Tom Cotton
Senator for Arkansas · Republican · United States
“(2) Chip security mechanism.--The term ``chip security mechanism'' means, with respect to a covered integrated circuit product, a software-, firmware-, or hardware-enabled security mechanism or a physical security mechanism, including-- (A) periodic on-site audits or inventories at the end- user's approved destination for the covered inte…”
“(2) Chip security mechanism.--The term ``chip security mechanism'' means, with respect to a covered integrated circuit product, a software-, firmware-, or hardware-enabled security mechanism or a physical security mechanism, including-- (A) periodic on-site audits or inventories at the end- user's approved destination for the covered inte…”
“(2) Report to congress.-- (A) In general.--Not later than two years after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for three years, the Under Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the results of the assessment required by paragraph (1), including-- (i) an identification of the…”
“(2) Report to congress.-- (A) In general.--Not later than two years after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for three years, the Under Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the results of the assessment required by paragraph (1), including-- (i) an identification of the…”
“(B) Elements.--The assessment required by subparagraph (A) shall include-- (i) an examination of the feasibility, reliability, and effectiveness of-- (I) methods and strategies that prevent the tampering, disabling, or other manipulating of covered integrated circuit products; and (II) any other method the Under Secretary determines appro…”
“(B) Elements.--The assessment required by subparagraph (A) shall include-- (i) an examination of the feasibility, reliability, and effectiveness of-- (I) methods and strategies that prevent the tampering, disabling, or other manipulating of covered integrated circuit products; and (II) any other method the Under Secretary determines appro…”
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“(g) Sunset.--The provisions of this section shall terminate on the date that is 5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act. SEC. 609. LIMITATIONS RELATING TO CHINESE PRODUCTS AND SERVICES. (a) Prohibition on Use by Intelligence Community.-- (1) In general.--Paragraph (1) of subsection (e) of section 6604 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (50 U.S.C.”
“Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Task Force shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional defense committees a report on the status of the Task Force, including-- (1) a summary of the efforts of the intelligence community with respect to China-Taiwan indications and warning; (2) a summary of efforts by the Task Force to develop a common set of indicators and organize collection efforts by the intelligence community against such indicators; (3) a description of the resources provided by each Task Force member towards efforts with respect to China-Taiwan indications and warning, disaggregated by-- (A) dollars spent or planned to be spent during fiscal year 2027; and [[Page S3760]] (B) total full-time equivalent personnel; and (4) recommendations to improve the collection and analysis of the intelligence community with respect to China-Taiwan indications and warning.”
“(2) Agency liaison.--Each member listed in subsection (b) shall appoint a senior intelligence officer from the agency concerned to serve as a liaison to the Task Force. Such liaison shall be responsible for coordinating the participation and support of the agency concerned to the Task Force. (f) Initial Reports.--.”
“(6) The Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis. (7) The Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research. (8) Such other heads of the elements of the intelligence community as the Director of National Intelligence determines appropriate. (d) Leadership; Organization; Meetings.-- (1) Chair.--The Director of National Intelligence (or a designee of the Director) shall be the chair of the Task Force. (2) Working groups.--The Task Force may create subordinate working groups as determined by the chair. (3) Meeting frequency.--The Task Force shall meet regularly but not less than quarterly. (e) Staffing.-- (1) In general.--The Task Force may hire staff and create joint duty assignments assigned to the Task Force. The Task Force may not exceed 25 full-time equivalent staff in total.”
“(2) The coordination of analysis related to China-Taiwan indications and warning and the development of analytic methodologies for use across the intelligence community in conducting analysis related to China-Taiwan indications and warning. (3) The development and implementation of information technology solutions to synchronize the access of the intelligence community to information relating to indications and warning. (c) Membership.--The Task Force shall be composed of the following members (or their designees): (1) The Director of National Intelligence. (2) The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. (3) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. (4) The Director of the National-Geospatial Intelligence Agency. (5) The Director of the National Security Agency.”
“SEC. 608. CHINA-TAIWAN STRATEGIC WARNING TASK FORCE. (a) Establishment.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall establish a task force to be known as the China-Taiwan Strategic Warning Task Force (referred to in this section as the ``Task Force'') to lead the efforts of the intelligence community with respect to providing indications and warning of any military aggression by the People's Republic of China against Taiwan. (b) Objectives.--The objectives of the Task Force are the following: (1) The synchronization of all intelligence community efforts related to China-Taiwan indications and warning, including the generation of indicators and development of collection requirements related to such indicators.”
“(2) Exemption.--The heads of the elements of the intelligence community are exempt from the restriction under paragraph (1) if the operation is required in the national interest of the United States and-- (A) is for the sole purposes of research, evaluation, training, testing, or analysis for electronic warfare, information warfare operations, cybersecurity, or development of unmanned ground vehicle system or counter-unmanned ground vehicle system technology; (B) is for the sole purposes of conducting counterterrorism or counterintelligence activities, protective missions, or Federal criminal or national security investigations, including forensic examinations, or for electronic warfare, information warfare operations, cybersecurity, or development of an unmanned ground vehicle system or counter-unmanned ground vehicle system technology; or (C) is an unmanned ground vehicle system that, as procured or as modified after procurement but before operational use, can no longer transfer to, or download data from, a covered foreign entity and otherwise poses no national security cybersecurity risks as determined by the exempting official.”
“(c) Prohibition on Operation of Covered Unmanned Ground Vehicle Systems From Covered Foreign Entities.-- (1) Prohibition.-- (A) In general.--Beginning on the date that is one year after the date of the enactment of this Act and except as provided in paragraph (2), no element of the intelligence community may operate a covered unmanned ground vehicle system manufactured or assembled by a covered foreign entity. (B) Applicability to contracted services.--The prohibition under subparagraph (A) applies to any covered unmanned ground vehicle systems that are being used by any element of the intelligence community through the method of contracting for the services of covered unmanned ground vehicle systems.”
“(2) Exemption.--The heads of elements of the intelligence community are exempt from the restriction under paragraph (1) if the procurement is required in the national interest of the United States and-- (A) is for the sole purposes of research, evaluation, training, testing, or analysis for electronic warfare, information warfare operations, cybersecurity, or development of unmanned ground vehicle system or counter-unmanned ground vehicle system technology; (B) is for the sole purposes of conducting counterterrorism or counterintelligence activities, protective missions, or Federal criminal or national security investigations, including forensic examinations, or for electronic warfare, information warfare operations, cybersecurity, or development of an unmanned ground vehicle system or counter-unmanned ground vehicle technology; or (C) is an unmanned ground vehicle system that, as procured or as modified after procurement but before operational use, can no longer transfer to, or download data from, a covered foreign entity and otherwise poses no national security cybersecurity risks as determined by the exempting official.”
“(b) Prohibition on Procurement of Covered Unmanned Ground Vehicle Systems From Covered Foreign Entities.-- (1) In general.--Except as provided under paragraph (2), the head of an element of the intelligence community may not procure any covered unmanned ground vehicle system that is manufactured or assembled by a covered foreign entity.”
“(3) Covered unmanned ground vehicle system.--The term ``covered unmanned ground vehicle system''-- (A) means a mechanical device that-- (i) is capable of locomotion, navigation, or movement on the ground; and (ii) operates at a distance from one or more operators or supervisors based on commands or in response to sensor data, or through any combination thereof; and (B) includes-- (i) remote surveillance vehicles, autonomous patrol technologies, mobile robotics, and humanoid robots; and (ii) the vehicle, its payload, and any external device used to control the vehicle.”
“(a) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Covered foreign country.--The term ``covered foreign country'' means any of the following: (A) The People's Republic of China. (B) The Russian Federation. (C) The Islamic Republic of Iran. (D) The Democratic People's Republic of Korea. (2) Covered foreign entity.--The term ``covered foreign entity'' means an entity that is domiciled in a covered foreign country, or subject to influence or control by the government of a covered foreign country as determined by the Secretary of Homeland Security or the Secretary of Defense, and any subsidiary or affiliate of such an entity.”
“3003) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``includes'' and inserting ``means''; and (2) in paragraph (5)-- (A) in the matter before subparagraph (A), by striking ``refer to all'' and inserting ``means''; (B) by amended subparagraph (B) to read as follows: ``(B) involves foreign threats to the United States, its people, property, or interests.''. (b) Scope of Intelligence Sharing Responsibilities.-- Section 102A(f)(1) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3024(f)(1)) is amended, in the first sentence, by inserting ``, and other Federal agencies as the Director considers appropriate,'' after ``community''. SEC. 607. PROHIBITION ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY USE OF ADVERSARY UNMANNED GROUND VEHICLES.”
“(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.) is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 518 the following: ``Sec. 519. Notification of criminal referrals regarding current or former intelligence community employees.''. SEC. 606. MODIFICATION OF DEFINITIONS IN NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947 AND SCOPE OF INTELLIGENCE SHARING RESPONSIBILITIES OF DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. (a) Definitions.--Section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.”
“``(a) Definition of Appropriate Committees of Congress.--In this section, the term `appropriate committees of Congress' means the following: ``(1) The congressional intelligence committees. ``(2) The Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate. [[Page S3759]] ``(3) The Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives. ``(b) Notice Requirement.--If an element of the intelligence community makes a criminal referral to the Department of Justice regarding a current or former employee of any element of the intelligence community, the general counsel of the element of the intelligence community that made the referral shall notify the appropriate committees of Congress of the referral on the date such referral is made and provide to the appropriate committees of Congress a summary of the referral.''.”
“(F) A description of any relationships that the individuals and entities identified under subparagraph (A) have with transnational organized crime groups. (3) Form; public availability.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. The unclassified form of the report shall be made available to the public. SEC. 605. NOTIFICATION OF CRIMINAL REFERRALS REGARDING CURRENT OR FORMER INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY EMPLOYEES. (a) In General.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 ( 50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``SEC. 519. NOTIFICATION OF CRIMINAL REFERRALS REGARDING CURRENT OR FORMER INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY EMPLOYEES.”
“(C) A description of the infrastructure, tactics, and techniques hostile foreign cyber actors, including foreign scam centers, commonly use, including reliance on any products or services subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. (D) A description of any relationships between the individuals and entities that operate as hostile foreign cyber actors, including foreign scam centers, and their governments or countries of origin that could impede the ability to counter threats from such centers. (E) An identification of communications and financial services providers subject to the jurisdiction of the United States that provide enabling services to individuals and entities identified under subparagraph (A).”
“(G) The Democratic Karen Benevolent Army. (H) HH Bank Cambodia PLC. (c) Report.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall submit to Congress a report on hostile foreign cyber actors, such as foreign scam centers. (2) Contents.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall include the following: (A) An identification of the individuals and entities operating as hostile foreign cyber actors, including foreign scam centers, that pose the most significant threat. (B) An identification of the locations from which the individuals and entities identified under subparagraph (A) operate.”
“(b) Sense of Congress.-- (1) In general.--It is the sense of Congress that-- (A) foreign malicious cybercriminal organizations, and foreign affiliates associated with those organizations, constitute hostile foreign cyber actors and are valid targets for intelligence operations under existing intelligence authorities; and (B) the Director of National Intelligence should treat collection, analysis, and disruption toward hostile foreign cyber actors as a national intelligence priority as part of the National Intelligence Priorities Framework. (2) Hostile foreign cyber actors.--The hostile foreign cyber actors described in paragraph (1) include, at a minimum, the following: (A) Prince Group. (B) Huione Group. (C) L.Y.P. Group. (D) Jin Bei Group. (E) Funnull Technology Inc. (F) TransAsia International holding Group Thailand Company Limited.”
“(3) Investigative reporting, Federal indictments, and sanctions designations issued by the Department of the Treasury have revealed the extent to which foreign malicious cybercriminal organizations collaborate with foreign governments, illicit finance actors, and foreign militia groups whose activities present a threat to the economic and national security of the United States. (4) Foreign malicious cybercriminal organizations rely extensively on communications and financial services of United States companies, enabling the organizations' targeting of vulnerable Americans. (5) Targeted efforts against the United States intelligence community by foreign malicious cybercriminal organizations to defraud or extort by using deepfakes, voice-cloning, or other sophisticated technological advancements presents a counterintelligence threat.”
“(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following: (1) In 2025, foreign malicious cybercriminal organizations, such as foreign scam centers that engage in sophisticated investment fraud, cyber-enabled extortion activity, and impersonation-based fraud, stole at least $7,566,000,000 from Americans according to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Internet Crime Complaint Center, which has emphasized that these estimates are conservative and only includes losses reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2) According to the Consumer Federation of America, Americans are losing an estimated $119,000,000,000 each year to online scams.”
“``(e) Selection.--Each year, each head of an element of the intelligence community described in subsection (c)(3) shall select two employees of such element to participate in the Program. ``(f) Term.--An employee selected for participation in the Program may serve for one year as a technology fellow at a nongovermental entity that has entered into an agreement under subsection (c)(1) with the head of the element of the intelligence community concerned.''. (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents of such Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 1002 the following: ``Sec. 1003. Ben Sasse Intelligence Community Technology Fellowship Program.''. SEC. 604. COUNTERING HOSTILE FOREIGN CYBER ACTORS AS A NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PRIORITY.”
“``(3) Elements described.--The elements of the intelligence community described in this paragraph are the following: ``(A) The Central Intelligence Agency. ``(B) The National Security Agency. ``(C) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. ``(D) The National Reconnaissance Office. ``(E) The Defense Intelligence Agency. ``(d) Board.-- ``(1) In general.--There is established a board for the Program (in this section referred to as the `Board'). ``(2) Membership.--The Board shall be composed of the directors of science and technology, or equivalents, of the elements of the intelligence community described in subsection (c)(3). ``(3) Co-chairs.--The members of the Board shall serve as co-chairs of the Board. ``(4) Selection criteria.--The Board shall establish selection criteria for the participation of employees in the Program.”
“The agreement shall-- ``(A) require that the employee of the element of the intelligence community, upon completion of the fellowship, serve in that element, or elsewhere in the intelligence community if approved by the head of the element that selected the employee, for a period equal to twice the length of the fellowship; ``(B) provide that if the employee of the element of the intelligence community fails to carry out the agreement, the employee shall be liable to the United States for payment of all expenses of the fellowship, unless that failure was for good and sufficient reason, as determined by the head of the element that selected the employee; and ``(C) contain language ensuring that the employee of the element of the intelligence community does not improperly use information that the employee knows relates to an acquisition or procurement of the element of the intelligence community for the benefit or advantage of the nongovernmental entity.”
“``(2) Selected employees.--For each employee of an element of the intelligence community selected for participation in the Program in accordance with subsection (e), the head of the element of the intelligence community that selected the employee shall provide for a written agreement among that element of the intelligence community, the nongovernmental entity concerned, and the employee.”
“3191 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 1002 the following: ``SEC. 1003. BEN SASSE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TECHNOLOGY FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM. ``(a) In General.--There is established a program (in this section referred to as the `Program') under which selected employees of the intelligence community may train at certain nongovernmental entities as technology fellows. ``(b) Designation.--The program shall be known as the `Ben Sasse Intelligence Community Technology Fellowship Program'. ``(c) Agreements.-- ``(1) Nongovernmental entities.--Each head of an element of the intelligence community described in paragraph (3) shall seek to enter into agreements with nongovernmental entities with experience in cutting-edge technology under which such entities may host technology fellows under the Program.”
“``(e) Tracking Adherence to Analytic Standards.--The Director of National Intelligence and each other head of an element of the intelligence community shall-- ``(1) develop metrics for evaluating the performance of their respective element in adhering to the analytic standards described in subsection (c); and ``(2) use such metrics to evaluate individual performance, develop analytic workforce training, and inform Congress on matters related to analytic performance.''. (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents of such Act is amended by adding at the end the following: ``Sec. 1115. Analytic standards for all-source intelligence products.''. SEC. 603. BEN SASSE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TECHNOLOGY FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM. (a) In General.--Title X of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.”
“``(d) Required Information.-- ``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), any all-source intelligence product shall include a section dedicated to [[Page S3758]] explaining the tradecraft related to the analytic tradecraft standards described in subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), (D), and (G) of subsection (c)(5). ``(2) Exceptions.--The requirement of paragraph (1) shall not apply to-- ``(A) any all source-intelligence product less than 300 words; or ``(B) any all-source intelligence product produced for the President's Daily Brief.”
“``(H) Accuracy.--Any all-source intelligence product shall-- ``(i) apply expertise and logic to make the most accurate judgments and assessments possible, based on the information available and known information gaps; and ``(ii) express judgments as clearly and precisely as possible, reducing ambiguity by addressing the likelihood, timing, and nature of the outcome or development. ``(I) Visuals.--Any all-source intelligence product shall incorporate effective visual information as appropriate. Any content of any all-source intelligence product depicted visually shall adhere to the analytic standards described in this subsection.”
“``(F) Argumentation.--Any all-source intelligence product shall-- ``(i) present a clear main analytic message up front; ``(ii) in the case of a product containing multiple judgments, have a main analytic message that is drawn collectively from those judgments; and ``(iii) be effectively supported by relevant intelligence information and coherent reasoning. ``(G) Analytic line.--Any all-source intelligence product shall-- ``(i) state how its major judgments on a topic are consistent with or represent a change from major judgments in previously published analysis, or that it represent initial coverage of a topic; and ``(ii) fully consider and bring to the attention of customers significant differences in analytic judgment, such as between two analytic elements of the intelligence community.”
“``(D) Incorporate analysis of alternatives.--Any all-source intelligence product shall-- ``(i) identify and assess plausible alternative hypotheses; ``(ii) in discussing alternatives, address factors such as associated assumptions, likelihood, or implications related to United States interests; and ``(iii) identify indicators that, if detected, would affect the likelihood of identified alternatives. ``(E) Relevance.--Any all-source intelligence product shall provide information and insight on United States national security issues.”
“``(C) Distinguishing.--Any all-source intelligence product shall-- ``(i) clearly distinguish statements that convey underlying intelligence information used in analysis from statements that convey assumptions or judgments; ``(ii) state an assumption explicitly when the assumption serves as the linchpin of an argument or when the assumption bridges key information gaps; ``(iii) explain the implications for judgments if assumptions prove to be incorrect; and ``(iv) as appropriate, identify indicators that, if detected, would alter judgments.”
“``(B) Uncertainty.--Any all-source intelligence product shall-- ``(i) indicate and explain the basis for the uncertainties associated with major analytic judgments, specifically the likelihood of occurrence of an event or development, and the analyst's confidence in the basis for the judgment; ``(ii) note causes of uncertainty, including assumptions and gaps, and explain how uncertainties affect analysis; and ``(iii) for expressions of likelihood or probability, use one of the sets of terms defined in Intelligence Community Directive 203.”
“``(5) Analytic tradecraft standards.--Any all-source intelligence product shall adhere to the following analytic tradecraft standards: ``(A) Sourcing.--Any all-source intelligence product shall-- ``(i) identify and properly describe the quality and credibility of underlying sources, data, and methodologies upon which judgments are based; and ``(ii) use source descriptors in accordance with sourcing guidance prescribed by the Director of National Intelligence.”
“``(2) Independent of political consideration.--Any all- source intelligence product shall not be-- ``(A) distorted by, or shaped for, advocacy of a particular audience, agenda, or policy viewpoint; or ``(B) influenced by the force of preference for a particular policy. ``(3) Timely.--Any all-source intelligence product shall be disseminated in time for the product to be actionable by customers. ``(4) Based on all relevant information available.--Any all-source intelligence product shall be informed by all relevant information available.”
“``(c) Analytic Standards.--The standards described in this subsection are the following: ``(1) Objectivity.--In producing any all-source intelligence product, an analyst-- ``(A) shall-- ``(i) perform the analyst's functions with objectivity and with awareness of their own assumptions and reasoning; ``(ii) employ reasoning techniques and practical mechanisms that reveal and mitigate bias; ``(iii) be alert to influence by existing analytic positions or judgments; and ``(iv) consider alternative perspectives and contrary information; and ``(B) shall not be unduly constrained by previous judgments when new developments indicate a modification is necessary.”
“``(b) Establishment.-- ``(1) In general.--The production of any all-source intelligence product shall adhere to-- ``(A) the analytic standards described in subsection (c); and ``(B) any guidance or policy issued under paragraph (2). ``(2) Guidance and policy.--The Director of National Intelligence or any other head of an element of the intelligence community may issue guidance or policy that expands upon the standards described in subsection (c) as such head considers appropriate, except that any such guidance or policy shall not contradict or otherwise circumvent such standards.”
“``(a) Definitions.--In this section: ``(1) All-source intelligence product.--The term `all- source intelligence product'-- ``(A) means any intelligence product published by an element of the intelligence community using multiple types of intelligence for purposes of providing an analytic assessment or situational update; and ``(B) does not include a product containing purely law enforcement information. ``(2) Assumption.--The term `assumption' means a supposition used to frame or support an argument. ``(3) Judgment.--The term `judgment' means a conclusion based on underlying intelligence information, analysis, and assumptions.”
“3028(a)) is amended by striking ``by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate'' and inserting ``by the Director of National Intelligence''. (f) Appointment of General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency.--Section 20(a) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3520(a)) is amended by striking ``by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate'' and inserting ``by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency''. SEC. 602. ANALYTIC STANDARDS FOR ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS. (a) In General.--The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``SEC. 1115. ANALYTIC STANDARDS FOR ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS.”
“(c) Appointment of Director of the National Counterterrorism Center.--Section 119(b)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3056(b)(1)) is amended by striking ``President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate'' and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''. (d) Appointment of Director the National Counterintelligence and Security Center.--Section 902(a) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (50 U.S.C. 3382(a)) is amended by striking ``President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate'' and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''. (e) Appointment of General Counsel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.--Section 103C(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.”
“TITLE VI--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS SEC. 601. AMENDMENTS TO PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS FOR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY POSITIONS. (a) Appointment of Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.--Section 104B(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3037(a)) is amended by inserting ``, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate'' after ``President''. (b) Appointment of Deputy Director of the National Security Agency.--Section 2 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 3602) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(c) There is a Deputy Director of the National Security Agency, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.''.”
“SEC. 505. ROLE OF NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY IN COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS OF SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE. The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 3601 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``SEC. 23. SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE. ``The Director of the National Security Agency shall-- ``(1) provide overall direction for and coordination of the collection and analysis of signals intelligence by elements of the intelligence community authorized to undertake such collection and analysis; and ``(2) in coordination with other departments, agencies, and elements of the United States Government that are authorized to undertake such collection, ensure that-- ``(A) the most effective use is made of resources; and ``(B) appropriate account is taken of the risks to the United States and those involved in such collection.''.”
“ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICE OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Section 311 of title 31, United States Code, is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)-- (A) in paragraph (2), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a semicolon; (B) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (4); and (C) by inserting after paragraph (2), the following new paragraph (3): [[Page S3757]] ``(3) identify and mitigate counterintelligence threats to the Department of the Treasury; and''; and (2) by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(c) Office of Counterintelligence.--There is established, within the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, the Office of Counterintelligence, which shall be responsible for implementing the policies and procedures across the bureaus of the Department of the Treasury required to carry out the counterintelligence responsibilities described in subsection (a).''.”
“``(2) Use of funds other than appropriated funds.--Funds expended under the authority of subsection (b) shall be reported to the committees described in paragraph (1) pursuant to procedures jointly agreed upon by such committees and the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office.''. (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the beginning of such subchapter is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 421 the following: ``421a. Funds for foreign intelligence activities conducted with and by the National Reconnaissance Office.''. SEC. 503. MODIFICATION OF ANNUAL REPORT ON FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION CASE DATA. Section 512A(b)(6) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3111a(b)(6)) is amended by striking ``country affiliation'' and inserting ``terrorist organization''. SEC. 504.”
“``(c) Reports.-- ``(1) Use of appropriated funds.--Any funds expended under the authority of subsection (a) shall be reported, pursuant to the provisions of title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.), to-- ``(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and ``(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.”
“``(b) Use of Funds Other Than Appropriated Funds.--The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office may use funds other than appropriated funds to pay for the expenses of arrangements with foreign countries for intelligence activities conducted with and by the National Reconnaissance Office, except that-- ``(1) no such funds may be expended, in whole or in part, by or for the benefit of the Department of Defense for a purpose for which Congress had previously denied funds; ``(2) proceeds from the sale of items or services may be used only to purchase replacement items similar to the items that are sold; and ``(3) the authority provided by this subsection may not be used to acquire items or services for the principal benefit of the United States.”
“Funds for foreign intelligence activities conducted with and by the National Reconnaissance Office ``(a) Use of Appropriated Funds.--The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office may use appropriated funds available to the National Reconnaissance Office for intelligence and communications purposes to pay for the expenses of arrangements with foreign countries for intelligence activities conducted with and by the National Reconnaissance Office.”
“The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 3601 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``SEC. 23. AUTHORITY TO CORRELATE, EVALUATE, AND DISSEMINATE CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE. ``The Director of the National Security Agency may-- ``(1) correlate and evaluate intelligence related to national security; and ``(2) disseminate such intelligence to legislative and executive branch customers as the Director considers appropriate.''. SEC. 502. FUNDS FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED WITH AND BY THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE. (a) In General.--Subchapter I of chapter 21 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 421 the following: ``Sec. 421a.”
“3024) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(z) No Police, Subpoena, or Law Enforcement Powers or Internal Security Functions.--The Director of National Intelligence shall have no police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal security functions.''. TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SEC. 401. MODIFICATION RELATING TO SECURITY PERSONNEL AT CERTAIN INSTALLATIONS. Section 15(a)(1)(D) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3515(a)(1)(D)) is amended by inserting ``or the National Reconnaissance Office'' after ``Office of the Director of National Intelligence''. TITLE V--MATTERS RELATING TO OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SEC. 501. AUTHORITY OF NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY TO CORRELATE, EVALUATE, AND DISSEMINATE CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE.”
“3033(k)(5)(D)(ii)(II)) is amended by inserting ``, unless the Director does not provide such direction not later than 7 calendar days after the date on which the employee furnishes the statement required by subclause (I)'' after ``practices''. (b) Central Intelligence Agency Employees.--Section 17(d)(5)(D)(ii)(II) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3517(d)(5)(D)(ii)(II)) is amended by inserting ``, unless the Director does not provide such direction not later than 7 calendar days after the date on which the employee furnishes the statement required by subclause (I)'' after ``practices''. SEC. 306. NO POLICE, SUBPOENA, OR LAW ENFORCEMENT POWERS OR INTERNAL SECURITY FUNCTIONS FOR DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.”