Rebecca Smith
MP for South West Devon · Conservative · United Kingdom
“His Majesty’s Opposition, the higher education sector and, most importantly, students right across the country need answers to those important questions.”
House of Commons28 October 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Against this uncertain backdrop, universities are being forced to close courses and sell buildings to cut costs and make efficiencies. The difficulties facing universities are explained well in the Policy Exchange report, “Tarnished Towers”.”
House of Commons28 October 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“That is all part of our new deal for young people. I reiterate His Majesty’s Opposition’s firm belief in the strength and value of the UK’s higher education sector; it is indeed a huge strategic asset. However, we must be honest and recognise that it will face huge challenges over the next decade.”
House of Commons28 October 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“I am going to make some progress. I do not want to burst the bubble of the hon. Member for Sunderland Central (Lewis Atkinson), but Plymouth has also had dentistry offered as a subject.”
House of Commons28 October 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“They teach young people to think critically and outside the box, skills that I believe will be essential in a Britain where communities are more divided than ever and the spectre of the AI revolution looms over us all. It is beyond clear that universities will play a central role in Britain for decades to come.”
House of Commons28 October 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Vaz, and to respond on behalf of His Majesty’s official Opposition. I thank the hon. Member for Sheffield Central (Abtisam Mohamed) for tabling this important debate and all Members for their contributions this morning.”
House of Commons28 October 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
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“That would support the Government’s ambition for a network that is accountable, transparent and responsive to passenger demand. I think that they are right. A core criticism of GBR is that it is a player and, now, the referee at the same time. Everyone must surely see that glaring conflict of interest. If His Majesty’s Government insist on changing the access and use policy to create a non-level playing field through the very tight capacity duty in clause 63, it should, at the very least, have an independent body responsible for applying the access and use policy. That is basic fairness in organisational structure. We tabled amendment 76, which was not selected. We are not sure why, because it would ensure that the access and use policy would remain with the ORR by removing clause 59.”
House of Commons5 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“By maintaining confidence in fair treatment and predictable regulation, the Government can encourage additional capital into the network, supporting the expansion of rail connectivity and the delivery of GBR’s passenger growth targets. Freight operators currently benefit from statutory protections that recognise their environmental and national importance. Open access services deliver comparable benefits by driving modal shift, reducing emissions and supporting regional economies, and should therefore receive equivalent recommendation. They recommend that the Bill provide statutory protection for open access services, equivalent to that afforded to freight, and ensure that the ORR retains full authority to make access determinations independent of GBR.”
House of Commons5 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“To ensure a transparent and fair access framework that the ORR can meaningfully enforce, it is important that private operators are involved in the development of the access and use policy and that appropriate statutory protections for open access are in place. Without consultation or clear safeguards, the access and use policy risks becoming a document shaped solely by GBR’s priorities, which would potentially exclude private operators and leave them with no effective mechanism to challenge decisions that affect their ability to operate. A robust and independent access framework will also help to unlock further private sector investment in new services and rolling stock.”
House of Commons5 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Lumo and Hull Trains, in their written evidence to the Select Committee on Transport, stated: “Maintaining a fair, evidence-based, and independent process for access to the network is fundamental to ensuring continued growth and innovation.” Under clause 59, however, the access and use policy will be developed and revised by GBR, setting the framework by which new services are assessed and defining the terms under which the ORR will judge appeals. Giving GBR exclusive control over that framework risks creating real or perceived conflicts of interest. For more than two decades, the independence of access decisions has underpinned rail market growth. The continued involvement of the ORR in assessing applications objectively, balancing passenger, freight and performance needs, is essential to preserving that success.”
House of Commons5 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“That is a core problem with the Bill and something that we feel is akin only to what a judicial review can do in other areas. The clause gives GBR sweeping control over access rules, with very few safeguards. GBR sets both the access criteria and the timetable dispute procedure, so the body compiling the timetable also controls challenges to its own decisions. Subsection (3) makes the publication of access terms optional, allowing for opaque or preferential conditions. Subsection (4) lets GBR change the rules at any time, with no duty to consult. Overall, the clause lacks the transparency and checks promised in the consultation and risks embedding clear conflicts of interest to the disadvantage of non-GBR operators.”
House of Commons5 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“The key issue is that the Government’s approach to the legislation is an assumption that the interests of GBR are synonymous with those of passengers, but we do not believe that that is always the case. Every organisation seeks to remove competition, which is uncomfortable—it exposes failures and weaknesses, and ultimately will show GBR up—but competition is crucial to improve service to customers, because organisations are forced to respond. That is why we believe that it needs to exist. The Bill gives GBR the power to design out competition to itself, with no checks or balances save what we consider to be a pathetic appeals process, where the Government’s position is that the appellate body should not second-guess the decision of GBR, only errors of law.”
House of Commons5 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“That is crucial information for all open access operators, and yet the Bill has no detail at all. It just makes reference to a future “document or documents”. In our view, that is a totally unacceptable approach, and it leaves the industry in the dark on mission-critical issues. Furthermore, no draft has been published, no direction of travel set out and no assurance given to the sector. We feel that to be a slightly arrogant approach from the Government and not a good sign of the approach that GBR itself will take to the independent sector. Under the Bill as drafted, GBR can make the application process as one-sided as it likes, favouring its own services over those of other competing operators—in the interests not of passengers, but of GBR.”
House of Commons5 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“It is a privilege to work under your chairmanship, Mr Western. I start by conveying the apologies of my hon. Friend the Member for Broadland and Fakenham, who is not able to be present today. Instead, I am standing in on his behalf. The clause sets out that Great British Railways must issue documents explaining the policies and procedures for access to and use of GBR infrastructure. Policy must cover procedures for applying for access, the criteria that GBR will apply to its decision making, and a procedure for resolving disputes. Subsection (3) permits GBR to set out the terms—that is, the rights and obligations —that a train operator can expect to receive where it has been granted access to GBR infrastructure. Subsection (6) allows a person aggrieved by a provision in the document to appeal to the Office of Rail and Road.”
House of Commons5 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“It is a bit of a chicken-and-egg situation: if we do not have them in the framework at the beginning, they are not being encouraged to stay involved and have that confidence. Does the Minister agree?”
House of Commons5 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Something that the Minister said reflects back to what my hon. Friend the Member for Broadland and Fakenham said on Tuesday. Not putting private operators, open access and freight on this mandatory list is making us nervous that it is not the Government’s intention to keep involving them in the future. I appreciate what the Minister is saying about them being consulted at the moment, but this amendment is important because it would keep them as a fixture of the future of GBR, rather than as an optional extra, where they can be useful, but if they are not considered to add any value to the railway, they will not be there any more. As we have already alluded to, industry certainty and assuredness needs to be there for private investment to come forward, some of which I know the Government will welcome.”
House of Commons5 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“I think I have said everything I want to say, but we would like to press amendment 79 and then amendment 217 to a vote. Question put, That the amendment be made.”
House of Commons5 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“I beg to move amendment 78, in clause 60, page 34, line 14, at end insert— “(4A) When preparing, revising or replacing the document or documents Great British Railways must consult and have regard to the views of other railway passenger services and services for the carriage of goods by railway.” This amendment would ensure that GBR had to consult and have regard to the views of open access and freight providers when preparing, revising or replacing the capacity plan.”
House of Commons5 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“The express obligation in the clause is that GBR prioritise its own planned growth, because it must ensure capacity for all current and expected GBR services. That obligation sits ahead of any consideration of open access bids, or whether the service provided by open access would be better for passengers and therefore in the public interest.”
House of Commons5 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Clause 63 ensures that where GBR has decided what constitutes best use, and where the Secretary of State or Scottish or Welsh Ministers have funded it to operate passenger services, consistent with their allocated section of the infrastructure capacity plan issued under clause 60, GBR must ensure that sufficient network capacity is available for those services to operate, while ensuring sufficient capacity for engineering works. The explanatory notes assert: “The duty does not enable GBR to secure more capacity for its own services than it thinks would equate to best use.” However, clause 63 is not designed to achieve a level playing field; it does not even try to. The clause is not interested in maximising passenger choice or services, or in allowing competition to maximise use of capacity for the benefit of passengers.”
House of Commons5 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“GBR will continue to follow general and wider legislative duties when taking access decisions, and the explanatory notes to the Bill assure us that “it must take decisions fairly on the genuine best use of the network.” The infrastructure capacity plan at clause 60 will indicate the capacity available to different market sectors—that is, how much capacity is best used for freight, for open access and for GBR passenger services.”
House of Commons5 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“When granting access under the clause—that is, when issuing any capacity commitment or access contract—and when preparing, issuing and revising the timetable under clause 62, GBR must ensure that it retains sufficient capacity on its infrastructure to operate its own passenger services and to carry out works to maintain and improve its structures. It is required to retain sufficient capacity for services it already operates and for those it expects to operate in the future—for example, as set out in a business plan or public service obligations in transport specification not yet awarded.”
House of Commons5 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Subsection (3) allows revisions “at any time”, and the “have regard” duty in subsection (4) is weak and does not stop GBR prioritising its own services. In fact, the capacity duty in clause 63 actively requires GBR to prioritise its own services, irrespective of passengers’ interest. Clause 60 lacks the transparency and safeguards signalled in the consultation. Our amendment 78 would ensure that GBR must consult and have regard to the views of other railway passenger services and freight when preparing, revising or replacing the capacity plan. That is the very least GBR should be required to do. Clause 63 provides for GBR to retain sufficient network capacity for the passenger services it is required to operate, and for engineering access.”
House of Commons5 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Subsection (6) gives a right to appeal to the ORR, but only on limited judicial review grounds, in line with clause 68; there is no right of appeal on the decision of GBR. The Bill contains a duty to consult the ORR and Scottish and Welsh Ministers, but no express duty to consult other rail operators, despite their activities being two of the four considerations for GBR under subsection (4). The Opposition believe that that is an extraordinary omission; only the ability for GBR to consult “such other persons as it considers appropriate” is included, in clause 66(1). Clause 60 gives GBR broad freedom to set and change the capacity plan at will, with no explicit duty to consult operators or freight interests when doing so.”
House of Commons5 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“The Government Whip referred to this as the “meaty” group, so we may be here for a while. That is fine; we have plenty of time. Clause 60 requires GBR to set out how, in its view, best use can be made of its infrastructure over a specified period. Subsection (3) allows GBR to replace or amend the document or documents that set that out at any time, and subsection (5) requires any plan or revisions to be published. Subsection (4) requires GBR to have “regard to the need to accommodate” its own passenger services, other passenger services—including open access services—freight services, and the maintenance and improvement of its infrastructure when preparing the document or documents.”
House of Commons5 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Finally, new clause 56, in the name of the Libs Dems, “requires GBR to explore and consider the potential benefits of centralised train planning and auctioning.” That is an interesting concept and could have significant benefits for passengers and taxpayers by driving competitive pricing for certain routes, while avoiding the abstraction arguments in relation to competing open access applications.”
House of Commons5 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Amendment 229 would ensure that “capacity allocation decisions reflect both planning priorities and freight-increase ambitions” and would require “GBR to publish and maintain a list of strategic freight corridors and ensures that any material reduction in capacity must be approved by the ORR.” The amendment would give a better balance to capacity considerations than the current wholly one-sided drafting. That is incredibly important because, ultimately, the Government are seeking to reduce climate change and achieve net zero. Freight plays a huge part in that, and if we do not have strategic freight corridors to ensure that we can make use of the freight system, we will fall short of what could be achieved.”
House of Commons5 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Amendment 80 puts forward an alternative approach, based on key performance indicators, but it is clear the Government are not interested, so in the interests of time I will not pursue that further today—that will be one fewer Division, the Government will be pleased to hear. Amendment 253, in the name of the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage, requires GBR “to retain sufficient capacity” to ensure that the rail freight target is met. To progress, there would need to be a mechanism to reach a decision if that conflicted with any planned GBR service. Amendment 211 would require GBR “to publish a statement explaining any decision not to grant access to a specific part of the network on the basis of network capacity.” For an appeals process to have any meaning at all, that would need to be a pre-requisite.”
House of Commons5 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“For that, I think you need to prioritise funded open access over speculative GBR services ‘someday in the future.’” It is very clear what the sector thinks: clause 63 needs substantial clarification. That is why, along with the Lib Dems, we have tabled a number of amendments, which I will briefly speak to. Amendment 81 would make it clear that capacity allocation should be based on a level playing field, without priority given to any particular operator. That would allow the best outcome for the passenger, and allows the public interest bit in clause 18 to take the lead. Proceeding on any other basis will leave us with a monopoly that is allowed to abuse its position.”
House of Commons5 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“We also understand that when an infrastructure capacity plan is reviewed, existing freight services could be stopped from operating if other services are considered to be higher value, as contractual commitments are expected to expire in line with the capacity plans.” Nick Brooks from ALLRAIL told the Transport Committee: “I think we would look for clarification, regarding clause 63, that GBR cannot reserve capacity for hypothetical future GBR long-distance services at the expense of privately funded open-access proposals or existing services that provide immediate benefits—and extra infrastructure income, of course, because open-access operators are paying track access fees too.”
House of Commons5 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“It is very difficult from these clauses to have a clear understanding of how the new process will operate, and how rail freight and rail freight growth will be facilitated, including in contractual rights for operators…For example, we understand from our discussions that there could be numerous infrastructure capacity plans across the network which a new freight service will have to navigate.”
House of Commons5 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“It should be obliged to carry out its functions fairly and without discrimination, so that if an open access train service can provide passenger benefit monopoly interests do not prevent that train from running.” FirstGroup also says: “Clause 63 must ensure that un-funded services which GBR ‘expects’ are not given train paths in advance of funded open access services, which will provide passenger benefit sooner.” The Rail Freight Group is also concerned by the clause, telling the Transport Committee: “We understand that the basis of the new approach will be via Infrastructure Capacity Plans (Clause 61) and, for GBR’s own trains, via the Capacity Duty (Clause 63).”
House of Commons5 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Recognising the role of competition as a driver of value and growth will ensure that passengers, the network, and the public purse all continue to benefit.” FirstGroup’s written submission to the Transport Committee tells a similar story, saying that open access operators “receive no government funding, take on full risk, and generate their own revenue— giving them very strong incentives to deliver a service which is endorsed by passengers…The way in which GBR structures its timetable will be critical.”
House of Commons5 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“This will ensure that it will continue to deliver these benefits to the millions of passengers who rely on them, now and into the future…As the Government looks to modernise and centralise rail through GBR, it will be important that competition remains an embedded principle within this framework. Open Access provides a proven model of innovation and efficiency, which can help GBR achieve its statutory objectives.”
House of Commons5 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“I agree with my hon. Friend. I alluded to that issue earlier in my comments, and my hon. Friend the Member for Broadland and Fakenham raised it on Tuesday. That is why we are concerned on behalf of not only open access, but first of all passengers, who are not going to get the best possible service because of the inbuilt assertion that open access can ultimately be discarded if the Government do not see it as palatable. The written evidence from Lumo and Hull Trains also says: “As the Government and GBR seek to deliver a thriving, growing railway, it is vital that the Railways Bill recognises and protects the contribution that Open Access makes to these shared goals.”
House of Commons5 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“I have listened to the Minister’s comments. As I said earlier, we will not press amendment 80 to a vote, but I wish to press the others to a vote. Question put, That the amendment be made.”
House of Commons5 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“The duty to consult and appeals provisions in clauses 66 to 68 also apply to the working timetable, but not to alterations of the working timetable.”
House of Commons5 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Clause 61(1) sets out that GBR must issue one or more timetables covering all train movements on GBR infrastructure for the period that GBR intends the timetable to cover, to be known as a working timetable. Subsection (3) allows GBR to alter a working timetable, for example to add new train movements, change a planned train movement, allow for maintenance works, deal with disruption, or change the duration of the timetable. Subsection (4) allows GBR to alter a planned train movement of an operator other than GBR only with that operator’s permission. Subsection (5) provides a right of appeal to the ORR for an operator who applied for a train movement to be included in the working timetable by GBR but was refused, or where the inclusion was made subject to conditions.”
House of Commons5 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Amendment is 211 is mine, and we would like to press it to a vote. [ Interruption. ] Oh, no, that is also a Liberal Democrat amendment—that says “Opp” as well.”
House of Commons5 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“I beg to move amendment 242, in clause 64, page 36, line 6, leave out subsection (1)(b). This amendment would remove the requirement for GBR to charge in relation to trains which are planned to use GBR infrastructure but do not operate, or do not operate in full.”
House of Commons5 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Subsection (6) allows for a change at any time, and without notice. It is clearly impossible to run a service without confidence of track-access charges. A devolved, concession, freight, open access or heritage and tour operator could, at the stroke of GBR’s pen, suddenly find its cost base increase significantly. That is not conducive to long-term business planning, and must harm private sector investment in rail services.”
House of Commons5 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“The clause allows GBR to set charges above direct cost based on what it considers an efficient operator could afford, which remains a subjective judgment made by a body that is itself a major operator. Even with the ORR able to substitute its own decision on appeal, the initial charging decision sits entirely with GBR. That creates scope for charges that disadvantage open access operators, unless and until challenged, which is not the level of neutrality expected for an industry-wide charging regime. Subsection (4)(a) is an oxymoron. Charges could not be assessed unless there were sufficient capacity to run a service, which by definition would mean that there is assessed to be spare capacity. Subsection (5) does not provide open access operators sufficient information to properly assess the fairness of the proposed charges.”
House of Commons5 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“GBR will not charge itself for use of infrastructure, despite being an operator as well as the infrastructure manager, but must include in its charging scheme sufficient information on the charges for its passenger services’ access to and use of its infrastructure to explain how charges in the scheme have been calculated. GBR will be able to make changes to its charging framework at any time. The Opposition believe that the clause is simply terrible. It confirms the worst fears of other rail users, and gives no certainty for business planning. Subsection (3) allows for a higher amount than the actual cost to GBR to be charged in particular circumstances, but those are not defined or explained. If GBR thinks that the operator has the money to pay it, then it is expected to pay—no rationale for the increase is given.”
House of Commons5 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“The base assumption is that charges will be set at the costs directly incurred—for example, the wear and tear caused by the service—but subsection (3) provides for a higher charge to be demanded in particular circumstances, “provided that it does not exceed the amount that Great British Railways considers is the amount that an efficient operator would be able to pay in those circumstances.” Subsection (4) confirms that GBR can also set a lower charge where it considers that appropriate, for various purposes, including but not limited to encouraging the use of spare capacity and promoting new services. The Subsidy Control Act 2022 would apply to any decision to lower charges under that provision.”
House of Commons5 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Clause 64(1) requires GBR to develop a charging scheme setting out the charges to be paid for access to and use of GBR’s infrastructure, and the extent to which charges may by payable in relation to trains that do not operate, or do not operate in full, despite their use being planned in.”
House of Commons5 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Amendment 230 would ensure that services are not caught within the charging scheme if they cannot operate due to GBR failures or actions—a case of natural justice. Does the Minister accept that the existing wording of the clause would allow GBR to profit from a cancellation of services caused by GBR’s failure to provide infra-structure? If so, will he explain how that could be a fair result? Amendment 242 would remove the requirement for GBR to charge in relation to trains that are planned to use GBR infrastructure, but do not operate or do not operate in full. Again, that is in effect a probing amendment, or a making-a-point amendment, as it were. With that, I shall sit down.”
House of Commons5 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Once again, that would put accountability and transparency back into the system—something the Government seem hellbent on ignoring. The second impact would be to allow affected organisations time to prepare an appeal. Judicial review requires a very short application process of just 12 weeks. This amended clause would help aggrieved parties to prepare a complex challenge in time for a JR timetable. Amendment 84 is more a probing one, so it will be interesting to hear the Minister’s response. The reflection on the judicial review process is particularly important, because we do not want to crowd people out of the opportunity to appeal. Anything he can offer in response would be appreciated.”
House of Commons5 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Instead, it would impose a duty on GBR to give other operators a minimum of 12 months’ notice of changes to the charging scheme, so at least they can react to the change and seek any appeal before the event rather than after it. Speaking to amendments 82 and 83, the Rail Forum has said: “We strongly support these amendment, access and other charges should be reasonable and operators should have sufficient warning of changes to be able to plan accordingly.” The amendments are not just a nice idea being suggested from the Opposition Benches, but something that the industry would like to see as well. Amendment 84 would provide that neither the Secretary of State nor Great British Railways can take any step to implement any part of the charging scheme until it has been laid before Parliament for three months.”
House of Commons5 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“This will sustain confidence in a fair and transparent access regime and ensure that private investment continues to play a central role in delivering a successful railway.” Amendment 83 would prevent GBR from charging any sum it liked without notice. Instead, it would be required to follow the standard pricing structure set out in clause 64(2), based on actual costs incurred as a result of the activity. Does the Minister agree that any serious business case for private investment in our railways will need to have the certainty of fixed costs? How does the clause achieve anything other than the opposite? Amendment 82 would remove the right of GBR to charge its competitors costs, basically at any time and without notice, on grounds that they have access to more money that they could pay.”
House of Commons5 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Confidence in a fair charging regime is essential for the continued profitability of private operators. Reinforcing a transparent and proportionate charging system will also help deliver the Government’s wider fiscal priorities by attracting and retaining private investment. By giving investors certainty that network costs are predictable and fairly allocated, the Bill can ensure that private operators continue to play a central role in funding innovation and expanding passenger capacity across the UK.” Lumo and Hull Trains recommend: “The updated charging regime must be developed in consultation with private stakeholders, appropriate for the markets being served and regulated with independent oversight from the ORR.”
House of Commons5 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Independent regulation of charging is therefore vital to maintain investor confidence and ensure fairness between different operators. Open Access operators already make a substantial contribution to the upkeep of the network while receiving no public subsidy. The charges paid by Open Access are calculated independently by ORR to encourage investment, sweat the railway asset and deliver connectivity and the associated economic benefits. It also acts as an additional income stream to Network Rail. These arrangements demonstrate the sector’s willingness to invest and its commitment to supporting the network’s long-term health. Ensuring that access charges remain proportionate and independently regulated will help reinforce the Government’s objective of crowding in private capital to support network growth.”
House of Commons5 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Is GBR an independent entity, or not? I think the Bill says it should be GBR itself that determines that, if I am not mistaken. It is a little bit like another conflict, or potential problem, with track access fees. Who decides the size of the track access fees? If you are a privately owned operator, is it your competitor—GBR—that decides your track access fees? That is a potential cause of worry.” Lumo and Hull Trains also had similar concerns, which they raised in their written evidence to the Transport Committee: “A transparent and proportionate charging regime will be critical to ensuring the financial sustainability and competitiveness of the railway. If GBR were able to set and revise access charges without independent oversight (as suggested by clause 64), it could create uncertainty and deter private investment.”
House of Commons5 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Indeed, there is a scheme coming in— I mentioned it on Tuesday, but now I cannot remember its name—that will look at different types of transport, and one of the plans is to ensure modal shift. Anything that undermines that is potentially contradictory and a backwards step. The Transport Committee also heard evidence from Nick Brooks of ALLRAIL, who said: “I was just going to say something about privately owned investors and privately owned operators, specifically privately owned investors that want to invest in our sector rather than in other sectors—aviation, the road sector, or even completely different sectors. There is a certain risk. There is a commercial risk, of course, and ultimately they are looking for lower fixed costs and higher variable costs. The worry with GBR is this: who determines what the market can bear?”
House of Commons5 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Through a general clause 64(3) which allows GBR discretion to charge more if ‘an efficient operator can pay it’. This is a very broad test and far wider than the test in current law ‘if the market can bear it’. This raises the prospect of far higher, and potentially uncapped charges being levied. Increasing the costs of rail freight will simply make using rail too expensive for customers when compared to road freight, and will reverse modal shift and undermine growth. It is essential that the powers to charge more than the standard charge are strictly limited for GBR.” The key point there is about reversing modal shift. On the one hand, the Government want to promote modal shift.”
House of Commons5 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Any of us who has worked with anyone who ever wanted to get a judicial review knows that it is incredibly difficult. It is also incredibly expensive, so it is certainly not a level playing field. The industry has rightly been outspoken on clause 64. In evidence to the Transport Committee, the Rail Freight Group stated: “The Bill sets out the future framework for access charges for freight. In headline terms the charges will be calculated in a similar way to today (costs directly incurred by running the train) which we welcome. However, the Bill provides for extra costs to be levied on freight services a. Through a mandatory reservation charge for capacity which is booked and then not used (for example, if a customer cancels a train due to poor weather) (Clause 64) b.”
House of Commons5 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“I can appreciate where the hon. Member is coming from. It sounds like a good idea; however, it could still be in the legislation directly, and the illustration he gave still leaves a huge number of questions about what happens if there is more than one user of that bit of infrastructure. Why should the private operator be the one that has to pay for the infrastructure? If anything, there is an issue, which I may come to, about the impact on fares, because ultimately, by the sound of it, GBR is going to have far fewer costs than other operators. In principle, I can see why the hon. Member made that point, but I think it is not clear enough at this stage. Clause 64(8) allows a right of appeal, but only under judicial review-type provisions, which is no right at all.”
House of Commons5 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗