Rebecca Smith
MP for South West Devon · Conservative · United Kingdom
“The Secretary of State claims that decisions reflect local identities. Well, I can advise him that the majority of my constituents and those living in rural Devon would highly disagree.”
“I thank the Minister for his answer. He and I have had several interactions over the marine autonomy sector in particular, and I welcome the regulating for growth Bill, as I have said before in this place. However, I am incredibly keen to be reassured that it is coming early in the autumn.”
“The right hon. Member has highlighted that, in his view, this is not a binary choice between a debate on the middle east and holding the new Prime Minister to account. I wonder whether I might therefore offer him a solution.”
“I want to hear his views on defence, welfare, taxation and special educational needs. Those are the things that I believe the House deserves to hear directly from the new Prime Minister before we return in September. Might the right hon. Member consider that pretty simple solution, which would give everyone what they want?”
“The Minister makes a very interesting point about city centres being hollowed out, but the main thrust of this debate is about young people doing summer jobs before they go back to school or university in the autumn.”
“My hon. Friend reminds me that one of the other soft skills that we learn that way is resilience. I am wondering how he got those jobs, because I earned £10 a day in my first job. I was sweeping the floor in a florist and, if I was lucky, bundling up some flowers before I sold them.”
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“That offers little to no real corrective power. Clause 68(4)(b) says that the ORR may substitute its own decision only where there is an error of law and where only one lawful outcome was possible. That is a very high bar and as a result this remedy will be rare. These concerns have been echoed by the industry. During one of the oral evidence sessions for the Transport Committee, Maggie Simpson of the Rail Freight Group said: “There are a number of problems with that appeal function. First, it will be incredibly hard to ever get to it. We are told that the appeal will have to meet the standards of a judicial review—illegality, irrationality or procedural unfairness—so there will be a very high bar to meet to even get there.”
“Then, however, all it can do is to send it back to GBR to reconsider, or it may substitute the decision with its own if quashing the decision is on the basis of an error of law and without the error there is only one decision that GBR could have reached. Clause 68(1) means that because appeals must be assessed using judicial review principles, operators can challenge GBR decisions only on procedural grounds and not on the substance or commercial merits. That means that GBR will be judge and jury in its decisions affecting its direct competition, which is obviously wildly unfair. Clause 68(3)(a) sets out that even where an appeal succeeds, the ORR can only remit the matter back to GBR for reconsideration, which means that GBR can often reach the same outcome again without revising its reasoning.”
“Subsections (2) and (3) provide for the ORR to allow an appeal or dismiss it, and, if it allows an appeal, to use the following remedies. For appeals made against the GBR policies, plans, and schemes themselves—under clause 59(6), on access and use; clause 60(6), on infra-structure capacity; clause 64(8), on charging; or clause 65(7), on the performance scheme—the ORR can only require GBR to reconsider the decision. For appeals made against a specific decision under clause 61(5) or clause 62(7), on the working timetable, or under clause 67, on GBR’s policies, plans and schemes, the ORR can quash the decision that is appealed against.”
“Clause 67, on appeals against access, charging and performance decisions, provides that a person who is aggrieved may appeal to the ORR against a GBR decision as to their train operations’ access to and use of the infrastructure, or a decision under the charging scheme or performance scheme. That sounds okay, until we realise that it is on judicial review terms, so there is no actual right of appeal at all. Clause 68, on the appeals procedure, sets out that the ORR, when determining appeals under this chapter, must apply the principles that the High Court would apply on an application for a judicial review, or the principles that the Court of Session would apply in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction for appeals in Scotland.”
“Clause 66 sets out who GBR must consult before issuing, revising or replacing the access and use policy under clause 59. The ORR and the Scottish and Welsh Ministers must be consulted as well as other persons GBR considers appropriate. Subsection (2) requires GBR to consult the persons it considers appropriate before issuing the infrastructure capacity planning document under clause 60, including any revisions and replacements; before issuing a working timetable under clause 61; and before making, altering or replacing a charging scheme under clause 64 or a performance scheme under clause 65. Subsection (3) provides that a requirement in this clause for consultation may be satisfied by a consultation before or after the commencement of the clause. There is currently no express requirement to consult existing open access operators.”
“I shall be brief. The amendments would strengthen the role of the ORR and reduce the role of the Secretary of State in considering appeals against GBR access decisions. Without further ado, I will say that we will support all three, should the Liberal Democrats press them to a vote.”
“The ORR must maintain a regulatory function to provide fairness and stability for the rail industry, which encourages investment and ensures financial sustainability by creating a level playing field across the sector and eliminating subjectivity from decision-making.” We therefore seek to leave out clause 69 and will vote against it. This would keep GBR under the normal access regime supervised by the ORR and ensure a fair system. We have no objections to Government amendments 175 to 183 but, as mentioned, we are less happy with clause 69 as a whole. Clause 70 amends the 2016 regulations to exempt GBR from the provisions of those regulations that would otherwise apply to its infrastructure. The 2016 regulations will continue to apply to other infrastructure managers. We do not object to the clause.”
“In order to provide adequate scrutiny and accountability, there must be sufficient checks and balances to ensure that financial, economic, and safety objectives are met. Angel Trains believes that there should be clear divisions between different parts of the rail system to ensure adequate accountability…As outlined above, it is vital that there is a fully independent regulator to hold GBR to account, for which the ORR could be best-placed. Beyond acting as an arbiter on access and charging decisions, the ORR should be empowered to report on GBR’s performance and issue performance improvements notices to GBR, in addition to other regulatory duties.”
“As a lessor of rolling stock to both GBR-led and Open Access operators we believe parity among operators is crucial and would welcome greater clarity from the Government on how access and charging decisions will be made and prioritised. As an independent regulator, the Office of Rail and Road (ORR) should be responsible for ensuring a level playing field by intervening if concerns are raised that GBR could have taken a discriminatory decision, for example, around preferential access rights and charging for GBR operators over Open Access competitors. Beyond access arrangements, we would welcome further detail from the Government about how GBR will be held to account. In its current form, GBR possesses a high concentration of power in its role in setting both strategy and delivery.”
“While the Government desires to create a ‘directing mind’ in GBR, coordinating rail with a whole network view, for private operators to have confidence in the system there must be appropriate protections guaranteeing fair access and charging. The ORR is well-positioned to perform that role as an essential backstop, but the correct framework must be built around it to enable it to operate as such.” Finally, Angel Trains also provided written evidence to the Transport Committee: “Angel Trains believes that the new access framework must provide equitable access to all parts of the railway, whether operators are GBR-led, Open Access, or freight.”
“The current drafting of the Bill, however, limits the ORR’s capacity to intervene proactively, restricting its powers primarily to appeals after decisions have been made. Enhancing the ORR’s decision-making and enforcement capability would help ensure that GBR’s commercial and operational decisions remain aligned with the wider interests of passengers and the market. This approach would reinforce the Government’s ambition for a collaborative, competitive, and accountable rail system. A strong regulator also provides stability for investors, ensuring that GBR operates within a framework that fosters long-term confidence and fair treatment for all market participants.”
“The ORR can also play a role in track access charges – costs for accessing the London-to-Calais stretch of rail are nine times higher per kilometre than the cost of accessing equivalent infrastructure in Belgium, France or the Netherlands.” Written evidence to the Transport Committee from Lumo and Hull Trains outlines their concerns: “The ORR plays an essential role in maintaining a fair, transparent, and competitive rail network. Its independence supports confidence among passengers, freight operators, and private investors. Lumo and Hull Trains believe the Railways Bill should preserve this role to help GBR succeed. To maintain balance across the system, the ORR must retain meaningful regulatory powers to ensure decisions made by GBR on access and charging are fair, evidence-based, and consistent with the Government’s growth objectives.”
“This statutory protection is essential to provide fair treatment for operators and give certainty for the future of UK international rail services. In international rail terms, the ORR’s role is more important than ever before, given the recent ruling enabling a new entrant to the market to access Temple Mills depot. The regulator will need to perform a strong, independent and objective role in ruling on cost sharing, compatibility and rolling stock issues.”
“ORR provides impartial oversight of track access, station allocation, depot facilities, charging, and timetabling. Its independence provides transparent decision-making and safeguards competition, while giving investors confidence in the long-term stability of services. Decisions such as the allocation of depot access at Temple Mills demonstrate the importance of ORR in balancing competing demands for constrained resources. Without statutory protection, GBR could constrain competition and impede international service growth. In addition, it could reduce transparency in access allocation. Eurostar recommends that the Bill explicitly preserves the ORR’s independent role in regulating access, charges, and depot allocation for international services.”
“Given the destruction of the current independently managed fair and level playing field, it is no surprise that the industry has major concerns. Eurostar’s written evidence to the Transport Committee explains: “The Railways Bill consolidates strategic and operational authority in Great British Railways. While centralising network management offers efficiency gains, it is essential that ORR’s independent regulatory function is preserved, especially for open access and international services. In future Government will have the overarching interest in the Infrastructure Concession (let to LSPH), the Maintainer Operator (Network Rail) and the largest operator on the route (SET). There needs to be an independent referee to balance these interests with those of open access operators.”
“Clause 69 amends the Railways Act 1993 to except GBR or a subsidiary of GBR from the sections outlining the ORR’s powers on access and its corresponding duties. That change would prevent the ORR from making access decisions on infrastructure operated by GBR. The clause removes GBR from the normal ORR supervised access regime, giving it a special exemption that no other operator has. Since GBR is both operator and infrastructure manager, we believe that this creates an uneven playing field and risks unfair treatment of competing operators. If the Government insist on the current drafting, they must come clean and admit that their intention is to treat competitors unfairly in comparison, and that they are not in favour of competition and reject private investment as a driver of innovation and improvement on the railway.”
“The Rail Freight Group is concerned. It states: “Clause 72 enables the Secretary of State by regulation to intervene in privately owned rail freight terminals, setting conditions of access and charges amongst other matters. Again, we understand that this is not the intention of the clause (which exists to enable GBR to take over other infrastructure such as HS1, Heathrow Branch or the Core Valley Lines) but nonetheless it is an extant risk to rail freight as presently worded, and we believe freight terminals should be explicitly out of scope for this clause.””
“I will speak to clauses 72 and 73, and the grouped amendments. Clause 72 is another controversial clause. It sets out that the Secretary of State may make regulations about the management and operation of non-GBR infrastructure, which means any network, station or track not operated by or on behalf of GBR; about the rights to operate trains that use non-GBR infrastructure; and about competition in the market for the provision and supply of such operations. Subsection (2)(c) allows the Secretary of State to set access terms and charges for non-GBR infrastructure, overriding commercial negotiation and bypassing the ORR. That cuts directly against the stated principle that the publicly owned operator must not regulate its competitors. It is an extraordinary clause that cuts up contract law and throws it out of the window.”
“I think he probably would have said it, to be perfectly honest. Clause 73 marks the end of a very significant chapter in the Bill, with many poorly drafted or simply ill thought through clauses. I am sure the drafting has been done with the greatest attention to detail; it is just the “thought-through-ness” that we are struggling with. But we end on a positive note, with no objections to clause 73.”
“The Minister just said that the amendments are completely unnecessary, because the stated concerns are not real, effectively. That does not answer the very real concerns put forward time and again in the Transport Select Committee and in this Committee’s evidence session—the written and oral evidence—by businesses that are experts in the field. They are not reassured by the Bill as it stands. How can the Minister go back and say, “No, we’re right and you’re wrong,” to those experts in the industry?”
“I beg to move amendment 99, in clause 74, page 42, line 24, after “monitor” insert “and audit”. This amendment would require the ORR to monitor and audit GBR’s statutory functions.”
“Friend the Member for Broadland and Fakenham told me not to forget it because we will have a vote on it. Are we debating group 73?”
“I think we have already debated amendment 98, but I want to put it in context we will vote on it at this point, so I want to mention why it is relevant. It “would require the ORR to consider whether GBR procuring services from the private sector would be a more efficient use of public funds.” That echoes previous amendments that we tabled, but we will be dividing on amendment 98 as part of this group, I believe. Amendment 222 “requires the Office of Rail and Road to consider Great British Railways’ performance against its KPIs, as set out in” new clause 2. As amendment 222 is consequential on new clause 2, we will not press it to a Division, given that the new clause is likely to be rejected. It is a probing amendment that we wanted on record. We also have amendment 236, which is not part of the group, but my hon.”
“Amendment 97 “ensures that Great British Railways in furtherance of railway safety actively engages with the industry bodies such as the Rail Safety and Standards Board and implements where reasonably practicable, the cross-sector recommendations of safety improvements and standards emerging from any cross-sector work.” That provides the Office of Rail and Road a clear mechanism to hold Great British Railways to account in safety matters. It also highlights an expectation of relevant industry bodies to recommend improvements to Great British Railways. We will not divide the Committee on amendment 97, but we ask the Government to think about what we are proposing in it. We all want the Bill to make the railways safer, and anything we can do to ensure that that happens will be for the good.”
“Amendments 99 to 101 “would require the ORR to monitor and audit GBR’s statutory functions.” The amendments address the relationship between GBR and the ORR, making it clear that the ORR remains an independent regulator with powers associated with audit, for example in relation to the release of documents. None of that applies to a woolly duty to monitor. Legally, the term “monitoring” is weak. It does not imply an ability to take action to demand improvement. That is particularly concerning when combined with clause 75, which removes the ORR’s ability to impose a financial penalty in the event of poor performance.”
“Clause 74 amends the Railways Act 1993. It gives the ORR a new function to monitor GBR’s delivery of its statutory functions and carry out investigations where appropriate to fulfil that monitoring. In particular, the ORR must consider how and whether GBR is carrying out the activities listed in its approved business plan, how the cost of carrying out those activities compares with the estimates in the business plan, and whether GBR is carrying out railway activities in a way that furthers railway safety. The ORR may advise the Secretary of State in relation to that monitoring function and publish its advice.”
“Liberal Democrat amendment 212 would remove the restriction on the ORR to impose fines on GBR for licence breaches. That is okay as far as it goes, and we will support the amendment, but we think that it does not quite go far enough. As I am sure Members expect on the basis of what I have just said, we will vote against clause 75 as a whole.”
“Government amendment 271 “would ensure that the ORR may not impose a fine on GBR under an order to secure compliance with conditions etc, to align with the amendment to section 57A of the Railways Act 1993 made by clause 75(3) of the Bill.” The Conservatives are against the whole clause, but, to save time, we will not seek a Division specifically on this amendment—I am sure that everybody will be pleased to hear that. However, as somebody who serves on the Transport Committee and sat through a lot of those evidence sessions, one of the key things that concerned me and some other members of the Committee was the breakdown of the relationship between the ORR and GBR and the weakening of the ORR’s powers. When I heard that evidence, I certainly felt that it was a compelling argument.”
“We are definitely interested to see how that transition of powers, as Ben mentioned, plays out, and how enforceability plays into that.” For once, the Government need to stop and listen. The sector is speaking with one voice and telling them that this is the wrong approach. The clause needs to be removed in its entirety. It is common for regulators to be able to issue financial penalties to private utility companies that are in breach of their statutory duties. Why should that consumer protection not also be applied to a public body like GBR? Removing clause 75 would restore the ORR as a strong, independent economic regulator.”
“How do we ensure that we do not see a perverse behaviour where GBR looks after its own operations to the detriment of others?” Nick Brooks from ALLRAIL said: “I can only echo that. With GBR writing the rules, controlling capacity and being linked to the main operator in the country, there is a structural conflict of interest, unless there is a clear duty of fairness and non-discrimination. I do not know of other European countries that do not have a strong independent rail regulator, across the EU and beyond. To be the judge and the jury at the same time is somewhat worrying.” Emma Vogelmann, the co-chief executive of Transport for All, told the Transport Committee: “Our recommendation on the role of the ORR is to retain its independent authority.”
“Clause 75 prevents the ORR from issuing directions to GBR relating to providing, improving or developing railway facilities. It also prevents the ORR from imposing a fine on GBR for licence breaches. We think those are both terrible ideas. The Transport Committee asked Maggie Simpson of the Rail Freight Group: “What is your view on the ORR’s downgraded power merely to ‘advise’ the Secretary of State on GBR’s performance, rather than having actual powers of enforcement?” She said: “I am quite worried about this.” To the same question, Steve Montgomery from First Rail said: “Following on from that, the independence element of it—marking your own homework—is a big concern for us.”
“As I mentioned, it amends the 1993 Act, and aside from my query about the ability that it provides to not publish information against a perceived public good, we have no objections to the clause—unless it falls outside the devolution settlement, but presumably the Minister can reassure the Committee that it does not. Clause 79 relates to the powers of Welsh Ministers, which are similar to those enjoyed by Scottish Ministers. The rationale behind allowing Ministers to not publish information over a perceived public good remains interesting to me, but I see no need to revise the clause.”
“Public trust is low—perhaps it is even lower today than it was when my hon. Friend the Member for Broadland and Fakenham wrote this speech—and any part of any Bill that allows the Secretary of State to get away with not publishing information under a perceived public good would look most suspicious indeed. I do think that, in the light of yesterday’s events, my hon. Friend will see the irony in the words that he wrote there. Clause 77(2) allows publication of anything that was in the register before the Bill’s commencement. What is the timeline for publication, and will the Minister commit to publication? Those queries aside, Members will be pleased to hear that we have tabled no amendments at this time. Clause 78, which relates to publication of information by Scottish Ministers, mirrors clause 77.”
“It states: “The Secretary of State may not publish particular information or documents under this section if it appears to the Secretary of State that publication of that information or those documents would be against the public interest or the commercial interests of any person.” Can the Minister outline under what circumstances not being transparent is not in the public interest? What determines public interest? I would be grateful to hear the methodology in this instance. Further, the only person with commercial interests in the railway will be the guiding hand of the Secretary of State herself, as it is all public money. I am sure that proposed new subsection (5) is standard practice in statute, but it raises an interesting point about transparency that I ask the Government to spend some time thinking about.”
“Each clause contains restrictions about publishing information that would affect individual, public or commercial interests. Each clause also allows for the publication of documentation that was previously contained in the registers. Clause 77, which is very similar to clause 76 and, indeed, clauses 78 and 79 on the devolved Ministers, amends section 73 of the 1993 Act, on the publication of a register by the Secretary of State, so that they are under duties to publish information—in particular, determinations that a closure is a minor modification and documentation relating to the enforcement of closure restrictions. However, proposed new section 73(5) of the 1993 Act is interesting.”
“Clauses 76 to 79 change the current duties on the ORR, the Secretary of State and Scottish and Welsh Ministers to maintain a register, in sections 72 to 73B of the Railways Act 1993, and put them under duties to publish certain information. The ORR must publish documentation relating to licences; access agreements; access contracts, other than those using GBR infrastructure, for which GBR will be responsible; experimental passenger services; closures; and railway administration orders, except where that would affect individual public or commercial interests. The Secretary of State, Scottish Ministers and Welsh Ministers must publish determinations that a closure is a minor modification, and documentation relating to the enforcement of closure restrictions.”
“Does the hon. Member agree that losing the skills and expertise of local training groups, such as the Plymouth Construction Training Group, which was formed in 1977 and has been funded by the CITB, and instead having centralised delivery from CITB in London, would be a retrograde step that risks us losing local construction skills?”
“I welcome the funding that the Minister has just outlined. Reference has been made to mayoral strategic authorities, but vast parts of the country do not have one yet and are unlikely to have one for some time. Indeed, my constituency and that of the hon. Member for Exeter (Steve Race) are in one of those regions. I am interested in how the funding will be delivered to where it is really needed in those smaller communities. At the moment, we have 124 training groups doing that, and ultimately they are best placed to know the workforce in their local areas. In those smaller communities that have not yet seen that devolution, how can we ensure that we do not see those skills just drop out of the bottom of the sector?”
“My hon. Friend’s comments provoke the question, is it a concern that the lack of flexibility for the Secretary of State will mean that there is no space for private sector companies in this role in the future? Ultimately, given the measures set out in the Bill, and that the opportunity to give access to other private businesses is entirely in the hands of the Secretary of State, it is potentially foreseeable that there could be no private involvement in the future, which would be a problem.”
“I will be very surprised if the Government vote against the amendment: that would send a very clear message to our veterans community that they are valued more greatly by the Conservatives than by Labour. Although I am sure there is no ill intent behind the omission of the veterans railcard in the Bill, we have to think about the messaging and the political point that is being made. It would be relatively easy to put the veterans railcard in law so that it cannot be changed in the future, and I would support that. As has been said, the Bill does not prevent it from being added later, but I wonder why we are not seeking to enshrine it in law now.”
“I want to pay tribute to the former Member for Plymouth Moor View, Johnny Mercer, who drove putting the veterans railcard in place in the first place through the work of the Office for Veterans’ Affairs. He said at the time that it underlined the “debt of gratitude” that we owe to our veterans. They are ultimately men and women who have fought hard for our country, and the opportunity to receive that discount in perpetuity—whether they have served one day or 100—is something that we should be proud of as a country and should seek to enshrine in legislation. The same goes for the opportunity for serving personnel to travel with their families.”
“I echo what my hon. Friend the Member for Broadland and Fakenham said on amendments 46 to 50. I too am surprised that the Government are not seeking to enshrine the right to a veterans railcard on the face of the Bill. While it is laudable that they want to ensure that those long-fought-for discount fare schemes remain for young, elderly or disabled people, I believe that not making the veterans railcard a statutory discount is a backward step and will send a particularly strong message to that community, who we know are quite agitated by a lot of what is being done by this Government, particularly around the prosecution of veterans for previous conduct. Not to use this Bill as an opportunity to put this provision on the statute book is a retrograde step.”
“I appreciate what the Minister is saying but, if that is the case, surely we should just remove the whole clause. If the Government do not seek to remove any discount schemes, why do they need three discount schemes, and none of the others, on the face of the Bill? It seems to me that there is a bit of a contradiction there.”
“I appreciate the Minister’s reassurance that there will still be opportunities for people taking part in remembrance events. However, there are additional matters such as the poppy train, which comes up through the south-west with Great Western Railway. While such things may be worked through in conjunction with the Secretary of State, they are put on by a privately owned franchise rail company. Is the Minister effectively saying that it will be down to the individual business units to decide what happens within their railway scope, or will it be in guidance through the licence or something else? There are many things that have been provided by privately owned franchises that the Bill does not confirm will take place once the railways are state owned.”
“It is worth reminding the Committee that the idea has also been used on a domestic route. Not that long ago GWR had a scheme with Nectar, and the points I accrued while travelling up and down to London for various engagements used to service me with a bottle of gin once a year. I am not necessarily saying that I support the hon. Gentleman’s new clause, but it is worth putting on the record the fact that it is not so farfetched an idea. It certainly made me use GWR’s app, even if I did not use anything else.”
“Is the hon. Gentleman aware that the Trussell Trust was founded in this country in 2000, under a Labour Government, and that the Department for Work and Pensions did not recommend that it be offered as a solution to families in need at the time? It is one thing to talk about food banks, but it is important to ensure that we acknowledge when they were first set up in this country.”
“Well, without having the statistics in front of me right this second— [ Interruption. ] No, let me finish. We had the global pandemic, when there was a huge need for food banks. In fact, it was the Conservative Government who invested hundreds of thousands of pounds in food banks to ensure that nobody went without. The council for which I was a cabinet member at the time used the funding from the Conservative Government directly to ensure that poverty did not increase over the covid pandemic. If numbers went up, we have to ensure that that fact is reflected.”
“While I am not saying that there might not have been an increase, I believe it is worth recognising that particular point.”
“No one has ever told me that they would adore to hear me speak in this place! I completely appreciate the point that the hon. Gentleman is making, but I too have been doing some research while this debate has been going on. It is worth noting that those food bank numbers have increased because they only count Trussell Trust food banks, so the more food banks join the Trussell Trust network, the more those numbers go up. In my city, where, as I may have mentioned, I held the cost of living portfolio during the pandemic— [ Interruption. ] There’s no need to yawn! My city did not need the additional food bank that was set up, and it ended up having to send food away. If that food bank had joined the Trussell Trust, it would have added to those numbers and distorted the figures.”
“I absolutely appreciate that auto-enrolment helps the most vulnerable, but if the Government are not taking account of the levers in their hands to improve that system, then they need to do some work. Having done my bit of ad-libbing, I will make some progress with my speech. Fundamentally, maintaining the two-child limit is about fairness—fairness to working parents who do the right thing, fairness to working parents who make difficult choices and fairness for families who live within their means.”