Rebecca Paul
MP for Reigate · Conservative · United Kingdom
“Britain’s steel industry is not competitive, because of high energy costs and excessive red tape, but instead of addressing the root causes, this Labour Government revert back to their default solution of nationalisation. Why are this Government so keen to take us back to the 1970s?”
“The previous Secretary of State, the right hon. Member for Stalybridge and Hyde (Jonathan Reynolds), said that the Government would seek to find a buyer for British Steel, and several parties have expressed interest. Are discussions ongoing with those parties, and if not, why not?”
“I recently invited residents to vote for their favourite local businesses in my constituency. Will the Leader of the House join me in congratulating MLP Wealth Management in Banstead, which won best overall small business; the Chapel in Reigate, which won best independent café; Murray Designs in Reigate, which won best independent shop; a…”
“The Secretary of State will know that e-bikes do not require insurance, but we are seeing some pedestrians suffer catastrophic injuries due to the additional weight of these bikes compared with a normal bike. Is she giving any consideration to reviewing the rules on this issue?”
“I thank the hon. Member for Tooting (Dr Allin-Khan) for securing the debate. This is a really important topic, and I do not think there has been enough focus on it in the last few years. Her speech was very powerful, and the hon.”
“The problem was not down to their lack of commitment or compassion; it was down to a system that is operating without enough physical space to meet the excessive demand placed upon it. The previous Secretary of State, the right hon.”
The complete record
Every one of 612 lines we hold for Rebecca Paul, in date order, each linked to its source. Free to read, in full, without an account. Page 3 of 13.
“However, the Government have compounded the problem by providing no right of appeal against allocation or reallocation decisions, and by permitting some decisions to be made without a hearing. Under proposed new section 74D, there would be no right of appeal against an allocation or reallocation determination made under proposed new sections 74A or 74B, and a reallocation determination could be made without a hearing. That is extraordinary. A defendant may lose trial by jury on the basis of an early-stage sentence prediction, under a mechanism that the Government know may need to be revisited as the case develops, yet there is no appeal.”
“The Bill does not properly assess a range of other policy options. Having made those points, I would like to pose a question to the Minister, which I think may shed some light on where we are with the clause. Has the additional work needed at both Crown court and magistrates court level for allocation, reallocation, submissions and case management been factored into the claimed 27,000 sitting day decrease and 8,500 sitting day increase? If the answer is yes, can we get some insight into precisely where and how? If the answer is no, the core productivity claim behind clause 3 is overstated from the start. If clause 3 were merely a bad threshold coupled with an elaborate reallocation maze, that would be bad enough.”
“Frankly, that sounds like a dream come true for a solicitor’s billing manager, but the rest of us can surely see the problem. JUSTICE and the Bar Council have both picked up on that point. JUSTICE notes that the “allocation of cases is going to lengthen the plea and trial preparation hearing as will the process of reallocation”, and it warns that the absence of any right of appeal against allocation decisions is likely to increase judicial reviews and Court of Appeal litigation. In the Bar Council’s written evidence, it states: “The proposed Crown Court Bench Division introduces an extra layer of hearings and complication…It could result in further litigation at an interlocutory stage.” It argues that one of the Bill’s fundamental flaws is precisely the fact that it presents a false binary: either do nothing, or do this.”
“When something like that happens, is it seriously proposed that the case repeatedly cycles through reallocation every time? Clause 3 says yes, at least in substance. Proposed new section 74B provides for a formal reallocation mechanism where there is a relevant change of circumstances, including changes in the indictment or new evidence affecting likely sentence. The problem is that that does not solve the uncertainty; it adds another layer of litigation, or at least potential litigation. It invites both sides to argue over whether the threshold position has changed, whether reallocation is required, whether the change is sufficiently material, what prejudice would be caused by moving the case, whether delay, wasted cost or witness inconvenience should prevail, and what happens if the case is already part way down the tracks.”
“The Bar Council adds that the Bill gives no schedule or annexe identifying categories of offence; instead, a Crown court judge will simply assess in individual cases whether the likely sentence exceeds three years, meaning that the determination is case specific, contestable and uncertain from the outset. I can well imagine the response to all that being that if circumstances change, the case can be reallocated, but to my mind that is not a defence of the clause; it is an admission that the initial prediction is often too flimsy to bear the weight placed on it. As any King’s counsel will readily point out, real criminal cases are not static things. Charges are amended, defendants are added and new evidence emerges. Perhaps a section 18 becomes a section 20.”
“Yet the clause asks the court to decide mode of trial at exactly this sensitive and uncertain stage. The Government are therefore building a supposedly rational system on a procedural moment that practitioners know, and I am sure the Minister knows, is often evidentially immature. The Committee will remember reading the Victims’ Commissioner’s written evidence, which accepts the need for reform but recognises the concern that sentencing ranges vary and that the evidential picture may be incomplete when the crucial decision is taken. JUSTICE likewise says that the proposal risks unfairness because the allocation and reallocation system lengthens the PTPH and depends on speculative assumptions about how much court time will actually be saved.”
“We cannot properly predict a sentence at the plea and trial preparation hearing, and in the context of clause 3, that is a problem. If the allocation decision is to be made at the hearing, the notion that a judge can decide the likely sentence then and there is, in many cases, unrealistic and, at the extreme, absurd. In many cases, the evidence is incomplete at the PTPH. In sexual offences, full achieving better evidence transcripts are often unavailable, and practitioners rely on summaries. CCTV may not yet have been watched in full, medical evidence may be outstanding and the victim impact, which can materially affect a sentence, may be unknown. Sometimes the complainant is still in hospital. It may well be that the psychiatric or psychological impact becomes clear only weeks or months later.”
“If that is not an admission that the threshold is an unstable and unsafe proxy, I do not know what is. Does that not cut to the most basic but most profound concern about this Bill—that it just is not fair? If the threshold cannot reliably distinguish the cases that merit a jury from those that do not, the clause is not preserving jury trial for the most serious cases. It is rationing jury trial on the basis of an impressionistic and sometimes speculative sentence prediction. The written evidence from the London School of Economics says exactly that, stating that the three-year threshold “is a poor metric for determining the right trial procedure” and that if jury trial is a “cornerstone protection against the state”, alternative measures ought to be exhausted first.”
“I do not accept that. More importantly, the Bill itself does not truly accept it either. The Commons Library briefing I referenced earlier notes this contradiction plainly: “While cases that are less likely to result in a sentence of more than three years would be allocated for trial by a judge alone, the judge could still pass a custodial sentence of more than three years.” In other words, the very legislation that uses the three-year threshold as the decisive basis for removing jury trials simultaneously recognises that the threshold may not map on to the final seriousness of the case at all. The initial allocation may say that the case is not serious enough for a jury, yet the final outcome may be serious enough for more than three years in prison.”
“Clause 3 would cover a huge number of either-way offences, including “sexual offences, sexual abuse of children, stalking, fraud offences, violence against the person offences and theft offences.” JUSTICE offers a chilling practical illustration with this observation: “Most of the postmasters wrongly convicted in the Horizon scandal received a sentence under three years.” That point ought to give the Committee serious pause. We are being asked to remove jury trial for the types of case in which miscarriages of justice have historically occurred. The centrepiece of clause 3 is the idea that a court can safely determine, at an early stage, whether a defendant is likely to receive more than three years if convicted, and that that prediction is a just and adequate basis for deciding whether the defendant gets a jury at all.”
“According to the Government’s own modelling, about 14,000 cases would continue arriving at the Crown court in 2028-29 and would require a trial, of which approximately 4,000 are expected to be heard by a judge alone, rather than a jury. The package is said to reduce Crown court sitting day demand by 27,000 days a year while increasing magistrates court sitting day demand by 8,500. Even if one accepts every assumption behind those figures—many serious people do not—they demonstrate that this is a major transfer of work and power. The offences within scope are not, as has sometimes been implied, confined to the sort of minor petty theft case used in media briefings. The written evidence from JUSTICE makes that point bluntly.”
“It inserts into the Senior Courts Act 1981 proposed new sections 74A to 74D, which create a mechanism under which, in a very wide category of cases, the court must decide at the outset whether a defendant will be tried by a jury or by a single judge alone. The central test is the threshold sentence: whether the defendant, if convicted, would be likely to receive more than three years’ imprisonment or detention. If the likely sentence is above that threshold, the defendant gets a jury; if not, the default is a judge-alone trial in what the Government and stakeholders have described as the Crown court bench division, although that phrase is not used in the Bill itself. This is about not a tiny number of trivial cases but a structural redesign of the Crown court’s work.”
“That is simply not the case in clause 3. In fact, we are dealing with a discretionary political choice to legislate in a way that is broader, harder and less cautious than many of the evidence-based alternatives that are already on the table. As the Law Society put it: “Clauses 1 to 7 represent radical changes to criminal procedure without convincing evidence that they will improve efficiency.” The Bar Council says: “Radical changes to the availability of jury trials…are unnecessary and will consume resources without bearing down on the backlog.” That is the proper context in which clause 3 should be considered. As much for my own clarity as for the benefit of the Committee, I would like to dedicate a limited amount of time to clarifying what the clause actually does.”
“Sir Brian proposed restricting, not abolishing, the right to elect, he did not propose the same increase in magistrates’ sentencing powers, and the Government’s model is more aggressive than the one on which much of the original discussion was based. JUSTICE makes the same point directly in its written evidence. It says that the Bill goes further than the review by removing the right to elect entirely, replacing the full rehearing appeal from the magistrates court with a permission stage, allowing the extension of magistrates’ custodial powers to 18 or 24 months, and introducing judge-only trials for either-way cases with likely sentences of three years or less. I say that at the outset because I am keen to avoid the suggestion that the Bill amounts to the Government reluctantly implementing a difficult but expert-led recommendation.”
“It also allows reallocation later if the case changes, says that there is no right of appeal against allocation or reallocation, permits some decisions to be made without a hearing, and still allows a judge sitting alone to impose a sentence of more than three years. The Government continue to maintain that this change is necessary to reduce the Crown court backlog and reserve jury trials for the most serious cases. I note, though, that the very good House of Commons Library briefing points out that these provisions are based only in part on Leveson, and contain material differences from that which he recommended.”
“It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Jardine. As the Committee has likely anticipated, I will argue that clause 3 should not stand part of the Bill. Clause 3 is the heart of the Government’s constitutional gamble. It creates a wholly new general rule for trial on indictment without a jury in a substantial category of criminal cases. Under the clause, a defendant charged with an either-way offence who has pleaded not guilty will lose the right to be tried by a jury unless the court considers that, on conviction, they would be likely to receive a sentence of more than three years’ imprisonment.”
“I thank you for making that point, Ms Jardine. I just emphasise how serious the changes in this legislation are. I know the Opposition are willing to put in the hours that are needed to go through the full detail, so that everyone can say what they need to. I imagine the Government are equally keen to spend the hours required to do full justice to the Bill.”
“Absolutely, Ms Jardine—we can go into the early hours of the morning if we need to, and I am happy to do so this evening if that is what people would like to do. In cases of offensive communications, malicious communications, harassment, stalking and other digital evidence-related cases, the line between criminality and obnoxiousness can be fact-sensitive and context-heavy. We have all seen how politically sensitive a question this has become. We should remember, too, that some of these cases are driven almost entirely by screenshots and unauthenticated digital material, which may be manipulated, selectively presented or forensically thin.”
“That is not a criticism of judges, but a recognition of why juries exist in the first place. They are there to not just decide facts but connect the administration of criminal justice to the public itself.”
“The Law Society says, and I very much agree, that removing jury trials for serious fraud cases “would significantly erode the fundamental principle of open justice.” These are often cases involving major companies, financial institutions, public markets, public money, terrorism financing, bribery and corruption. They are exactly the sort of cases where the public must have confidence that justice has not simply been done inside a closed professional world by one member of that same world. Fraud and related financial cases often concern the conduct of powerful, well-resourced and sophisticated defendants. In those cases, public confidence matters immensely. A verdict reached by a jury of citizens commands a kind of legitimacy that a judgment by a single judge does not carry in the same way.”
“Hayes where convictions were quashed because of judicial misdirection, not because of anything the jury did wrong. That strongly refutes the suggestion that juries are the weak link in these cases. The Government have two problems here: first, they have not shown that such cases are generally too long for juries; secondly, they have not shown that juries are what is causing the failures when these cases go wrong. Unfortunately, that leaves the Government looking rather like they are indulging in ideological hostility to jury trials rather than evidence-based reform. There is also a wider constitutional point.”
“JUSTICE’s written evidence points to the Southwark Crown court data gathered by His Honour Geoffrey Rivlin KC, showing that the vast majority of fraud cases lasted less than three months, with only one or two per year lasting over three months and only two cases in total lasting over six months. That is important, because it rather punches the myth that these are all endless epics that juries simply cannot understand or follow. Rivlin’s evidence also says that jury trials compose a discipline that helps to keep fraud trials shorter. Without that discipline, judge-alone trials may end up running as long as, or even longer than, jury trials. More to the point, delays, collapses and miscarriages of justice in fraud are not caused by juries, as shown by R v .”
“Twelve ordinary jurors are far better placed to decide that than a single judge alone. That goes to the very nature of fraud. Fraud is not merely an accounting or regulatory puzzle; it is an allegation of dishonesty, and dishonesty, by definition, is exactly the sort of question on which the community’s judgment matters. Who should decide dishonesty: a single professional judge, or 12 citizens applying the standards of ordinary life? In a democratic criminal justice system, the answer should remain: the jury. The evidence that we have does not support the idea that juries are what make these cases collapse, drag on or miscarry.”
“In written evidence, the Law Society tells us: “Serious cases of any complexity, including serious allegations of fraud, must be presented by the prosecution in a way that is understandable, not only to the judge and jury…but also, in line with the principle of open justice, to the public.” It goes on to say: “They should be subject to effective case management to ensure they take only a reasonable length of time, if necessary, by reducing the number of charges”. In other words, the answer to complexity is to manage it properly, not to remove the jury. It is worth reminding ourselves that the issues juries decide on in fraud trials are factual, not technical—in particular, whether the defendant was dishonest. That is judged by reference to the standards of ordinary decent people.”
“We are not being asked to approve some modest efficiency measure; we are being asked to displace the jury in some of the most important and contested criminal cases for an alleged benefit so small that, even in the Government’s own case, it barely registers against total Crown court demand. That trade-off is so poor that I refuse to believe the Minister, in her heart of hearts, believes it is the right way to proceed. The second point is that the case against juries being used in serious fraud and related cases has never really been made.”
“That is the first and most obvious point I want to make. The Government are proposing a very serious encroachment on jury trials in return for a saving that amounts to just 200 sitting days. JUSTICE describes the change as “unnecessary,” says that it “will not impact the backlog in any meaningful way” and warns that it risks opening the door to restricting jury trials in other categories of case too. The Law Society is similarly clear: “Removing jury trials for serious fraud cases is unlikely to have a significant effect on the backlogs, but would significantly erode the fundamental principle of open justice.” That should be the frame for the whole debate on clause 4.”
“The court may order trial without a jury if it is satisfied that the likely complexity and/or length makes that appropriate, that it is not in the public interest for the trial to be conducted with a jury, and that there are no other reasons why it would be more appropriate for the trial to be with a jury. There would be no right of appeal against that decision. That is a serious and constitutionally significant change in its own right, but what makes it even more troubling is that it has been justified on the strength of a paper-thin theoretical benefit. The House of Commons Library states that the Government estimate clause 4 will save 200 Crown court sitting days. That is around 0.18% of current Crown court capacity, which indicates just how small the potential gain is—if there is that gain at all.”
“It will no doubt be a relief to Members to hear that I am not going to talk for quite as long as I did this morning. I oppose clause 4 and schedule 1 standing part, and I support amendment 51, tabled in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle. As is becoming habit, I will begin with a very brief overview of what we are considering. Clause 4 and schedule 1 create a new framework for judge-only trials in certain complex or lengthy cases. The listed offences include fraud, tax evasion, false accounting, insider dealing, money laundering, terrorist funding, bribery and related offences.”
“If we think the core principle of clause 4 is wrong, then the schedule that operationalises it is wrong too. Rivlin’s description of the list as “arbitrary” is worth keeping in mind. One of the reasons that schedule 1 is objectionable is that once Parliament accepts the principle that a whole category of serious Crown court cases can be singled out for juryless trial on grounds of length and complexity, the argument for confining the list to that category becomes very hard to sustain. The logic of the thing pushes outward. That is why schedule 1 is dangerous: for not only what it contains now but what it invites later. I am particularly concerned that there is an ideological push away from jury trials. My concern is that this is only the start, not the end of where the Government want to get to.”
“He quotes the explanatory notes to show that offences not related to fraud or financial crime could easily be added in the future. He describes this as “a mighty step along the way to the end of jury trials.” That does not strike me as overstatement. The Secretary of State will indeed have this untrammelled power, and we should carefully heed this sober warning from a senior judge. For similar reasons, the Opposition oppose schedule 1 standing part of the Bill. Schedule 1 is the list that gives clause 4 its reach, and the list is already troubling. It is not confined to a tiny, tightly defined category of unusual mega-fraud; it covers a wider class of economic and financial offences, including money laundering and terrorist funding, and can then be expanded later.”
“I completely agree with my hon. Friend. What is considered complex and lengthy could be quite subjective. We all know that we are potentially going to end up in the courts over defining exactly what is complex and lengthy. It feels like the Bill is not written clearly enough for us to understand exactly how it will work in reality. Amendment 51 is an important safeguard against those risks. In his written evidence, His Honour Geoffrey Rivlin KC notes that the schedule 1 list already “appears to be arbitrary, perhaps the work of a moment; and it goes beyond anything suggested before. But even that is not the end of it.” That is because part 2 of the schedule gives the Secretary of State the power by order to add or remove offences.”
“For all those reasons, I oppose clause 4 and schedule 1, and I support amendment 51. Clause 4 offers a constitutionally serious reduction in jury trials for a tiny claimed benefit of 200 sitting days. The evidence does not show that juries are the cause of delay, collapse or miscarriage in these cases. Fraud cases are not too technical for juries. The key issue is dishonesty, and ordinary citizens are uniquely well placed to judge that. The removal of juries in these cases would damage open justice and public confidence. Schedule 1 gives effect to that flawed principle and then goes further by creating a route to ministerial expansion. Amendment 51 is therefore a sensible and necessary safeguard, but in truth, the better course is simpler still: clause 4 and schedule 1 should not be included in the Bill at all.”
“I agree with my hon. Friend, as I normally do. Finally, there is the obvious practical point that there are better answers available. The Law Society says that reform and investment must be strategic, not piecemeal, and warns against stand-alone measures such as changing from jury trials to judge-only trials without convincing evidence that they will significantly reduce the backlog. It says that Parliament should insist on “detailed modelling” and on understanding the Government’s intentions across the whole package of reform, not just on this isolated measure. The existence of pressure in the system does not prove that every proposed constitutional shortcut is justified. The question is whether the shortcut is necessary. With clause 4, the answer is plainly no.”
“My hon. Friend is making some powerful points. Hearing him read out what the law says brings home to me just how terrible this Bill is. Surely everyone can see that there is no clarity how it would work. Rather than there being any clear guidance, it essentially feels as though any judge can have their own view on complexity and length. We will end up with inconsistency and disputes and arguments about the approach. Surely, that could do the opposite of address the backlog by adding additional complexity and confusion to our justice system.”
“As my hon. Friend was speaking, it suddenly occurred to me that under our current system, jurors can already make that argument—that if sitting on a jury would be particularly disruptive, they should not have to do so. How does that interact with this measure? It feels like this does not make sense.”
“If we are increasing the sentence in the magistrates court, I would imagine the Minister will agree that, in some situations, we are increasing the complexity of the case. For example, a sexual assault case could be quite complicated and require, in order to look after the alleged victim and make sure their wellbeing is managed, four consecutive days of sitting to get that over with. How will the magistrates court do that? They are all volunteers, and quite often they are working. How will this help address the backlog if we are in a situation where those volunteer magistrates are not able to commit to the four consecutive days needed to deal with a complex and sensitive case such as a sexual assault?”
“Does my hon. Friend agree that Government Members and the Minister have spent a lot of time talking about victims being central to all of the changes, so why on earth would they not support the amendment if it is really about protecting victims from being cross-examined?”
“That suggests a lack of confidence, or a continuing tendency to send more serious cases upwards, which in turn means the Government’s projected savings may not materialise in anything like the way they hope. If magistrates are already not retaining all the cases that the Government assumed they would after the jump to 12 months, what is the evidence that authorising 18 or 24 months will suddenly transform the position? If cases continue to be sent up, or bounce between jurisdictions, the supposed efficiency gain becomes much more doubtful.”
“There is then the practical point that clause 6 will not solve the pressure in the system so much as move it around. The change will merely transfer the burden from one overstretched part of the system to another. The Law Society says that the magistrates court already has its own backlog of more than 370,000 cases, and that the Government have shown no convincing plan to deal with the added pressure brought by more serious and complex cases. JUSTICE makes the same point, and adds an especially telling practical detail drawn from the Institute for Government’s analysis: since magistrates’ sentencing powers were increased from six to 12 months in 2024, only around 30% of sentences in the six-to-12-month band were handed down by magistrates.”
“It warns that this raises the likelihood that “people will receive longer custodial sentences with fewer safeguards or opportunities to rectify wrongful convictions.” I will dwell on this point for a moment, as it is something that none of us who have been tasked with scrutinising the Bill in detail should forget. A system designed to be faster, simpler and less formal is being asked to shoulder cases in which the consequences are far more severe. Two years in prison is not some trivial matter: a custodial sentence like that can cost a person their job, their home, their family life, their good name and their future. A justice system that is appropriate for low-level offending cannot be assumed fit for cases that carry that sort of lifechanging penalty.”
“The extension of summary justice to cases in which a defendant could receive up to 2 years’ imprisonment…particularly when combined with the removal of a right to elect Crown Court trial, and the removal of a right of automatic appeal” amounts to a “comprehensive rolling back of safeguards.” That is blunt language, but it is hard to disagree with. Clause 6 will change the kind of cases that summary justice is expected to absorb. The Law Society warns that under the clause magistrates will have the power to impose lengthy custodial sentences for serious offences such as actual bodily harm, grievous bodily harm and possession with intent to supply drugs “in proceedings that are intended to be quicker” and less formal than than those in the Crown Court.”
“If the Government and the Minister wish to make evidence-based law, they should first show Parliament what the 12-month expansion has actually done: what kinds of cases have been retained, what sentencing patterns have changed, what effect there has been on appeals, what impact there has been on magistrates courts and whether the claimed savings have materialised. Instead, they are asking, through clause 6, for a much broader delegated power, and inviting us to trust that this will all somehow work out later. That is not good enough where a question as fundamental as the administration of good justice is concerned. The Bar Council puts its objection crisply and, I think, rightly. It says: “Summary trial is designed for the purpose of dispensing swift justice in low-level cases.”
“It is perfectly valid to ask, “If the very review on which the Government say the Bill is based said that 12 months should remain the ceiling, why are Ministers now seeking the power to raise it to two years?” Let me briefly touch on a second common-sense point. The move from six to 12 months took effect only for offenders convicted on or after 18 November 2024. In other words, the current system has barely had time to bed in and the Government are already asking Parliament to authorise a further jump to 18 or 24 months. The earlier increase to 12 months was justified as a response to court pressures, and the Government said it would save up to 2,000 sitting days. We have not had anything like enough time to assess properly how that change has worked in practice before Ministers seek power to go dramatically further.”
“Sir Brian said that his recommendation on restricting the right to elect trial by jury was “contingent upon magistrates’ sentencing powers remaining at the current maximum of 12 months.” He also recommended that the Government’s ability to amend magistrates’ sentencing powers by statutory instrument be repealed, and that the current 12-month maximum be made permanent. Clause 6 therefore cannot be said to follow Leveson: it goes beyond him and, on this point, directly contradicts him. That is a serious weakness in the Government’s position. Ministers have repeatedly leaned on Leveson when defending the Bill as a whole, but in this instance he gave no endorsement of what clause 6 will usher in. More than that, he warned us directly against it.”
“The Government have justified the change on the basis that the power is needed so that sentencing limits can be adjusted swiftly to rebalance work between the magistrates courts and the Crown court. The Government estimate that increasing the maximum to 18 months would save 8,000 Crown court sitting days. That all sounds rather neat but, in reality, it is another example of the Government trying to force more serious criminal business into a part of the system designed for swift, relatively low-level justice, and doing so before they have properly shown that the courts can absorb it or that the benefits are worth it. The first and perhaps most important point is that even Sir Brian Leveson did not recommend the change.”
“It is a pleasure to start the day with you and end the day with you, Ms Jardine. I am sure you are very much enjoying starting your day with me and ending your day with me, too. [ Laughter. ] I have just realised how that can be interpreted. My apologies, Ms Jardine; I cannot account for the minds of other Members. To get back to business, I do not support clause 6 standing part of the Bill. It will expand the Government’s existing power to increase the maximum custodial sentence that a magistrates court can impose for a single either-way offence. The current maximum is 12 months, but the clause will permit Ministers, entirely at their own discretion, to increase that to 18 months or even 24 months. That will affect consecutive sentencing for multiple either-way offences.”
“I agree with my hon. Friend. Frankly, I am shocked that a Labour Government would do that. It is the last thing I expected of a Labour Government.”
“Thank you for that guidance, Ms Jardine, but that seems to suggest that we are not allowed ever again in this Bill Committee to bring up the fact that the right to elect for jury trial and rights to legal aid are being removed. Surely we need to be able to talk about that as we go through the Bill.”
“Thank you for that guidance, Ms Jardine. I would suggest that the legal aid changes are a really important outcome of clause 6. In fact, I think I would come under huge criticism if I made this speech without mentioning legal aid, because I have not raised it at all—well, I did in an earlier speech. I have not raised it at all today.”
“It risks moving the backlog rather than solving it, and it does so by way of an over-broad delegated power that gives Ministers too much room to reshape criminal jurisdiction by regulation. The magistracy deserves respect, and nothing I say should be taken as criticism of the many magistrates who serve conscientiously and well, but having respect for magistrates is not the same thing as assuming that every structural burden should now be placed on the summary justice system. The Government have not even begun to make the case for the clause compellingly.”