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Joel David Hamkins

We hold 128 passages that may be Joel David Hamkins’s. We do not publish them until we can confirm who spoke. See the correction.

On the record 2025

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2025
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This is everything the corpus holds for Joel David Hamkins. It is not everything they have said on the record.

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  1. “Yeah, it has the discotation. And so this idea can be for all the logical connectors and quantifiers and everything. You're applying Taraski's idea of discotation.”

    Lex Fridman Podcast31 December 2025Source ↗

  2. “Is true if and only if snow is white. And what he means by that is look to say truth is a property of an assertion so we can think of the assertion as it syntactically. So the sentence is true if and only if the content of the sentence is the case. So the sentence snow is white in quotations is true. That just means that snow is white. And that's why it's called the disquotational theory because we remove the quotation marks from the assertion, right?”

    Lex Fridman Podcast31 December 2025Source ↗

  3. “Truth is on the semantic side of the syntax semantics dichotomy. Truth has to do with the nature of reality. I mean, okay, when I talk about reality, I'm not talking about physical reality. I'm talking about mathematical reality. So we have a concept of something being true in a structure, a statement being true in a mathematical structure. Like maybe you have the real field or something and you want to know, does it satisfy this statement or that statement, or you have a group of some kind, or maybe you have a graph, this is a particular kind of mathematical structure that has a bunch of vertices and edges, and you want to know, you know, does this graph satisfy that state? And Tarski gave this absolutely wonderful account of the nature of truth in what's now known as the disquotational theory of truth. And what Tarski says is, the sentence, quote, snow is white.”

    Lex Fridman Podcast31 December 2025Source ↗

  4. “Yeah, this is a really core distinction that. It's fascinating to me to go back and read even the early 20th century people before Girdle and Tarski. And they were totally sloppy about this distinction between truth and proof. It wasn't clear at all until Girdle, basically. Although even as late as Bourbaki has a kind of confusion in these foundational works, so this standard graduate level textbooks used in France in the presentation of logic, are conflating truth and proof to be true for them means to be provable. So in the early days, maybe it wasn't clear enough that the concept of truth needed”

    Lex Fridman Podcast31 December 2025Source ↗

  5. “Yeah, well, they're so closely connected. Although all the features aren't the same, so. If you have a computable list of axioms for a theory, then you can start enumerating the consequences of the axioms, but you won't be able to computably decide whether a given statement is a consequence or not. You can enumerate the consequences so you can semi-decide the consequences, but you won't be able to decide yes or no whether a given statement is a consequence or not. So it's the distinction between a problem being computably decidable and a problem being computably enumerable, which was made clear following the work of Turing and others that came from that. So that's one difference between the list of axioms of the theory and the theory itself. The axioms could be, you can decide maybe computably whether something is an axiom or not, but that doesn't mean that you can decide computably whether or not something is a theorem or not.”

    Lex Fridman Podcast31 December 2025Source ↗

  6. “Consistency of the strong infinitary theory, but even the infinitary theory can't prove its own consistency, right? That's the second incompleteness theorem. And so it's in that sense a decisive takedown of the Hilbert program, which is His theorem just really answered that whole puzzle. It's quite amazing. But there's another aspect. Kind of easy to think about. I mean, if you're wondering about theories that prove their own consistency, then.”

    Lex Fridman Podcast31 December 2025Source ↗

  7. “But okay, so to talk about the alternative to the Hilbert point of view, I mean, if he's wrong, then what is the nature of mathematical reality? Well, it would mean that we couldn't ever maybe for the first goal, we couldn't ever write down a theory that answered all the questions. So we would always be in a situation where our best theory, even the infinitary theories”

    Lex Fridman Podcast31 December 2025Source ↗

  8. “First of all, to have a strong theory that's going to answer all the questions because the idea of logical independence and pervasiveness that we now know exists just wasn't, you know, there was no known, they didn't know anything like that happening ever. And so it's natural to think that it wouldn't happen and also that they would be able to guard against this inconsistency. So it seems like the goals of the Hobbit program are quite natural in that historical context. But when you think a little more about what the nature of it would be like, it shows you this kind of road procedure. And now you're saying, well, that doesn't seem so unlikely maybe. I mean, in the light of the increasing computer power and so on, it's actually maybe turning into our everyday experience where the machines are calculating more and more for us. And in a way that could be alarming.”

    Lex Fridman Podcast31 December 2025Source ↗

  9. “You could answer it by just waiting for either the answer to come out yes from the machine or the answer to come out no. So the nature of mathematical investigation in Hilbert's world is one of just turning the crank of the theorem or enumeration machine devoid of creative thinking or imagination. It's just getting the answer from this by procedure. So Hilbert, in effect, is telling us, I mean, with his program, the fundamental nature of mathematics wrote computation. I mean, the way I think about the Hilbert program seems extremely attractive in the historical context of being worried about the antinomies, the inconsistencies, and so how can we kind of block them. And so it seems natural”

    Lex Fridman Podcast31 December 2025Source ↗

  10. “Right, exactly right. Let's imagine what it would be like if he had been right. So we would have this finitary theory. And it would prove that the strong theory was free of contradiction. So we could start enumerating proofs from the strong theory. I mean, right now, we can write a computer program that would systematically generate all possible proofs from a given theory. So we could have like this theorem enumeration machine that just spit out theorems all day long in such a manner that every single theorem would eventually be produced by this device. And so, if you had a mathematical question. Of any kind”

    Lex Fridman Podcast31 December 2025Source ↗

  11. “One of the hugely successful theories of the natural numbers and elementary number theory, essentially all of classical number theory, so whatever kind of theorems you want to be proving about the prime numbers or factorization or any kind of finitary reasoning about finite combinatorial objects, all of it can be formalized in piano arithmetic. I mean, that's the basic situation. Of course, one has to qualify those statements in light of the G ⁇ tel incompleteness theorem, but for the most part, the classical number theoretic analysis of the finite number is almost entirely developable inside piano arithmetic.”

    Lex Fridman Podcast31 December 2025Source ↗

  12. “Yeah, well, this is, of course, philosophically contentious, and people have different ideas about what exactly it should mean. And so there's hundreds of papers out exactly that question. But I like to take it just kind of informally. I mean, it means that we're talking about finite sequences of symbols and we're going to have a theory, you know, finite strings of symbols and we affinitary theory would be one whose subject matter is about those kinds of things so that we can conceivably argue about the nature of these finite strings. So a proof is just a finite sequence of statements so that every statement is either one of the axioms or follows by the laws of logic from the earlier statements in some specified manner, like using modus ponens or some other law of logic like that, and such that the last line on the list is, you know, the theorem that you're proving. So that's what a proof is in this kind of way of thinking.”

    Lex Fridman Podcast31 December 2025Source ↗

  13. “The main thing about formalism is that you think of the process of doing mathematics, you divorce it from the meaning of the mathematical assertions, right? So the meaning of the mathematical assertions that you make in this infinitary theory has to do with these huge uncountable infinities and so on possibly. And that's a very sort of uncertain realm maybe and the source of the paradoxes and so on in some people's minds. And so, but the reasoning process itself consists of writing down sequences of symbols on your page and undertaking an argument with them, which is following these finitary rules. And so if we divorce the meaning of the symbols from just the process of manipulating the symbols, it's a way of looking at the nature of mathematics as a kind of formal game.”

    Lex Fridman Podcast31 December 2025Source ↗

  14. “In a very weak arithmetic, purely finitistic theory, we want to prove that the reasoning process of the strong theory is safe. So in order to make sense of that point of view, you basically have to invent the philosophy of formalism where we can look at what is the proof, what is the nature of mathematical reasoning. And on Hilbert's way of thinking about this, a proof is basically itself a finitistic kind of object. It's a sequence of if you think about the nature of what a proof is, it's a sequence of assertions which can be viewed as sort of sequences of symbols that conform with certain rules of logical reasoning. And this is a formalist way of understanding the nature of proof. So we think about a proof in a kind of syntactic, formal way, even though the content”

    Lex Fridman Podcast31 December 2025Source ↗

  15. “Going to have this strong theory, this set theory that we want to be proving our theorems in. But I mean, on the one hand, we want it to be as strong as possible. We would like it to answer all the questions. There's another famous quote of Hilbert in his retirement address where he proclaims Vermusen Wissen, Ver Verden Wissen. So we must know, we will know, in which he's very optimistic about the ability of mathematics to answer all of the questions of mathematics that we have posed. We have all these problems we want to solve, and he is saying we're going to do it, we're going to solve all these problems. So we want to propose this strong theory, and one has the sense that he had in mind set theory, in which all the questions are going to be answered. But secondly, we want to combine That”

    Lex Fridman Podcast31 December 2025Source ↗

  16. “A minefield that's a really good way of describing the situation. And so Hilbert said, well, look, we have to fix this problem. We want to use the set theory foundations, but we want to do it in a way that is trustworthy and reliable. We can't allow that the foundations of mathematics are in question. This is a kind of attitude, I think, that underlies Hilbert and the Hilbert program. And so he proposed, look, look.”

    Lex Fridman Podcast31 December 2025Source ↗

  17. “Of course, the project of logicism did not die with Rege, and it was continued. And there's a whole movement, the neologists and so on in contemporary times even. But my view of the matter is that really we should view the main goals of logicism are basically completely fulfilled in the rise of said theoretic foundationalism. I mean, when you view ZFC as a foundation of mathematics and in my view, the principles of ZFC are fundamentally logical in character, including the axiom of choice, as I mentioned, as the principle of logic. This is a highly disputed point of view, though, because a lot of people...”

    Lex Fridman Podcast31 December 2025Source ↗

  18. “And so Russell wrote this letter to Freget, and it was just at the moment when Frege was finishing his work it was already at the publishers and in press basically but it's completely devastating. I mean, it must have been such a horrible situation for Frege to be placed in because he's finished this monumental work years of his life dedicated to this and Russell finds this basically one line proof of a contradiction in the fundamental principles of the thesis that completely destroys the whole system.”

    Lex Fridman Podcast31 December 2025Source ↗

  19. “And he was appealing to the principles that support that axiom throughout his work. I mean, it was really, it wasn't just an incidental thing. He was really using this principle. And Russell rode him a letter when he observed the work in progress, that there was this problem. Because if you accept the principle that for any property whatsoever, you can make the set of objects with that property, then you could form the set of all sets that are not members of themselves. That's just an instance of the general comprehension principle. The set of all sets that aren't elements of themselves can't be a set because if it were then it would be an element of itself if and only if it's not a member of itself, and that's a contradiction.”

    Lex Fridman Podcast31 December 2025Source ↗

  20. “Before that time, Frege was working on his monumental work undertaking, implementing the philosophy of logicism, which is the attempt to reduce all of mathematics to logic. So Frager wanted to give an account of all of mathematics in terms of logical notions. And he was writing this monumental work and had formulated his basic principles. And those principles happened to imply that for any property whatsoever, you could form the set of objects with that property. This is known as the general comprehension principle.”

    Lex Fridman Podcast31 December 2025Source ↗

  21. “Because we can form the diagonal class, the class of all sets that are not elements of themselves. If that were a set, Then it would be an element of itself if and only if it was not an element of itself. It's exactly the same logic in all four of those arguments. So there can't be a class of all sets because if there were, then there would have to be a class of all sets that aren't elements of themselves. But that set would be an element of itself if and only if it's not an element of itself, which is a contradiction. So this is the essence of the Russell paradox. I don't call it the Russell paradox actually when I teach it. I call it Russell's theorem. There's no universal set. And it's not really confusing anymore. At the time, it was very confusing, but now we've absorbed this nature of set theory into our fundamental understanding of how sets are and it's not confusing anymore. I mean, the history is fascinating, though, how the Russell paradox because”

    Lex Fridman Podcast31 December 2025Source ↗

  22. “Might have just some in not all. So that diagonal salad would have to be named after some fruit. So let's suppose it's named after durian, meaning that it was associated with durian in the one-to-one correspondence. And then we ask, well, is durian In the salad that it's named after. And if it is, then it shouldn't be, and if it isn't, then it should be. And so it's again the same contradiction. So all of those arguments are just the same as Cantor's proof that the power set of any set is bigger than the set. And this is exactly the same logic that comes up in Russell's paradox because Russell is arguing that the class of all sets can't be a set. Because if it were, then we could form the set of all sets that are not elements of themselves. So basically he's what Russell is proving is that there are more collections of sets than elements.”

    Lex Fridman Podcast31 December 2025Source ↗

  23. “For any collection of fruits, there are more possible fruit salads than there are fruits So if not, then you can put a one to one correspondence between the fruits and the fruit salads, so you could name every fruit salad after a fruit might not be, that fruit might not be in that salad. It doesn't matter. It's a naming, a one-to-one correspondence. And then, of course, we form. The diagonal salad, which consists of all the fruits that are not in the salad that's named after them. And that's a perfectly good salad. It might be the kind of diet salad if it was the empty salad or it might be the universal salad which had all fruits in it if all the fruits are in it.”

    Lex Fridman Podcast31 December 2025Source ↗

  24. “So now we ask is Daniela on the committee that's named after her? Then she shouldn't be because it was the Committee of People who aren't on their own committee. And if she isn't, then she should be. So again, it's a contradiction. So when I was teaching in Oxford, one of my students came up with the following different anthropomorphization of Cantor's argument. Let's consider all possible fruit salads. We have a given collection of fruits and Know apples and oranges and grapes, whatever. And a fruit salad consists of some collection of those fruits. So there's the banana pear grape salad and so on. There's a lot of different kinds of salad. Every set of fruits makes a salad, a fruit salad. And we want to prove that for any collection of fruits, even if there are infinitely many different kinds of fruit,”

    Lex Fridman Podcast31 December 2025Source ↗

  25. “Yeah, maybe it's always in session. I don't know. So the claim is that there's more committees than people. Okay, suppose not. Well, then we could make an association between the people and the committees. So we would have a kind of every committee could be named after a person in a one-to-one way. And I'm not saying that the person is on the committee that's named after them or not on it, whatever, maybe sometimes that happens, sometimes it doesn't. I don't know. It doesn't matter. But let's form what I call committee D. Which consists of all the people that are not on the committee that's named after them. Maybe that's everyone. Maybe it's no one. Maybe it's half the people. It doesn't matter. That's a committee. It's a set of people. And so it has to be named after someone. Let's call that person Daniela.”

    Lex Fridman Podcast31 December 2025Source ↗

  26. “Maybe nobody's like that. Maybe there's no element of X that's like that. Or maybe they're all like that. Or maybe some of them are and some of them aren't. It doesn't really matter for the argument. I defined a subset D consisting of the individuals that are not in the set that's attached to them. But that's a perfectly good subset. And so because of the equanumerosity, it would have to be attached to a particular individual. But that let's call that person, it should be a name starting with D, so Diana. And now we ask is Diana an element of D or not? But if Diana is an element of D, then she is in her set. So she shouldn't be because the set D was the set of individuals that are not in their set. So, if Diana is in D, then she shouldn't be. But if she isn't in D, then she wouldn't be in her stead, and so she should be in D.”

    Lex Fridman Podcast31 December 2025Source ↗

  27. “Whether it's strictly more or not. And so candor reasoned like this. It's very simple. It's a kind of distilling the abstract diagnosization idea without encumbered by the complexity of the real numbers. So we have a set X, and we're looking at all of its subsets. That's the power set of X. Suppose that X and the power set of X have the same size. Suppose there's contradiction, they have the same size. So that means we can associate to every individual of X a subset. And so now let me define a new set. I mean another set. I'm going to define it. Let's call it D. And D is the subset of X that contains all the individuals that are not in their set Every individual Was associated with a subset of x, and I'm looking at the individuals that are not in their set.”

    Lex Fridman Podcast31 December 2025Source ↗

  28. “Right. So let's. So we talked about Cantor's proof that the real numbers, the set of real numbers is an uncountable infinity. It's a strictly larger infinity than the natural numbers. But Cantor actually proved a much more general fact, namely that for any set whatsoever, the power set of that set is a strictly larger set. So the power set is the set containing all the subsets of the original set. So if you have a set and you look at the collection of all of its subsets, then counterproved that this is a bigger set. They're not equanumerous. Of course, there's always at least as many subsets as elements because for any element you can make the singleton subset that has only that guy as a member, right? So there's always at least this many subsets as elements. But the question is whether they”

    Lex Fridman Podcast31 December 2025Source ↗

  29. “Zermelo and others actually looked into the mathematical papers and so on of some of the people who had been objecting so vociferously and found in many cases that they were implicitly using the axima choice in their own arguments even though they would argue publicly against it because it's so natural to use it because it's such an obvious principle in a way. I mean it's easy to just use it by accident with if you're not critical enough and you don't even realize that you're using the axima choice. That's true now even people like to pay attention to when the axima choice is used or not used in mathematical arguments. I mean up until this day it used to be more important in the early 20th century. It was very important because people didn't know if it was a consistent theory or not and there were these antinomies arising and so there was a worry about consistency of the axioms. But then of course eventually”

    Lex Fridman Podcast31 December 2025Source ↗

  30. “I read some historical accounts by historians about that time period specifically about Zermelus' axioms and his proof of the well order theorem, and the historians were saying never before in the history of mathematics has a mathematical theorem been argued about so publicly and so vociferously as that theorem of Sermellos. It's fascinating also because the axiom of choice was widely regarded as a kind of basic principle at first, but then but people were very suspicious of the well-order theorem because no one could imagine a well-ordering say of the real numbers. And so this was a case when Zermelo seemed to be from principles that seemed quite reasonable proving this obvious untruth. And so people were mathematicians were objecting. But then...”

    Lex Fridman Podcast31 December 2025Source ↗

  31. “So, the history of it is really quite fascinating. So Zumelo introduced most of these axioms as part of what's now called Zermelo set theory to formalize his proof from the axiomatoice to the well-order principle, which was an extremely controversial result. So in 1904, he gave the proof without the theory, and then it was challenged to provide the theory. And so in 1908, he produced the Zermello set theory and gave the proof that in that theory you can prove that every set admits a well-ordering. And so the axioms on the list, these things like extensionality express the most fundamental principles of the understanding of sets that he wanted to be talking about. For example, extensionality says if two sets have the same members, then they're equal. So it's this idea that the sets consists of the collection of their members, and that's it. There's nothing else.”

    Lex Fridman Podcast31 December 2025Source ↗

  32. “That, well, look, I mean, I don't, not every way of choosing the Sox has to be defined by a rule. Why should everything that exists in mathematical reality follow a rule or a procedure of that sort if I have the idea that my mathematical ontology is rich with objects, then I think that there are all kinds of functions and ways of choosing. Those are all part of the mathematical reality that I want to be talking about. And so I don't have any problem asserting the aximo choice. Yes, there is a way of choosing, but I can't necessarily tell you what it is. But in a mathematical argument, I can assume that I fix the choice function because I know that there is one. So the philosophical difference between working when you have the axim of choice and when you don't is the question of this constructive nature of the argument. So if you make”

    Lex Fridman Podcast31 December 2025Source ↗

  33. “When you think about the infinite collection of socks that the person has in their closet. And if we assume that socks are sort of indistinguishable within each pair, you know, they match each other, but this sort of, you know, indiscernible, then the butler wouldn't have any kind of rule for which sock in each pair to pick. And so it's not so clear that he has a way of producing one sock from each pair because that's what's at stake is the question of whether you can specify a rule by which the choice function, you know, a rule that it obeys that defines the choice function or whether there's sort of this arbitrary choosing aspect to it. That's when you need the axiom of choice to know that there is such a function. But of course, as a matter of mathematical ontology, we might find attractive the idea.”

    Lex Fridman Podcast31 December 2025Source ↗

  34. “And he tells his butler please go and give me one shoe from each pair. And the butler can do this easily because he can for any pair of shoes he can just always pick the left shoe. I mean, there's a way of picking that we can describe. We always take the left one or always take the right one or take the left one if it's a red shoe and the right one if it's a brown shoe or, you know, we can invent rules that would result in these kind of choice functions. We can describe explicit choice functions. And for those cases, you don't need the axiom of choice to know that there's a choice function. When you can describe a specific way of choosing, then you don't need to appeal to the axiom to know that there's a choice function. But the problematic case occurs.”

    Lex Fridman Podcast31 December 2025Source ↗

  35. “Yeah, absolutely. So one should be aware also that there's huge process of mathematics that pay attention to whether the External Choice is being used and they don't want to use the exmo choice that they work out the consequences that are possible without the eczema choice or with weakened forms of Sermella-Frankl set theory and so on. And this is quite a vibrant amount of work in that area. I mean, but going back to the Exma choice for a bit, it's maybe interesting to To give Russell's description of how to think about the axiom of choice. So Russell describes this rich person as a An infinite closet, and in that closet he has infinitely many pairs of shoes.”

    Lex Fridman Podcast31 December 2025Source ↗

  36. “That's right. So on the one hand, I mean, the eczema choice principle is. Completely obvious that we want this to be true, that it is true. I mean, a lot of people take it as a law of logic. If you have a bunch of sets, then there's a way of picking an element from each of them. There's a function. If I have a bunch of sets, then there's a function that when you apply it to any one of those sets gives you an element of that set. It's a completely natural principle. I mean, it's called the Exmo choice, which is a way of sort of anthropomorphizing the mathematical idea. It's not like the function is choosing something. I mean, it's just that if you were to make such choices, there would be a function that consisted of the choices that you made. And the difficulty is that when you can't specify a rule or a procedure by which you're making choices, then it's difficult to say what the function is that you're asserting.”

    Lex Fridman Podcast31 December 2025Source ↗

  37. “That's a great question. Cetheri really has two roles that it's serving. This kind of two ways that set theory emerges. On the one hand, set theory is its own subject of mathematics with its own problems and questions and answers and proof methods. And so really, from this point of view, set theory is about the transfinite recursive constructions or well-founded definitions and constructions. And those ideas have been enormously fruitful and setheists have looked into them and developed so many ideas coming out of that. But set theory has also happened to serve in this other foundational role. It's very commented here things said about set theory that really aren't taking account of this distinction between the two roles that it's serving. It's its own subject, but it's also serving as a foundation of mathematics. So in its foundational role, set theory provides”

    Lex Fridman Podcast31 December 2025Source ↗

  38. “Exactly. Because the only kind of case where that phenomenon occurs is when the number is eventually zero or eventually nine. And so since our numbers E never had any zeros or nines in it, it wasn't one of those numbers. And so actually in those cases, we didn't need to do anything special to diagnose just the mere fact that our number has a unique representation already means that it's not equal to those numbers. So maybe it was controversial in Cantor's day more than 100 years ago, but I think it's most commonly looked at today as one of the initial main results in set theory and its profound and amazing and insightful and the beginning point of so many later arguments. And this diagnosization idea has proved to be an extremely fruitful proof method and almost every major result in mathematical logic is using in an abstract way the idea of diagnosis.”

    Lex Fridman Podcast31 December 2025Source ↗

  39. “And then I want to do something a little bit more, and that is I'm going to make it different in a way that I'm never using the digits zero or nine. I'm just always using the other digits and not zero or nine. There's a certain technical reason to do that. But the main thing is that I make the digits of Z different in the nth place from the nth digit of the nth number. If you had drawn out the numbers on the original list R one, R two, R three, and so on, and you made it, you know, and they were each filling a whole row, and you thought about the nth digit of the nth number, it would form a kind of diagonal going down and to the right. And for that reason, this argument is called the diagonal argument because we're looking at the nth digit of the nth number, and those exist on a kind of diagonal going down”

    Lex Fridman Podcast31 December 2025Source ↗

  40. “Arsavin is the nth real number on the list. Basically, our assumption allows us to think of the real numbers as having been placed on a list, R1, R2, and so on. Okay, and now I'm going to define the number Z, and it's going to be the integer part is going to be a zero, and then I'm going to put a decimal place, and then I'm going to start specifying the digits of this number Z. D1, D2, D3. And what I'm going to make sure is that the nth digit after the decimal point of z is different from the nth digit of the nth number on the list. Okay, so to specify the nth digit of z, go to the nth number on the list r sub n, and I look at its nth digit after the decimal point. And whatever that digit is, I make sure that my digit is different from it.”

    Lex Fridman Podcast31 December 2025Source ↗

  41. “Now, obviously, since the natural numbers are included in the real numbers, we know that the real numbers are at least as large as the natural numbers. And so the claim that we want to prove is that it's strictly larger. So suppose that it wasn't strictly larger. So then they would have the same size. But to have the same size, remember, means by definition that this is a one-to-one correspondence between them. So we suppose that the real numbers can be put into one-to-one correspondence with the natural numbers. So therefore, for every natural number n, we have a real number, let's call it r sub n”

    Lex Fridman Podcast31 December 2025Source ↗

  42. “Okay, so Cantor wants to prove that the infinity of the real numbers is different and strictly larger than the infinity of the natural numbers. So the natural numbers are the numbers that start with zero and add one successively. So 0, 1, 2, 3, and so on. And the real numbers, as we said, are the numbers that come from the number line, including all the integers and the rationals and the algebraic numbers and the transcendental numbers and all of those numbers all together.”

    Lex Fridman Podcast31 December 2025Source ↗

  43. “And we won't even go to the surreal numbers about whichever wonderful blog post. We'll talk about that a little bit later.”

    Lex Fridman Podcast31 December 2025Source ↗

  44. “And yet, the rational numbers are also still only accountable infinity. And the way to see that is actually, it's just exactly the same as Hilbert's train again, because every fraction consists of two integers, the numerator and the denominator. And so if I tell you two natural numbers, then you know what fraction I'm talking about. I mean, plus the sine issue, I mean, if it's positive or negative. But if you just think about the positive fractions, then you have the numbers of the form P over Q, where Q is not zero. So you can still do 3 to the P times 5 to the Q if the same idea works with the rational numbers. So this is still a countable set. And you might think, well, every set is going to be countable because there's only one infinity. I mean, if that's a kind of perspective, maybe that you're a...”

    Lex Fridman Podcast31 December 2025Source ↗

  45. “But if we think about it in this grid manner, then I can imagine a kind of winding path winding through these grid points like up and down the diagonals winding back and forth. So I start at the corner point and then I go down up into the left and then down into the right, up into the left, down into the right, and so on, in such a way that I'm going to hit every grid point on this path. So this gives me a way of assigning room numbers to the points because Every grid point is going to be the nth point on that path for some end and that gives a correspondence between the grid points and the natural numbers themselves. So it's a kind of different picture. I mean, before we use this three to this C5 times 5 to the S, which is a kind of”

    Lex Fridman Podcast31 December 2025Source ↗

  46. “Yeah, that's exactly right. I mean, I guess. Because when you work with these notions that the argument of Hilbert Sortel becomes kind of clear, there's many, many other ways to talk about it too. For example, let's think about, say, the integer lattice, the grid of points that you get by taking pairs of natural numbers, say, so the upper right quadrant of the integer lattice. So there's the row zero, row one, row two, and so on, column zero, column one, column two, and so on. And each row and column has a countable infinity of points on it, right? Those dots, if you think about them as dots, are really the same as the train cars. If you think about each column in that integer lattice, it's accountable infinity. It's like one train car and then the next train car next to it. And then the next column next to that, the next train car.”

    Lex Fridman Podcast31 December 2025Source ↗

  47. “Exactly right. We've proved that if you have countably many countable sets, then the union of those sets, putting all those sets together into one giant set, is still countable, because the train cars are each countable, plus the current hotel, it's sort of like another train car, if you want to think about it that way. The current occupants of the hotel could have the same number as any of the train cars. So putting countably many countable sets together to make one big union set is still countable. It's quite remarkable, I think. I mean, when I first learned this many, many years ago, I was completely shocked by it and transfixed by it. It was quite amazing to me that this notion of countable infinity could be closed under this process of infinitely many infinities adding up still to the very same infinity, which is a strong instance, a strong violation of Euclid's principle.”

    Lex Fridman Podcast31 December 2025Source ↗

  48. “And so we have an infinity of infinities of the train passengers together with the current occupants of the hotel and everybody on the train wants to check in to Hilbert's hotel So the manager can again, of course, send a message up to all the rooms, telling every person to double their room number again. And so that will occupy all the even numbered rooms again, but free up again the odd numbered rooms. So somehow we want to put the train passengers into the odd numbered rooms. And so, well, every train passenger is on some car, let's say car C and seat S. Somehow we have to take these two coordinates c, s, the car number and the seat number, and produce from it an odd number in a one-to-one way. And that's actually not very difficult. In fact, one can just use, say, an easy way to do it is to just use the number.”

    Lex Fridman Podcast31 December 2025Source ↗

  49. “You have two countably infinite sets, then their union is also countably infinite. If you put them together and form a new set with all of the elements of either of them, then that union set is still only countably infinite. It didn't get bigger. And that's a remarkable property for a notion of infinity to have, I suppose. But if you thought that there was only one kind of infinity, then it wouldn't be surprising at all because if you take two infinite sets and put them together, then it's still infinite. And so if there were only one kind of infinity, then it shouldn't be surprising that the union of two countable sets is countable. So, that's another way to push this a bit harder, and that is when. When Hilbert's train arrives, and Hilbert's train has infinitely many train cars, and each train car has infinitely many seats”

    Lex Fridman Podcast31 December 2025Source ↗

  50. “That's right. So, what it really shows, I mean, another way of thinking about it is that what we can define that a set is countable if it is equinumerous with a set of natural numbers and a kind of easy way to understand what that's saying in terms of Hilbert's hotel is that a set is countable if it fits into Hilbert's hotel because Hilbert's hotel basically is the set of natural numbers in terms of the room numbers. So to be equanumerous with a set of natural numbers is just the same thing as to fit into Hilbert's hotel. And so what we've shown is that”

    Lex Fridman Podcast31 December 2025Source ↗