Tom Cotton
Senator for Arkansas · Republican · United States
“(2) Chip security mechanism.--The term ``chip security mechanism'' means, with respect to a covered integrated circuit product, a software-, firmware-, or hardware-enabled security mechanism or a physical security mechanism, including-- (A) periodic on-site audits or inventories at the end- user's approved destination for the covered inte…”
“(2) Chip security mechanism.--The term ``chip security mechanism'' means, with respect to a covered integrated circuit product, a software-, firmware-, or hardware-enabled security mechanism or a physical security mechanism, including-- (A) periodic on-site audits or inventories at the end- user's approved destination for the covered inte…”
“(2) Report to congress.-- (A) In general.--Not later than two years after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for three years, the Under Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the results of the assessment required by paragraph (1), including-- (i) an identification of the…”
“(2) Report to congress.-- (A) In general.--Not later than two years after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for three years, the Under Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the results of the assessment required by paragraph (1), including-- (i) an identification of the…”
“(B) Elements.--The assessment required by subparagraph (A) shall include-- (i) an examination of the feasibility, reliability, and effectiveness of-- (I) methods and strategies that prevent the tampering, disabling, or other manipulating of covered integrated circuit products; and (II) any other method the Under Secretary determines appro…”
“(B) Elements.--The assessment required by subparagraph (A) shall include-- (i) an examination of the feasibility, reliability, and effectiveness of-- (I) methods and strategies that prevent the tampering, disabling, or other manipulating of covered integrated circuit products; and (II) any other method the Under Secretary determines appro…”
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“``(3) Limitations on reduction of intelligence sharing.-- ``(A) In general.--Intelligence sharing and related security information exchanges with the Government of Israel shall not be suspended, reduced, or otherwise materially limited except on the basis of a specific and identifiable national security concern determined by the President, such as the protection of intelligence sources and methods, counterintelligence risk, or another significant security consideration. ``(B) Documentation requirement.--The President shall document any determination to suspend, reduce, or otherwise materially limit intelligence sharing or related security information exchanges with the Government of Israel, including a description of the national security rationale supporting the change.”
“``(2) Scope of intelligence sharing.--Intelligence sharing carried out under this subsection shall include the sharing of information relating to cybersecurity threats, terrorism, sanctions evasion, plans and intentions of state and nonstate actors, adversarial technology proliferation, missile threats, unmanned aerial systems, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, air and space domain awareness, and other aerial threats relevant to the defense of Israel, United States forces and interests in the region, and regional security partners.”
“(c) Requirements Relating to Intelligence Sharing.-- (1) In general.--Title XI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3231 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``SEC. 1115. REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO INTELLIGENCE SHARING. ``(a) Intelligence Sharing With Israel.-- ``(1) In general.--The President, acting through the Director of National Intelligence and, as necessary, the Secretary of Defense, shall, subject to applicable law and the protection of intelligence sources and methods, expand and enhance intelligence sharing with the Government of Israel.”
“(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) Israel remains a critical United States security partner whose defense and intelligence capabilities provide a strategic advantage that contributes to enhanced operational effectiveness and technological superiority; (2) timely and actionable intelligence sharing between the United States and Israel has saved United States personnel and property in the region and should remain a central pillar of the bilateral security relationship; (3) the evolving threat environment in the Middle East-- including missile proliferation, unmanned systems, cyber operations, terror financing, and proxy warfare--requires sustained and adaptive cooperation between the United States and Israel; (4) the United States-Israel security partnership has historically benefitted from bipartisan support, which strengthens the partnership's credibility, durability, and deterrent value; and (5) expanding normalization and practical security cooperation between Israel and regional states can serve as a force multiplier for collective deterrence and integrated defense.”
“(a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States-- (1) to maintain and strengthen the strategic security partnership with Israel as a means of advancing the national defense of the United States, regional stability, and the protection of United States personnel and interests in the Middle East; (2) to enhance intelligence collaboration through robust intelligence sharing and analytic partnership with Israel to counter terrorism, proliferation networks, cyber threats, state and nonstate aggressors, terror financing, sanctions evasion, and other transnational security challenges that threaten both Israel and the United States; (3) to deter and counter destabilizing activities by the Government of Iran and Iran-aligned state and nonstate actors that threaten Israel, United States forces, and regional partners; (4) to ensure that security assistance and defense cooperation are structured to help Israel maintain its qualitative military edge, consistent with United States law and broader regional security considerations; (5) to encourage and support the expansion of regional security architectures that include Israel and willing regional partners, with a focus on integrated air and missile defense, maritime security, early warning systems, and intelligence-sharing frameworks; and (6) to leverage security coordination with Israel to enhance force protection, early warning, and crisis response capabilities for United States military and diplomatic personnel in the region.”
“``(B) Elements.--The notification required in subsection (a) shall include-- ``(i) a detailed description of the reason for the pause, termination, restriction, or material downgrade of intelligence support; ``(ii) a description of the change in intelligence sharing; ``(iii) the categories of information affected; ``(iv) the expected duration of the pause, termination, restriction, or material downgrade; and ``(v) the anticipated impact of such decision on regional security and the national security objectives of the United States.''. SEC. 618. UNITED STATES-ISRAEL INTELLIGENCE SHARING ENHANCEMENT.”
“3001 note; relating to United States intelligence activities), to Israel, Ukraine, Taiwan, or any other country or partner determined by the President to be of significant importance to the United States, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a notification of such decision.”
“3024(j)) is amended-- (1) by striking ``Under the direction'' and inserting the following: ``(1) In general.--Under the direction''; and (2) by adding at the end the following: ``(2) Notification required.-- ``(A) In general.--Not later than 48 hours after a decision to pause, terminate, or otherwise restrict or materially downgrade intelligence support or intelligence activities (as defined in section 501(f)), including information, intelligence, and imagery collection authorized under Executive Order 12333 (50 U.S.C.”
“(D) Credible intelligence that an element of the Government of Ukraine receiving United States intelligence support engaged in a pattern of human rights violations, atrocities, or violations of the law of armed conflict. (4) Territory of ukraine.--The term ``territory of Ukraine'' means all territory internationally recognized to be the sovereign territory of Ukraine on February 19, 2014, including Crimea and the territory that the Russian Federation claims to have annexed in Kherson and Zaporizhzia. SEC. 617. REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO INTELLIGENCE SHARING WITH COUNTRIES AND PARTNERS OF SIGNIFICANT IMPORTANCE TO THE UNITED STATES. Section 102A(j) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.”
“(2) Intelligence support.--The term ``intelligence support'' means activities authorized under the provisions of law governing the heads of the elements of the intelligence community, including the collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of information, intelligence, and imagery. (3) Specific and identifiable national security concern.-- The term ``specific and identifiable national security concern'' includes the following: (A) Credible intelligence that an element of the Government of Ukraine has been compromised by the Russian Federation or another foreign adversary. (B) Protection of sources and methods. (C) A voluntary request from the Government of Ukraine to pause intelligence support.”
“(B) Recommencement.--Upon the cessation of the provision of intelligence support under subparagraph (A), the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, in coordination with the heads of any other relevant elements of the intelligence community, shall resume the provision of intelligence support to Ukraine pursuant to subsection (d). (f) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Armistice; comprehensive political settlement.--The terms ``armistice'' and ``comprehensive political settlement'' mean a formal written agreement between the Government of Ukraine and the Government of the Russian Federation that has the effect of permanently ending the armed conflict between both nations.”
“(C) Form.--A notification submitted pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall be in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (3) Sunset.-- (A) In general.--The provision of intelligence support for Ukraine under this subsection shall cease on the date that is 120 days after the date on which the Government of Ukraine and the Government of the Russian Federation agree to reinstate the armistice or comprehensive political settlement that was violated or a new armistice or comprehensive political settlement is entered into force.”
“(2) Notification.-- (A) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence shall promptly notify the congressional intelligence committees not later than 5 days after resuming intelligence support pursuant to paragraph (1). (B) Contents.--A notification submitted pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall include-- (i) a description of the specific attack or act of aggression against Ukraine; (ii) a description of any intelligence support that Ukraine requested from the United States; (iii) an assessment of the support that Ukraine might require in order to deter or repel the attack or act of aggression; [[Page S3763]] (iv) a description of any intelligence support that the Director has authorized to be provided to Ukraine; and (v) a description of the response of the Government of Ukraine upon receiving the intelligence support.”
“(C) Form.--A notification submitted pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall be in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (e) Requirement Relating to Intelligence Support in the Event of an Armed Attack on Ukraine in Violation of an Armistice or Comprehensive Political Settlement.-- (1) In general.--In the event of an armed attack by the Russian Federation on Ukraine that violates an armistice or a comprehensive political settlement, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the heads of other relevant elements of the intelligence community, shall immediately resume the provision of intelligence support to the Government of Ukraine at a level the Directors deem necessary to support military operations of the Government of Ukraine that are intended, or reasonably expected, to help the Armed Forces of Ukraine defend or liberate the territory of Ukraine and prevent such territory of Ukraine from being occupied or attacked by the Russian Federation.”
“(B) Contents.--A notification submitted pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall include-- (i) a description of the specific threatened attack or act of aggression shared with Ukraine; (ii) the date on which the intelligence was provided to Ukraine; (iii) details of the channel through which the intelligence was shared, including the names and titles of the relevant intelligence community officers and Ukrainian government officials; (iv) the response of the Government of Ukraine upon receiving the intelligence; (v) an assessment produced by the Defense Intelligence Agency, in coordination with other relevant elements of intelligence community, as to what support Ukraine might require in order to deter or repel the threatened attack or act of aggression; and (vi) a summary of subsequent actions that the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and other heads of relevant elements of the intelligence community, directed be taken to support Ukraine in defending against or otherwise responding to the threatened attack or act of aggression.”
“(3) Form.--The report required by paragraph (2) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (4) Early warning.--The Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of any other relevant elements of the intelligence community, shall provide to Ukraine and member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization intelligence and early warning to allow for an appropriate and timely response with respect to any potential attack or act of aggression against Ukraine by the Russian Federation. (5) Notification.-- (A) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence shall promptly notify each Member of the congressional intelligence committees not later than 5 days after any intelligence element provides Ukraine any intelligence pursuant to paragraph (4).”
“(2) Report on modifications to united states intelligence support.--Not later than 30 days after an armistice or a comprehensive political settlement is entered into force, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, in coordination with the heads of the other relevant elements of the intelligence community, including the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security Agency, and the Director of the National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report that includes-- (A) a description of the details of the armistice or the comprehensive political settlement of the conflict in Ukraine, including a description of the role of the intelligence community in monitoring the adherence by the parties to specific elements of the agreement; (B) an assessment of the vulnerabilities that Ukraine will face under the terms of the agreement and potential measures that the intelligence community or other parties could take to help mitigate such vulnerabilities; (C) a description of the modifications to ongoing intelligence support the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency has authorized in light of the changed situation on the ground in Ukraine in order to help build and sustain the capacity of Ukraine to detect, deter, and repel any future Russian attack against the territory of Ukraine; (D) an assessment of the implications of the armistice or comprehensive political settlement for the national security interests of the United States in Europe, including the capacity of the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to deter future aggression by the Russian Federation; and (E) a description and assessment of any cooperative arrangements that Ukraine has with other countries, including member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, that the intelligence community assesses would contribute to deterring a future attack or act of aggression by the Russian Federation aimed at occupying or seizing the territory of Ukraine.”
“(d) Requirement Relating to Intelligence Support in the Event of Armistice or Comprehensive Political Settlement.-- (1) In general.--If Ukraine and the Russian Federation voluntarily and freely enter into an armistice or a comprehensive political settlement, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of the other relevant elements of the intelligence community, shall adjust the intelligence support to Ukraine to support implementation of the armistice or the comprehensive political settlement and, consistent with the national security interests of the United States, support building and sustaining the capacity of Ukraine to detect, deter, and repel any future Russian attack against the territory of Ukraine.”
“(2) Notification.--Not later than 15 days after making the decision to pause, terminate, restrict, or otherwise materially downgrade intelligence support to Ukraine, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a notification that includes-- (A) a detailed description of the reason for the pause, termination, restriction, or material downgrade of intelligence support; (B) the expected duration of the pause, termination, restriction, or material downgrade; and (C) the anticipated impact of such decision on the ability of Ukraine to conduct effective military operations. (3) Form.--A notification submitted under paragraph (2) shall be in unclassified form, but may include an classified annex.”
“(c) Pauses in Intelligence Support.-- (1) In general.--Intelligence support to Ukraine required under this section shall not be suspended or limited unless the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, identifies a specific and identifiable national security concern.”
“(b) Requirement Relating to Intelligence Support Absent an Armistice or Comprehensive Political Settlement.--Until Ukraine and the Russian Federation voluntarily and freely enter into an armistice or comprehensive political settlement of the conflict, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the heads of any other relevant element of the intelligence community, shall continue to ensure the provision of intelligence support to the Government of Ukraine for purposes of advancing United States policy goals in Ukraine.”
“``(4) Intelligence support.--The term `intelligence support' means activities authorized under the provisions of law governing the heads of the elements of the intelligence community, including the collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of information, intelligence, and imagery.''.”
“8901) is amended-- (A) by redesignating paragraphs (3) and (4) as paragraphs (5) and (6), respectively; and (B) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following: ``(3) Credible defense and deterrence capability.--The term `credible defense and deterrence capability' means the ability to defend against and deter any credible conventional military threat from the Russian Federation acting unilaterally or in concert with partners, through the use of conventional military means, possessed in sufficient quantity, including weapons platforms and munitions, and command, control, communication, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.”
“SEC. 616. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES RELATED TO UKRAINE. (a) Statement of Policy.-- (1) In general.--Section 3 of the Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8902) is amended-- (A) in paragraph (16), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a semicolon; (B) in paragraph (17), by striking the period at the end and inserting ``; and''; and (C) by adding at the end the following: ``(18) to assist Ukraine in maintaining a credible defense and deterrence capability, including through the provision of intelligence support, as a means of advancing the national security of the United States, regional stability, and the protection of United States interests in Europe.''. (2) Definition.--Section 2 of such Act (22 U.S.C.”
“(2) Priority areas for enhanced cooperation.--Efforts undertaken pursuant to paragraph (1) shall include efforts-- (A) to address the speed and complexity of potential strategic and operational contingencies in the Indo-Pacific region, including any scenarios involving adversarial efforts to limit the freedom of navigation through critical maritime chokepoints threaten supply chain security; (B) relatedly, to ensure shared situational awareness across the full spectrum of potential contingencies, including military indications and warnings; (C) to enhance maritime, air, and space domain awareness, with the goal of providing decision advantage; (D) to inform collective defense planning and response by further integrating intelligence cooperation into joint and combined operational planning activities, exercises, and wargames focused on regional contingencies, including the Rim of the Pacific; [[Page S3762]] (E) to encourage intelligence cooperation with Taiwan, consistent with United States law and policy; and (F) to promote multilateral intelligence sharing and collaboration among allies and partners of the United States, such as through the United States-Japan-Republic of Korea trilateral mechanism and the United States-Japan-Philippines trilateral mechanism.”
“(c) Requirements.-- (1) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence shall, acting in close coordination with such heads of elements of the intelligence community as the Director considers relevant and the members of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing alliance, undertake efforts to bolster and improve-- (A) the intelligence foundations of alliances between the United States and Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, and Thailand; and (B) intelligence cooperation between the United States and other regional partners, such as India and Vietnam.”
“(a) Definition of Intelligence Cooperation.--In this section, the term ``intelligence cooperation'' means activities authorized under the provisions of law administered by the heads of the elements of the intelligence community, including the collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of information, intelligence, and imagery. (b) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to consider intelligence cooperation with allies and partners of the United States in the Indo-Pacific region a priority national security investment that will help deter aggression, reinforce regional stability, and reduce the risk of miscalculation, all of which will advance the national security and economic prosperity of the United States by helping to ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific region.”
“(e) Notification.--Not later than 30 days after the head of an element of the intelligence community issues a waiver described in subsection (d), such head shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a written notice of the waiver, which shall include-- (1) a justification for the waiver, including the product, intellectual property, technology, or other object subject to the waiver; and (2) a description of the national security threat mitigation measures implemented for permitting the activity that otherwise would be prohibited under subsection (c). SEC. 615. ENHANCING INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION IN THE INDO- PACIFIC REGION.”
“(d) Waiver.--The head of an element of the intelligence community-- (1) may waive the prohibition in subsection (c) for the element on a case by case basis if the head determines that in the particular case, sending or receiving any product, intellectual property, technology, or other object by an entity identified pursuant to subsection (b) is necessary for the national security of the United States; and (2) not later than 3 days after issuing such waiver, shall notify the Director of National Intelligence of the waiver.”
“(2) Form.--The list required by paragraph (1) may be in classified form. (c) Prohibition.--Except as provided in subsection (d), no element of the intelligence community may send or receive any product, intellectual property, technology, or other object as identified pursuant to subsection (b) within the United States using an entity, including any shipping company, that is owned or substantially controlled by a person or a governmental entity domiciled in a covered nation.”
“SEC. 614. PROHIBITION ON SENDING AND RECEIVING OBJECTS USING ENTITIES OWNED OR CONTROLLED BY PERSONS OR GOVERNMENTS OF CERTAIN COUNTRIES. (a) Definition of Covered Nation.--In this section, the term ``covered nation'' has the meaning given such term in section 4872(f) of title 10, United States Code. (b) In General.-- (1) List required.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, shall develop a list of products, intellectual property, technology, and any other objects that the Directors determine-- (A) affect the national security of the United States; and (B) if acquired by a covered nation, would pose a threat to the national security of the United States.”
“(b) Office of Director of National Intelligence.--Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(z) Biennial Reviews and Reports Regarding Intelligence Community Personnel Travel, Allowances, and Related Expenses Regulations.--Not later than September 30, 2027, and not less frequently than once every 2 years thereafter, in order to reflect the requirements of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence not taken into account in the formulation of Government-wide travel procedures covered by this section, the Director shall-- ``(1) review such requirements; and ``(2) not later than 10 days after completing a review under paragraph (1), submit to the congressional intelligence committees the findings of the Director with respect to the review, including any regulations that the Director determines to be necessary for the performance of intelligence functions.''.”
“INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PERSONNEL TRAVEL, ALLOWANCES, AND RELATED EXPENSES REGULATIONS. (a) Central Intelligence Agency.--Section 4 of the Central Intelligence Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3505) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(c) Biennial Reviews and Reports.--Not later than September 30, 2027, and not less frequently than once every 2 years thereafter, the Director shall-- ``(1) review the regulations covered by this section; and ``(2) not later than 10 days after completing a review under paragraph (1), submit to the congressional intelligence committees the findings of the Director with respect to the review, including identification of any changes to the regulations or personnel coverage thereof that the Director determines to be necessary for the performance of intelligence functions.''.”
“(o) Software Licensing.--Section 109 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3044) is amended-- (1) by striking subsection (c); and (2) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (c). (p) Review and Update of Position Designation Guidance.-- Section 7 of the SECRET Act of 2018 (Public Law 115-173; 132 Stat. 1294) is amended-- (1) by striking subsection (c); and (2) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (c). (q) Report on Independent Study on Economic Impact of Military Invasion of Taiwan by People's Republic of China.-- Section 7407 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal year 2024 (Public Law 118-31; 137 Stat. 1075) is amended-- (1) by striking subsection (c); and (2) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (c). SEC. 613.”
“(l) Briefings on Status of Intelligence Community Innovation Unit.--Subsections (c) and (d) of section 7502 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (Public Law 118-31; 137 Stat. 1082) are repealed. (m) Annual Training Requirement and Report Regarding Analytic Standards.--Section 6312 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (50 U.S.C. 3364 note; Public Law 117-263) is amended-- (1) by striking subsections (c) and (d); and (2) by redesignating subsections (e) and (f) as subsections (c) and (d), respectively. (n) Annual Reports Regarding Intelligence Community Public- private Talent Exchanges.--Section 6506 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law 118-159; 138 Stat. 2497) is amended by striking subsection (e).”
“(i) Enforcement of Cybersecurity Requirements for National Security Systems; Report on Exemptions.--Section 6309(f) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (44 U.S.C. 3557 note; division F of Public Law 117-263) is amended by striking paragraph (3). (j) Report on Collaboration Between Intelligence Community and Department of Commerce to Counter Foreign Commercial Threats.--Section 6514(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (50 U.S.C. 3370b(b)) is amended by striking paragraph (6). (k) Timeliness Standard for Rendering Determinations of Trust for Personnel Vetting; Reviews.--Section 7702(a) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (50 U.S.C. 3352h(a)) is amended by striking paragraph (2).”
“(f) Review of Shared Information Technology Services for Personnel Vetting.--Section 7701 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (division G of Public Law 118-31; 137 Stat. 1100) is repealed. (g) Supply Chain and Counterintelligence Risk Management Task Force.--Section 6306 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (50 U.S.C. 3370) is amended by striking subsection (e). (h) Report on Best Practices to Protect Privacy, Civil Liberties, and Civil Rights of Chinese Americans.--Section 620 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (50 U.S.C. 3240) is repealed.”
“[[Page S3761]] (c) Monitoring Mineral Investments Under Belt and Road Initiative of the People's Republic of China.--Section 7003 of the Energy Act of 2020 (50 U.S.C. 3372) is amended by striking subsection (d). (d) Briefing on Protocols for Certain Intelligence Community Employees and Dependents.--Section 605(g) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (50 U.S.C. 3334k(g)) is amended by striking paragraph (3). (e) Periodic Report on Positions in the Intelligence Community That Can Be Conducted Without Access to Classified Information, Networks, or Facilities.--Section 6610 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (50 U.S.C. 3352e) is repealed.”
“(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents of such Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 304 the following: ``Sec. 304A. Prohibition on participation in prediction markets.''. SEC. 612. REPEAL OF CERTAIN REPORT AND BRIEFING REQUIREMENTS. (a) Oversight of Foreign Influence in Academia.--Section 5713 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (50 U.S.C. 3369b) is repealed. (b) Report on Efforts to Illicitly Acquire Satellites and Related Items.--Section 1261 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (22 U.S.C. 2778 note; Public Law 112-239) is amended by striking subsection (e).”
“``(b) Policy.--Not later than 45 days after the date of the enactment of this section, the Director of National Intelligence shall issue a policy implementing the prohibition in subsection (a), including-- ``(1) establishing appropriate penalties for violating the prohibition; and ``(2) providing notice to all covered individuals. ``(c) Definitions.--In this section: ``(1) Covered individual.--The term `covered individual' means an employee or contractor, or a former employee or contractor, of an element of the intelligence community who holds a security clearance. ``(2) Prediction market.--The term `prediction market' means a platform, company, or service that allows agreements, contracts, transactions, or swaps between users over the outcome of non-financial future events, such as sports, military actions, and elections.''.”
“``(a) In General.--Except as may be necessary to conduct authorized intelligence activities, a covered individual may not participate in a prediction market on any topic relating to nonpublic information to which the covered individual has access by virtue of being a covered individual, during-- ``(1) the period during which the covered individual is employed or contracted by an element of the intelligence community; or ``(2) the two-year period beginning on the date on which the covered individual ceases to be employed or contracted by such an element.”
“(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents of such Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 123 the following: ``Sec. 124. Biological intelligence activities of the intelligence community.''. SEC. 611. PROHIBITION ON PARTICIPATION IN PREDICTION MARKETS. (a) In General.--Title III of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3071 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 304 the following: ``SEC. 304A. PROHIBITION ON PARTICIPATION IN PREDICTION MARKETS.”
“``(d) Priority.--In carrying out subsections (b) and (c), the Director of National Intelligence shall prioritize supporting capabilities, including the development of technical tools, that enable the early detection, characterization, and attribution of naturally occurring, novel, or engineered pathogens that could threaten the United States. ``(e) Rule of Construction.--Unless otherwise authorized by any other provision of law, nothing in this section shall be construed to allow the sharing or dissemination of anonymized biological data derived from law enforcement actions, or to allow such law enforcement data to be maintained or shared through databases covered in paragraph (c)(2), unless such biological data solely relates to a biological threat as defined by (a)(3).''.”
“``(c) Standards; Databases.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this section, the Director of National Intelligence shall, in such coordination with the Secretary of Defense as the Director considers appropriate and in consultation with the Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology-- ``(1) ensure standards for the collection and data formats of anonymized biological data and biological intelligence are, to the extent possible, consistent with standards used by other United States agencies, including by-- ``(A) providing for standardized data categorization and tagging of biological data; ``(B) considering standardized scientific and laboratory equipment and data collection methodologies; and ``(C) minimizing collection of any biological data that is likely to contain biological or genomic information specific to any United States person, including any derived data that is specific to any United States person; and ``(2) facilitate the establishment and maintenance of streamlined and unified accesses to databases of biological intelligence collected by the intelligence community or the Department of Defense.”
“3001 note; relating to United States intelligence activities)-- ``(1) determine which United States agencies would benefit from receiving anonymized biological data and biological intelligence in support of detection, characterization, and attribution of foreign biological threats; and ``(2) disseminate such anonymized biological data and biological intelligence to agencies identified under paragraph (1).”
“``(2) Biological intelligence.--The term `biological intelligence' includes the information collected or disseminated by the intelligence community concerning biological threats through genomic surveillance, immunological monitoring, environmental sampling, multiomic analysis, and other scientific methodologies. ``(3) Biological threat.--The term `biological threat' includes any naturally occurring infectious disease, engineered pathogen, toxin, or other biological agent that poses a risk to human, animal, or plant health or to the national security of the United States. ``(b) Determination; Dissemination.--The Director of National Intelligence, in such coordination with the Secretary of Defense as the Director considers appropriate, shall, consistent with applicable Federal law and Executive Order 12333 (50 U.S.C.”
“1648).''. SEC. 610. BIOLOGICAL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. (a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``SEC. 124. BIOLOGICAL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. ``(a) Definitions.--In this section: ``(1) Biological data.--The term `biological data' means multiomic information and other relevant information, including associated descriptors, derived from the structure, function, or process of a biological system, that is measured, collected, or aggregated for analysis, including information from humans, animals, plants, or microbes.”
“532 note; division X of Public Law 117- 103) is amended-- (1) in the section heading, by striking ``by federal bureau of investigation''; (2) in subsection (a)-- (A) in the matter before paragraph (1), by striking ``Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation'' and inserting ``head of an element of the intelligence community''; (B) in paragraph (1), by striking ``Federal Bureau of Investigation'' and inserting ``element''; and (C) in paragraph (3), by striking ``Director (or a designee of the Director)'' and inserting ``head''; (3) in subsection (b), by striking ``the Director (or a designee of the Director, as applicable) approves a recommendation pursuant to subsection (a)(3), the Director shall'' and inserting ``the head of an element of the intelligence community approves a recommendation pursuant to subsection (a)(3), the head shall''; (4) in subsection (c), by amending paragraph (2) to read as follows: ``(2) People's republic of china product or service.--The term `People's Republic of China product or service' means-- ``(A) an information or communication technology product manufactured in China, Hong Kong, or Macau and designed, developed, or maintained by a firm that is domiciled in China, Hong Kong, or Macau; or ``(B) an information or communication technology product or service provided or manufactured by-- ``(i) an entity that is fully or partially owned or controlled by, or otherwise connected to, the government of China; or ``(ii) an entity included on the list submitted by the Director of National Intelligence under section 6706(c) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (division F of Public Law 119-60; 139 Stat.”
“1701 note; relating to addressing the threat from securities investments that finance certain companies of the People's Republic of China), or any successor order; or ``(iii) the list of Chinese military companies required under section 1260H of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (10 U.S.C. 113 note; Public Law 116-283) and maintained by the Department of Defense.''. (2) Conforming amendment.--The heading for such section is amended by striking ``deepseek'' and inserting ``products and services from people's republic of china''. (b) Limitation on Procurement by Intelligence Community.-- Section 414 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (28 U.S.C.”
“3334m note; division F of Public Law 119-60) is amended to read as follows: ``(1) Covered application.--The term `covered application' means-- ``(A) the DeepSeek application or any successor application or service; or ``(B) any product or service from any entity of the People's Republic of China that is included on-- ``(i) the Entity List maintained by the Bureau of Industry and Security of the Department of Commerce; ``(ii) the list (sometimes known as the `Non-SDN Chinese Military-Industrial Complex Companies List') maintained by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury under Executive Order 13959, as amended by Executive Order 14032 (50 U.S.C.”