Graeme Downie
MP for Dunfermline and Dollar · Labour · United Kingdom
“Young people make a hugely positive contribution to our communities, but for months, sadly, we have seen physical assaults and antisocial behaviour at Dunfermline bus station, perpetrated by a small minority of young offenders.”
“It is something I have raised with the Department since the publication of the DIP. On future infrastructure capability, I will be slightly parochial and ask the Minister to respond to a couple of questions around submarine infrastructure when he is winding up.”
“I have repeatedly argued in this place that the United Kingdom should regard itself as already being in a sustained confrontation with the Russian state—not a conventional shooting war, but a prolonged campaign of hostile activity directed against our people, our infrastructure, our economy and our democratic institutions—and that raises…”
“Friend the Member for North East Derbyshire (Louise Sandher-Jones), said: “We cannot provide detail on how the MOD would respond to certain activities versus others as this would assist our adversaries.” Rather than burden the Department with a load of additional written questions, can I ask the Minister some very specific questions?”
“That includes the improvements in pay and support for serving personnel and their families and in housing, which is leading to increases in recruitment, retention and morale. That is all a vital part of rearmament and deterrence, showing our adversaries that our armed forces are ready to fight tonight, as was mentioned earlier.”
“We are not alone, and for anyone who wants to track this activity across Europe, Emma Burrows from AP News has a fantastic website with up-to-date information. At what point do Governments say enough is enough, and at what point, crucially, do they tell the British people that a line has been crossed?”
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“Young people make a hugely positive contribution to our communities, but for months, sadly, we have seen physical assaults and antisocial behaviour at Dunfermline bus station, perpetrated by a small minority of young offenders. Innocent citizens, both young and old, have been badly hurt, and many are afraid to use the bus station at night. Although justice is devolved, the local Member of the Scottish Parliament has not said a word about the matter. Does the Minister agree that the behaviour of this minority does not represent Scotland’s young people, and will she do everything she can to force the SNP Scottish Government to do more to protect local people? What steps can the UK Government take to support the vast majority of young people who are making positive choices and deserve hope, opportunity and a bright future?”
“This is why warfighting readiness is about much more than what sits in the inventory of our armed forces; it is about national capability and public awareness. In a recent article written with my hon. Friend the Member for East Thanet (Ms Billington), we argued that politics too often becomes obsessed with targets instead of capabilities. We must show Russia that we have the capability to effectively respond and to deter these kinds of attacks. The Government must begin to attribute these attacks directly to the ultimate perpetrator in the Kremlin, to trust the British people with that information and to ask for their help in building the necessary capabilities to defend against it.”
“We are not alone, and for anyone who wants to track this activity across Europe, Emma Burrows from AP News has a fantastic website with up-to-date information. At what point do Governments say enough is enough, and at what point, crucially, do they tell the British people that a line has been crossed? The Kremlin does not view these kinds of activities in isolation. It sees them as different tools being used in the pursuit of the same objectives: to weaken our democracy, undermine confidence, gather intelligence, create division and test our resolve. While we may not be the only country this is happening to, I am concerned that our public might be the least aware of these co-ordinated actions and the effects they have on their daily lives.”
“One has to assume that the Government consider all of these to be sub-threshold, because Russia has undertaken all of these activities. Let me go further. Is poisoning UK citizens on UK soil sub-threshold? Is firing shots near a civilian yacht in the English channel sub-threshold? Is launching drones from a shadow fleet vessel to monitor UK air bases and critical national infrastructure sub-threshold? Is recruiting activists on Signal and having them commit arson attacks against property sub-threshold? Is endangering a UK aircraft carrier by dropping sonar buoys in its immediate vicinity sub-threshold? Is attempting an arson attack against the British Prime Minister sub-threshold? Once again, Russia has undertaken all of these activities.”
“Friend the Member for North East Derbyshire (Louise Sandher-Jones), said: “We cannot provide detail on how the MOD would respond to certain activities versus others as this would assist our adversaries.” Rather than burden the Department with a load of additional written questions, can I ask the Minister some very specific questions? Is using a cyber-attack to steal the electoral register sub-threshold? Is stealing the email addresses of Foreign Office diplomats sub-threshold? Is using ransomware to disrupt NHS patient care, contributing to the deaths of UK citizens, sub-threshold? Is using lasers to threaten the safety of RAF pilots sub-threshold? Is targeting a major UK business with a cyber-attack costing hundreds of millions of pounds and meaningfully impacting Bank of England interest decisions sub-threshold?”
“I have repeatedly argued in this place that the United Kingdom should regard itself as already being in a sustained confrontation with the Russian state—not a conventional shooting war, but a prolonged campaign of hostile activity directed against our people, our infrastructure, our economy and our democratic institutions—and that raises a fundamental question. We often hear the term “sub-threshold”, but what exactly is the threshold, and when are we going to give an indication to the British people of where that threshold is? The answer to that question matters, because it is the hard line in deterrence and absolutely key when we are considering rearmament. I would not expect the Government ever to provide a precise answer to the question, but in a written answer this week, the Minister for the Armed Forces, my hon.”
“I congratulate the hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells (Mike Martin) on helping to secure this debate. Others have already spoken about rearmament and the focus on budgets, procurement and force structures, and while those things definitely matter, there is another question that I believe we must confront as well. As touched on briefly by the hon. Member for Harwich and North Essex (Sir Bernard Jenkin), it is the question of whether we are honest enough with the British public about the nature of the threat that we face.”
“Preparedness for war is not warmongering. Warfighting readiness begins long before the first shot is fired, but it must start with an honest assessment and acknowledgment of the threats that we face, and with making clear to the public and our adversaries what we mean by sub-threshold. Rearmament, preparedness and public clarity are the best way to ensure that Vladimir Putin and those around him never conclude that Britain lacks either the capability or the determination to defend itself.”
“It is something I have raised with the Department since the publication of the DIP. On future infrastructure capability, I will be slightly parochial and ask the Minister to respond to a couple of questions around submarine infrastructure when he is winding up. First, we know that to bring Dreadnought into service as quickly as possible we need a contingent docking facility. The Royal Navy has said that that would have to be at Rosyth, and with time moving on to get that operational, can I ask the Minister for a progress update? Secondly, on the decommissioned nuclear-powered submarines that remain tied up at Devonport and Rosyth, occupying valuable dock space, can the Minister update the House on when the next part of this programme will commence, releasing capacity in both the dockyards and strengthening our sovereign capability?”
“That includes the improvements in pay and support for serving personnel and their families and in housing, which is leading to increases in recruitment, retention and morale. That is all a vital part of rearmament and deterrence, showing our adversaries that our armed forces are ready to fight tonight, as was mentioned earlier. Alongside the human infrastructure, the Government have also invested in physical infrastructure. I know that it is attracting some scepticism and questioning from across the House, but the leap to hybrid warfare is the right thing to do. That is why I welcome the decision to build six common combat vessels and ensure that we are building ships more quickly, to give us flexibility on the capabilities that we need. I hope we make progress on that very quickly indeed.”
“My hon. Friend is absolutely right. One of the ways we can go about building trust in the Government and in how they respond to a crisis is by trusting the people with the information. The people will be the ones who can press us to take the action that they know requires to be taken, if we give them the information. We must use our secrets more effectively and bring the British people along with us. The central question cannot just be whether we spend 3%, 3.5% or some other percentage of GDP. The real question must be: what capability are we creating? This is where I believe the Government deserve a lot of credit. Although the DIP was delayed, what we are seeing in it is a commitment to fighting the next war and not the last one.”
“I welcome the move to commit to the procurement of six common combat vessels in the DIP. I hope that they will be based on the hull of the Type 31, which is being built by the very skilled workforce at Rosyth in my constituency. Will the Minister take immediate action and work with me to progress the CCV programme so that hopefully we do not see a gap between the end of the Type 31 programme and the start of CCV construction?”
“After holding a series of stakeholder events with local businesses and charities and an online survey attracting more than 1,000 responses, I have recently published the results of a city centre survey for Dunfermline. That survey highlighted that people are very proud to live in Scotland’s newest city and ancient capital, but that improvements are needed in the city centre itself to improve aesthetics and attract new businesses. Does the Leader of the House agree that the people of Dunfermline deserve to see improvements in their city centre, and will he help me deliver that for my constituents?”
“I thank the Minister for his work and engagement on this issue over the last few weeks and months. I have been contacted by a range of defence and aerospace companies both in my constituency and across the UK—including some with a footprint in Northern Ireland—that are concerned that some of the quotas and exclusions do not take into account some of the relevant codes suggested by industry, which could lead to increased costs, project delays and threats to jobs in the future. Will he assure me that he will meet the industry again to discuss the codes that it feels are outstanding? Will he or his officials meet me to discuss this issue in more detail?”
“It is always a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Surrey Heath (Dr Pinkerton), who is both gracious with his time and entertaining to listen to. I thank him for that. I begin by thanking all armed forces personnel who are protecting our country at the moment. Importantly, this debate is taking place in Armed Forces Week; I give credit to the Opposition—this once at least—for bringing forward this debate today, though I am not sure that we have quite reached the level of consensus across the House that we might hope for on defence.”
“It is always slightly daunting to be in the Chamber for debates like these—there are Members present who have served in the military, and who know far more than I do—but I believe that there is a conversation that we must have across this House. We must, wherever possible, draw lines between the threats that we face, and the detailed military programmes that we talk about, and what they mean for the day-to-day lives of people in this country. Otherwise, those people will not grant any Government the licence to increase defence spending and capability in the way that Members from across this House want.”
“This country is in conflict with Russia, and Russia considers itself to be in conflict with us. We must always respond accordingly. The attacks extend into cyber-space. Every day we see thousands of attacks, whether on private businesses or on our defence and energy infrastructure. The threats are there. We also see misinformation peddled online that seeks to undermine our democracy. This country is in conflict with Russia. In order to respond effectively to that, the public need to understand the direct implications for them. They must recognise that a cyber-attack on Jaguar Land Rover has consequences for our economy. A cyber-attack on Marks & Spencer has consequences for people’s ability to buy a jumper, and for the staff working there as well, but these attacks also have a direct impact on our economy and society every single day.”
“Most have been used to a safe world, and have not seen the necessity of increased defence spending, unless they have a member of the armed forces in their family, or have served in the armed forces themselves. The majority of people in this country who are my age or younger do not know what a threat from Russia, or indeed any other country, looks like. I have said before that I believe that the UK is already in a conflict with Russia. Not only that, but we are a frontline nation and should always consider ourselves as such, whether we are talking about our RAF jets taking off from Lossiemouth or Coningsby to defend our airspace, or our Royal Navy ships and Royal Air Force aircraft in the High North protecting our subsea cables from Russian threats.”
“I was slightly concerned that I was going to have to disagree with the right hon. Gentleman at this early stage, but I absolutely agree with him. Any politician who wraps themselves in a flag, without there being any substance to their reason for doing so, is not worthy of leading any constituency or party—and certainly not any country. As I have mentioned previously in the House, I grew up in Berlin from 1987 to 1990, and I was there when the Berlin wall came down. That gives me an unusual insight for someone of my age. I grew up hearing Russian artillery one mile away, and seeing Russian helicopters testing and firing. I was there when Rudolf Hess died, and I saw the various security measures in place. That makes me unusual among people who are my age or younger, most of whom have not seen what a cold war threat is.”
“We must look after our people as well, so I am very proud that this Government are updating recruitment policies, and making sure that we have better recruitment and retention. As the Minister mentioned, recruitment is up and pay is increasing. We are turning around the decade of decline under the Conservatives; there has been a cumulative pay award of 10.5% since July 2024—the largest on record—and new recruits are receiving a pay boost of 35%.”
“The Conservatives have talked about parties across the House not spending on defence since the end of the cold war, and to a point I agree with what they are saying, but the threats were there in 2014 and beyond, and there was no mass drive from any party in government to increase in defence spending. The warning signs were there already. It is this Government who have had to pick up the mantle, move forward and make the kind of changes that we need. We have awarded 1,400 major defence contracts since July 2024. In Scotland, we have a £10 billion frigate deal with Norway that will secure jobs on the Clyde. We have been pressing for the £8 billion Typhoon deal with Turkey, and for the upgrading of Typhoon jets.”
“If we say that we must spend more on protecting our North sea or national grid infrastructure, we must also say that if we do not, it will put up household energy bills by even more and cause blackouts—those are the consequences. When it comes to, say, energy infrastructure, we must always be clear that some things cost money. If we want a more energy-secure, resilient nation, people will be asked to pay more, in one way or another. That is the nature of defending our nation properly and effectively. I am very proud of the steps that this Government have taken to prepare our armed forces for the future, having been left a hollowed-out armed forces when they took over.”
“That is not something I want to be drawn on in the Chamber. I have not seen the news report, and I believe that the answer to that question would have to come from the Government. As well as making sure that we are speaking to the public about the things that matter to them, we must broaden out the conversation. When we talk about national security and defence readiness, we are not only referring to Ministry of Defence budgets; we should also be talking about what it means for energy security, food security and everything else that makes our country safe—from economic security to delivering the skills and apprenticeships that we need for the future. We must engage the public on why this subject matters to them.”
“When it comes to defence spending, I hope that we will continue to focus on consensus, where possible, and protecting our nation. I end by again thanking those serving in the armed forces, and all those veterans who served in the past.”
“The country is safe when we have the right capabilities in each domain to fight against the threats that we face, be it in the air, on land, at sea, in cyber-space or in any other domain. In our discussions, we must focus on capability. If we have the correct capabilities to defend our nation, we will have spent the amount of money we should spend to defend our nation. I believe that amount is higher than what we are spending at the moment, but the discussion must stay on capability, and should not be about spending money for its own sake. The Government are doing a good job on defence procurement, and on turning issues over to ensure that is not the case, but I urge hon. Members from across the House to please keep that point in mind when we discuss defence spending.”
“Friend the Member for Rawmarsh and Conisbrough (John Healey), on the joint expeditionary force in the High North. We are a frontline nation, and our frontline is in the North sea—the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap. We need to tackle the threats we face there. We have a partnership with Norway on the Type 26 frigates; that is exactly the type of capability that we must focus on, as well as focusing on the other work done with joint expeditionary force nations. I want to ensure that the debate about defence in the House, and about budgets, does not become focused solely on a number. We must not think that just because we have hit a particular number by a particular date, our country is safe. It is not.”
“The hon. Gentleman always picks out the issues that really matter to our people. The Ministry of Defence’s Op Courage does exactly the kind of work that he is talking about. I am sure that Members from across the House see correspondence on that in their constituency mailbag all the time. We must make sure that we are properly protecting our veterans. Not only is it important because of our responsibility to them, but it is how we ensure that we have effective recruitment and retention in the future. We must be a nation that looks after our serving soldiers. I have mentioned that I believe we are already in a conflict with Russia. I praise the focus of, and work done by, the previous Secretary of State for Defence, my right hon.”
“That is the kind of action we could see China take in the event of a future crisis. Closer to home, my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington mentioned that Norway tested two of its Chinese-designed electric buses, one manufactured in the Netherlands and one built in China, to discover exactly the same kill switch technology.”
“It could be hidden for a number of weeks or months in different technologies and across different parts of our economy, and it would be incredibly difficult—nigh on impossible—to prove exactly what had happened and who had done it, and to tie it to any one state actor with certainty. It is certainly not something that could be done quickly, allowing for a full response. As my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington said earlier, there are a number of examples of that from around the world. Perhaps the best known was when Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022 and tried to steal more than two dozen John Deere tractors and ship them to Chechnya. The US company intervened to switch them off. It remotely locked the thieves out of the equipment, rendering the tractors useless.”
“If a manufacturer is subject to state influence—and in China we know that they are—it could insert a kill switch or back door that allows it to disable devices at scale and at will. It could push out malicious updates, insert malware or remotely disable devices. That could mean vehicles being turned off, cranes and industrial machinery being halted mid-operation, or financial terminals suddenly going offline. We could even see disruption to areas such as NHS refrigeration, affecting drugs and blood supply. The concern with that type of module is that it might not happen overnight or be something we immediately see.”
“Because the modules present three major security threats. The first is dependency. When one country controls the overwhelming supply of a critical technology, that is by its nature a structural risk. If supply is disrupted, whether for geopolitical leverage or commercial pressure, our energy systems, transport networks and emergency services could be left without essential replacement parts. We have already seen that threat with Huawei and our 5G network—a mistake we must not repeat. The second reason is disruption—as colleagues have said, that is increasingly referred to as the “kill switch”. Internet-of-things cellular modules contain firmware that can be updated remotely.”
“Despite their importance, however, very little is known publicly about what they do and the potential harm that they could cause. Today, more than 70% of all cellular IOT modules used globally are manufactured in China, and that dominance creates strategic vulnerabilities that the Bill must address. Amendments 4 and 5 would ensure that the Bill covers the risks created by embedded communications components manufactured outside the UK. Amendment 4 would ensure that the Secretary of State can treat the provenance of those components as a cyber-security risk, and amendment 5 would allow Ministers to require operators of critical systems to identify and mitigate those risks. In short, the amendments would give the Government clear authority to act where foreign-made modules create known vulnerabilities. Why is that necessary?”
“Amendments 4 and 5 seek to deal with part of our digital infrastructure that is almost entirely invisible to the public and rarely discussed in Parliament—other than this afternoon—yet is essential to our national security: cellular internet-of-things modules. As my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western) described, cellular IOT modules are small electronic components, about the size of a credit card, and they allow a device to connect to the internet over a mobile network. They sit inside everything from smart meters, CCTV cameras and traffic lights to industrial sensors, medical devices and parts of our energy grid. They are the connective tissue of our modern digital economy, and we all rely on them every day.”
“We must do more to ensure that they are fully aware of that threat, and that they hold our feet, and those of the Government, to the fire, and ensure that we are taking the kinds of measures in this Bill, and beyond, that we need to protect our economy, our military and our democracy more widely. I will limit my remarks to amendments 4 and 5, which I tabled. It is always difficult to speak at this point in a debate, because people with far more experience and knowledge than me have said a lot of the things that I was planning to say, and have done so with far more eloquence and knowledge than I have.”
“I refer Members to my registered interest as parliamentary chair of the Campaign for Secure Technology, which I thank for its work in preparing my two amendments as well as my speech. I echo the comments of my hon. Friends the Members for Leeds Central and Headingley (Alex Sobel) and for Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West (Dame Chi Onwurah) about the scale of the threat that we face from cyber-attack. We must ensure that we are having that national conversation about the nature of the threats we face, and who those threats come from. In many ways, this country is already in conflict with Russia, and in more than what we could call competition with China—something that the public are not fully aware of.”
“That proves why we need more awareness of the threat that we face. It is not necessarily a case of banning certain components or technologies, but we must be more aware and ensure that the Government have the powers they need to respond where possible.”
“My amendments would ensure that the Bill explicitly covers these risks and gives Ministers the clarity and authority to act when necessary. If this Bill is to truly strengthen the UK’s cyber-resilience, it must not leave one of the most serious threats to our modern and increasingly digital world outside its scope. I ask the Government to work with me to address the threat of cellular IOT modules.”
“Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West (Dame Chi Onwurah), I was concerned that there was a suggestion by one of the officials that there was no need to concern ourselves about the threat of Chinese internet-of-things modules because the threat was merely “theoretical”. As I and others have shown today, these examples are not just theoretical. Frankly, most threats are theoretical until they are not theoretical. This is happening now across critical sectors and national infrastructure. Other countries, such as the US, Australia and those in the EU, are all moving to toughen up their legislation specifically on cellular internet-of-things modules, and I believe that the UK must take action as well.”
“The US Select Committee on China recently warned that Chinese EVs are “rolling data collection devices” and argued that restricting Chinese-made components is a national security imperative. The US Department of Commerce has now moved to limit the deployment of software and communications equipment sourced from adversary Governments in connected vehicles. Those who are worried about China’s reaction to such measures should be aware that it has already taken precisely these steps against the west. Tesla cars have been banned not just from entering Chinese defence, bases but from various Government agencies and authorities. In the meeting mentioned by my hon.”
“On that note, I refer to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests about the trip to Taiwan. I did not intend to raise it during my speech, but there was an opportunity to do so. The third element of risk is data extraction, as was mentioned by the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith). Under the Chinese national intelligence law, companies and organisations are legally required to assist state intelligence agencies and to hand over data upon request, creating a systemic risk in the UK that any data accessible through a cellular internet-of-things module could ultimately be accessible to the Chinese state. Modern vehicles, especially electric and autonomous vehicles, are effectively computers on wheels, continuously collecting data on drivers, surroundings and infrastructure.”
“As ever, my hon. Friend is correct. How many of us have had some bit of technology break because the firmware is no longer allowed to be updated, meaning that something no longer works, it is no longer supported and it breaks down immediately? To add to that, by its nature, something that is not regularly updated becomes more vulnerable to attack by hackers. They may not be state sponsored, but they may take advantage of a weaker part of a technology. That was pointed out to me on a recent visit to Taiwan. Its semiconductor industry is incredibly strong, but it builds the more high-tech elements of semiconductors. I was told that it would not bother to commit to manufacturing other types of technology because they were too cheap and simple to make and could be mass produced.”
“I would be more than happy to work with the Government on something that will provide specific protections against cellular internet-of-things modules. What assessment has he made of the specific threat of internet-of-things modules, and what protections are there against that in the legislation?”
“Given that many of the key pressures facing farmers in Scotland, such as food security, input costs and trade policy, are determined on a UK-wide basis, will my right hon. Friend commit to continuing that contact and to regular, structured and direct engagement with NFU Scotland, as well as other devolved unions, to ensure that their expertise and the distinct needs of Scottish agriculture are properly reflected in UK decision making?”
“T2. Farmers in my constituency are concerned about tariff suspensions and the Government’s need to strike a balance between quite rightly reducing costs, and protecting and actively encouraging domestic production capacity. What discussions is the Minister having with Treasury Ministers about the principles and direction of travel of future tariff suspensions to ensure that domestic production is not harmed, but is in fact encouraged?”
“West Fife has huge potential for geothermal. In particular, the Comrie colliery development, at a former mining site, is now being regenerated to create leisure facilities, housing and other mixed-use development. It has been exploring the possibility of using deep geothermal from the former mine. Will the Minister meet me to discuss this in more detail, and perhaps come to visit the site to see its huge potential?”
“What it showed was that when the system came under real strain, the weaknesses were clear. Preparedness cannot be about having plans on paper; it must be about whether those plans work when they are actually needed.”
“In opening this debate, I want to do four things: reflect on a recent example of where preparedness fell short; set out the changing nature of the threats we face; address the need for stronger co-ordination across Government; and reflect on the role of the public. During Storm Éowyn in January 2025, thousands of homes across my constituency lost power, many for several days. That came during a period of cold weather, leaving people without heating, electricity and, in some cases, access to essential medical equipment. People did not know where to turn, but they were receiving inconsistent information and had very little clarity on when the situation would improve. What stood out to me was not a lack of commitment, as energy companies, emergency services, local authorities and community organisations worked tirelessly.”
“I beg to move, That this House has considered preparedness for national emergencies. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Barker, and I am grateful to colleagues for coming to this important debate. As the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy has set out, the assumptions underpinning UK security are being challenged to an unprecedented degree in what it describes as “an era of radical uncertainty”. This is not a distant or theoretical challenge; it is happening now, and it is shaping the lives of our constituents already. We are rightly beginning to recognise that resilience at home—across our infrastructure, our communities and our economy—is vital.”
“Those are very practical failings, but they had very real consequences. The challenges we face now are broad and evolving—cyber-attacks, infrastructure sabotage, supply chain disruption, hybrid threats from hostile states, climate-related events and health and bio-security emergencies.”
“I could not agree more. A lot of planning had gone into severe weather events in Fife over the years, but it had never been tested. A lot of it was out of date, and staff had moved on. For example, in High Valleyfield, a former coal-mining village, there was an almost 10-year-old resilience plan that said that the local community centre would be opened. The community knew about the plan, but the council had totally forgotten about it. They did not even know who had the keys for the community centre, so the community figured it out for themselves. Broader lessons were also highlighted during that event, such as vulnerable customer data not being shared, confusion about support for care homes, a lack of generators, limited logistical capacity to deploy that provision, and access to temporary accommodation.”