Jerome Mayhew
MP for Broadland and Fakenham · Conservative · United Kingdom
“] I would be grateful if Members listened to the speech being made, rather than making their own from the Government Front Bench. Welfare dependency has to be addressed, yet we are waiting for a report, and then a response from the Government, and then a White Paper sometime next year, apparently.”
House of Commons28 October 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“That is an increase of more than a quarter of a trillion pounds in borrowing, with no plan to get it down and no credible plan to reduce welfare spending, which is the next major issue that we have to address.”
House of Commons28 October 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“I will go out on a limb and say that this is a terrible Budget. It is not just a “steady as it goes” Budget, because everyone in this Chamber knows that we have got some serious problems that have to be addressed by this country, both politically and economically. This will be known as the “kick it down the road” Budget.”
House of Commons28 October 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“I will not. I have only a minute left. We have tax rises being imposed on savers. What a weird argument that is—that increased taxes should be imposed on people who are doing the right thing.”
House of Commons28 October 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“This is ridiculous. We have Ministers telling us that we have to stockpile food, but we have capital expenditure that is due to take place after that 1,000-day period. This is back-to-front government, and it is a negligent Treasury that is imposing this on our defence sector.”
House of Commons28 October 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“The Government spent two and a half years virtue signalling about the North sea. They said there was no future for oil and gas and had a ban on licences, as well as increasing taxation.”
House of Commons28 October 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
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“There could be a scenario whereby GBR decided that, in order to meet its reliability duty”— and this is the point— “it reduced services to smooth them out and improve reliability, and in order to avoid overcrowding, it then introduced fares that” managed “demand, as has been suggested might happen on the west coast main line in the context of HS2. There might be scenarios where, for perfectly logical reasons, internally GBR might decide that it did not want to increase passenger demand either on a particular route or overall. It seems to us that it would be sensible to have an equivalent duty or pair of duties in the Bill on passenger demand as it has for freight. GBR would need, as we were just discussing, to work out how to optimise that objective versus the other objectives it has set out in the duties and functions.””
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“We know that the expansion and increase in capacity and connectivity in the rail network has huge socioeconomic benefits. Look at the Northumberland line that recently reopened; look at Crossrail. There are huge benefits from expanding network capacity and increasing the number of people who are able to travel by rail. If you look at the Bill, it is interesting that service performance is defined in terms of ‘reliability (including punctuality)’ and ‘the avoidance or mitigation of passenger overcrowding’.”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Our concern is that otherwise, the risk is that GBR might manage demand as a steady state, achieving its other objectives without necessarily seeking to grow demand by expanding the network or making better use of existing capacity.” Hon. and right hon. Members will recall—although the only right hon. Member has done a runner—that Ben Plowden made a substantially similar point in oral evidence to this Committee. I think he prayed in aid the experience post covid, when all sorts of targets were met, but that was because there were not any trains running. He went on to say to the Transport Committee: “It seems to us that the logic would suggest that if it is important for GBR to have a statutory incentive to promote a growth in freight traffic, it also ought to have a statutory incentive to do that for passenger growth.”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“In oral evidence before the Transport Committee, Ben Plowden, the chief executive of the Campaign for Better Transport, said: “We have a question about the difference in the duties between the way that freight is treated and passenger travel is treated: the duty on GBR and Secretary of State in relation to passengers is ‘to promote’ their ‘interests’, whereas it is ‘to promote the use of the…network’ for freight. Our view is that in order to incentivise GBR strongly—once it is set up—to grow the network and to grow passenger demand, there should be equivalent duties about passengers in clauses 18 and 17, so that GBR is required to promote the use of the network for passengers and future passengers, with a corresponding duty on the Secretary of State to set a passenger growth target.”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“It feels like they have chucked in a passengers’ council, which can be ignored because it has no enforcement powers, and then lip service is paid to the experiences of the passenger. We already know that Great British Railways as an organisation is dominated by Network Rail. It is an organisation with about 41,000 members of staff, to which is added every six weeks or couple of months another operating company of 2,000 to 4,000 staff. It is quite apparent where, without intervention, the dominating culture will come from. We have to focus on improving customer experience as a whole, and it is for that reason that I will press the amendment to a vote.”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“I am grateful to the Minister for her intervention, but it needs to be much clearer than that, because we are talking about the general duties of GBR. GBR will be able to rely on the definition and say, “We’ve satisfied our general duty under clause 18(2) because we have improved railway service performance as defined by the Minister,” which is reliability and the avoidance of passenger overcrowding. That is clearly wholly unacceptable and does not support the significant improvement that we all wish to see in the provision of passenger services. We think that amendment 32 is important, since the Government are not showing a customer focus and are being overly led by an engineering mindset.”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Does the hon. Gentleman not see the logic of the lobby group for rail freight saying that we should focus on rail freight while the lobby group in favour of the passenger, which I quoted earlier, says that there should be a passenger growth target? Does he not think that those representing passengers are better qualified to express an opinion on passengers than the rail freight lobbyist?”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Will the Minister clarify his argument? I ask because a business plan by its nature looks forward, whereas a report looks backward and marks homework. How can the business plan mark homework?”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“I am aware that we need to make progress in this Committee, so I will not press every amendment to a Division. I am not persuaded by the Minister’s arguments in relation to amendments 32 and 33, but I will not press amendment 31 to a Division. I wish now to press amendment 33 to a vote. Question put, That the amendment be made.”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“I beg to move amendment 36, in clause 18, page 10, line 41, at end insert— “(5) In this section, Great British Railways must make an assessment of the effect of procuring services from businesses in the private sector in meeting its duties under subsection (2)(f).” This amendment would require GBR to assess whether procuring services from the private sector would help it meet its value for money duty.”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Surely it makes sense to give the Secretary of State all the tools in the box to allow her to drive efficiency in GBR and cross-check value for money for the taxpayer.”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Just because we want GBR to be a success, let us not forget that, even once established, it will be a minority interest in relation to the rail sector as a whole. There is not just open access—there are all sorts of other users of and suppliers to the railways—so we can have both duties. They are not mutually incompatible. The new clause would require that the target must be kept under review and that GBR must have regard to it when exercising its statutory functions. The private sector is best at providing us with innovation and efficiencies and should therefore be used to ensure that GBR can be the best version of itself. In more common parlance, we need the private sector to keep GBR honest. The Bill designs the ORR and the Secretary of State out of comparing GBR against a thriving private sector.”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Amendment 98, which is tabled in my name, would require the Office of Rail and Road to consider whether it would be a “more efficient use of public funds” for GBR to procure services from the private sector. It echoes the other amendments in this group but would amend clause 74, which, as everyone will remember, relates to the ORR’s monitoring duties towards GBR. Amendment 236 would also amend clause 74 to require the Office of Rail and Road to assess whether procuring services from the private sector would better enable GBR to meet its value for money duty. New clause 43 relates to a private sector growth target. It would require the Secretary of State to publish a target for increasing private sector involvement in railway services and infrastructure for each financial year, including its involvement in supply chains and open access.”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“The clause currently allows the Secretary of State to award a licence only to a public-sector company. It cannot be in the best interests of the taxpayer to exclude even the consideration of alternative providers based on their ability and value for money. This is one of the most blatant examples of political ideology trumping pragmatism. The amendments would grant maximum flexibility to a future Secretary of State and Scottish and Welsh Ministers to make an award to the organisation, public or private, that is best placed to undertake the operation. It seems obvious that we should allow that degree of flexibility to the organisation and the Secretary of State in future.”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“I should make it clear for Labour Members who are considering supporting this amendment that it would not require GBR to choose a private sector provider, but it would require it to benchmark against the private sector. Procuring from the private sector could enable access to specialist expertise, innovation—dare I say that?—and competitive pricing, helping to deliver better value for money and more efficient outcomes for taxpayers. Will the Minister listen to the concerns of the industry and support this amendment, which seeks to make GBR an organisation that cares about passengers and taxpayers at the same time? Amendments 42 and 43 would amend clause 31, on the provision of railway passenger services, which we will get to in due course.”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Let us go straight into amendment 36, which would require GBR to benchmark the cost of its activities against similar provision through the use of the private sector. That is important, because if competition is removed, there is literally no benchmark against which to judge the effectiveness and efficiency of the organisation. Without comparison, where is the value in clause 18(2)(f), which says: “taking into account the costs that will need to be met from public funds and the need to make efficient use of those funds,”? What benchmark will the organisation have if it does not cross-reference against alternative providers? The amendment would require GBR to assess whether “procuring services from…the private sector” would help it to meet its value for money duty.”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“The hon. Member is as capable of reading the amendments as I am of drafting them. I do not want to get hung up on that, but my working assumption and my assertion to him is that the ownership structure internationally may be a state-owned organisation, but the delivery body in the United Kingdom would be a for-profit, private organisation, so it would pass the test of being in the private sector. Jolly good news too—if the British taxpayer can benefit from the largesse of the foreign taxpayer providing a more competitive service for whatever the Secretary of State is seeking to contract for, that is a wonderful thing. That is a gift from abroad, and we should be encouraging it.”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Thank you, Mrs Hobhouse; I am grateful for that guidance. Amendment 36 is a bench-marking amendment. It is absolutely crucial to keep GBR honest in the future when it comes to value for money, in particular for the taxpayer. I will certainly press it to a Division. Question put, That the amendment be made.”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“I can beat that. The clause appears necessary, and it is not one that His Majesty’s Opposition will object to. Question put and agreed to . Clause 19 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill . Clause 20 Competition duty of ORR”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“I beg to move amendment 237, in clause 20, page 11, line 21, leave out paragraph (c). This amendment removes the exemption for ORR’s functions under schedule 2 from its competition duty.”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Lord Hendy took the trouble to write to the Office of Rail and Road in July last year, and said: “The Government firmly believes that the arrival of competition will benefit users of international rail services by expanding the number of stations served (including new markets), encouraging greater differentiation in service provision and promoting competitive prices.” I could not have written it better myself. The Government are clearly sending out extraordinarily mixed messages: competition is good, except when it is against the Government. Those statements cannot both be right, can they?”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Despite the appearance that the clause allows the Office of Rail and Road to promote competition, examination of subsection 1(d) shows that the Office of Rail and Road is required to promote competition unless it gets in the way of the access and use policy, which—as the Committee will discuss later—does not promote competition at all. Elsewhere, the Government appreciate the positive impact of competition. Look at international rail.”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“The Minister, just a moment ago, said that there are circumstances in which he would wish open access to flourish and grow, yet the Bill as drafted does not give any confidence to that sector that an operator can put forward a business case and attract investment because such an operator does not know whether there will be fair competition around crucial elements of its business case—elements as basic as whether it will get access to the railways. In the Bill, such competition is specifically, expressly excluded. The exceptions in the clause are key to understanding the true intentions of the Government.”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Excluding from the competition duty chapter 1 of part 3 of the Bill means that key parts of GBR’s operation, such as the access and use policy and capacity duty—two very important issues—are not covered by the duty of competition. That effectively makes GBR all-powerful over any other operator, be it devolved, open access or freight. That is not competition; that is a designed monopoly. The Minister has said that the Government have taken that decision because they want GBR to be a single controlling mind, but GBR will not be the only operator on the railways.”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“The Government claim that they want the Office of Rail and Road to have a powerful role to monitor GBR and to promote laudable objectives such as “competition….for the benefit of users of railway services.” On the face of it, that is welcome. It is a sound principle, after all, that monopolies—whether they are public or private—are rarely in the interests of the consumer. It is for that exact reason that we created, over time, arms of the state such as the Competition and Markets Authority to break up anti-competitive monopolies in the private sector, although GBR is another monopoly that the Government are setting up, in the other direction. However, when we dig into the detail of what subsection (1) of the clause exempts from the competition duty, the picture becomes considerably less attractive.”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“I hope I am not going to miss out any of those amendments, Mrs Hobhouse, but it is going to be quite a challenge. Clause 20 concerns the “competition duty” of the Office of Rail and Road; it sounds pretty good when you read that title but the clause gets progressively less and less good once you delve into it. The clause requires the ORR to promote competition in the exercise of its functions, subject to certain exceptions. Exempt activities relate to safety, train driver licensing, the funding of GBR, GBR’s access process and decisions in relation to railway infrastructure, licence enforcement, functions under the Competition Act 1998, and monitoring GBR, where the Government believe that other considerations are equally or more important than the need to promote competition.”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“We are all pushing in the same direction because we are trying to stand up for passengers, and I hope the Government will too.”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“In the absence of other private passenger operators, whether via open access or a devolved concession, which would be equally powerful as a comparator for GBR’s performance, against what will GBR’s efficiency and performance on value for money be measured? Amendment 38 would correct the language in clause 20. I have not made it up myself; it has been considered and approved of by the sector as a whole—people standing up for passengers. On amendments 37, 41, 42 and 43, Rail Forum said: “Again, this is desirable to ensure some competition.” I have spoken to all my amendments, but I would also like to speak about amendment 210, which is in the name of the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage. The amendment also removes the exemption of the ORR’s duty to promote competition in regard to GBR’s access process. It is a variation on a theme.”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Amendment 38 would insert “and deliver value for money” after “competition” in clause 20, page 11, line 27. We do not need the Office of Rail and Road just to fight the cause of competition; it is also about value for money for the taxpayer. We have already heard that about 50% of all money spent on the railways at the moment is taxpayers’ money, not farebox money. It is therefore crucial that the ORR should have a duty to ensure that GBR delivers value for money. The general duty, as set out in clause 18, is to have regard to the “efficient use” of public funds. That is clearly insufficiently strong.”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“However, we want to see the ORR’s competition powers in these areas restored as a way to ensure that GBR, while having a reasonable duty to look at and balance the needs of the network as a whole, does not unfairly discriminate against other operators because we have GBR as referee and player. That is clearly a designed, structural conflict of interest. We need to have the ORR focusing on competition and holding the ring. Amendment 237 deals with funding, amendment 37 deals with access, amendment 238 deals with railway closures, and amendments 239 and 240 deal with advice to the Secretary of State and amendment 240 also deals with advice to the Secretary of State. I know all Members will have read those amendments, so I will not take the Committee through them one by one in the interests of time.”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“The amendments would keep alive the role of open access operators as challenger brands to GBR, forcing GBR to up its game and stay honest, just as we have seen with the nationalised operator on the east coast main line. Just because there would be competition, that does not mean that GBR would wither and decline. As we have seen on the east coast main line, competition drives increased performance and results from all organisations when properly applied. Competition is always uncomfortable. I complained about it many times in my previous business career. Many businesses, including my own, would have loved to be able to regulate it away. All the more reason for the Government to stand up to GBR in the interests of passengers. The Minister was quite right to say that it is a positive step that GBR will have oversight of the whole network.”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Furthermore, organisations have to put in their application for judicial review within three months of the commission of the event against which they are complaining. It is incredibly onerous, and perhaps the single biggest problem with the drafting of the Bill is a combination of those two issues. That was a very enjoyable aside, but I need to get on to the amendments—you are probably relieved to hear that, Mrs Hobhouse. Amendments 237, 37, 238, 239 and 240 essentially all serve to apply the ORR competition duty to GBR functions, to serve the passenger rather than the organisation of GBR. That is what we need to focus on time and again: this organisation is to serve the passenger, not itself as an organisation.”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Even though the bar is so high in legislation that it is almost impossible to appeal, we’re going to the ORR because clause 67 says that any organisation that is disgruntled at such a decision has a right to appeal.” Look at what the appeal duty provides for: organisations can go to the ORR, and there is an appeal akin to judicial review in the High Court, meaning that there can be no appeal at all on the application’s merits, which cannot be reopened. No evidence regarding whether there is a good business case can be considered—just whether there has been an error of law, or whether an organisation properly constituted could have come to that decision without irrationality. That is what the judicial review principles mean.”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“That is a bar, I suggest, that no open access application could ever get over. GBR gets a get-out-of-jail-free card. No one likes competition. When I ran businesses, I did my best to avoid competition as much as I could. The inclination of GBR will be no different. It will not want to be shown up by competition. It will not want its market to be pinched by competition. All it will have to do is look at clause 63 and say, “There you go. At some stage in the future we might think about having something there,” and Bob’s your uncle. Then what can the open access operators do? They could say, “That is a terrible decision. We’re going to appeal it.”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“It may well do, in short answer. The Minister makes a valid point: having a single point of contact for this may well have a benefit. Of course, it could be the Office of Rail and Road as opposed to GBR, but the real problem, which we will come on to in a few hours—or days—is the drafting of clause 63, which concerns the capacity duty and the very onerous level that open access operators will have to get above in order for GBR to consider that there is sufficient excess capacity to allow for new services. As clause 63(2) states: “Great British Railways must exercise the functions so as to ensure that it retains sufficient capacity over GBR infrastructure to allow for…the operation of GBR passenger services and of railway passenger services that it expects will in future be GBR passenger services”.”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“You will not be wholly surprised, Mrs Hobhouse, to know that I am entirely unconvinced by the Minister’s arguments. This is one of the key differences of opinion between the Government and the sector, and I seek to give the sector a voice through my amendments and my submissions. I will look to you, Mrs Hobhouse, for guidance on the exact process; I intend to press some amendments to a Division, but not all of them, to save a bit of time for everyone.”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“To give you an advance clue, I intend to press amendments 237 and 37 to a vote. Depending on the outcome of the vote on amendment 37, I may not seek to divide on the others, apart from amendment 38.”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“The Minister might not be able to whip an answer out of his back pocket, but perhaps he can clarify that issue once he has consulted his officials. Naturally, Scotland has had oversight of Network Rail for many years, so the working relationship between the ORR and GBR north of the border is not likely to change, but, similarly to my concerns about clause 21, protecting the ORR’s independence is important to the entire smooth functioning of the railways. I know the Minister would not wish to speak for Scottish Ministers, but I would very much appreciate it if he could outline the dispute resolution mechanism between the Secretary of State and devolved Ministers. The Minister will be delighted to hear that, beyond that query, we do not oppose clause 22.”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“I have a query about clause 22—I am not leading up to some devastating amendment—in respect of the dispute resolution process, if one exists, between the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers. Under clause 21, the Secretary of State must consult Welsh Ministers—that creates a clear direction for the conversation—but there does not appear to be an equivalent provision in clause 22. I would be grateful if the Minister could clarify that seeming contradiction and expand further on what happens in a situation where the guidance issued by the Scottish Minister contradicts that issued by the Secretary of State, or perhaps the other way round. Would that be covered by the memorandum of understanding, which of course we have not yet seen? Or is a tightening of statute on the horizon that we are not yet aware of?”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“In the new age of GBR, it is important that the Secretary of State, who will direct both the ORR and GBR, should be mindful not to create an environment in which the ORR feels it cannot be critical of GBR and its actions. Committee members will struggle to find many sectors where stakeholders praise their regulator, but it is right that Ministers should get out of the way of the work of the ORR, because its oversight work is the difference between life or death. I acknowledge that that is the Minister’s intention in clause 21. Clause 22 sets out the duty of the ORR to have regard to Scottish Ministers’ guidance, and clause 22 mirrors that, enabling Scottish Ministers to give guidance except on the safety-related issues I have mentioned.”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“The ORR publishes masses and reams of data as part of its continuing mission to provide transparency and oversight. By most key metrics, safety has improved significantly, with the UK being praised as one of the safest railways, if not the safest railway, in Europe. We really should stop and consider that achievement, whether it relates to nationalised or privatised parts of the industry. Government Members criticise privatisation, but it has not impinged on safety, and that is quite an achievement. It is vital that the ORR can continue its strong work in delivering not only a safe railway but a transparent one. The ORR has consistently worked by acting as a critical friend to the franchise operators and Network Rail.”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“The principle the Government continue to establish is important for the relationship between the state and the ORR when it comes to safety-related duties. I recognise the Government’s work to ensure that the clauses protect the ORR’s independence in many regards, rather than encroaching upon it. The protection of that independence is vital. When it comes to the relationship between Great British Railways, the ORR, the Department for Transport and Ministers, as well as the various devolved Governments and mayoralties —not forgetting the fact that passengers count—the Opposition have thought long and hard about how we can ensure that the ORR maintains its standards of excellence as a regulator. I want to take this opportunity to review the safety record of the railways overseen by ORR as the safety regulator since its inception in 2004.”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“I beg to move amendment 39, in clause 23, page 13, line 9, at end insert— “(3) The memorandum of understanding must be published at the same time as the Rail Strategy. (4) The memorandum of understanding must be laid before both Houses of Parliament for a period of two months before it can come into force.” This amendment would require the memorandum of understanding to be published at the same time as the Rail Strategy, and laid before Parliament for two months before it can come into force.”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“The Opposition believe it is vital for Ministers to outline, at the very least, the broad framework for the basis of the memorandum if they will not commit to provide core elements in the Bill itself. It really is very frustrating: we are paid to come to this Committee to give the Bill line-by-line consideration, set up the function of GBR and improve the relationship among Ministers in Whitehall, Edinburgh and Cardiff, the ORR and the other organisations affected by GBR, yet time and again we get the blank answer, “Oh well, this is going to be sorted out somewhere else.” It is very hard to say with confidence that we have scrutinised the Bill and come to an improved outcome when the Government have not done the work on the detail. This is not the first time Members have heard me say that—”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“I do not know why I bothered going to the gym this morning, Mrs Hobhouse, because I have been doing squat thrusts every time I rise to speak to a new group of amendments. Clause 23 deals with the memorandum of understanding, about which we have heard so much but know so little, and the relationship between the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers. It sets out the key arrangements between the UK Government and the Scottish Government, stating the intention for the memorandum of understanding to include steps to facilitate the integration of GBR infrastructure and Scottish railway services. The elephant in the room is that is none of that is set out in the Bill.”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Parliament is being asked to give broad Executive powers as if an international treaty were being negotiated, but this is not an international treaty. Parliament ought to have the right to approve the memorandums to ensure, in particular, that Members whose constituencies are affected by them have a say on behalf of their constituents. That is what amendment 39 would provide, by providing two additions: that a memorandum be published at the same time as the rail strategy, which would give a concrete timeframe for the delivery of that important document, and that it be laid before Parliament for a period of two months before it can come into force. I look forward to the Government’s response.”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“My understanding is that it will be coming into force in late March, which is only weeks away. Given that the Minister will be eager to ensure that all the appropriate orders and memorandums are in place as quickly as is reasonably possible, what thought has he given to avoiding a rush job ahead of the election, or to the timetable for the memorandums of understanding being reached with any change of Government in Scotland? This is actually quite a significant question. Is the Minister going to rush it through to get it in before March? What happens if there is a change of Administration north of the border? It is with that uncertainty in mind that we believe the clause ought to have a clear timeframe for the publication of the MOU. The memorandums of understanding should be laid before Parliament for approval.”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“I stand to be informed by the Minister, but my current understanding is that that agreement has not yet been reached. The lack of oversight is clearly at the core of this issue. Parliament is expected to allow the Secretary of State and her Scottish counterpart to set the tone of the nature of rail operations without any say from this House, beyond this clause. The Government criticise the franchise system, but at least the parameters for its operation were clearly set out. Memorandums of understanding are nothing more than IOUs to the trust of parliamentarians, and we should not willingly give those out. There is a further issue at stake here: the Scottish parliamentary elections. This is a matter of practicalities, as opposed to principles. The pre-election period, or purdah, is rapidly approaching for the Scottish Parliament.”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“What legal standing will the memorandums have? They do not appear to have statutory force, and there is very little democratic accountability, as I have mentioned. As far as I can see, the memorandum is essentially a handshake agreement. Not a single member of this Committee is any the wiser about what will be part of the memorandums. Finally, what happens if no agreement is reached on a memorandum of understanding between the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers? The Minister can give evidence about his willingness to reach agreement, but he cannot give evidence on the part of Scottish Ministers. They can be willing to negotiate, but he cannot say with confidence that they will achieve full agreement until such time as that agreement is reached.”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“I hope it will be the last, but I fear I will not be. I have some key questions for the Minister. I understand that the memorandum of understanding has not yet been finalised; has the work to scope it out even begun? The Minister should at least be able to answer that. At what stage in the deliberations between the two Ministries has it got to? What is the timeline for a memorandum of understanding under the clause being finalised and therefore made public? How often, if at all, must the memorandum of understanding be reviewed, updated or renegotiated? Or is it a one-stop shop? It currently seems that the memorandums will have no statutory force. Unless I have missed something in the Bill—I always enjoy being corrected when I have missed something—it is not in there at the moment. Is that by design?”
House of Commons29 January 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗