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UK PARLIAMENT · SITTING

Ben Obese-Jecty

MP for Huntingdon · Conservative · United Kingdom

IN THEIR OWN WORDS

The Secretary of State has announced that there will be a delay to the decision in Cambridgeshire and Peterborough. Most Cambridgeshire and Peterborough MPs are in the Chamber, but he has not gone into more detail on the reasons for the delay. What specific issues are causing a delay to the decision in Cambridgeshire and Peterborough?

LOCAL GOVERNMENT REORGANISATION · 2026-07-16 · READ IN HANSARD

Some 40% of roads in Cambridgeshire take up roughly 80% of the highways budget. With the forthcoming announcement about local government reorganisation in Cambridgeshire, what assessment has the Department made of the feasibility of that being deliverable given that most of those roads will end up in the same, much smaller unitary authori…

TOPICAL QUESTIONS · 2026-07-16 · READ IN HANSARD

The hon. Gentleman is making an excellent speech. The first four years—the near-term investment period—covers the period until the next election. The second half—the longer-term investment period—covers the next five years, all the way up to 2035.

REARMAMENT AND WARFIGHTING READINESS · 2026-07-08 · READ IN HANSARD

The hon. Member is making a very important speech. I agree that there should be a life extension plan for the Type 45, but we know that there is not one. It is not costed, it is not in the DIP, and the plan is to take them out of service over several years from 2035.

REARMAMENT AND WARFIGHTING READINESS · 2026-07-08 · READ IN HANSARD

Earlier this year I asked the Home Secretary at the Dispatch Box about the case of Fabian Henry, a child rapist who was removed from a deportation flight in 2021 after the Home Secretary herself, then in opposition, signed a letter calling for the removal of people from that flight.

ROCHDALE GROOMING GANG: OFFENDER DEPORTATION · 2026-07-06 · READ IN HANSARD

The defence investment plan is split into two parts: the near-term investment plan, which covers the four remaining years of this Parliament, and the long-term investment plan, which covers the following five years, up to 2035.

TOPICAL QUESTIONS · 2026-07-06 · READ IN HANSARD

The complete record

Every one of 601 lines we hold for Ben Obese-Jecty, in date order, each linked to its source. Free to read, in full, without an account. Page 5 of 13.

  1. The police are required to pick up the slack in so many different aspects of this, and I do not think that that is factored into or reflected in the way we are looking at the force structures. I hope that it will be factored into the review of the forces. Coming back to rural crime, in my constituency of Huntingdon, Cambridgeshire constabulary has an effective and successful rural crime action team, but they are only 14 strong and cover a huge rural area. This must be factored into discussions and not risk being lost in the maelstrom of big-ticket policing items brought under national control and a myopic focus on urban and neighbourhood policing.

    POLICE GRANT REPORT · 2026-02-11 · READ IN HANSARD

  2. The Minister mentions the factors that will go into the police allocation formula. That formula is currently based on the 2014 population size, and density and sparsity figures from 2001. However, since that formula first came into effect, an additional 300,000 people now live in Cambridgeshire. Will that be factored into the formula? From what date will the population data be taken? Will it be the 2021 census or the 2011 census?

    POLICE GRANT REPORT · 2026-02-11 · READ IN HANSARD

  3. I want to return to a question that was initially asked by the Opposition spokesperson, my hon. Friend the Member for South Suffolk (James Cartlidge). When the Prime Minister met Palantir and Peter Mandelson in February 2025 in Washington DC, was he aware that Palantir was a client of Peter Mandelson’s firm Global Counsel?

    MINISTRY OF DEFENCE: PALANTIR CONTRACTS · 2026-02-10 · READ IN HANSARD

  4. The Secretary of State talked about British people having a stake in our energy system, and generating returns for local communities and people. He then went on to say that he was on the side of local communities. I appreciate that he was talking about auction round 7, not nationally significant infrastructure projects, but in my constituency, we have the East Park Energy solar farm proposal. At 1,900 acres, it would have a huge impact on local communities. Residents of Great Staughton and Hail Weston in my constituency are massively opposed to the development. What would he say to my constituents, who feel that he is not on the side of local communities, given that the decision on this project falls squarely to the Secretary of State?

    LOCAL POWER PLAN · 2026-02-10 · READ IN HANSARD

  5. Rasheed Afrin, co-director of the al-Roj camp in Syria, recently commented that several ISIS-linked individuals have been repatriated from that camp to the UK. Can the Home Secretary say how many ISIS-linked individuals have been repatriated to the UK, and whether they were held in custody on their return?

    TOPICAL QUESTIONS · 2026-02-09 · READ IN HANSARD

  6. The Minister appears to have come to the Chamber today with absolutely nothing to say. The recent visit to China was an absolute disaster, with people taking burner phones and a burner plane—we even appear to have taken a burner Prime Minister. The Minister referred earlier to progress being made in these discussions, so can she outline exactly what progress has been made, and what was the response from the Chinese Government when the Prime Minister raised the case of Jimmy Lai with them directly?

    JIMMY LAI: PRISON SENTENCE · 2026-02-09 · READ IN HANSARD

  7. The Chief Secretary keeps making reference to, “If we had known then what we know now,” with regard to Peter Mandelson’s appointment. The key fact is that we already knew of Peter Mandelson’s ongoing relationship with Jeffrey Epstein, as the Prime Minister spoke about at PMQs last week, just as the Government knew about Matthew Doyle’s relationship with Sean Morton and still gave him a peerage after the internal investigation. Let me come back to the resignation statement of the chief of staff yesterday. He stated that he “did not oversee the due diligence and vetting process”. Can the Chief Secretary explain who did oversee the due diligence and vetting process?

    STANDARDS IN PUBLIC LIFE · 2026-02-09 · READ IN HANSARD

  8. Can the Justice Secretary tell us what is the current counter-drone strategy for HM Prison and Probation Service, given the current delays in the installation of physical unmanned aircraft systems countermeasures, what specific projects are actually in flight to develop the counter-UAS capability across our prison estate, and by when that capability will be available?

    PRISON ESTATE: SAFETY · 2026-02-03 · READ IN HANSARD

  9. The use of drones to bring contraband into prisons has become a significant issue. Last year there was an intra-year increase of 43% in the use of drones for illegal activity on the prison estate, and, as an MP with a prison in my constituency, HMP Littlehey, I find this surge in their use alarming. Last month the Justice Secretary announced that he had “tasked British prisons with learning from Ukraine’s drone expertise” with a £6.5 million funding stream, but no tenders are currently out to develop that capability. The only specific competition from the Ministry of Justice has been November’s £60,000 counter-drone challenge.

    PRISON ESTATE: SAFETY · 2026-02-03 · READ IN HANSARD

  10. I wholeheartedly agree that our most dangerous prisoners should be dealt with appropriately, but I will touch on an adjacent point around prison capacity. We are aware that the Government are in the process of rolling out more prison places—around 14,000—but we are also aware that none of those prison places are currently designated as category A. Looking at the most recent statistics for the beginning of the year, we see that of the available capacity in the prison system, only 12% is category A. Is the Justice Secretary confident that there is enough remaining capacity in the prison system at category A level, given that the remaining prison places planned are categories B to D? What is the number of available prison places remaining that will trigger a need for us to build out that capacity?

    SEPARATION CENTRES REVIEW · 2026-02-03 · READ IN HANSARD

  11. The Minister knows that I have a keen interest in this topic. There were 33 injuries sustained during Exercise Titan Storm. General Dynamics achieved initial operating capability for Ajax on 23 July, and between then and Exercise Titan Storm on 22 November, there were three other exercises: Exercise Scorpion Cyclone, Exercise Cyclone Storm and Exercise Tradewind. I asked the Minister a written question last year about how many injuries were sustained, but I am yet to receive a response. How many noise and vibration injuries were sustained on those three exercises? Will he confirm whether there were any injuries prior to his signing off IOC on 5 November?

    AJAX: INITIAL OPERATING CAPACITY · 2026-02-02 · READ IN HANSARD

  12. I want to follow up on the questions from the Chair of the Defence Committee, the hon. Member for Slough (Mr Dhesi), and from the hon. Member for Aldershot (Alex Baker), on the global combat air programme. The funding for the next round of GCAP is going to run out in a matter of months. That will affect Edgewing and the British phase of the programme. It has been reported that contract for the next phase of GCAP has been delayed, due to the delay to the defence investment plan. Will the contract be signed before the defence investment plan is published?

    CHINA AND JAPAN · 2026-02-02 · READ IN HANSARD

  13. The Ajax armoured vehicle programme is currently under threat, but work is due to be completed at the Merthyr Tydfil factory next summer. Could the Minister confirm whether there are any conversations through the UK Defence and Security Exports office around securing an export package for the Ajax vehicle and guaranteeing work at the factory going forwards?

    TOPICAL QUESTIONS · 2026-01-29 · READ IN HANSARD

  14. Regarding prison capacity, my understanding is that none of the 14,000 prison places that are planned is category A. Can the Minister confirm how much remaining capacity there currently is within the prison system at category A, and is he confident that there will be enough going forward? Twelve prison projects, including the new prison in Buckinghamshire, were due to be delivered by ISG Construction Ltd before it went into administration, and both the major project portfolio programmes it was working on are red-rated within that. Can the Minister confirm that all 12 of those projects have recommenced, and that a new contractor is now delivering them?

    PRISON CAPACITY: ANNUAL STATEMENT · 2026-01-29 · READ IN HANSARD

  15. Kudos to Mauritian Prime Minister Navin Ramgoolam, clearly a savvier negotiator than our dear Prime Minister. “There is no doubt that China and Russia have noticed this act of total weakness”, said President Trump. Perhaps the Prime Minister could ask Xi Jinping about it before he offers him a state visit.

    BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY · 2026-01-28 · READ IN HANSARD

  16. I asked that question on 5 February last year, and here we are, a year letter, with the treaty on the brink and no update from the Government, other than through a slightly churlish appearance from the Minister at the Dispatch Box in Monday’s urgent question. Crucially, the legislation was pulled from the other place that afternoon. Throughout the passage of the Bill, the Government have deflected, obfuscated, been dragged to the Chamber, given us the run-around on detail, gaslit us, and generally tried to force this deal through. The lack of speakers on the Government Benches is testament to the fact that Labour MPs simply do not want to put their name to this legislation. All it achieves is a weakening of our military options in the southern hemisphere, and the exemption of 80% of Mauritian workers from income tax.

    BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY · 2026-01-28 · READ IN HANSARD

  17. 25 between the ambassador of the United States of America and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, written on 30 December 1966, point (1) states very clearly: “The Territory shall remain under United Kingdom sovereignty.” This time last year, I asked the Government whether the 1966 exchange of notes would require amendment as a result of the change in sovereignty, and they answered: “The 1966 Exchange of Notes between the UK and US regarding the joint UK-US base on Diego Garcia has been subject to routine amendments and supplementation since signature. Any amendments resulting from the proposed agreement with Mauritius will be factored into this existing process.” Can the Minister outline what progress the Government have made?

    BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY · 2026-01-28 · READ IN HANSARD

  18. We should bear in mind that the Prime Minister is in China this week. Strategic posture across the Pacific, particularly in Taiwan and the second island chain, will surely come up in conversation. Ceding the Chagos islands to a country within China’s orbit is yet another strategic mis-step in the Prime Minister’s inability to deal with China robustly. On the ongoing issue of sovereignty, in note No.

    BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY · 2026-01-28 · READ IN HANSARD

  19. There are obviously no intercontinental ballistic missiles based at Diego Garcia, but the US nuclear triad is designed to provide a second-strike capability that includes air-launched warheads. Naval support facility Diego Garcia is a strategic waypoint for the US air force bomber fleet, the B-1, B-2 and B-52 bombers. Following 9/11, the US used Diego Garcia for operations in Afghanistan, and subsequently during the start of the Iraq war. As recently as last May, the US air force had B-2 bombers stationed on the island. This is critical because the B-2 Spirit is the delivery method for the Mod 11 B61-12 thermonuclear gravity bomb, the primary weapon for the ground-penetrating mission. This capability matters, and while it will likely never be used, we cannot afford to let enemies in the region know that that will never be on the table.

    BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY · 2026-01-28 · READ IN HANSARD

  20. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth responsible (Stephen Doughty) was quick to imply that discussions regarding the deal with the United States were an almost daily occurrence. With that in mind, perhaps the Minister in his summing up could outline to the House what discussions the Government have had with their US counterparts regarding the limitations placed on operations by compliance with the Pelindaba treaty. This was the answer I received to a recent written question: “Both the UK and Mauritius are satisfied that our existing international obligations are fully compatible with the Agreement”, but what precisely does that exclude going forward? The African nuclear weapon-free zone treaty was signed by Mauritius in 1996 and prohibits myriad functions relating to nuclear weapons, including possession or control of nuclear weapons.

    BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY · 2026-01-28 · READ IN HANSARD

  21. The UN General Assembly adopted resolutions urging the UK to comply with the ICJ’s advisory opinion, but crucially, the US voted in support of the UK, clearly not fearing the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, of which it is not a member. As I am sure everybody here already knows, the United States’s support is significant because of the presence of the naval support facility, Diego Garcia. It is a strategically important location that is effectively a persistent aircraft carrier in the Indian ocean, critical for force projection in the southern hemisphere and across INDOPACOM—the United States Indo-Pacific Command. On Monday, the Minister of State responsible for the overseas territories, the hon.

    BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY · 2026-01-28 · READ IN HANSARD

  22. So wrote the President of the United States only a week ago: “The UK giving away extremely important land is an act of GREAT STUPIDITY.” For once, he is not wrong. I have lost track of the number of times I have spoken about the Chagos deal in this House, but each time brings a new stick with which to beat the Government. It is genuinely difficult to see how the Government have got to this point, but their kamikaze negotiating tactics have led them to a situation where they can no longer even muster the collective energy of their Back Benchers to defend it. The dogged determination of the Government to capitulate to a 2019 advisory ruling by the International Court of Justice would be commendable, were it not so timid.

    BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY · 2026-01-28 · READ IN HANSARD

  23. Could the Minister explain why the previous Labour Government entered into negotiations in 2009, when the first talks took place with the Mauritian Government, which were ultimately ruled out after being criticised for being a unilateral decision around the marine protected area?

    BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY · 2026-01-28 · READ IN HANSARD

  24. Last week we had a discussion about the cost of this deal, and I asked the Minister whether he would confirm the figure of £34.7 billion from the Government Actuary’s Department. He did not give me a direct answer, but later in the debate he confirmed that it was a nominal amount, not adjusted for inflation or the social time preference rate. With that in mind, will the Minister give the House the most accurate assessment he can of the true figure for the total cost of the deal, adjusted for inflation and the social time preference rate?

    DIEGO GARCIA MILITARY BASE AND BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY BILL · 2026-01-26 · READ IN HANSARD

  25. Lastly, on pay, local police officers have raised concerns with me around things like the application of overtime and the adjustment bank, and of course the south-east allowance for forces in Cambridgeshire.

    POLICE REFORM WHITE PAPER · 2026-01-26 · READ IN HANSARD

  26. I have raised in the House a number of times the police allocation formula and how it impacts Cambridgeshire, which is the fourth worst funded force in the country. Could the Home Secretary outline how the formula will be changed to reflect the division of tasks between the National Police Service and regional forces? I heard what she said about rural crime and neighbourhood policing. The rural crime action team in Cambridgeshire, although incredibly under-resourced, is very effective. This seems like a fantastic opportunity to try to restructure rural crime action teams to tackle hare coursing and machinery theft, rather than neighbourhood policing in rural areas.

    POLICE REFORM WHITE PAPER · 2026-01-26 · READ IN HANSARD

  27. On the issue of the consolidation of the consular buildings, last week the Government informed me that they had no record of how many properties within London or within the UK are owned by the Chinese state, so how will they keep track on other buildings that are used unofficially by the Chinese state?

    CHINESE EMBASSY · 2026-01-20 · READ IN HANSARD

  28. The Minister will be pleased to know that I am not going to ask him about the FIRS, but he quoted extensively from the weighty tome of the planning approval letter. It says that the Secretary of State “notes that no bodies with responsibility for national security, including HO and FCDO, have raised concerns”, but he did not mention that it goes on to say that the Secretary of State “considers that the lack of objection from these bodies on this issue carries significant weight”. Given that extensive measures had to be put in place to protect sensitive data, will he explain why neither the Home Office not the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office put in any objections to the proximity of the data cables and their vulnerabilities?

    CHINESE EMBASSY · 2026-01-20 · READ IN HANSARD

  29. I thank the Minister for giving way and for his detailed explanation of how the calculations have been made. The Government Actuary’s Department clearly stated that this deal would cost £34.7 billion. That figure was then confirmed by his colleague, the Minister for the Middle East, who said that all the figures had been ratified by the Government Actuary’s Department, but his colleague sitting next to him, the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry, told me that that figure was inaccurate. Will the Minister therefore clarify how much this deal costs?

    DIEGO GARCIA MILITARY BASE AND BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY BILL · 2026-01-20 · READ IN HANSARD

  30. If I may, I will return to the topic of Craig and Lindsay Foreman. The Minister will be aware that they have been imprisoned for more than a year and are in Evin prison, regarded as the harshest in Iran. Can the Minister update the House on their medical condition since the outbreak of violence in Iran in recent weeks? Can he say when he was last informed of their medical condition, and whether they are still safe?

    IRAN: PROTESTS · 2026-01-19 · READ IN HANSARD

  31. Looking at the wider implications of the Bill, the Minister talks about the intelligence services. Can she confirm whether there is a carve-out for military intelligence services in any way? Looking at that more broadly still, will it also apply to special forces operations and personnel, and will it be applied retrospectively?

    PUBLIC OFFICE (ACCOUNTABILITY) BILL · 2026-01-19 · READ IN HANSARD

  32. The Minister talks about mandatory right-to-work checks in a way that implies it is always the worker who is the bad faith actor in the relationship. Will he explain how mandatory right-to-work checks will be used to check employers, who are often the guilty party for employing people illegally? Will he outline what other agencies will have access to the database in a passive way—that is, without having been asked to provide an individual’s ID—to work out what is going on?

    DIGITAL ID · 2026-01-15 · READ IN HANSARD

  33. Within the letter note AJAX the vehicle was described as ‘demonstrably safe to operate’.” The Minister added that “prior to Ajax Initial Operating Capability being announced, I sought assurances in writing from the Chief of the Defence Staff and the National Armaments Director that the system was safe to operate, which I received.”

    AJAX PROGRAMME · 2026-01-14 · READ IN HANSARD

  34. The Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry confirmed to me: “All criteria for Ajax Initial Operating Capability…were met on 23 July 2025 and following a period of review, IOC was declared by the Army on 15 September 2025.” We know that only because it was written on a cake in a General Dynamics promotional video of the Minister’s visit to Merthyr Tydfil. Additionally, he confirmed: “Before declaring Initial Operating Capability, I received written assurances from the Chief of the General Staff and the acting NAD”— national armaments director— “that the vehicle was safe to operate.

    AJAX PROGRAMME · 2026-01-14 · READ IN HANSARD

  35. As a result, it pressed ahead with the programme without resolving performance issues.” Given what we know now and the issues encountered less than three weeks after IOC was declared, I would like to hear an assessment from the Minister as to whether he believes that that is still an issue today. Initial operating capability for the Ajax programme was declared on 5 November 2025 by the Government; I stress “by the Government”, because several stages to that process were not made public until last month.

    AJAX PROGRAMME · 2026-01-14 · READ IN HANSARD

  36. Noise and vibration issues were recognised in mid-2020, with a stop notice issued in June 2021. All dynamic movement and transition activity was halted while the programme underwent a significant reset. The Army resumed training on Ajax in 2023, but paused again in November 2025. The programme’s issues from 2020 to 2021 are well documented. Those issues are a failure to establish effective governance, complex assurance arrangements, high turnover of senior staff, an ineffective programme board, weak project controls—the list goes on. The most stark, however, was “an over-emphasis on achieving its IOC”— initial operating capability— “target date, which meant that it prioritised time and cost over capability.

    AJAX PROGRAMME · 2026-01-14 · READ IN HANSARD

  37. The March 2022 National Audit Office report on the Ajax programme details the fact that neither the Department nor General Dynamics fully understood some component specifications or how they would be integrated on to the Ajax vehicle, leading to consequential changes to the overall design, disputes between the Ministry of Defence and General Dynamics and, inevitably, programme delays. Both the MOD and General Dynamics have been criticised for underestimating the scale of the work, the technical challenge and the sequencing of the work. General Dynamics blamed the MOD for not having fully defined acceptance criteria; the MOD blamed the General Dynamics safety documentation. The contingency within the programme was quickly used up and the programme was suddenly four years behind schedule.

    AJAX PROGRAMME · 2026-01-14 · READ IN HANSARD

  38. It is clear that the Ajax programme has been failing for a number of years, although I will go on to question some of the recent specific decision making regarding the programme. Accountability sits with successive Ministers. The slow progress on delivery appears to be an issue between the Army, the Department and General Dynamics. We can skip over the potted history of the Ajax programme—others will cover that—but, to paraphrase Rodgers and Hammerstein, “How do you solve a problem like Ajax?” Although it was based on an existing General Dynamics platform, the Army made so many additions and revisions to the existing capability that it is now considered to be bespoke technology. We are talking about a staggering 1,200 capability requirements for each of the six vehicle types under the Ajax umbrella.

    AJAX PROGRAMME · 2026-01-14 · READ IN HANSARD

  39. I beg to move, That this House has considered the future of the Ajax Programme. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Stuart. This debate has been a long time coming. Such is the Kafkaesque procedure for selecting debates that this application was granted only at the eighth time of asking; I had first requested a debate on this subject on 1 September 2025—over four months ago. Since then, the Ajax programme has gone from on track to throwing a track, and the outlook for the programme and our armoured capability, the future of armoured infantry as a concept and the current deployability of 3rd (UK) Division are now all very much under the microscope. In this debate, I am not seeking to apportion blame, point fingers at individuals or orchestrate a witch hunt.

    AJAX PROGRAMME · 2026-01-14 · READ IN HANSARD

  40. So which is it: Ares or Boxer for Javelin platoons? Will armoured infantry battalions be tracked or a mix of wheeled and tracked, with the logistical implications of that? Will Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers light aid detachments have both Ajax and Boxer repair and recovery variants? Where are we going to keep the additional vehicles? What is the training burden of mixed armoured fleets, thereby doubling driving cadres, maintenance training, and vehicle commanders’ courses? Have we even bought a recovery variant of Boxer yet? The Army’s own website suggests it is not one of the variants within the 623. This approach is incoherent and suggests that the Army does not really know what to do with the capability it will shortly have.

    AJAX PROGRAMME · 2026-01-14 · READ IN HANSARD

  41. It is equipped with a remote weapon station that can mount a 50-calibre machine gun at the heaviest. As someone whose specialisation in the Army was armoured infantry, I know my way around a 30 mm canon. A 50-cal cannot defeat armour; it is no substitute for 40 mm APFSDS, which is the round that its Ajax brother uses. In September, the hon. Member for Plymouth Sutton and Devonport stated in a written answer that Ares would be, “used to deliver and support specialist troops across the battlefield. The term ‘specialist troops’ is used informally, and in this context refers to Anti-Tank Javelin Teams, Snipers and Support Troops.” But by November that had changed again, with the same Minister contradictorily stating: “Anti-tank platoons within Armoured Infantry units will be equipped with Boxer variants”.

    AJAX PROGRAMME · 2026-01-14 · READ IN HANSARD

  42. The decision to field Ares with Infantry Battalions was taken after a considerable assessment programme.” I would be interested to know whether the aim of the Ares assessment programme was simply to justify the existing total of 589 vehicles, or actually to highlight the capability required, because whichever question the Army asks, the answer always appears to be 589 Ajax vehicles. I asked to see the outcome of that assessment programme but was told that its disclosure would “be likely to prejudice the capability, effectiveness or security of the Armed Forces”. I suggest that, given the enemy knows that Ares does not have any armour-defeating weapons capability, the issue around prejudicing capability lies elsewhere. Let’s walk that back a step. In my opinion, the Ares variant is not designed for mounted close combat.

    AJAX PROGRAMME · 2026-01-14 · READ IN HANSARD

  43. The number of Ares platforms to be provided has not changed since 2014: just 93. For reference, the current land equipment table shows that we currently have 604 Warrior. Ares’s role was originally “protected mobility reconnaissance support” and latterly to “deliver and support specialist troops”. It has never once been earmarked as an infantry-fighting vehicle. The present Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry, the hon. Member for Plymouth Sutton and Devonport (Luke Pollard), then gave this written response to my question: “The Ares variant of Ajax is designed for mounted close combat and is being delivered to the Field Army.

    AJAX PROGRAMME · 2026-01-14 · READ IN HANSARD

  44. Member for Liverpool Garston (Maria Eagle), the then Minister of State for Defence Procurement and Industry, stated in a written answer to my question: “On current plans, Boxer will be delivered to four Heavy Mechanised Infantry Battalions and Divisional Enablers.” Seven months later, however, on 15 July, she stated: “The Army intends to reorganise its Heavy Forces units in 3 Division, such that all four would become Armoured Infantry Units based on the Ajax and Boxer family of vehicles.” She subsequently went on to state: “The Army intends to equip the Regular Infantry Units within 3 (UK) Division with Ares in the infantry troop carrying role: 1 Mercian, 1 Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, 1 Royal Welsh and 5 Rifles.” What happened between December 2024 and July 2025 that saw such a fundamental change to the future of the infantry, and indeed our entire armoured capability?

    AJAX PROGRAMME · 2026-01-14 · READ IN HANSARD

  45. We cannot discuss the future of the Ajax programme without discussing how the Army plans to use Ajax within those brigade combat teams. As somebody with a background in armoured infantry, who formerly held an admittedly niche specialisation in anti-tanks, I have more than a keen interest in the future of our armoured capability. Being something of a tank-spotter, I note some glaring capability gaps based on the information provided by Ministers over the past year or so. Let us start with the basics. In December 2024, the right hon.

    AJAX PROGRAMME · 2026-01-14 · READ IN HANSARD

  46. When Ajax was commissioned, we were still undertaking combat operations in Afghanistan. Since then, we have had multiple defence reviews, and changed our focus to the Indo-Pacific and now to the High North, and now we are talking about putting troops in eastern Europe as a deterrent to a belligerent Russia. The irony is that we still have much of the same armour designed to do that job the first time round. The original plan was for Ajax, alongside Boxer and Challenger 3, to provide the backbone of the Army’s armoured capability within Integrated Force 2030. March 2021’s “Defence in a Competitive Age” outlines how the Army would use Ajax in its two close-combat armoured brigade combat teams, and as part of its deep reconnaissance strike brigade combat team—formations that are now putatively in place.

    AJAX PROGRAMME · 2026-01-14 · READ IN HANSARD

  47. Although the near future revolves around the resolution of the immediate issues that followed Exercise Titan Storm, beyond that the programme will need to achieve full operating capability, but crucially, it will be the tip of the spear in our armoured doctrine. So, a good start would be to have an armoured doctrine that is coherent. In 2014, we ordered 589 vehicles out of an optional 1,328—below the Army’s required fleet size at the time of 686. Although that was not necessarily a defining error at the time, subsequent decisions, even as recently as last summer, have compounded the issue, bringing us to a situation where our armoured fleet is now completely unbalanced—increasingly so given the evolution of modern conflict since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the ubiquity of drones at all levels, and the current global arms race.

    AJAX PROGRAMME · 2026-01-14 · READ IN HANSARD

  48. That suggests that the pause will be lifted after the investigation but before the conclusion of the ministerial-led review. Will the Minister clarify the timeline for the investigation, which he previously stated would take at least two weeks and so should be approaching conclusion, and the ministerial-led review, for which we are yet to see the terms of reference, which were due before Christmas? I appreciate it will still be autumn until the defence investment plan is published in March. Will the pause on the use of Ajax be lifted before the conclusion of the Minister’s review, given that the noise and vibration issues may not have been identified, let alone resolved? This debate is about the future of the Ajax programme.

    AJAX PROGRAMME · 2026-01-14 · READ IN HANSARD

  49. On 8 December the Minister confirmed: “We are currently undertaking reviews into the medical injuries sustained by Ajax crews, and more details on the findings will be published in due course.” Will the ministerial-led review he has commissioned or the report from the Defence Accident Investigation Branch contain the details of those findings? In that review, will he confirm how many service personnel are undergoing treatment or have been diagnosed with hearing loss following audiometry protocols after operating within an Ajax variant? Regarding when the vehicles will be able to recommence training, any decisions on the pause are to be made by Ministers after the investigations by the Defence Accident Investigation Branch have concluded.

    AJAX PROGRAMME · 2026-01-14 · READ IN HANSARD

  50. In November, I asked the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry how many compensation claims related to noise and vibration symptoms incurred during the use of Ajax variants had been made since the start of the armoured cavalry programme. The Minister informed me that it would take time to collate and review the information needed to answer the question, and that he would write to me. It is now mid-January and I would appreciate it if the Minister could provide that information in his response. It should not take two months to work out how many compensation claims have been made relating to Ajax. If I were Minister, I would have a close eye on the running tally, particularly in preparation for this debate.

    AJAX PROGRAMME · 2026-01-14 · READ IN HANSARD