YouSaid · the spoken record

Albright

lines on the record: 1,073
first: 1993-02-05
most recent: 2000-01-24
sittings or episodes: 157
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“I thank the representative of Benin for the kind words he addressed to me. The next speaker is tle representative of Nigeria. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.”
1993-08-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3263 (1993) · source
“I thank the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Interim Government of National Unity of Liberia for the kind words he addressed to me. The next speaker is the representative of Benin. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.”
1993-08-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3263 (1993) · source
“of the Permanent Mission of Benin to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, which will be issued as document S/26272. The first speaker is the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Interim Government of National Unity of Liberia, His Excellency Mr. Gabriel Baccus Matthews. On behalf of the Council, I welcome him and invite him to make his statement.”
1993-08-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3263 (1993) · source
“The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Security Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations. Members of the Council have before them the further report of the Secretary-General on Liberia, document S/26200. Members of the Council also have before them document S/26259, which contains the text of the draft resolution prepared in the course of the Council's prior consultations. I should like to draw the attention of the members of the Council to document S/26265, which contains the text of a letter dated 4 August 1993 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council. Members of the Council have also received photocopies of a letter dated 6 August 1993 from the Charge d'affaires a.i.”
1993-08-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3263 (1993) · source
“I should like to inform the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Benin, Egypt, Liberia and Nigeria, in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In accordance with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure. There being no objection, it is so decided. At the invitation of the President, Mr. Matthews (Liberia) took a place at the Council table; Mr. Whannou (Benin), Mrs. Hassan (Eqypt) and Mr. Gambari (Nigeria) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council Chamber.”
1993-08-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3263 (1993) · source
“The authorities in Belgrade should understand that all parties to the tragedy that has engulfed the former Yugoslavia can only gain by the presence of impartial human rights observers. Human rights abuses will simply delay Serbia and Montenegro's return to the community of nations. Broader conflict born of human rights abuses will wound the aggressor along with the victim. I now resume my function as President of the Council. There are no further speakers. The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda. The meeting rose at 5.25 p.m.”
1993-08-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3262 (1993) · source
“The United States Government has made this same point. President Bush's message was specific and clear: We are prepared to respond against Serbia in the event of a conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian action. Secretary of State Christopher has firmly reiterated this message. The decision of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to terminate the CSCE missions was a serious mistake, and we call on the authorities to reinstate them at once, without any precondition. It is evident that the authorities in Belgrade would.like to trade their permission to reinstate the CSCE missions for the Federal Republic's return to membership in the CSCE. The CSCE has made it unequivocally clear that these missions are not part of any bargain. We fully support that position.”
1993-08-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3262 (1993) · source
“I thank the representative of Djibouti for his kind words addressed to me, and in my national capacity I should like to thank him for his good words about the problems of the people in the United States. I should now like to nake a statement in my capacity as the representative of the United States. The United States strongly supports the activities of the missions of long duration of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) as vital to the international community's efforts to prevent the spread of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. By monitoring the human rights situation in Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina, these missions have announced clearly to the authorities in Belgrade that the international community will not tolerate Serbian oppression of local non-Serb populations.”
1993-08-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3262 (1993) · source
“The result of the voting is as follows: 14 in favour, none against and one abstention. The drzft resolution has been adopted as resolution 855 (1993). I shall now call on those members of the Council who wish to make statements following the voting.”
1993-08-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3262 (1993) · source
“I thank the representative of China for his kind words addressed to me. I shall now put to the vote the draft resolution in document S/26263. A vote was taken by show of hands. In favour: Brazil, Cape Verde, Djibouti, France, Hungarv, Japan, Morocco, New Zealand, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Spain, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela Against: None Abstaining: China”
1993-08-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3262 (1993) · source
“I should like to draw the attention of the members of the Council to the following other documents: S/26210, letter dated 28 July 1993 from the Charge @'affaires a.i.of the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary--General and S/26234, letter dated 3 August 1993 from the Charge d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General. It is my understanding that the Security Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that that is the case. There being no objection, it is so decided. Before putting the draft resolution to the vote, I shall call on those members of the Council who wish to make statements before the voting.”
1993-08-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3262 (1993) · source
“'The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Security Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations. Members of the Council have before them document S/26263, which contains the text of a draft resolution submitted by France, Hungary, Spain, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America. Members of the Ccuncil also have before them documents 8/26121 and $/26148, which contain the text of letters dated 20 and 23 July 1993, respectively, from the Charge d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Sweden to the United Nations, addressed to the President of the Security Council.”
1993-08-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3262 (1993) · source
“I should like to inform the Council that I have received a request dated 9 August 1993 from Ambassador Dragomir Djokic. With the consent of the Council, I would propose to invite him to sit at the table during the course of the discussion of the item before it. There being no objection, it is so decided. At the invitation of the President, Ambassador Djokic took a place at the Council table.”
1993-08-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3262 (1993) · source
“OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF SWEDEN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL (S$/26121) LETTER DATED 23 JULY 1993 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF SWEDEN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL (S/26148)”
1993-08-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3262 (1993) · source
“I should like at the outset of this meeting to take the opportunity to pay tribute, on behalf of my Council colleagues, to His Excellency Sir David Hannay, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations, for his outstanding service as President of the Security Council for the month of July. I am sure I speak for all the members of the Security Council in expressing our deep appreciation to Ambassador Hannay for the great diplomatic skill and unfailing courtesy with which he conducted the Council's business last month. ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA The agenda was adopted. CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (CSCE) MISSIONS IN KOSOVO SANDJAK AND VOJVODINA, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA (SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO) , LETTER DATED 20 JULY 1993 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I.”
1993-08-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3262 (1993) · source
“United Nations peace-keeping has become a growth industry. But before we can effectively meet the increased demand, we must understand the needs of those demanding our services and how our scarce resources are being employed. Our goal is to retool the peace-keeping machinery so as to meet the new demand. Until then, we must ensure that our limited supply is used to best effect.”
1993-07-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3254 (1993) · source
“We also applaud and support the United Nations effort to alleviate the humanitarian suffering in Angola. We continue to be gravely concerned about the plight of the people of Angola. In this context we call on UNITA to refrain from military action and return to the peace process. We also recognize the costs of continued conflict for the people of Angola and the international community. We must also note that it is only logical that we shall not be able to agree to increase the strength of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II) until conditions have been established that will make exercise of its mandate feasible. Furthermore, before agreeing to additional commitments, we shall need to have the Secretariat's clear advice on the costs involved and their duration.”
1993-07-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3254 (1993) · source
“In all honesty, Mr. President, I cannot remember whether I have congratulated you or not, but to be safe I shall do so again. My Government applauds the efforts of Miss Margaret Anstee, who laboured tirelessly as the Secretary-General's previous Special Representative, to attempt to bring peace to Angola. We applaud as well the energetic efforts of the newly appointed Special Representative, Mr. Beye, who has worked since his appointment to revive both humanitarian-assistance deliveries and face-to-face negotiations between the parties. The 12 July agreement on emergency aid between UNITA and the United Nations is a hopeful sign that the need to deal with the humanitarian problems facing Angola has been acknowledged. We continue to support the efforts of the United Nations to bring the conflict in Angola to a peaceful conclusion.”
1993-07-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3254 (1993) · source
“Dhlakama will demonstrate his commitment to the peace accord by taking up residence in Maputo and participating fully in the activities of the peace Commissions. Finally, I would like to note my Government's appreciation of the skilful and energetic efforts of Mr. Aldo Ajello, the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Mozambique. Mr. Ajello's patient and balanced diplomacy has greatly advanced the ONUMOZ mission. We have great confidence in his abilities and are pleasea to know that he will be directing the peace effort over the upcoming critical months.”
1993-07-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3253 (1993) · source
“However, my Government would be very concerned about, and would find it difficult to support, any postponement of the elections past October 1994. While we realize that a number of political differences must be overcome in order to meet this schedule, we also note that the ONUMOZ presence in Mozambique costs in excess of $1 million a day. Each day that passes without progress wastes precious peace-keeping funds and gives rise to lingering doubts about the seriousness of the parties in pursuing a lasting resolution to the conflict. We note that President Chissano and RENAMO leader Dhlakama are scheduled to meet in Maputo on or about 17 July. We hope that meeting will serve as a catalyst for resolving outstanding differences and that it will accelerate the pace of the peace process. We also hope that Mr.”
1993-07-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3253 (1993) · source
“It is now up to the Mozambican Government and RENAMO to take advantage of ONUMOZ's presence and move the peace process forward, in the first instance by beginning the phased demobilization of combatants as soon as possible, but no later than by the end of August. The United States has been mindful of the political and logistical difficulties of implementing the Rome accord. Accordingly, we have accepted the need to postpone elections until 1994. However, as demonstrated at the recent donors' conference in Maputo, we and the rest of the international community are very concerned about recurring delays in the peace process and will not be able to fund the costly transition process indefinitely. The proposed timetable laid out in the Secretary-General's report, leading to national elections in September-October 1994, is realistic.”
1993-07-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3253 (1993) · source
“As a result of those developments, the peace process is poised to move forward rapidly. Unfortunately, though, this potential has yet to be realized. The all-important demobilization of combatants, which should have commenced months ago, has not yet begun. Preparations for elections and for training of the new national military are also far behind schedule. As the Secretary-General has acknowledged, the slow pace of ONUMOZ deployment earlier this year contributed to delays in the implementation of the accord. However, the United Nations has now largely delivered on its commitments. The peace-keeping forces and the institutional mechanisms are in place.”
1993-07-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3253 (1993) · source
“Since the Secretary-General's last report in April, the difficulties which delayed the deployment of ONUMOZ peace-keeping forces have been overcome and the ONUMOZ military contingent is virtually fully deployed. At the same time, various legal, administrative and political problems which held back implementation have been resolved: the Mozambican Government and the United Nations have signed a status-of-forces Agreement; a United Nations trust fund has been established to address RENAMO's financial requirements; and the peace commissions in Maputo have reconvened following the three-month absence of RENAMO representatives. Perhaps most significantly, the Government and RENAMO have demonstrated their commitment to peace by continuing to adhere to the general cease-fire.”
1993-07-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3253 (1993) · source
“As this is my first opportunity, Sir, to address the Security Council since your assumption of the presidency, let me congratulate you and tell you how much we look forward to working with you this month. I would also like to extend my commendation to Ambassador Yanez Barnuevo for the excellent job he did last month in leading the Council through many difficult issues. The United States has reviewed and fully endorses the Secretary-General's 3 July status report on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ). My Government continues to support strongly the ONUMOZ mission and has well-founded confidence in its prospects for success. We are concerned, though, over delays in the implementation of the peace accord and agree with the Secretary-General's observation that rapid progress is needed now to move the peace process forward.”
1993-07-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3253 (1993) · source
“We will continue to insist that, if the authorities in Belgrade want to rejoin the family of nations, they will have to stop the violence, stop the killing, stop their aggressive war against the Bosnian State and comply with all relevant Security Council resolutions. Until that day, the Council will have no choice but to keep the pressure on, Our goal remains a negotiated settlement freely agreed to by all the parties. The United States believes that exempting the Bosnian Government from the arms embargo is a means to that end. The Council must continue to look for ways to restore its credibility on this issue. We must continue to make clear that the status quo is unacceptable. In the face of continued obstructionism, my Government continues to believe that all options for new and tougher measures must remain open.”
1993-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3247 (1993) · source
“We therefore regret that the Council was unable to adopt the resolution under consideration today. Although the Council has not chosen to act today on the arms embargo, it would be a grave mistake for the Bosnian Serbs to interpret today's action by the Council as an endorsement of their intransigence or of their attempts to use military force to change international boundaries and destroy a neighbour. Nor should today's vote be seen as an indication that the international community is willing to turn a blind eye to the gross violations of human rights that have been committed in Bosnia, primarily by the Bosnian Serbs.”
1993-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3247 (1993) · source
“My Government has consistently advocated lifting the arms embargo imposed by the Council on the Government of Bosnia. In fact, our views on lifting the embargo have not changed since Secretary Christopher first presented them. In voting "yes" on today's draft resolution, the United States reaffirms its belief that the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a sovereign State and Member of the United Nations, has a right to defend itself. This is not a perfect solution, but the arms embargo mandated by the Council has had an unintended yet devastating effect in favour of the aggressor: it has frozen in place a vast disparity in arms. We do not believe that this body should deny the Bosnian Government the wherewithal to defend itself in the face of brutal aggression conducted by the Bosnian Serbs and their backers in Belgrade.”
1993-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3247 (1993) · source
“The international community has spoken with one voice in insisting that Iraq abide by the principles of the United Nations Charter. We ignore a crime of this magnitude at our collective peril as members of an international society that seeks to uphold the role of law. While the incident we are discussing today is an issve between Iraq and the United States, it should lead all nations represented here to redouble their resolve to ensure that the criminal regime in Baghdad is never again able to disturb the peace to which this institution is dedicated.”
1993-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3245 (1993) · source
“The Iraqi regime rejects the delineation of the Kuwait-Iraq boundary. The Iraqi regime continues to repress its own people, in violation of Security Council resolution 688 (1991), instead choosing to impose a policy of economic deprivation and even blockade on some of its citizens. And the Iraqi regime refuses to accept Security Council resolutions 706 (1991) and 712 (1991), which would allow Iraq to sell oil to meet the needs of its own citizens, a monumental act of abuse and disregard of the suffering of the Iraqi peorle. My Government's policy remains constant: we insist on full Iraqi compliance with all United Nations resolutions. fhrough a policy of firmness and consistency, including readiness to use force if necessary, the international community must frustrate Iraq's efforts to ignore the will of the Council.”
1993-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3245 (1993) · source
“Nevertheless, although we took action under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, there is ~ broader context of which members of the Security Council are only too well aware. Since its invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 Iraq has repeatedly and consistently refused to comply with the resolutions of this Council. Only a few days ago the Council found Iraq again to be in material breach of Security Council resolution 687 (1991). The Iraqi regime today refuses to meet the requirements of the United Nations Special Commission on a range of matters <elating to the destruction of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes. The Iragi regime refuses to accept Security Council resolution 715 (1991), which mandates long-term monitoring of these weapons programmes.”
1993-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3245 (1993) · source
“Our action is not directed against the Iraqi people. For far too long they have suffered under the yoke of the tyrannical repression of Saddam Hussein's regime. The United States looks forward to the day when that criminal regime is no longer able to oppress the Iraqi people and the Iraqi nation can take its rightful place again among the family of nations. Let me also say this: we regret the loss of civilian life. However, one should keep in mind that had the Iraqi attempt in Kuwait succeeded hundreds of Civilians could have died. This specific incident was between Iraq and the United States directly, which is why we acted alone. Only United States forces were involved. Our military action yesterday was aimed specifically at the instruments of terror that mounted the campaign egainst President Bush.”
1993-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3245 (1993) · source
“We are all aware of the many acts of terror carried out by the Iraqi Intelligence Service against United Nations relief convoys in northern Iraq, and on United Nations personnel and humanitarian eid workers in Iraq. This Iraqi Intelligence Service has also carried out assassinations of Iraqis seeking to escape Saddam's dictatorship, including a cold-blooded murder in Amman, Jordan, last year. The Iraqi Intelligence Service has been a major participant in the perpetration of Saddam's war crimes during the occupation of Kuwait and the regime's crimes against humanity at home. The Iraqi Intelligence Service headquarters building that was the target of last night's attack is the nerve centre of the Iraqi Intelligence Service, the hub for all its activities. Let me stress one point in particular.”
1993-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3245 (1993) · source
“Our response has been proportionate and aimed at a target directly linked to the operation against President Bush. It was designed to damage the terrorist infrastructure of the Iraqi regime, reduce its ability to promote terrorism and deter further acts of aggression against the United States. Let me say a word about the Iraqi intelligence apparatus. To survive in power, the Iraqi regime depends upon the fear created by its intelligence infrastructure, renowned for its brutality. The Iraqi Intelligence Service, the largest part of this infrastructure, has responsibility for investigating and acting against any suspected disloyalty to Saddam Hussein. It is also responsible for conducting terrorism abroad, as it tried to do in this case, and for directing terror aqainst Saddam's opponents at home.”
1993-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3245 (1993) · source
“From all the evidence available to our intelligence community, we are therefore highly confident that the Iraqi Government, at its highest levels, directed its intelligence services to carry out an assassination attempt against President Bush. As President Clinton indicated last night, this was a direct attack on the United States, an attack that required a direct United States response. Consequently, President Clinton yesterday instructed the United States Armed Forces to carry out a military operation against the headquarters of the Iraqi Intelligence Service in Baghdad. We responded directly, as we are entitled to do under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which provides for the exercise of self-defence in such cases.”
1993-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3245 (1993) · source
“One of the suspects said that he had been recruited for the specific purpose of assassinating President Bush. The other main suspect told the FBI that he had been instructed to guide the first suspect with the car bomb to Kuwait University, where President Bush and the Emir of Kuwait were scheduled to appear, and to plant smaller explosives elsewhere in Kuwait. During and immediately after the Persian Gulf War the Saddam Hussein Government - through its controlled media - indicated that Iraq would hunt down and punish President Bush, even after he left office. Since then various classified intelligence sources support the conclusion of our investigation that the Iraqi Government ordered this terrorist attack against President Bush.”
1993-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3245 (1993) · source
“The fifth set of photos shows a comparison of the undersides of the two firing devices. Again you can see the obvious similarity of the circuit boards. Finally, the last photograph shows the smaller "cube bombs" that were also seized by the Kuwaitis. The "cube bombs" contained the same type of integrated circuitry that was found in earlier-known Iraqi terrorist devices. In addition to this graphic evidence, we have the results of the interrogations cf the suspects. The FBI conducted extensive interviews of all 16 suspects now on trial in Kuwait. The two main suspects are Iraqi nationals. They told the FBI that they had been recruited and received orders in Basra, Iraq, from individuals associated with the Iraqi intelligence service. They said that the Iraqis provided them with the car bomb and other explosive devices on 10 April 1993.”
1993-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3245 (1993) · source
“The forensic experts have concluded that this bomb had a lethal radius of 400 yards: it would kill people occupying a four- square-block area. Hundreds of innocent people would have died. The third set of photos shows that the front of the radio-controlled firing system found in Kuwait and, above it, the front of another device recovered from an earlier terrorist bomb known to be of Iraqi origin. Even an untrained eye can see that these are identical except for the serial numbers. Next, we have a similar comparison of the insides of the two firing devices. The bottom photo is of the device found in Kuwait. As you can see, the selection of the components and the construction techniques in the two devices, including soldering, the use of connectors and the wiring techniques, are also identical.”
1993-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3245 (1993) · source
“Similarly, the other explosives seized in the plot, including so-called "cube bombs", contained components built by the same person or persons who built similar devices recovered in the past from the Iraqi intelligence service. Let me show you some photographs that demonstrate the identical nature of the evidence seized in Kuwait with photos of Iraqi devices found elsewhere. The first photo is of the vehicle, a Toyota Landcruiser, that was turned into a car bomb by concealing approximately 80 kilograms of explosives in the vehicle's body panels. The second photo shows the concealed wiring that was part of the bomb. This is a sophisticated device possessing devastating power. It was well hidden in the vehicle and constructed to allow detonation by remote control, by a timer or manually.”
1993-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3245 (1993) · source
“A car bomb hidden in a Toyota Landcruiser was smuggled across the Iraq- Kuwait border by the suspects during the night of 13 April 1993. This bomb, and the other explosives that were seized by the Kuwaiti authorities, have been directly examined by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) forensic experts. In their judgement, key components - including the remote-controlled firing device, the plastic explosives, the blasting cap, the integrated circuitry and the wiring - were built by the same person or persons who built bombs previously recovered from the Iraqis. Certain aspects of these devices have been found only in devices linked to Iraq and not in devices used by any other terrorist group.”
1993-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3245 (1993) · source
“Based upon that investigation, the United States Department of Justice and the Central Intelligence Agency have concludei that Iraq planned, equipped and launched the terrorist operation that threatened the life of an American President. Further, it is the firm judgement of the United States intelligence community, based on all the sources of evidence available to it, that this assassination plot was directed and pursued by the Iraqi intelligence service, an arm of the Government of Saddam Hussein. The evidence that supports these conclusions includes forensic data, interviews with the suspects and other intelligence. The physical evidence is most impressive, and I shall take some time to describe it to you.”
1993-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3245 (1993) · source
“On April 14 1993, while President Bush was beginning a three-day visit to Kuwait City, Kuwaiti authorities thwarted a terrorist plot, seizing a powerful car bomb and other explosives and arresting 16 suspects. The ringleaders of this plot were two Iraqi nationals. Over the next two months, American law enforcement, forensic and intelligence professionals conducted a meticulous and exhaustive investigation of this incident. They conducted detailed forensic examinations of the bombs and devices. Through the cooperation of the Kuwaiti Government, they had independent access to all he suspects in the case. They interviewed all involved several times. The process took time. There was no rush to judgement.”
1993-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3245 (1993) · source
“Mr. President, I come to the Council today to brief you on a grave and urgent matter: an attempt to murder a President of the United States by the intelligence service of the Government of Iraq, a Member of the United Nations. Even by the standards of an Iraqi regime known for its brutality against its neighbours and its own people, this is an outrage. The attempt against President George Bush's life during his visit to Kuwait last April was an attack on the United States of America. JI am not asking the Council for any action, but, in our judgement, every Member here today would regard an assassination attempt against its former Head of State as an attack against itself, and would react. Let me begin by reviewing the events in question.”
1993-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3245 (1993) · source
“In the final analysis, however, the international community cannot solve the Haitian crisis. Only the Haitians themselves can do that. The negotiating process led by Dante Caputo, the Special Envoy of the United Nations and Organizetion of American States Secretaries-General, presents a historic opportunity for the Haitian parties to provide for a secure and democratic future. We call on all sides to seize this opportunity now. We call on all sides to negotiate seriously for a settlement, and make the difficult decisions leadership requires. We call on all sides to take responsibility now for ending this tragedy. Haiti stands at an important crossroads. The international community, with this action today, is signalling its commitment to bring a resolution to the suffering in Haiti. Haitians in leadership positions now must do their part.”
1993-06-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3238 (1993) · source
“The Council has just acted decisively to underline the international community's demand for a return to democratic legitimacy in Haiti. In taking the extremely serious step of imposing mandatory sanctions, we are sending a clear and resounding message. It is time for the Haitian parties to engage in honest and serious negotiations. It is time for the Haitian parties to put their country's interests first and take responsibility for a lasting settlement of this crisis. It is time to end the suffering of the Haitian people. It is time for President Aristide and democracy to be returned to this long-suffering land. We know that sanctions alone are not a solution to the Haitian tragedy. Rather, the tough sanctions adopted today represent a further step by the international community to put pressure on those who stand in the way of a solution.”
1993-06-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3238 (1993) · source
“We look forward to receiving the Secretary-General's report. The pressure must be kept on the Bosnian Serbs. Sealing Bosnia's border with Serbia and Montenegro would be a constructive step in that direction.”
1993-06-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3234 (1993) · source
“With the resolution just adopted, the Security Council has taken the third step towards implementing the joint action programme. Our overall goals remain the same: to stop the Slaughter, prevent the conflict from spreading and achieve a lasting and equitable settlement. By actively pursuing these goals, we are paving the way for a renewed effort to end the conflict through a comprehensive political settlement. After the Bosnian Serbs rejected the Vance-Owen Plan, Serbian strongman Milosevic claimed that Serbia and Montenegro would no longer aid the Bosnian Serbs in their violence against the Bosnian Government. While I remain sceptical, we shall soon know whether Mr. Milosevic is serious about ending the carnage in Bosnia or is merely engaging in yet another elaborate attempt to hoodwink the civilized world.”
1993-06-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3234 (1993) · source
“Those who would challenge the authority of this body to enforce its resolutions must know that we stand firm in our resolve to bring peace and reconciliation to Somalia and that they will pay a heavy price for ignoring the Council.”
1993-06-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3229 (1993) · source
“Factional violence is impermissible under the terms of resolution 814 (1993). It can and will be stopped. Hostilities aimed at United Nations forces are a gross violation of paragraph 9 of that resolution which "demands that all Somali parties, including movements and factions, take all measures to ensure the safety of the personnel of the United Nations". Today's draft resolution reaffirms the existing authority of UNOSOM II to take strong and forceful action to safeguard international forces, to punish those who attack them and to restore security. Appropriate measures include the disarming and detention of persons posing a threat to United Nations forces or obstructing their operations.”
1993-06-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3229 (1993) · source
“Yesterday's actions by certain factional leaders of the USC, resulting in many deaths and injuries to United Nations forces, especially the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) forces from Pakistan, are an outrage and unacceptable. My Government offers its deepest condolences to the Government of Pakistan as well as to the families of those who were lost. These actions threaten international peace and security and must be dealt with accordingly. The United States supports today's draft resolution as the minimum required to restore the conditions for peace and reconciliation in Somalia. This Council, in a number of resolutions, leading up to resolution 814 (1993) establishing the mandate for UNOSOM II, has left no doubt about the imperative of establishing and maintaining a secure environment.”
1993-06-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3229 (1993) · source
“The United States voted for this resolution with no illusions. It is an intermediate step - no more, no less. Indeed, both the Security Council and the Governments that developed the Joint Action Programme have agreed that they will keep open options for new and tougher measures, none of which is prejudged or excluded from consideration. My Government's view of what those tougher measures should he has not changed. Finally, let me say that we expect the full cooperation of the Bosnian Serb party in implementing this resolution. If that cooperation is not forthcoming, we will move to seek further action in the Security Council. The violence must stop. This resolution can be a decisive step in that direction,”
1993-06-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3228 (1993) · source