. I then tabled a paper to the shadow Cabinet on what I had found that had caused me a great deal of concern. The paper on post conflict Iraq mentioned “the widening gap between expectations and reality.” It said: “Many are wondering how much longer before the coalition’s window of opportunity closes.” I went on to explain that what we needed was a proper comprehensive plan, a road map and benchmarks in order to structure a proper coalition provisional Administration, backed by the necessary civilian and military resources. In the addendum to the paper, I wrote, “Quagmire?” and for that I pay tribute to the hon. Member for Bradford West (George Galloway)—and it may disturb him that I am doing so.”
“Another five of us were named on the motion, including me and a future leader of the Conservative party, now Lord Howard of Lympne. The motion said: “This House is concerned at the growing public confusion since the summer adjournment as a result of increasingly conflicting accounts of intelligence relating to and events leading up to the recent Iraq war and what has happened since; and calls for the setting up of a comprehensive independent judicial inquiry into the Government’s handling of the run-up to the war, of the war itself, and of its aftermath, and into the legal advice which it received.” How long was it before we actually got an inquiry, and a rather watered down inquiry at that? Let me explain why we called for the inquiry at that point—and this is a significant point.”
“It is that we need to understand the “set of conditions” that allowed us “to pursue this particular course of action”. It would have been nice if that had been put into the terms of reference, to which I will come in a moment. The origins of the Chilcot inquiry go back beyond 2006, to which my right hon. Friend the Member for Sutton Coldfield (Mr Mitchell) adverted. I also congratulate my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) on securing this debate, because it has proved already to be a very informative and interesting discussion. Just to go back to the origins of the inquiry, I have in my hand the resolution that was tabled by the then Leader of the Opposition, my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Mr Duncan Smith).”
“I am pleased that my hon. Friend the Member for Southend West (Sir David Amess) spoke before me and came up with some very practical suggestions about how things could be done. I am particularly pleased because those suggestions really underline the fact that we allowed the Government of the day to set up this inquiry in a haphazard and casual way. I speak as someone who straddles two aspects of this matter. I was shadow Defence Secretary at the time and often spoke from the Dispatch Box in the run-up to the Iraq war. I am also taking part in this debate, in answer to the hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn), as someone who feels a deep responsibility for what has happened as a consequence of that war. It may surprise the hon. Member for Perth and North Perthshire (Pete Wishart) that I agree with a phrase of his speech.”
“I fear this inquiry will turn out to be a shadow of what we really need and we will not learn the lessons. We did not learn the lessons before we went to Afghanistan, before we went to Libya, before we threatened Syria, and these are lessons that we must learn.”
“There would not be any question about people being able to give their evidence in public, immune from prosecution, which the Chilcot inquiry has been unable to do. We could have ensured the inquiry’s independence. Speakers in this debate have asked why there are no politicians, lawyers or military figures on the inquiry. All those questions were asked when the inquiry was set up, and we are all now ruing the fact that those suggestions were not adopted. I will recommend that my Committee follows up this inquiry in the next Parliament, covering such questions as how inquiries are established, why, what for, how they operate, judicial or parliamentary, lessons from the terms of reference, how the timing is organised when they are set up and how long they are allowed to sit.”
“I have struggled to find definitive terms of reference for the inquiry. In fact, the terms of reference are drawn from a long and rambling statement made from that Dispatch Box by the then Prime Minister, who boasted about how broad and comprehensive and utterly large it was going to be. One wonders whether the words “long grass” were lurking at the back of his mind—the longer the better. This House failed. This House failed to create an accountable inquiry process. We let it happen. We were all so desperate for an inquiry, so desperate to get it started, that we lost our perspective. If this was a judicial inquiry, as we originally called for, the issues of conflict of interests of people involved on the fringes of the inquiry would not be allowed to arise.”
“We need more capacity in Whitehall to learn and understand, to gather real knowledge and information—capacity for analysis and assessment, which paradoxically we do quite well in the intelligence field through the Joint Intelligence Committee, unless it is sat on by political appointees. We need the ability to choose realistic objectives for our foreign and security policy; to formulate comprehensive plans and then be able to implement them. As we wait for the inquiry to conclude and to report its findings, we must reflect on the process that we feel has failed us. The first lesson is that it is too late—much too late. It started too late, and it is taking far too long. Why did we not set a time limit? Leveson was set a time limit; why did we not set one for the Iraq inquiry?”
“Why does this disconnect exist between what people in Whitehall think is going on or think that they are able to control and what the people on the ground find out is actually going on and are unable to control? When I came back from Basra on that occasion, I remember reporting to the shadow Cabinet that I had asked the General Officer Commanding in Basra what message he wanted me to take back home. He said in slightly less proper language, “Where the hell is DFID? What is the plan? What are we meant to do now?” There was no plan. I do not apologise for complaining about the lack of a plan in the aftermath because it reflects exactly what the General was saying. There is a lack of seriousness, a lack of trusting people who come with challenging information and uncomfortable truths.”
“No one creates a single document and keeps it updated on how we are to conduct our statecraft in this increasingly troubled world in which we are increasingly vulnerable. I say to the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw) that we found that the Foreign Office had an aversion to any kind of strategy. Culturally, it does not like the idea of being tied to a plan, misunderstanding that a plan is different from strategy. We need to learn. How does the machinery of government allow us to go to war without a better understanding of the consequences? Those consequences have led to a complete loss of confidence in this Chamber in the ability of Whitehall to make those judgments, as my hon. Friend the Member for Gravesham said. What sort of reform do we want to be able to drive—as my hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border asked?”
“What this inquiry must do is address the machinery of government problem, the capacity problem—the understanding problem to which my hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border (Rory Stewart), the Chairman of the Defence Committee so capably referred. The Select Committee on Public Administration produced—this is the other side of the equation in this debate—no fewer than three reports in the last Parliament about how to conduct inquiries. We produced a report at the beginning of this Parliament entitled “Who does UK National Strategy?” The informal answer that I received from the then Chief of the Defence Staff, which we put in our report, was nobody. Nobody holds a strategic concept for the United Kingdom.”
“Yes, it was Ambassador Bremer. In my paper, I wrote: “The Bremer administration has 3,000 US officials, only 16 of which are Arab speakers. 650,000 Iraqi Government officials have failed to return to work.” There was a complete misappreciation in the first 100 days —the golden 100 days after the invasion—that we were sitting on a volcano. I remember asking questions from the Opposition Benches such as, “What are we going to do about the Iranian insurgents coming over the border?” The border between Iraq and Iran was completely open. There was flat denial that any of this mattered or was actually happening. What this inquiry cannot do is resolve the controversies about legality or intelligence, which have been raked over so many times. So many other inquiries have looked at those things.”
“Following the declaration of a major incident at the accident and emergency unit of Colchester hospital, we now await the Care Quality Commission report into that incident, which will be published very shortly. We want the report to tell the truth, but it is harder to tell the truth in a political atmosphere where there are people who want to gloat over these challenges to get votes.”
“As a traditionalist, perhaps, neither do I want to see business as usual. The right hon. Gentleman’s findings are a great opportunity for a big change in the culture—by which we mean the attitudes and behaviour—of people throughout the organisation so that, in cases such as that of the gym, there is somebody who is clearly accountable for such decisions and wants to take responsibility for making them. The lack of trust that the current structure has generated needs to change, and I think he has come up with the right solution. Some structures can be set up in such a way as to generate mistrust, but he has chosen a structure—not entirely one of my choosing, I accept—that will create the opportunity to generate real trust and accountability throughout the organisation.”
“The other tension that exists in the current organisation is that, with the best will in the world, the Management Board is trying to think strategically in the long term and there has not always been synergy between its strategic long-term thoughts and the Commission’s strategic long-term thoughts. Merging the two organisations will generate that synergy.”
“Given the delays that tend to affect legislation, is there any impediment to the Management Board and the existing Commission working together as one body on a pro tem basis until legislation formalises the arrangement, even though any formal Commission decisions would have to be taken by the Commission as currently constituted?”
“I agree with everything that has been said, but what is so vital in the arrangement is that there should be complete trust and understanding between the Clerk of the House and the director general. The sequencing of the appointments, which my right hon. Friend the Leader of the House mentioned, is therefore very important. The Clerk must feel that he or she has had a say over the director general’s job description and how the job is advertised, otherwise the arrangement will not work. We will be setting it up to fail if anybody feels that premature decisions have been foisted on them. That must be borne in mind.”
“From hearing this debate, I am increasingly persuaded that part of the accountability that we need is the autonomy and clear visibility of the director general. Even now, the director general of facilities wears a badge telling us his name and title, and he feels more accountable because people stop him and talk to him as he walks around the Palace. That shows how important the visibility and demonstrable autonomy of the director general will be under the new arrangement, which is something we have all learned from this process.”
“What evidence is there that if we got rid of our nuclear weapons, anybody else would get rid of theirs? Would the French give up their nuclear weapons? Would the Russians?”
“If we are going to talk about through-life costs, is it not important to point out that the amortised costs of our nuclear deterrent will be only some 6% of the overall defence budget or 0.3% of gross domestic product? The idea that cancellation of this programme will pay for all the goodies outlined by the Scottish National party—one presumes that the SNP will want to carry on building different types of submarine at the these yards in any case—is just moonshine.”
“The right hon. Lady makes a necessary contribution to this debate and she asks a very interesting question about the banning of other unacceptable weapons systems while we continue to possess nuclear weapons. But is it not the case that nuclear weapons represent, in the psychology of our global civilisation, an unacceptable threshold of use? Therefore, they have a deterrent effect because the release of one weapon could release many. I ask her this question: why, since the end of the second world war when nuclear weapons were first deployed, did war between the great powers end? Why was that the last world war? Could the possession of nuclear weapons have something to do with it?”
“If the United States withdrew co-operation for the maintenance of our nuclear deterrent, the fact is that the capabilities with which they provide us have a long lead time, so we would have time to develop our own indigenous capacity to provide those capabilities. There is no point in our doing so while the US is happy to share the costs with us and help us to provide a cheaper, better-value nuclear deterrent.”
“I remind the hon. Gentleman of the following words: “I admit to some miscalculations about Russia. I did not calculate how the collective mood of Russia was so ready to respond to a dominant and ruthless leadership…Nor did I expect that the perestroika and glasnost that we welcomed so enthusiastically in this country and elsewhere would become so despised at home in Russia.” —[ Official Report , 18 March 2014; Vol. 577, c. 670.] Those were the words of his colleague, the right hon. and learned Member for North East Fife (Sir Menzies Campbell). Why is the hon. Gentleman so confident that he can predict the future when the right hon. and learned Gentleman has admitted that he was wrong?”
“I am sorry that I missed the earlier part of my hon. Friend’s speech. Surely the point is that there is no obligation at all to disarm unilaterally in any shape or form, yet that seems to be the policy favoured by the supporters of this motion.”
“It is to keep all those non-nuclear members of NATO under an umbrella. It is to engage the United States in what happens in Europe. If we gave up our nuclear weapons and France gave up its, which I presume is what is advocated by proponents of the motion, why would the United States be bothered to defend us when we cannot be bothered to defend ourselves? That is what the US would think; in fact, it is what the US already thinks in respect of conventional capability. If we were to take our piece off the board, it would be the final nail in the obligation of the US to defend us in extremis. It is the same question as whether we would pull the trigger to defend a non-NATO country without any nuclear capability, should Russia become aggressive with that country.”
“Member for Lewisham, Deptford (Dame Joan Ruddock), who used to represent CND and apparently still does, asked why we should waste this money on weapons that we never use. This is another misconception. These weapons are in use every day. They are deployed and they are ready to fire at a few moments’ notice. They are not targeted on any particular country or city, but they are ready to be deployed in anger on any day of any year at any hour. I echo the Secretary of State’s tribute to the Trident submarine crews and their families and all those who support their operation. It is an immense achievement that we maintain a continuous at-sea deterrent. The presence of this capability at our disposal in the oceans helps to shape the global security environment. It is not just to keep us safe; it is to keep the world safe.”
“That is a tiny, minute part of the defence budget. As my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State said, it is merely a pull forward of what will be spent later, and spending it now probably saves money in the long term. Even if one accepted this £100 billion lifetime cost of Trident over, say, 50 years, that would be less than our net contribution to the European Union in each of those years. It would be less than many other costs that we sign away without a breath. I will never forget the day we underwrote all the banks with hundreds of billions of pounds of capital in an extraordinarily under-populated and uncontroversial debate. This is a relatively small decision—less than HS2, as was pointed out. The right hon.”
“To some extent, it is rather laughable. I would not usually pick holes in a motion, but this one says that this House believes that Trident should not be renewed. We know what the Scottish and Welsh nationalists mean by the motion, but we are not renewing Trident; we are renewing the submarines. We are not renewing the missiles or the warheads, but simply renewing the submarines. For the hon. Member for Perth and North Perthshire (Pete Wishart), currently sitting in the place of the SNP leader, to say that a vote against this motion is a vote for “stockpiling” nuclear weapons really is an exaggeration. That does not excuse itself from the mouth of a unilateralist. There are many points to pick up from the debate. The cost needs to be put in context. The extra cost that has occasioned this debate is a mere—I say a mere—£261 million.”
“In following the hon. Member for Carmarthen East and Dinefwr (Jonathan Edwards), it is worth reflecting on how important it is to have these debates. We do not necessarily hear anything new and startling emerge in the arguments put forward, but it is important that the British public—our voters—see that we are having this discussion. If there was one shortcoming in the decision taken at the end of Tony Blair’s reign, it was that it was felt to have been taken in an unseemly rush. It is absolutely right that we should continue to debate this matter until the maingate decision is taken. The hon. Member for Carmarthen East and Dinefwr remarked that the main decision is going to be taken after the next election. To that extent, this debate is rather otiose. It is not a turning-point debate; it is about political positioning.”
“Another question that we keep being asked is, “Does deterrence work?” There is evidence that it does, and those who argue that deterrence had nothing to do with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war are flying in the face of that evidence. There was an arms race, and the options that were available to the Soviet Union as it sought to solve its internal problems by expanding were contained by deterrence. It lost the arms race because it could not afford to keep up with the cost of the technology that the west could afford.”