Tom Cotton
Senator for Arkansas · Republican · United States
“(2) Chip security mechanism.--The term ``chip security mechanism'' means, with respect to a covered integrated circuit product, a software-, firmware-, or hardware-enabled security mechanism or a physical security mechanism, including-- (A) periodic on-site audits or inventories at the end- user's approved destination for the covered inte…”
“(2) Chip security mechanism.--The term ``chip security mechanism'' means, with respect to a covered integrated circuit product, a software-, firmware-, or hardware-enabled security mechanism or a physical security mechanism, including-- (A) periodic on-site audits or inventories at the end- user's approved destination for the covered inte…”
“(2) Report to congress.-- (A) In general.--Not later than two years after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for three years, the Under Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the results of the assessment required by paragraph (1), including-- (i) an identification of the…”
“(2) Report to congress.-- (A) In general.--Not later than two years after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for three years, the Under Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the results of the assessment required by paragraph (1), including-- (i) an identification of the…”
“(B) Elements.--The assessment required by subparagraph (A) shall include-- (i) an examination of the feasibility, reliability, and effectiveness of-- (I) methods and strategies that prevent the tampering, disabling, or other manipulating of covered integrated circuit products; and (II) any other method the Under Secretary determines appro…”
“(B) Elements.--The assessment required by subparagraph (A) shall include-- (i) an examination of the feasibility, reliability, and effectiveness of-- (I) methods and strategies that prevent the tampering, disabling, or other manipulating of covered integrated circuit products; and (II) any other method the Under Secretary determines appro…”
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“(2) Adaptation of requirement for geographical differences.--In implement the requirements of paragraph (1), the Under Secretary may select chip security mechanisms that vary by geographical region and by party, as the Under Secretary deems appropriate to support national security and foreign policy. (3) Proposed regulations.-- (A) In general.--Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary shall promulgate proposed regulations implementing the requirements of paragraph (1).”
“(a) Primary Requirements.-- (1) In general.--Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, [[Page S3955]] the Under Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Energy, shall require any covered integrated circuit product that is exported, reexported, or in-country transferred to or within a foreign country to be secured by a chip security mechanism that enables reliable verification of whether the product has been illegally diverted to destinations of concern, to the extent consistent with the recommendations transmitted pursuant to section 1098, using techniques that are feasible and appropriate on such date of enactment.”
“(2) Form.--The report required in this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex. SEC. 1099. REQUIREMENTS FOR CHIP SECURITY MECHANISMS FOR EXPORT, RE-EXPORT, OR IN-COUNTRY TRANSFER OF COVERED INTEGRATED CIRCUIT PRODUCTS.”
“(c) Report to Congress.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 210 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the results of the assessment required by subsection (a), including-- (A) an identification of the chip security mechanisms the Under Secretary plans to propose pursuant to implementing section 1099; (B) an identification of future research and development directions that could be used to enhance robustness of chip security mechanisms and incentives to promote such research and development directions; (C) a roadmap for the timely implementation of the chip security mechanisms; and (D) any recommendations for potential modifications to relevant export controls to allow for more flexibility with respect to the countries to or in which covered integrated circuit products may be exported, reexported, or in-country- transferred if the products include chip security mechanisms.”
“(b) Stakeholder Engagement.--In carrying out the requirements under subsection (a), the Under Secretary shall undertake a robust stakeholder engagement process to inform the development and implementation of chip security mechanisms, which shall include-- (1) soliciting input from relevant stakeholders, including-- (A) private sector entities involved in the covered integrated circuit product supply chain; (B) experts in software, firmware, hardware security, cybersecurity, privacy, export compliance, national security, and advanced artificial intelligence; and (C) individuals from academic institutions, federally funded research and development centers, Federal departments and agencies, and other research organizations with relevant expertise; and (2) incorporating stakeholder feedback to ensure that required chip security mechanisms are operationally effective, scalable, and aligned with best practices in security, privacy, and export compliance.”
“(a) Assessment.--On the date of the enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Energy and in robust consultation with the public in a manner determined appropriate by the Under Secretary and in consultation with the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall initiate an assessment-- (1) to identify potential chip security mechanisms to enable reliable verification of whether a covered integrated circuit product has been illegally diverted or accessed; (2) to develop incentives for facilitating industry-wide incorporation of such chip security mechanisms; (3) to conduct an analysis of the potential costs associated with implementing such chip security mechanisms; and (4) to recommend a set of chip security mechanisms that would effectively detect diversion and smuggling and is technically feasible, cost-effective, and ensures the technology leadership of the United States.”
“4801 et seq.) or any other provision of law; or (6) to apply any requirements or regulations under this subtitle to any covered integrated circuit products in the United States. SEC. 1098. INITIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHIP SECURITY MECHANISMS.”
“Nothing in this subtitle may be construed to direct the Under Secretary-- (1) to require any chip security mechanisms that-- (A) may hinder the capability or functionality of a covered integrated circuit product, such as a kill switch or geofencing mechanism; or (B) meaningfully undermine the cybersecurity of the covered integrated circuit product; (2) to mandate the incorporation of a location verification mechanism on a covered integrated circuit product that requires physical changes to hardware; (3) to consider any chip security mechanism requirements of this subtitle as applicable to a person that fabricates covered integrated circuit products, unless the person also designs the respective covered integrated circuit products; (4) to require chip security mechanisms for exports of integrated circuits, computers, electronic assemblies, or components that are not designed or marketed for artificial intelligence datacenter use; (5) to limit any other enforcement authority of the Under Secretary or the head of any other Federal department or agency under the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C.”
“(5) Export, in-country transfer, and reexport.--The terms ``export'', ``in-country transfer'', and ``reexport'' have the meanings given those terms in section 1742 of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801). (6) Under secretary.--The term ``Under Secretary'' means the Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security. SEC. 1097. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.”
“(C) Exclusion.--The term ``covered integrated circuit'' does not include-- (i) covered integrated circuits or products containing a covered integrated circuit that are not designed or marketed for use in a data center; (ii) microprocessor microcircuits, such as central processing units, that are not graphics processing units or similar products; or (iii) network switch integrated circuits whose dominant function is routing traffic over a computing network. (4) Destination of concern.--The term ``destination of concern'' means-- (A) a country subject to a United States arms embargo as described in section 126.1 of title 22, Code of Federal Regulations; or (B) any other country determined by the Under Secretary.”
“(3) Covered integrated circuit product.-- (A) In general.--The term ``covered integrated circuit product'' means a certain integrated circuit, computer, or other product classified under Export Control Classification Number 3A090, 4A090, 5A002.z, related .z Export Control Classification Numbers, or other functionally equivalent or substantially similar items. (B) Modification.--The Under Secretary shall routinely modify the definition of the term ``covered integrated circuit product'' under subparagraph (A) for the purposes of this subtitle to ensure only integrated circuits, computers, electronic assembly, or components designed or marketed for datacenter use are subject to the requirements of this subtitle.”
“(2) Chip security mechanism.--The term ``chip security mechanism'' means, with respect to a covered integrated circuit product, a software-, firmware-, or hardware-enabled security mechanism or a physical security mechanism, including-- (A) periodic on-site audits or inventories at the end- user's approved destination for the covered integrated circuit product; (B) periodic attestations by a U.S.-headquartered entity, or its subsidiaries, confirming that all covered integrated circuit products are accounted for, provided the Under Secretary approves the attestations; (C) except in the case of a covered integrated circuit product whose sole or principal function is memory or storage, ping-based location verification through a trusted landmark server utilizing secure software- or firmware- enabled mechanisms; or (D) various other mechanisms, or combinations of mechanisms, that the Under Secretary determines can verifiably demonstrate with significant confidence that the covered integrated circuit product has not been illegally diverted to a destination of concern.”
“SEC. 1096. DEFINITIONS. In this subtitle: (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means-- (A) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.”
“SEC. 1095. SENSE OF CONGRESS. It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) technology developed in the United States should serve as the foundation for the global ecosystem of artificial intelligence to advance the foreign policy and national security objectives of the United States and allies and partners of the United States; (2) the United States can foster goodwill, strengthen relationships, and support innovative research around the world by providing allies and partners of the United States with advanced computing capabilities; (3) advanced integrated circuits and computing hardware that are exported from the United States must be protected from diversion, theft, and other unauthorized use or exploitation in order to bolster the competitiveness of the United States and protect the national security of the United States; (4) illegal diversion of advanced integrated circuits and computing hardware, particularly illegal diversion to the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation, is a significant and growing issue that undermines the United States' export controls and threatens the United States' national security; (5) implementing chip security mechanisms will improve enforcement of export control laws of the United States, assist allies and partners with guarding computing hardware, and enhance protections from bad actors looking to access, divert, or tamper with advanced integrated circuits and computing hardware; and (6) implementing chip security mechanisms may help with the detection of smuggling or exploitation of advanced integrated circuits and computing hardware, thereby allowing for increased flexibility in export controls and opening the door for more international partners to receive streamlined and larger shipments of advanced computing hardware.”
“Congressional Record, Volume 172 Issue 114 (Tuesday, July 14, 2026) [Congressional Record Volume 172, Number 114 (Tuesday, July 14, 2026)] [Senate] [Pages S3953-S3956] From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [ www.gpo.gov ] SA 6683. Mr. COTTON submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 4784, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2027 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, [[Page S3954]] and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: At the end of title X, add the following: Subtitle H--Chip Security Act SEC. 1094. SHORT TITLE. This subtitle may be cited as the ``Chip Security Act''.”
“His contributions to conflict resolution went well beyond the United States. Just days ago, Lindsey was in Ukraine meeting with President Zelenskyy and standing with a nation fighting for its survival because he believed at his core that American leadership was the difference between peace and oppression. Lindsey Graham was tough, he was funny, and he loved this country. To the people of South Carolina and to Lindsey's family and, most especially, to his sister Darline and all who loved him, we are all mourning together. As a Christian like Lindsey, I know God will bring comfort where there is fear, strength where there is shock, and hope where there is loss. Lindsey, we miss you, and this Chamber will never be the same without you. Godspeed, my dear friend, and thank you for your service. I yield the floor.”
“He was always working the phones--phone call after phone call--whether it was President Trump or my mom back in Iowa. He was always certain that presence was power. I had the privilege of traveling many times over with Lindsey. The very first codel, which is a congressional delegation trip, that I took in the U.S. Senate was with Lindsey. It was to the Munich Security Conference in Germany. The other Senators on that trip were former Senator Joe Lieberman, a dear friend of his; Senator John McCain, who was his deepest and truest friend; and Senator Kelly Ayotte. We had a wonderful trip together. And it was such a great experience for me to see him on the world stage, easily moving from conversation to conversation with some of the world's most important and powerful leaders, and to see how much they deeply respected Senator Graham.”
“I know times are hard, but send money anyway. Lindseygraham.com. He did that all the time, and he was always so funny. And I can't tell you how many times I have watched that video, over and over again, and just laughed. He was certainly a very funny man, even when times were difficult, but behind the jokes was one of the most serious and effective legislators this body has ever known. He didn't care whose name was on a bill if the policy was right. He brokered friendships and alliances that many in this town said were no longer possible. He fought hard, and then he would sit down and crack a joke with the people that he had just been arguing with. All of us here on this floor know that Lindsey was always moving. The man never stood still.”
“Earlier this year, we were talking about Lindsey, doing dinner with Lindsey, as many of us did, and we were talking about this year's race because he was running for another term in the Senate. And my mother, again, being very close to Lindsey and his No. 1 fan in Iowa--in fact, she had a screen saver on her computer. It was her and Lindsey Graham. If you asked my mother who her favorite Senator was, it wouldn't be Senator Chuck Grassley or even her own daughter; it would be Senator Lindsey Graham. She was agonizing: Should I send Lindsey a donation for his campaign? And I was laughing about this with Lindsey. So he was like: Give me your phone. He said: Let's shoot a video for your mom. And so he took my phone, and he made this cute little 10-second video. And it went something like this: Marilyn, we love you. We love Joni.”
“My mother's birthday was just a few days before Lindsey's, and through the years, he would call her on her birthday and wish her the happiest of birthdays. As my daughter entered the U.S. Army, he would call her and just give her words of encouragement--in the hilarious way that only Lindsey Graham could. He was such a good and decent man. One thing we all knew about Lindsey was his great sense of humor. I will never forget the gift he gave me after I won Iowa's Senate seat. In fact, I may be the only Senator in history to be handed a mounted castration clamp with a plaque engraved ``Make `Em Squeal, Joni!'' just off the floor of this Chamber, courtesy of Lindsey Graham. And I think he is probably still laughing about that one.”
“Before he ever set foot on this floor, he wore the uniform of the U.S. Air Force, serving 33 years between the Air Force, the South Carolina Air National Guard, and the Air Force Reserve. That service and his upbringing in the back of his parents' South Carolina bar shaped everything about how he approached his work here in the Senate. He understood, in a way too few in Washington, DC, do, what it costs to defend freedom. He was one of the loudest, most persistent voices this institution has seen on the importance of American leadership in this world. And before I joined the Senate, Lindsey was one of my earliest supporters. I am so grateful for his mentorship and his friendship throughout the years. Lindsey was really dear to my family.”
“Lindsey's unwavering love for our Lord, devotion to our country, and commitment to his family defined his entire life. He was an example of what makes America exceptional. Though we lost a dedicated public servant, a workhorse of a colleague, and an irreplaceable friend, his memory and his legacy will never be forgotten. I extend my deepest prayers, thoughts, and condolences to Darline, Lindsey's family, Lindsey's staff, his friends, and his loved ones. America and this Senate will forever be grateful to Senator Lindsey Graham for his lifetime of service, patriotism, and courageous leadership. I yield the floor. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa. Ms. ERNST. Mr. President, I rise today with a heavy heart to honor my dear friend and colleague Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina.”
“[[Page S3917]] While he served as chairman of the Judiciary Committee, he oversaw the confirmation of a Supreme Court Justice and more than 200 Federal judges committed to upholding the rule of law as our Founders intended. Further, Lindsey knew that strength produces peace and prosperity, and he believed that the United States is the greatest force for freedom that mankind has ever known. Through every bill he introduced, every speech he gave, every statement he made, Lindsey ensured our allies knew our word was good and our enemies feared our resolve. If you loved America, Lindsey loved you. If you fought for freedom, Lindsey would fight for you. Only in America could a man like Lindsey Graham leave such a mark on our history and our future. That above all is a testament to his strength of character.”
“When Lindsey arrived in the House in 1995 as the first Republican Congressman from South Carolina's Third Congressional District since 1877, he brought with him a sense of duty and responsibility, a love for liberty, and a resolute commitment to America's national security. He carried this with him to the Senate, where he served for more than two decades and became the first person in South Carolina history to earn more than 1 million votes in a general election. Needless to say, South Carolinians loved him, and it is not hard to see why. Throughout my time working with Lindsey in the Senate, he fought for South Carolinians, he defended America's founding principles, and he supported the men and women of our military.”
“That was Lindsey, self-described rascal that he was. I often joked about it--and with him. You never knew quite what Lindsey was up to, but it probably wasn't nothing. He became the first member of his family to attend college. After suddenly and unexpectedly losing both parents while attending the University of South Carolina, he stepped in to raise his beloved younger sister Darline. But even in the face of tragedy, Lindsey's grit, determination, and faith enabled him to finish college, earn a law degree, serve in the Air Force, and eventually make his way here to the U.S. Congress.”
“That evening, as I was meeting some of the other Senators on the delegation--Senator Ayotte and Senator Corker-- Lindsey came up to me and slapped me on the back and asked me who the hell I was. I introduced myself, and I told him a little bit about my story, my service in the Army before I was elected to the House. He told me I was great; I needed to run for the Senate; we had to win the Senate seat in Arkansas. The next morning, we had a 08 briefing with General Breedlove, then the commander of our forces in Europe, and Lindsey stumbled in at about 8:55. Senator McCain hailed the arrival of his illegitimate son, and then we had a coffee break 5 minutes later, when Lindsey came over, slapped me on the back, and said: You were great. We have got to have you run for Senate. Now, what was your name again?”
“Congressional Record, Volume 172 Issue 114 (Tuesday, July 14, 2026) [Congressional Record Volume 172, Number 114 (Tuesday, July 14, 2026)] [Senate] [Pages S3916-S3917] From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [ www.gpo.gov ] Remembering Lindsey Graham Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, Lindsey Graham was a self-made American original. Born in Central, SC, Lindsey grew up in a room behind his parents' bar and pool hall, where he worked to help the family make ends meet and earned the nickname ``Stinkball'' from its patrons because of his sense of humor and his irrepressible nature and his rascal streak, as he called it. I saw that in my first experience with Lindsey Graham. I traveled with him and Senator McCain to the Munich Security Conference in 2013 as a brandnew Congressman.”
“International Development Finance Corporation to help ensure all projects of the Corporation are appropriately informed and strategically executed in accordance with the purpose of the Corporation as described in section 1412(b) of the BUILD Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9612(b)). SEC. 803. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS. (a) Definition of Armed Forces in National Security Act of 1947.--Section 605(8) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3126(8)) is amended by inserting ``Space Force,'' after ``Marine Corps,''. (b) National Intelligence University.--Section 6801(a)(4) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119-60) is amended in the matter preceding subparagraph (A) by striking ``3327'' and inserting ``3227''. ______”
“4865 note; division E of Public Law 119-60) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services,'' after ``Foreign Affairs''; and (2) in paragraph (2), by inserting ``, the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services,'' after ``Foreign Relations''. SEC. 802. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORPORATION. The Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of the other elements of the intelligence community, may provide intelligence and analytic support to the U.S.”
“(e) Cure.--If a covered application is identified for removal or is disqualified from use or acquisition pursuant to this section, the head of an element of the intelligence community may offer the provider of the covered application an opportunity to cure performance to avoid removal pursuant to subsection (b)(2). TITLE VIII--OTHER MATTERS SEC. 801. MODIFICATION TO NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS FOR AUTHORIZED AND ORDERED DEPARTURES. Section 5173(e) of the Department of State Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (22 U.S.C.”
“(2) Congressional notification.--Not later than 7 days after issuing a waiver pursuant to paragraph (1), the head of the element of the intelligence community that issues such waiver shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a notification that includes-- (A) an identification of the national security or research justification for such usage; (B) an estimate of the approximate cost of such usage; and (C) a plan to implement a safeguard in such a way as to allow for continued usage consistent with the general prohibition described in subsections (b)(1) and (c)(1).”
“(d) National Security and Research Waiver.-- (1) In general.--The head of an element of the intelligence community may issue a waiver for any artificial intelligence model that would otherwise be subject to the prohibition under subsection (b) if the head identifies a national security or research justification for such artificial intelligence model that benefits the intelligence community.”
“(2) Certification required.--The head of an element of the intelligence community shall certify to the Director of National Intelligence that safeguards implemented under paragraph (1) are sufficient to prevent misuse of covered applications to generate child pornography or intimate visual depictions of a minor. (3) Congressional notification.--The head of an element of the intelligence community that issues a certification pursuant to paragraph (2) shall notify the appropriate committees of Congress of such certification not later than 7 days after issuing such certification. Such a notification shall identify the safeguards implemented pursuant to paragraph (1).”
“(B) Subsequent removals.--Beginning after the 180-day period described in subparagraph (A), any artificial intelligence model that becomes a covered application shall be required to be removed from national security systems operated by an element of the intelligence community or a contractor of such element not later than 180 days after the date that the model is confirmed by the head of an element of the intelligence community, or their designee, to be a covered application. (c) Safeguards.-- (1) In general.--The head of an element of the intelligence community may implement additional safeguards that prohibit the generation of child pornography or non-consensual intimate visual depictions of an identifiable adult or a minor.”
“(5) Intimate visual depiction.--The term ``intimate visual depiction'' has the meaning given that term in section 1309 of the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2022 (15 U.S.C. 6851). (b) Prohibition.-- (1) In general.--The acquisition or use of any covered application on national security [[Page S3769]] systems operated by an element of the intelligence community or by a contractor of such element is prohibited unless the appropriate safeguards described in subsection (c) can be implemented. (2) Implementation.-- (A) Initial removal.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, any covered application shall be required to be removed from national security systems operated by an element of the intelligence community or a contractor of such element.”
“(4) Covered application.--The term ``covered application'' means any specific artificial intelligence model that has been confirmed by a head of an element of the intelligence community, or their designee, as-- (A) failing to adhere to the National Institute of Standard and Technology Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework: Generative Artificial Intelligence Profile with respect to ``obscene, degrading, and/or abusive content'', or a successor standard or framework, to the extent the framework applies to synthetic child sexual abuse material or non-consensual intimate images of adults; (B) subject to a Federal court determination that such artificial intelligence model has generated content depicting child pornography; or (C) subject to a Federal court determination that such artificial intelligence model has generated non-consensual intimate visual depictions of an identifiable adult or a minor.”
“(2) Artificial intelligence model.--The term ``artificial intelligence model'' means a capability or series of capabilities combined that can, for a given set of objectives, generate outputs such as predictions, recommendations, or decisions without human intervention or input. (3) Child pornography.--The term ``child pornography'' has the meaning given that term in section 2256 of title 18, United States Code.”
“(e) Consultation Required.--The Director of the National Security Agency shall carry out subsections (b), (c), and (d) in consultation with-- (1) the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; (2) the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and (3) other entities as the Director of the National Security Agency considers appropriate. SEC. 710. PROHIBITION ON CERTAIN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE MODELS ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SYSTEMS. (a) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means the following: (A) The congressional intelligence committees. (B) The Committee on Appropriations of the Senate. (C) The Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.”
“(d) Briefing on Vulnerabilities Identified by Artificial Intelligence Systems.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the National Security Agency shall provide the congressional intelligence committees with a briefing on-- (1) the volume of vulnerabilities of information systems identified by artificial intelligence systems; (2) the impact of any change in such volume on the functioning of the Vulnerabilities Equities Process; and (3) whether the increasingly rapid discovery and exploitation of such vulnerabilities by external cyber actors using artificial intelligence systems materially alters the equity of disclosure.”
“(c) Process.--In carrying out subsection (b), if the Director of the National Security Agency determines that the existing Vulnerabilities Equities Process does not sufficiently accommodate the submission and review of artificial intelligence security vulnerabilities identified by elements of the intelligence community, and that such vulnerabilities present public interest considerations meriting review under the Vulnerabilities Equities Process, the Director shall establish a process for the submission and review of such vulnerabilities under the Vulnerabilities Equities Process not later than 30 days after the date of such determination.”
“(b) Evaluation; Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the National Security Agency shall-- (1) evaluate whether the existing Vulnerabilities Equities Process sufficiently accommodates the submission and review of artificial intelligence security vulnerabilities; and (2) submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report describing the applicability of the Vulnerabilities Equities Process to such vulnerabilities, including whether the submission and review of such vulnerabilities under the Vulnerabilities Equities Process would result in an unduly large volume of notifications to affected vendors and, if so, an assessment of mechanisms to manage the volume of such notifications.”
“(2) Artificial intelligence system.--The term ``artificial intelligence system'' means a capability or series of capabilities combined that can, for a given set of objectives, generate outputs such as predictions, recommendations, or decisions without human intervention or input. (3) Vulnerabilities equities policy and process document.-- The term ``Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process document'' means the executive branch document entitled ``Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process for the United States Government'' dated November 15, 2017. (4) Vulnerabilities equities process.--The term ``Vulnerabilities Equities Process'' means the interagency review of vulnerabilities carried out pursuant to the Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process document or any successor document.”
“(a) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Artificial intelligence security vulnerability.--The term ``artificial intelligence security vulnerability'' means a weakness in an artificial intelligence system that could be exploited by a third party to subvert, without authorization, the privacy, integrity, or availability of an artificial intelligence system, including through techniques such as-- (A) evasion attacks; (B) poisoning attacks; (C) privacy-based attacks; (D) model theft or extraction attacks; and (E) attacks designed to circumvent or degrade the safety, alignment, or access control mechanisms of an artificial intelligence system.”
“(2) Intelligence community.--The Director of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, in coordination with the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence Community, shall brief the heads and Chief Artificial Intelligence Officers of the elements of the intelligence community on the findings and recommendations of the research campaign required by subsection (a), as appropriate. SEC. 709. REVIEW OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE SECURITY VULNERABILITIES UNDER VULNERABILITIES EQUITIES PROCESS.”
“(c) Briefings.-- (1) Congress.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, or 30 days after the date of completion of the research campaign required by subsection (a), whichever occurs first, the Director of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, in coordination with the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence Community, shall brief the congressional intelligence committees on the findings and recommendations of the research campaign.”
“(b) Elements.--The research campaign required by subsection (a) shall-- (1) pursue sandbox demonstrations with frontier artificial intelligence models or leverage other tactics necessary to uncover vulnerabilities to intelligence community systems, infrastructure, or personnel that may result from-- (A) the accelerated development of artificial intelligence capabilities by foreign nations; (B) the increasing access that non-state and criminal actors have to commercial artificial intelligence tools that can identify vulnerabilities and propose or orchestrate attacks; and (C) the potential for artificial intelligence systems to interact directly with each other during an attack; and (2) pursue findings, including-- (A) an identification of potential mitigations for unique vulnerabilities discovered; or (B) if no mitigation could be identified, an identification of vulnerabilities that require follow-up action by the intelligence community.”
“(a) Requirement.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and subject to the availability of appropriations, the Director of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, in coordination with the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence Community, shall commence a research campaign to deepen the understanding of the intelligence community with respect to novel dynamics and vulnerabilities that may arise when an adversarial artificial intelligence system interacts directly with systems of, or contracted by, the intelligence community that include artificial intelligence components.”
“(2) Intelligence community.--The Director of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, in coordination with the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence Community, shall brief the heads and Chief Artificial Intelligence Officers of the elements of the intelligence community on the findings and recommendations of the research campaign required by subsection (a), as appropriate. SEC. 708. RESEARCH ON INTERACTION OF ADVERSARIAL ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS WITH INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SYSTEMS.”
“(c) Briefings.-- (1) Congress.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, or 30 days after the date of completion of the research campaign required by subsection (a), whichever occurs first, the Director of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, in coordination with the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence Community, shall brief the congressional intelligence committees on the findings and recommendations of the research campaign.”
“(b) Elements.--The research campaign required by subsection (a) shall include-- (1) the identification of scenarios in which artificial intelligence capabilities could contribute to inadvertent escalation with foreign nations or actors, including-- (A) analytic judgments that fail to properly consider or weigh alternative explanations; (B) automation of imagery classification or signals intelligence; (C) distinguishing between civilians and authorized targets; (D) operational uses of artificial intelligence, such as time-constrained uses that do not allow for independent verification; and (E) such other scenarios as identified by the Director or participating subject matter experts; [[Page S3768]] (2) a simulation of select scenarios to discern where miscommunication or miscalculations have a higher likelihood of occurrence; and (3)(A) an identification of potential mitigations for vulnerabilities discovered; or (B) if no mitigation could be identified, an identification of vulnerabilities that require follow-up action by the intelligence community.”