Jerome Mayhew
MP for Broadland and Fakenham · Conservative · United Kingdom
“More than 100 organisations have warned the Government that their early release scheme will put women and girls at increased risk. Can the Minister explain to the House and to those organisations how the scheme will help her to halve violence against women and girls?”
“It is apparent to absolutely everyone that this local government reform is now a shambolic, incompetent mess. I just want to put on record how much time, as well as money, has been spent by councillors and council officials right across Norfolk, where this has been a massive, monumental distraction, not for months, but for years.”
“Rural and coastal communities are particularly reliant on seasonal tourism. If Members look at my registered interests, they will see that I used to run one of those businesses. Do the Government not understand that it is already tough enough out there, without them thinking up a new tax on holidays?”
“I am very aware that this may be the last time I face these Ministers across the Dispatch Box, so I just want to say that from my perspective, they are a good bunch. I have really enjoyed it, and I wish each and every one of them the best of luck on Monday or Tuesday.”
“Q7. Books are going to be written about how a Mayor of Manchester has managed to out-manoeuvre a sitting Prime Minister with a 170-seat majority and take the keys to No. 10.”
“Scotland’s beef breeding herd is in trouble; it is down 373,000 in the last decade. There are also declines in dairy cattle, pigs and chickens, which show that the industry is in distress.”
The complete record
Every one of 604 lines we hold for Jerome Mayhew, in date order, each linked to its source. Free to read, in full, without an account. Page 9 of 13.
“I beg to move amendment 237, in clause 20, page 11, line 21, leave out paragraph (c). This amendment removes the exemption for ORR’s functions under schedule 2 from its competition duty.”
“Lord Hendy took the trouble to write to the Office of Rail and Road in July last year, and said: “The Government firmly believes that the arrival of competition will benefit users of international rail services by expanding the number of stations served (including new markets), encouraging greater differentiation in service provision and promoting competitive prices.” I could not have written it better myself. The Government are clearly sending out extraordinarily mixed messages: competition is good, except when it is against the Government. Those statements cannot both be right, can they?”
“Despite the appearance that the clause allows the Office of Rail and Road to promote competition, examination of subsection 1(d) shows that the Office of Rail and Road is required to promote competition unless it gets in the way of the access and use policy, which—as the Committee will discuss later—does not promote competition at all. Elsewhere, the Government appreciate the positive impact of competition. Look at international rail.”
“The Minister, just a moment ago, said that there are circumstances in which he would wish open access to flourish and grow, yet the Bill as drafted does not give any confidence to that sector that an operator can put forward a business case and attract investment because such an operator does not know whether there will be fair competition around crucial elements of its business case—elements as basic as whether it will get access to the railways. In the Bill, such competition is specifically, expressly excluded. The exceptions in the clause are key to understanding the true intentions of the Government.”
“Excluding from the competition duty chapter 1 of part 3 of the Bill means that key parts of GBR’s operation, such as the access and use policy and capacity duty—two very important issues—are not covered by the duty of competition. That effectively makes GBR all-powerful over any other operator, be it devolved, open access or freight. That is not competition; that is a designed monopoly. The Minister has said that the Government have taken that decision because they want GBR to be a single controlling mind, but GBR will not be the only operator on the railways.”
“The Government claim that they want the Office of Rail and Road to have a powerful role to monitor GBR and to promote laudable objectives such as “competition….for the benefit of users of railway services.” On the face of it, that is welcome. It is a sound principle, after all, that monopolies—whether they are public or private—are rarely in the interests of the consumer. It is for that exact reason that we created, over time, arms of the state such as the Competition and Markets Authority to break up anti-competitive monopolies in the private sector, although GBR is another monopoly that the Government are setting up, in the other direction. However, when we dig into the detail of what subsection (1) of the clause exempts from the competition duty, the picture becomes considerably less attractive.”
“I hope I am not going to miss out any of those amendments, Mrs Hobhouse, but it is going to be quite a challenge. Clause 20 concerns the “competition duty” of the Office of Rail and Road; it sounds pretty good when you read that title but the clause gets progressively less and less good once you delve into it. The clause requires the ORR to promote competition in the exercise of its functions, subject to certain exceptions. Exempt activities relate to safety, train driver licensing, the funding of GBR, GBR’s access process and decisions in relation to railway infrastructure, licence enforcement, functions under the Competition Act 1998, and monitoring GBR, where the Government believe that other considerations are equally or more important than the need to promote competition.”
“We are all pushing in the same direction because we are trying to stand up for passengers, and I hope the Government will too.”
“In the absence of other private passenger operators, whether via open access or a devolved concession, which would be equally powerful as a comparator for GBR’s performance, against what will GBR’s efficiency and performance on value for money be measured? Amendment 38 would correct the language in clause 20. I have not made it up myself; it has been considered and approved of by the sector as a whole—people standing up for passengers. On amendments 37, 41, 42 and 43, Rail Forum said: “Again, this is desirable to ensure some competition.” I have spoken to all my amendments, but I would also like to speak about amendment 210, which is in the name of the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage. The amendment also removes the exemption of the ORR’s duty to promote competition in regard to GBR’s access process. It is a variation on a theme.”
“Amendment 38 would insert “and deliver value for money” after “competition” in clause 20, page 11, line 27. We do not need the Office of Rail and Road just to fight the cause of competition; it is also about value for money for the taxpayer. We have already heard that about 50% of all money spent on the railways at the moment is taxpayers’ money, not farebox money. It is therefore crucial that the ORR should have a duty to ensure that GBR delivers value for money. The general duty, as set out in clause 18, is to have regard to the “efficient use” of public funds. That is clearly insufficiently strong.”
“However, we want to see the ORR’s competition powers in these areas restored as a way to ensure that GBR, while having a reasonable duty to look at and balance the needs of the network as a whole, does not unfairly discriminate against other operators because we have GBR as referee and player. That is clearly a designed, structural conflict of interest. We need to have the ORR focusing on competition and holding the ring. Amendment 237 deals with funding, amendment 37 deals with access, amendment 238 deals with railway closures, and amendments 239 and 240 deal with advice to the Secretary of State and amendment 240 also deals with advice to the Secretary of State. I know all Members will have read those amendments, so I will not take the Committee through them one by one in the interests of time.”
“The amendments would keep alive the role of open access operators as challenger brands to GBR, forcing GBR to up its game and stay honest, just as we have seen with the nationalised operator on the east coast main line. Just because there would be competition, that does not mean that GBR would wither and decline. As we have seen on the east coast main line, competition drives increased performance and results from all organisations when properly applied. Competition is always uncomfortable. I complained about it many times in my previous business career. Many businesses, including my own, would have loved to be able to regulate it away. All the more reason for the Government to stand up to GBR in the interests of passengers. The Minister was quite right to say that it is a positive step that GBR will have oversight of the whole network.”
“Furthermore, organisations have to put in their application for judicial review within three months of the commission of the event against which they are complaining. It is incredibly onerous, and perhaps the single biggest problem with the drafting of the Bill is a combination of those two issues. That was a very enjoyable aside, but I need to get on to the amendments—you are probably relieved to hear that, Mrs Hobhouse. Amendments 237, 37, 238, 239 and 240 essentially all serve to apply the ORR competition duty to GBR functions, to serve the passenger rather than the organisation of GBR. That is what we need to focus on time and again: this organisation is to serve the passenger, not itself as an organisation.”
“Even though the bar is so high in legislation that it is almost impossible to appeal, we’re going to the ORR because clause 67 says that any organisation that is disgruntled at such a decision has a right to appeal.” Look at what the appeal duty provides for: organisations can go to the ORR, and there is an appeal akin to judicial review in the High Court, meaning that there can be no appeal at all on the application’s merits, which cannot be reopened. No evidence regarding whether there is a good business case can be considered—just whether there has been an error of law, or whether an organisation properly constituted could have come to that decision without irrationality. That is what the judicial review principles mean.”
“That is a bar, I suggest, that no open access application could ever get over. GBR gets a get-out-of-jail-free card. No one likes competition. When I ran businesses, I did my best to avoid competition as much as I could. The inclination of GBR will be no different. It will not want to be shown up by competition. It will not want its market to be pinched by competition. All it will have to do is look at clause 63 and say, “There you go. At some stage in the future we might think about having something there,” and Bob’s your uncle. Then what can the open access operators do? They could say, “That is a terrible decision. We’re going to appeal it.”
“It may well do, in short answer. The Minister makes a valid point: having a single point of contact for this may well have a benefit. Of course, it could be the Office of Rail and Road as opposed to GBR, but the real problem, which we will come on to in a few hours—or days—is the drafting of clause 63, which concerns the capacity duty and the very onerous level that open access operators will have to get above in order for GBR to consider that there is sufficient excess capacity to allow for new services. As clause 63(2) states: “Great British Railways must exercise the functions so as to ensure that it retains sufficient capacity over GBR infrastructure to allow for…the operation of GBR passenger services and of railway passenger services that it expects will in future be GBR passenger services”.”
“You will not be wholly surprised, Mrs Hobhouse, to know that I am entirely unconvinced by the Minister’s arguments. This is one of the key differences of opinion between the Government and the sector, and I seek to give the sector a voice through my amendments and my submissions. I will look to you, Mrs Hobhouse, for guidance on the exact process; I intend to press some amendments to a Division, but not all of them, to save a bit of time for everyone.”
“To give you an advance clue, I intend to press amendments 237 and 37 to a vote. Depending on the outcome of the vote on amendment 37, I may not seek to divide on the others, apart from amendment 38.”
“The Minister might not be able to whip an answer out of his back pocket, but perhaps he can clarify that issue once he has consulted his officials. Naturally, Scotland has had oversight of Network Rail for many years, so the working relationship between the ORR and GBR north of the border is not likely to change, but, similarly to my concerns about clause 21, protecting the ORR’s independence is important to the entire smooth functioning of the railways. I know the Minister would not wish to speak for Scottish Ministers, but I would very much appreciate it if he could outline the dispute resolution mechanism between the Secretary of State and devolved Ministers. The Minister will be delighted to hear that, beyond that query, we do not oppose clause 22.”
“I have a query about clause 22—I am not leading up to some devastating amendment—in respect of the dispute resolution process, if one exists, between the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers. Under clause 21, the Secretary of State must consult Welsh Ministers—that creates a clear direction for the conversation—but there does not appear to be an equivalent provision in clause 22. I would be grateful if the Minister could clarify that seeming contradiction and expand further on what happens in a situation where the guidance issued by the Scottish Minister contradicts that issued by the Secretary of State, or perhaps the other way round. Would that be covered by the memorandum of understanding, which of course we have not yet seen? Or is a tightening of statute on the horizon that we are not yet aware of?”
“In the new age of GBR, it is important that the Secretary of State, who will direct both the ORR and GBR, should be mindful not to create an environment in which the ORR feels it cannot be critical of GBR and its actions. Committee members will struggle to find many sectors where stakeholders praise their regulator, but it is right that Ministers should get out of the way of the work of the ORR, because its oversight work is the difference between life or death. I acknowledge that that is the Minister’s intention in clause 21. Clause 22 sets out the duty of the ORR to have regard to Scottish Ministers’ guidance, and clause 22 mirrors that, enabling Scottish Ministers to give guidance except on the safety-related issues I have mentioned.”
“The ORR publishes masses and reams of data as part of its continuing mission to provide transparency and oversight. By most key metrics, safety has improved significantly, with the UK being praised as one of the safest railways, if not the safest railway, in Europe. We really should stop and consider that achievement, whether it relates to nationalised or privatised parts of the industry. Government Members criticise privatisation, but it has not impinged on safety, and that is quite an achievement. It is vital that the ORR can continue its strong work in delivering not only a safe railway but a transparent one. The ORR has consistently worked by acting as a critical friend to the franchise operators and Network Rail.”
“The principle the Government continue to establish is important for the relationship between the state and the ORR when it comes to safety-related duties. I recognise the Government’s work to ensure that the clauses protect the ORR’s independence in many regards, rather than encroaching upon it. The protection of that independence is vital. When it comes to the relationship between Great British Railways, the ORR, the Department for Transport and Ministers, as well as the various devolved Governments and mayoralties —not forgetting the fact that passengers count—the Opposition have thought long and hard about how we can ensure that the ORR maintains its standards of excellence as a regulator. I want to take this opportunity to review the safety record of the railways overseen by ORR as the safety regulator since its inception in 2004.”
“I beg to move amendment 39, in clause 23, page 13, line 9, at end insert— “(3) The memorandum of understanding must be published at the same time as the Rail Strategy. (4) The memorandum of understanding must be laid before both Houses of Parliament for a period of two months before it can come into force.” This amendment would require the memorandum of understanding to be published at the same time as the Rail Strategy, and laid before Parliament for two months before it can come into force.”
“The Opposition believe it is vital for Ministers to outline, at the very least, the broad framework for the basis of the memorandum if they will not commit to provide core elements in the Bill itself. It really is very frustrating: we are paid to come to this Committee to give the Bill line-by-line consideration, set up the function of GBR and improve the relationship among Ministers in Whitehall, Edinburgh and Cardiff, the ORR and the other organisations affected by GBR, yet time and again we get the blank answer, “Oh well, this is going to be sorted out somewhere else.” It is very hard to say with confidence that we have scrutinised the Bill and come to an improved outcome when the Government have not done the work on the detail. This is not the first time Members have heard me say that—”
“I do not know why I bothered going to the gym this morning, Mrs Hobhouse, because I have been doing squat thrusts every time I rise to speak to a new group of amendments. Clause 23 deals with the memorandum of understanding, about which we have heard so much but know so little, and the relationship between the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers. It sets out the key arrangements between the UK Government and the Scottish Government, stating the intention for the memorandum of understanding to include steps to facilitate the integration of GBR infrastructure and Scottish railway services. The elephant in the room is that is none of that is set out in the Bill.”
“Parliament is being asked to give broad Executive powers as if an international treaty were being negotiated, but this is not an international treaty. Parliament ought to have the right to approve the memorandums to ensure, in particular, that Members whose constituencies are affected by them have a say on behalf of their constituents. That is what amendment 39 would provide, by providing two additions: that a memorandum be published at the same time as the rail strategy, which would give a concrete timeframe for the delivery of that important document, and that it be laid before Parliament for a period of two months before it can come into force. I look forward to the Government’s response.”
“My understanding is that it will be coming into force in late March, which is only weeks away. Given that the Minister will be eager to ensure that all the appropriate orders and memorandums are in place as quickly as is reasonably possible, what thought has he given to avoiding a rush job ahead of the election, or to the timetable for the memorandums of understanding being reached with any change of Government in Scotland? This is actually quite a significant question. Is the Minister going to rush it through to get it in before March? What happens if there is a change of Administration north of the border? It is with that uncertainty in mind that we believe the clause ought to have a clear timeframe for the publication of the MOU. The memorandums of understanding should be laid before Parliament for approval.”
“I stand to be informed by the Minister, but my current understanding is that that agreement has not yet been reached. The lack of oversight is clearly at the core of this issue. Parliament is expected to allow the Secretary of State and her Scottish counterpart to set the tone of the nature of rail operations without any say from this House, beyond this clause. The Government criticise the franchise system, but at least the parameters for its operation were clearly set out. Memorandums of understanding are nothing more than IOUs to the trust of parliamentarians, and we should not willingly give those out. There is a further issue at stake here: the Scottish parliamentary elections. This is a matter of practicalities, as opposed to principles. The pre-election period, or purdah, is rapidly approaching for the Scottish Parliament.”
“What legal standing will the memorandums have? They do not appear to have statutory force, and there is very little democratic accountability, as I have mentioned. As far as I can see, the memorandum is essentially a handshake agreement. Not a single member of this Committee is any the wiser about what will be part of the memorandums. Finally, what happens if no agreement is reached on a memorandum of understanding between the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers? The Minister can give evidence about his willingness to reach agreement, but he cannot give evidence on the part of Scottish Ministers. They can be willing to negotiate, but he cannot say with confidence that they will achieve full agreement until such time as that agreement is reached.”
“I hope it will be the last, but I fear I will not be. I have some key questions for the Minister. I understand that the memorandum of understanding has not yet been finalised; has the work to scope it out even begun? The Minister should at least be able to answer that. At what stage in the deliberations between the two Ministries has it got to? What is the timeline for a memorandum of understanding under the clause being finalised and therefore made public? How often, if at all, must the memorandum of understanding be reviewed, updated or renegotiated? Or is it a one-stop shop? It currently seems that the memorandums will have no statutory force. Unless I have missed something in the Bill—I always enjoy being corrected when I have missed something—it is not in there at the moment. Is that by design?”
“I am interested to hear the Minister’s strong hints that the memorandum of understanding may be much more advanced than we had previously been led to believe. The intention of amendment 39 was to flush out the MOU—it sounds like it may well have already achieved its purpose. Taking the Minister’s words at face value, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Clause 23 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 24 Memorandum of understanding: Secretary of State and Welsh Ministers”
“I tried to be understanding with the Minister in not pressing amendment 39 on Scotland to a vote, because of the direction he was able to hint at in his response. I look forward to being similarly reassured in respect of Wales.”
“He spoke in some detail about the future relationship between GBR and the Welsh Government, and how it relies on the memorandum of understanding. Will the Minister take this opportunity to reassure the Committee about the safeguards or timeline the Government have in place? Do they believe it would be helpful to have a clearer timeline, especially considering the electoral sensitivities and, if the opinion polls are to be believed, the likely change of Administration in Cardiff Bay? I have plenty more to say about this, but I am aware that it is getting dark outside and we have been going on for some time. Those concerns are the rationale for amendment 40, which would apply similar requirements to those that amendment 39 would have applied to clause 23.”
“There is a big caveat for Wales in particular, where—though I do not want to ruin anyone’s sleep tonight—it is very likely that Labour will be removed from office come May, and that there will be a new Government in Cardiff. It would be improper for a rush job to take place in order to shoehorn through a memorandum of understanding between two like-minded Administrations. I have tabled amendment 40 to clause 24 for the same reason that I tabled amendment 39 to clause 23. Amendment 40 seeks to introduce a degree of control over the timeline for the publication of the memorandum of understanding. In the Transport Committee evidence session on 17 December, Peter McDonald, who is the director for transport, spoke on behalf of the Welsh Government.”
“This is at the core of the issue of value for money, so it should be an important consideration, and I look to the Minister to provide reassurance that it is in the mix. I have a compounding concern, which I expressed in relation to clause 23, about the timeline of the publication of the memorandum of understanding. Again, a purdah period is approaching: the elections for the Welsh Senedd are in May. I think I am right in saying—my right hon. Friend the Member for Melton and Syston mentioned it—that it was suggested in the oral evidence that the heads of terms have already been agreed, but that is not the same as the memorandum of understanding being agreed, so we need a bit more detail from the Minister, if he is able to give it.”
“Taxpayers in both nations will rightly presume that the value of ticket sales will be distributed proportionately between both railways, as they will both be Government-run, rather than going to the operator whose livery happens to adorn the locomotive. The issue is relatively small in the discussions about Scotland, where I think only 3% of services are cross-border between England and Scotland. In Wales, the proportion is much greater, and I am concerned that there is no clear mechanism for how the allocation of ticket sales is set to be achieved or agreed. Will GBR and Transport for Wales—or, more accurately, the Secretary of State and the Welsh Ministers—come to a profit-sharing or fare-box sharing agreement as part of the memorandum of understanding?”
“From there, it manages services that run exclusively in England, such as Shrewsbury to Manchester. It also runs all manner of cross-border services, such as the Heart of Wales line, of which about 5% is in England, and Aberystwyth to Birmingham, which is 50:50 England and Wales—on it goes. Any memorandum of understanding will have to outline in detail, one assumes, how the allocation of moneys for tickets will be divided. This works both ways. Former Great Western Railway and Avanti services from London to Holyhead and from London to Swansea via Cardiff have significant portions of their routes running through Wales as well as England.”
“The relationship between the Welsh and UK Governments is far more nuanced and complex than the relationship in the case of ScotRail and the management of rail in Scotland. Transport for Wales covers a significant number of cross-border rail services. I stand to be corrected, but I think that as many as 80% of all its services have an element of cross-border movement. This harks back to the former private sector franchise of Arriva Trains Wales, which ran many England-only services and joint England-Wales services. That system of rail service provision persists under Transport for Wales; it is much more blended than is the case in Scotland. I have some examples. Shrewsbury station, which, for the geographically challenged, is in England, is managed by Transport for Wales.”
“The Government amendment makes further provision concerning the memorandum of understanding between the Secretary of State and Welsh Ministers. I have no objection to it. The Minister is absolutely right that clause 24 is similar in intention to clause 23, but there are huge questions about the role that Welsh Ministers are to have in the governance and management of GBR in their jurisdiction under the memorandum of understanding, and whether the Secretary of State will have any role in the governance and management of Transport for Wales. The Welsh settlement is very different from the Scottish one, in both geography and degree of devolution— I suppose that is how it can be most simply described.”
“I understand the point the Minister is making about the lack of relationship between those two documents. In the debate on the previous group, he was able to give an indication of the likely timeframe for publishing the Scottish memorandum of understanding. Can he give a similar hint on the Welsh memorandum of understanding? [ Interruption. ] There seems to be a bit of nodding on the Government Benches, but it is entirely up to him, because he decides.”
“Having heard the semi-reassurance of the Minister, I will not move amendment 40. Clause 24, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. — (Nesil Caliskan.)”
“I beg to move amendment 12, in clause 7, page 4, line 30, after “functions” insert— “where the Office for Rail and Road, in carrying out its functions under section 69A of the Railways Act 1993 (as inserted by section 74 of this Act), has deemed Great British Railways to be in breach of its statutory functions.” This amendment would restrict the Secretary of State’s ability to give directions to Great British Railways to circumstances where the Office for Rail and Road has deemed Great British Railways in breach of its statutory functions.”
“We will have the cost of GBR and its oversight structures—we are told in the recently published job application for the part-time chair that GBR will have more than 100,000 employees; it will be an enormous organisation, with its own senior management team—and then we will have the same again, with an overactive Department for Transport second-guessing GBR’s day-to-day working and being able to give guidance and directions as a result of clauses 7 and 8.”
“We are told repeatedly by the Minister and others that GBR is the directing mind, but will that really be the case if the clause goes through unamended? If GBR really is the directing mind, what is the necessity for the clause? It is a recipe for decision paralysis, with GBR, given the decision-making structures, undermined by guidance—we will come on to that when we discuss clause 9—and by directions from the Department for Transport in the name of the Secretary of State. Clause 7 really does risk creating the worst of both worlds.”
“Under subsection (5) of both clauses 7 and 8, directions must be published, but there is no requirement for them to be laid before and scrutinised by Parliament—the old trap of creating transparency without consequence. A reporting or laying requirement, perhaps through the Select Committee, would turn publication into genuine accountability. However, I am interested to hear what rationale the Minister has not to allow greater scrutiny of GBR in Parliament. Again, perhaps he will address that directly in his response. That is the rationale behind our suggested amendments to require the Secretary of State to lay directions before Parliament, in order to allow us to scrutinise the decisions in greater detail. There is a fundamental question about leadership and who is the key decision maker.”
“A question arises on clause 8(4), and I would be grateful if the Minister could provide clarity on the oversight system outlined in clauses 7 and 8. Subsection (4) states: “Before giving, varying or revoking a direction under this section the Scottish Ministers must consult the Secretary of State.” Presently, GBR must decide whether a decision directly affects devolved services, but the Bill provides no statutory test, which leaves a delivery body making politically sensitive judgments, further increasing the risk of challenge by devolved nations. Clarity for Members, especially those from the devolved nations, will be extremely helpful, so I would be grateful if the Minister would address that directly.”
“Without a clear breakdown of the procedures and directions, surely we run the risk of granting the Secretary of State a large degree of power with very limited oversight. The clause gives the Secretary of State unrestricted power, other than for operations in Scotland and Wales, to intervene in the running of GBR. That is a step too far. While it is justifiable for the democratically elected Government of the day to set and agree GBR’s strategic objectives, key performance indicators and business plans, after those are set out, the Government’s role should be to hold GBR to account for the delivery of the targets, objectives and strategies, and not to tell it how to do so on a day-to-day basis.”
“Interestingly, although the explanatory notes state that a direction by the Secretary of State is a mechanism of last resort, the clause itself gives no indication to substantiate that. Instead, it suggests that the Secretary of State can act independently of their Welsh and Scottish counterparts’ views, especially as there is a reliance on non-legislative measures. My first question to the Minister is, therefore: why is this supposed last-resort requirement not on the face of the Bill? When dealing with matters relating in particular to the interpretation of devolution, the risk is that any decision taken by the Secretary of State may be disputed by the devolved nations and end up as a political football, which only increases lawyers’ profits. Would it not therefore be prudent to set out in the legislation exactly what is meant?”
“It is just as pleasurable to have you in the Chair today as it was last week, Sir Alec. I remind hon. Members that clause 7 gives the Secretary of State the power to issue and publish directions to Great British Railways relating to its railway activities. It also outlines how the Secretary of State must obtain consent from Welsh and Scottish Ministers before giving directions relating to their devolved services, except where powers are used in relation to the access regime. The clause further outlines how GBR will be required to comply with directions, which are mandatory and binding, and intended to be used as a so-called “responsive tool for necessary course correction, rather than as a proactive tool to set requirements on GBR,” or, as further clarified in the explanatory notes, as “a last resort”.”