Jerome Mayhew
MP for Broadland and Fakenham · Conservative · United Kingdom
“] I would be grateful if Members listened to the speech being made, rather than making their own from the Government Front Bench. Welfare dependency has to be addressed, yet we are waiting for a report, and then a response from the Government, and then a White Paper sometime next year, apparently.”
House of Commons28 October 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“That is an increase of more than a quarter of a trillion pounds in borrowing, with no plan to get it down and no credible plan to reduce welfare spending, which is the next major issue that we have to address.”
House of Commons28 October 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“I will go out on a limb and say that this is a terrible Budget. It is not just a “steady as it goes” Budget, because everyone in this Chamber knows that we have got some serious problems that have to be addressed by this country, both politically and economically. This will be known as the “kick it down the road” Budget.”
House of Commons28 October 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“I will not. I have only a minute left. We have tax rises being imposed on savers. What a weird argument that is—that increased taxes should be imposed on people who are doing the right thing.”
House of Commons28 October 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“This is ridiculous. We have Ministers telling us that we have to stockpile food, but we have capital expenditure that is due to take place after that 1,000-day period. This is back-to-front government, and it is a negligent Treasury that is imposing this on our defence sector.”
House of Commons28 October 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“The Government spent two and a half years virtue signalling about the North sea. They said there was no future for oil and gas and had a ban on licences, as well as increasing taxation.”
House of Commons28 October 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
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“I am interested to hear the Minister’s strong hints that the memorandum of understanding may be much more advanced than we had previously been led to believe. The intention of amendment 39 was to flush out the MOU—it sounds like it may well have already achieved its purpose. Taking the Minister’s words at face value, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Clause 23 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 24 Memorandum of understanding: Secretary of State and Welsh Ministers”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“I tried to be understanding with the Minister in not pressing amendment 39 on Scotland to a vote, because of the direction he was able to hint at in his response. I look forward to being similarly reassured in respect of Wales.”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“He spoke in some detail about the future relationship between GBR and the Welsh Government, and how it relies on the memorandum of understanding. Will the Minister take this opportunity to reassure the Committee about the safeguards or timeline the Government have in place? Do they believe it would be helpful to have a clearer timeline, especially considering the electoral sensitivities and, if the opinion polls are to be believed, the likely change of Administration in Cardiff Bay? I have plenty more to say about this, but I am aware that it is getting dark outside and we have been going on for some time. Those concerns are the rationale for amendment 40, which would apply similar requirements to those that amendment 39 would have applied to clause 23.”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“There is a big caveat for Wales in particular, where—though I do not want to ruin anyone’s sleep tonight—it is very likely that Labour will be removed from office come May, and that there will be a new Government in Cardiff. It would be improper for a rush job to take place in order to shoehorn through a memorandum of understanding between two like-minded Administrations. I have tabled amendment 40 to clause 24 for the same reason that I tabled amendment 39 to clause 23. Amendment 40 seeks to introduce a degree of control over the timeline for the publication of the memorandum of understanding. In the Transport Committee evidence session on 17 December, Peter McDonald, who is the director for transport, spoke on behalf of the Welsh Government.”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“This is at the core of the issue of value for money, so it should be an important consideration, and I look to the Minister to provide reassurance that it is in the mix. I have a compounding concern, which I expressed in relation to clause 23, about the timeline of the publication of the memorandum of understanding. Again, a purdah period is approaching: the elections for the Welsh Senedd are in May. I think I am right in saying—my right hon. Friend the Member for Melton and Syston mentioned it—that it was suggested in the oral evidence that the heads of terms have already been agreed, but that is not the same as the memorandum of understanding being agreed, so we need a bit more detail from the Minister, if he is able to give it.”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Taxpayers in both nations will rightly presume that the value of ticket sales will be distributed proportionately between both railways, as they will both be Government-run, rather than going to the operator whose livery happens to adorn the locomotive. The issue is relatively small in the discussions about Scotland, where I think only 3% of services are cross-border between England and Scotland. In Wales, the proportion is much greater, and I am concerned that there is no clear mechanism for how the allocation of ticket sales is set to be achieved or agreed. Will GBR and Transport for Wales—or, more accurately, the Secretary of State and the Welsh Ministers—come to a profit-sharing or fare-box sharing agreement as part of the memorandum of understanding?”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“From there, it manages services that run exclusively in England, such as Shrewsbury to Manchester. It also runs all manner of cross-border services, such as the Heart of Wales line, of which about 5% is in England, and Aberystwyth to Birmingham, which is 50:50 England and Wales—on it goes. Any memorandum of understanding will have to outline in detail, one assumes, how the allocation of moneys for tickets will be divided. This works both ways. Former Great Western Railway and Avanti services from London to Holyhead and from London to Swansea via Cardiff have significant portions of their routes running through Wales as well as England.”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“The relationship between the Welsh and UK Governments is far more nuanced and complex than the relationship in the case of ScotRail and the management of rail in Scotland. Transport for Wales covers a significant number of cross-border rail services. I stand to be corrected, but I think that as many as 80% of all its services have an element of cross-border movement. This harks back to the former private sector franchise of Arriva Trains Wales, which ran many England-only services and joint England-Wales services. That system of rail service provision persists under Transport for Wales; it is much more blended than is the case in Scotland. I have some examples. Shrewsbury station, which, for the geographically challenged, is in England, is managed by Transport for Wales.”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“The Government amendment makes further provision concerning the memorandum of understanding between the Secretary of State and Welsh Ministers. I have no objection to it. The Minister is absolutely right that clause 24 is similar in intention to clause 23, but there are huge questions about the role that Welsh Ministers are to have in the governance and management of GBR in their jurisdiction under the memorandum of understanding, and whether the Secretary of State will have any role in the governance and management of Transport for Wales. The Welsh settlement is very different from the Scottish one, in both geography and degree of devolution— I suppose that is how it can be most simply described.”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“I understand the point the Minister is making about the lack of relationship between those two documents. In the debate on the previous group, he was able to give an indication of the likely timeframe for publishing the Scottish memorandum of understanding. Can he give a similar hint on the Welsh memorandum of understanding? [ Interruption. ] There seems to be a bit of nodding on the Government Benches, but it is entirely up to him, because he decides.”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Having heard the semi-reassurance of the Minister, I will not move amendment 40. Clause 24, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. — (Nesil Caliskan.)”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Question put, That the amendment be made.”
House of Commons27 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Question put , That the amendment be made.”
House of Commons27 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“That is the Government’s Competition and Markets Authority, so who is right here—the CMA, or the Bill as drafted?”
House of Commons27 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“I beg to move amendment 12, in clause 7, page 4, line 30, after “functions” insert— “where the Office for Rail and Road, in carrying out its functions under section 69A of the Railways Act 1993 (as inserted by section 74 of this Act), has deemed Great British Railways to be in breach of its statutory functions.” This amendment would restrict the Secretary of State’s ability to give directions to Great British Railways to circumstances where the Office for Rail and Road has deemed Great British Railways in breach of its statutory functions.”
House of Commons27 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“We will have the cost of GBR and its oversight structures—we are told in the recently published job application for the part-time chair that GBR will have more than 100,000 employees; it will be an enormous organisation, with its own senior management team—and then we will have the same again, with an overactive Department for Transport second-guessing GBR’s day-to-day working and being able to give guidance and directions as a result of clauses 7 and 8.”
House of Commons27 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“We are told repeatedly by the Minister and others that GBR is the directing mind, but will that really be the case if the clause goes through unamended? If GBR really is the directing mind, what is the necessity for the clause? It is a recipe for decision paralysis, with GBR, given the decision-making structures, undermined by guidance—we will come on to that when we discuss clause 9—and by directions from the Department for Transport in the name of the Secretary of State. Clause 7 really does risk creating the worst of both worlds.”
House of Commons27 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Under subsection (5) of both clauses 7 and 8, directions must be published, but there is no requirement for them to be laid before and scrutinised by Parliament—the old trap of creating transparency without consequence. A reporting or laying requirement, perhaps through the Select Committee, would turn publication into genuine accountability. However, I am interested to hear what rationale the Minister has not to allow greater scrutiny of GBR in Parliament. Again, perhaps he will address that directly in his response. That is the rationale behind our suggested amendments to require the Secretary of State to lay directions before Parliament, in order to allow us to scrutinise the decisions in greater detail. There is a fundamental question about leadership and who is the key decision maker.”
House of Commons27 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“A question arises on clause 8(4), and I would be grateful if the Minister could provide clarity on the oversight system outlined in clauses 7 and 8. Subsection (4) states: “Before giving, varying or revoking a direction under this section the Scottish Ministers must consult the Secretary of State.” Presently, GBR must decide whether a decision directly affects devolved services, but the Bill provides no statutory test, which leaves a delivery body making politically sensitive judgments, further increasing the risk of challenge by devolved nations. Clarity for Members, especially those from the devolved nations, will be extremely helpful, so I would be grateful if the Minister would address that directly.”
House of Commons27 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Without a clear breakdown of the procedures and directions, surely we run the risk of granting the Secretary of State a large degree of power with very limited oversight. The clause gives the Secretary of State unrestricted power, other than for operations in Scotland and Wales, to intervene in the running of GBR. That is a step too far. While it is justifiable for the democratically elected Government of the day to set and agree GBR’s strategic objectives, key performance indicators and business plans, after those are set out, the Government’s role should be to hold GBR to account for the delivery of the targets, objectives and strategies, and not to tell it how to do so on a day-to-day basis.”
House of Commons27 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Interestingly, although the explanatory notes state that a direction by the Secretary of State is a mechanism of last resort, the clause itself gives no indication to substantiate that. Instead, it suggests that the Secretary of State can act independently of their Welsh and Scottish counterparts’ views, especially as there is a reliance on non-legislative measures. My first question to the Minister is, therefore: why is this supposed last-resort requirement not on the face of the Bill? When dealing with matters relating in particular to the interpretation of devolution, the risk is that any decision taken by the Secretary of State may be disputed by the devolved nations and end up as a political football, which only increases lawyers’ profits. Would it not therefore be prudent to set out in the legislation exactly what is meant?”
House of Commons27 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“It is just as pleasurable to have you in the Chair today as it was last week, Sir Alec. I remind hon. Members that clause 7 gives the Secretary of State the power to issue and publish directions to Great British Railways relating to its railway activities. It also outlines how the Secretary of State must obtain consent from Welsh and Scottish Ministers before giving directions relating to their devolved services, except where powers are used in relation to the access regime. The clause further outlines how GBR will be required to comply with directions, which are mandatory and binding, and intended to be used as a so-called “responsive tool for necessary course correction, rather than as a proactive tool to set requirements on GBR,” or, as further clarified in the explanatory notes, as “a last resort”.”
House of Commons27 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“If GBR is operating on a day-to-day basis with oversight from the Department for Transport—the Secretary of State—and concerns arise as to its direction or performance, the sequence of severity of the response should not start with guidance from the Secretary of State and then mandatory directions. They might be the final requirement, because we all need those levers, but surely they should come only after the chief executive has been challenged and then removed, just as in the private sector with an arm’s length majority investment.”
House of Commons27 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“The intention behind the amendment is to treat GBR as a business, which I think we all agree is what it is intended to be—albeit a nationalised one. Where there is a board of non-executive directors, they can question the executive team, and they can challenge decisions and require the chief executive to explain and defend the direction of the company. However, when push comes to shove, and the decision is made that the organisation is moving in the wrong direction, the weapon available to the chairman is the removal of the chief executive officer.”
House of Commons27 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“However, amendment 12 would still allow the Secretary of State to intervene in emergency scenarios, as the ORR would deem that such events make it impossible for GBR to conform to its business plan targets. Clause 74 sets out the ORR’s power to monitor GBR’s performance. Elsewhere in the Bill, we shall argue that the ORR needs more teeth to hold GBR to account, and this provision limiting the potential for the Secretary of State to intervene until such time that an independent regulatory body has recognised that GBR has not been able to fulfil its functions will be an important safeguard. Amendment 11 would put the words “last resort” on the face of the Bill, and would provide that a direction may be made only after the removal of GBR’s chief executive officer.”
House of Commons27 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“I have tabled two amendments to address this issue. Amendment 12 would limit directions to circumstances in which the Office of Rail and Road assesses GBR to be in breach of its statutory functions. It could be argued that the Secretary of State should have an emergency lever; that is fair enough, because bad things happen. One of our great complaints before the election, although I am beginning to hear it from Labour Ministers as well, was, “We pull the levers but they’re not attached to anything—we have no power.” When we form the Government after the next election, we will want to have levers that are attached to something, and I accept that it is necessary to have an emergency lever to pull should a significant unforeseen event occur—another pandemic, perhaps—and an intervention be required.”
House of Commons27 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“We talk about the Secretary of State, but we all know that officials in the Department for Transport will be advising the Secretary of State on what he or she should be doing in a particular circumstance, and there will be a power grab. Without amendment, the clause will absolutely allow for that. We should be alive to the real-world experience that we all have and take this opportunity to strengthen its wording in order to design out that issue and ensure that there is proper accountability—with GBR accountable to the Secretary of State and, through the Secretary of State, to Parliament—and that operational independence stays with what will be a nationalised business, rather than creating a railway version of NHS England, as my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East mentioned a moment ago.”
House of Commons27 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“It will be set up with the best of intentions, and perhaps in the first two or three years all will run smoothly and the directing mind in practice might well be GBR, but then something will happen, because something always does happen in the real world, with lots of people doing their best but sometimes making mistakes, and there will be a collective gasp from the Department of Transport, because it will feel like it is on the hook, so “Something must be done to ensure that this doesn’t happen again.” We have designed into this mechanism a structure that allows the removal of GBR’s operational independence, and it does so without any reference to actions of last resort by the Government—the Bill is silent on that.”
House of Commons27 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“The Department no longer talked only about outcomes that needed to be achieved, leaving how companies went about that entirely up to them, which is the appropriate way to draft a franchise agreement. Instead, that devolved into mechanisms of how a franchise should be operated. We had that mission creep, and I fear that under the Bill we might get exactly the same approach with GBR.”
House of Commons27 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“It is not a perfect analogy, because GBR is at least intended to be more akin to a business—a nationalised business—but my hon. Friend is entirely right that where we have two organisations in competition, each one thinking that it runs the railways, that is a recipe for confusion at the least, and disaster at the worst. This is not an idle concern, because it has happened before. We all remember the Virgin West Coast franchise debacle in 2012, when the slightly arm’s length process of franchising did not go well, causing a communal panic in the Department for Transport. The phrase, “Something must be done to prevent this from ever happening again,” was no doubt repeated many times. The result was that more and more micromanaging took place by the Department for Transport in the setting of franchises.”
House of Commons27 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“The industry itself is saying that GBR needs to be operationally independent and to manage its own affairs. Amendment 14 would correct that issue. It would require the Secretary of State to lay any decision before Parliament—the right place for primary scrutiny. Rail Forum supports the amendment. It says: “This is essential to ensure that normal Parliamentary process is not bypassed.” Amendment 16 would mean that decisions on fares imposed on GBR by the Secretary of State can be assessed against passenger growth and affordability. Such a direction would have a huge impact on the financial position of GBR, because decisions on fares and passenger growth and affordability are central to revenue. It is crucial that decisions are made on proper evidence and in line with the objects of GBR.”
House of Commons27 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Is it the Government’s intention that directions issued under clause 7 will be, as described in the explanatory notes, used as a “last resort” emergency brake, or do they intend—this is the case as the Bill is drafted—that the Secretary of State will give himself or herself the power to intervene in day-to-day management, even down to the level that individual decisions will not be taken until there has been consultation with the Secretary of State or the Secretary of State has consented to them? Clause 7(5) needs improvement. It requires publication by the Secretary of State, but anticipates no role for Parliament in that oversight. The organisation Rail Forum said: “We agree that this is desirable to ensure GBR remains arm’s length and is allowed to manage its own affairs.” That is important.”
House of Commons27 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“We are told that the powers in the clause will be used only as a last resort, but subsection (2) states: “A direction under this section may provide, in particular, that a function is only to be exercised— (a) after consulting the Secretary of State, or (b) with the Secretary of State’s consent.” The clause is not an emergency lever. It is quite clear from the drafting that the circumstances in subsection (2) cannot apply to a last-resort emergency lever. It is saying, “You can carry on doing things, but we need to have oversight in the nitty-gritty.” It is truly an interference clause.”
House of Commons27 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“First, the chief executive is given guidance from the Secretary of State. Most chief executives worth their salt would take notice of official guidance given by their 100% shareholder, but if for some reason they fail to act on the guidance and they are still missing their KPI, then the power to dismiss would be exercisable. In my submission, that is a good approach. Clause 7(2)—the “interference clause”—anticipates minor direction changes, which is exactly the kind of direction that should not be issued and is contrary to the explanatory notes.”
House of Commons27 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“That is a perfectly fair challenge, but amendment 11 would not require the CEO’s removal by the Secretary of State if those KPIs are not met; it would be a necessary first step to demonstrate that the KPIs are not being met, and then there would be a discretion. I suppose the hon. Member is really arguing that my safeguard is not quite as strong as it could be. Nevertheless, it would be a step in the right direction, and it would not require the removal of the chief executive. New clause 4 would give the Secretary of State the power to dismiss the CEO of GBR on the grounds that a KPI has not been met and—this is an important bit, which the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage might recognise gives the new clause some weight—GBR has failed to act on guidance that has been issued by the Secretary of State under clause 9. It is sequential.”
House of Commons27 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“As parliamentarians, we know our value in holding not only GBR to account but the Government of the day, which will not always be a Labour one. That is our important role, which is done through the Select Committee process and more widely. As parliamentarians, we should seek to improve the Bill. I recognise that we will have a number of Divisions during this process and I am unlikely to win a single one, but I urge the Government to listen—perhaps to the private comments of its own Committee members; they do not have to tell me about it—because these are genuine areas of improvement that we as parliamentarians should be encouraging the Government to add to the Bill. On that note, I will stop.”
House of Commons27 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“My hon. Friend is entirely right. That will be a theme of our comments on and challenges to the Bill throughout the progress of our scrutiny: accountability without responsibility is no accountability at all. Time and again, we see an unwillingness from those who drafted the Bill to trust the role of parliamentarians as scrutineers. As a former businessman, I know—I have not made this one up; it is not unique thinking—that, in any organisation, you get what you measure. That will have been the case in any organisation that hon. and right hon. Members may have worked in in the private or public sector: the NHS has targets because it gets what it measures. At the moment, the Bill measures very little on GBR’s performance, and where it does, that disappears off to the Department for Transport and is reported to other civil servants.”
House of Commons27 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“As I have set out in my series of amendments, the appropriate oversight and control is to remove the chief executive. The Minister must accept that, if the Secretary of State thinks that the organisation is going in the wrong direction, is not listening to guidance or has gone rogue in some way, they have the unfettered power to remove the chief executive officer at any stage. If he does not think that is the case, he should say so now, because if the Secretary of State has the power to remove the chief executive officer and put in place someone who will do his bidding, then none of this is needed, is it?”
House of Commons27 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“I am grateful that the Minister is being very generous. In my opening remarks, I asked him to give me some real-world examples of when injunctive relief might be required. Could he not forget to provide those?”
House of Commons27 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“I am grateful to the Minister, though I remind him that we do have 14 sessions; we are not cantering to the last fence. He prays in aid National Highways. We are all constituency MPs. We all know how frustrating it is trying to deal with National Highways. I do not want to make a headline unnecessarily, but my personal view, as a constituency MP, is that trying to deal with National Highways in the interests of my constituents is almost impossible. Why would he choose that as the example to follow when designing accountability for GBR?”
House of Commons27 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“I am wholly unconvinced by the explanation the Minister has given. On many of the clauses and amendments I have put forward, and those put forward in the names of other Members, one can see both sides of the argument; on this one, I think the Government are entirely wrong. They are setting up a structure using another arm’s length non-governmental body, National Highways, that is a byword among us constituency MPs for a lack of accountability and for being a frustrating body to deal with. That is not the right direction for the Government to be going in and I will push the amendments to a Division. Question put, That the amendment be made.”
House of Commons27 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“I will speak further in detail on the memorandum of understanding when we reach clauses 23 and 24, but it is important that Ministers note that the current framework of the Bill relies on a document that has little oversight or clearly defined objectives, and which we have not seen.”
House of Commons27 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Bill Reeve, the director of rail reform for Transport Scotland, when invited to add further to the remarks from the Cabinet Secretary, said: “An awful lot will rely on the memorandum of understanding to flesh that out and give examples.” There is a question for the Minister surrounding this memorandum of understanding for Scottish and Welsh Ministers. A lot of the powers in the Bill seemingly rely on a document that is not part of the Bill. Will the Minister provide details of the memorandum of understanding prior to the passage of this Bill? If not, why does he refuse to let us know what the memorandum of understanding is likely to stay? Why does he believe that Parliament should approve a working arrangement between the devolved Governments on which no consultation has been undertaken?”
House of Commons27 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“That could be okay, but we as a Committee do not know, because we have not seen the memorandum of understanding, even in draft. We are going to come back to this issue again and again. There are a plethora of documents designed to support the operation of GBR—to support this skeleton Bill—and yet we have not seen them. How can this Committee do our job of scrutinising this Bill line by line, seeking to improve it and to ensure that it achieves the objectives that the Government say it does, when 19 documents and counting—documents that are crucial to the actual running of the railway both in Scotland and in the United Kingdom as a whole—are absent, even in draft?”
House of Commons27 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Clause 8 not only prevents GBR from being independent—as clause 7 does—but prevents devolved Ministers from acting within their own devolved settlements without being second-guessed by the Secretary of State. I accept that the Scottish Cabinet Secretary for Transport, Fiona Hyslop MSP, when speaking about clause 8 during the Transport Committee evidence session, seemed not to oppose that oversight, as she recognised that certain aspects, such as access and freight, remain reserved. It seems that Scottish Ministers are content to accept the clause as drafted because a further memorandum of understanding will create firebreaks between non-devolved powers, in which the Secretary of State may intervene, and devolved powers.”
House of Commons27 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“What a recipe for confusion, delay and poor governance that creates! Who is really in charge of the railways in Britain? It is certainly does not sound as though it is GBR, which is being second-guessed on the one hand by the Scottish Ministers and on the other by the Secretary of State. It does not sound as though Scottish Ministers are in charge even in Scotland, because they can suffer a revocation from the Secretary of State. Yet the consultation document tells us, as the Government have told us time and again, that “GBR will be operationally independent, staffed by experts and professionals from the rail sector…who will be empowered to deliver for passengers and freight customers without government interference in day-to-day decision-making.” When did that change? Perhaps the Minister can let us in to the secret.”
House of Commons27 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“The clause suffers from the same issues as clause 7, as I have already intimated: granting the Secretary of State, and then by extension Scottish Ministers, the ability to direct GBR, which is meant to be operationally independent. That is the first confusion. I will not rehash the arguments, but hon. Members should take it as read that I repeat them here. As the Minister just mentioned, clause 8(7) will allow the Secretary of State to revoke a direction given by Scottish Ministers under that clause. That is confusion No. 2. We anticipate circumstances in which GBR has a direction of travel—that is not meant to be a rail pun—with which the Scottish Minister disagrees; the Scottish Minister issues a direction for GBR to go in a different direction, and then the Secretary of State disagrees with that direction and issues a revocation.”
House of Commons27 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“The Committee will be pleased to hear that I am not going to reheat my arguments on clause 7, but we have not yet discussed clause 8. The arguments inevitably mirror each other to a degree, because clause 8 in the main seeks to extend the provisions of clause 7 to Scottish Ministers. Clause 8 will grant Ministers in Scotland the power to issue and publish directions to GBR—so far, so similar—and GBR will be required to comply with those directions. However, the Secretary of State has ensured that they will have the ability to remove a direction of Scottish Ministers where it is inconsistent with her directions. The clause requires the Secretary of State to consult Ministers in Scotland before revoking and must publish any revocations.”
House of Commons27 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Does the power lie with the board? Does the board have to get clearance from a second board in a wholly different organisation, which might have a different view? Should people in GBR wait for the nod from the Department for Transport before taking action within the organisation, particularly if it is a decision with which its sub-department may not agree?”
House of Commons27 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Now, if I was in the passenger seat of a vehicle and kept telling someone how to drive, I suppose I would call that a course correction, but they might call it backseat driving. That is the problem: the Bill is designed for backseat driving by the Department for Transport. Will the Minister explain how the clause is nothing short of backseat driving? I obviously wish GBR the best of luck, and I hope the Minister’s enthusiasm and optimism is fully justified, but I fear that the disastrous consequence of forcing it to walk on eggshells will be constant second-guessing. I have been involved in an organisation in which there was second-guessing—no one was sure who had the decision-making power—and it was a disaster. If there is second-guessing, the organisation as a whole does not know when a decision has been taken.”
House of Commons27 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗