YouSaid · the spoken record

Albright

lines on the record: 1,073
first: 1993-02-05
most recent: 2000-01-24
sittings or episodes: 157
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“My Government joins with the Council and with the Government and people of France in expressing sorrow and anger at the recent murder of two French soldiers serving as peace-keepers in Bosnia. They died, as so many have died in that tragic land, at the hands of cowardly snipers. This resolution will not bring those brave soldiers back. But it should serve to renew our resolve that the parties to the conflict in Bosnia must respect the status of United Nations personnel. It should prompt us to explore urgently the means by which UNPROFOR personnel might better defend themselves. And it should give new life to our support for an extension to the Bosnian cease-fire and cessation of hostilities that are due to expire at the end of this month.”
1995-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3521 (1995) · source
“For their sake, we urge the Government of Iraq to take advantage of this chance. In closing, let me make it clear that this resolution would not be necessary, and the Iraqi people would not be suffering, if Iraq's Government were not driven by ruthless ambition. Let us not forget that this is a Government that has invaded its neighbour, supported terrorism, built weapons of mass destruction and continues to threaten the stability of the Persian Gulf. It is only when the regime changes its underlying objectives that the resolutions will no longer be necessary and the Iraqi people will no longer be suffering.”
1995-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3519 (1995) · source
“If it still refuses to implement it, it will only be because the Government of Iraq does not know how to take "Yes" for an answer. The Government of Iraq already has at its disposal the means to lift the sanctions: compliance with the Council's resolutions. It declines to exercise this option. If it refuses to implement this resolution, it will be clear for all to see, and especially to the Iraqi people, that the blame for the suffering of the people of Iraq rests not with the Security Council, but with the Government in Baghdad. Let me stress that that is not the outcome we desire. We call on Iraq to take its time, study this resolution with an open mind, and decide to accept it and implement it. The Council has once again given Baghdad the opportunity to act in the best interests of its citizens.”
1995-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3519 (1995) · source
“Even before the passage of this resolution, and even before the passage of resolutions 706 (1991) and 712 (1991), this Council has always demonstrated that it has no quarrel with the Iraqi people. The Council has tried to assure that the people of Iraq had access to basic humanitarian goods, and has never prohibited the shipment of food and medicines. The Council and Member States have supported the United Nations Inter-Agency Humanitarian Programme, which operates throughout Iraq. We want the Government of Iraq to accept and implement this resolution. The co-sponsors made extraordinary efforts, even before entering a phase of flexible and productive cooperation with other members of the Council, to craft a text that would address Iraq's concerns.”
1995-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3519 (1995) · source
“Then, and only then, can this Council move to modify the sanctions regime. This resolution today is technical, not political, and we have resisted efforts by Iraq and others to insert political provisions into the resolution. Our work on this new resolution is based on our humanitarian concern that the people of Iraq are suffering as a result of the policies of their Government. We believe sanctions are a valuable tool for the Security Council to use when dealing with rogue States that refuse to live peaceably with their neighbours. But we have always shared the concern expressed by so many here that sanctions not strike an unintended target. We believe we have found exactly the right compromise here - not a lifting of the sanctions on the Iraqi regime, but a humanitarian exception to the sanctions for the benefit of the Iraqi people.”
1995-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3519 (1995) · source
“His is the Government that has imposed an economic and electricity blockade against one section of his country. Doubts about Iraq's territorial integrity, and the need to make special arrangements to provide for humanitarian needs in northern Iraq, arise only because of the actions of the Iraqi Government. The Council has other business before it with regard to Iraq, as we wait with impatience for a change in Iraq's attitude and its compliance with all the Council's resolutions. Today's resolution, however, does not prejudge in any way subsequent actions the Council may take in this regard. The United States believes that Iraq's compliance with all the Security Council's resolutions is the only way in which it will prove to the international community that its intentions are peaceful.”
1995-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3519 (1995) · source
“We note that, eventually, Iraq has found it in its interest to accept, and on occasion even implement, several Council resolutions. We hope that Iraq's current position, taken for the sake of posturing and negotiations, will not be the same as its final position, taken on the basis of a calm measurement of the benefits this resolution offers to the Iraqi people. Let me address just some of the arguments that some delegations have advanced on behalf of Iraq. First, I reaffirm here, as we reaffirm in the resolution, my Government's unchanging support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq. But I must note that the greatest threat to the territorial integrity of Iraq is Saddam Hussein. His is the only Government in history to have used weapons of mass destruction against its own citizens.”
1995-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3519 (1995) · source
“We also reviewed the record of negotiations between Iraq and Turkey in 1994, when Council members considered a plan, at first supported by Iraq, to export oil through the Turkish pipeline and use the proceeds for humanitarian purposes. Throughout our drafting, we made every effort to understand every concern expressed by Iraq, and we addressed those concerns in a serious and open-minded way. While we addressed every issue Iraq had raised before, we never underestimated Iraq's ability to generate dozens of new objections and excuses. We realized from the beginning that Iraq would never say in advance of the vote that it accepted this plan, just as it has never accepted any Council resolution before or at the time of its passage.”
1995-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3519 (1995) · source
“Thirdly, we wanted a greatly simplified resolution, building on both the positive and negative lessons from resolutions 706 (1991) and 712 (1991) and other experiences. Finally, against the desire for simplification, we had to balance the need to take full account of the fact that Iraq had not proven trustworthy in implementing previous resolutions, and had consistently sought to turn innocent-sounding phrases into excuses for non-compliance. We approached the task of drafting the new by returning to the old, and examined carefully the complete record of resolutions 706 (1991) and 712 (1991). We looked carefully at all the reasons Iraq gave at that time to justify its refusal to implement that plan.”
1995-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3519 (1995) · source
“Argentina, the United States, the United Kingdom and Oman began work on this resolution at the specific request of a number of Arab, non-aligned and European States. We shared a common concern about the unnecessary humanitarian suffering of the Iraqi people caused by the Iraqi Government's policies, particularly its refusal to implement the resolutions of the Security Council. We agreed to make a good-faith effort to draft a plan that Iraq would have no reason to reject. We decided that we must be guided by the following principles. Firstly, the purpose of the resolution is to address humanitarian needs, not to meet political or other extraneous objectives. Secondly, this resolution is not an easing or lifting of sanctions, but an exception to the sanctions regime for a specified purpose.”
1995-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3519 (1995) · source
“The United States supports this limited extension of the UNOMIL mandate in the hope that the regional summit meeting on 17 May will give real impetus to peace. We must say, however, that technical roll-overs are not a solution and that the patience of the international community is not endless.”
1995-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3517 (1995) · source
“The United States continues to support fully the efforts of the Chairman of the Economic Community of West African States, President Rawlings of Ghana, to bring about a summit meeting of the concerned States in the region, together with the faction leaders. This meeting is now scheduled for 17 May in Abuja, Nigeria. We strongly urge all invited Heads of State to attend the summit in the interest of harmonizing their policies on Liberia, and particularly to halt the flow of arms into Liberia, thereby facilitating an end to the war. The United States believes that the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) has a key role to play in monitoring implementation of the peace process and protecting civilians from the fighting. Unfortunately, it has been unable thus far to carry out its mandate because of continuing hostilities.”
1995-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3517 (1995) · source
“The United States is deeply concerned about the absence of progress towards peace in Liberia. The cease-fire begun on December 28 has largely broken down. There are new reports of massacres and atrocities against civilians and new movements of displaced persons towards Buchanan and across the Ghanaian and Ivoirian borders. Primary responsibility for the continued bloodshed lies with the armed factions that have proved unwilling thus far to implement the Akosombo and Accra Agreements. We strongly urge that the cease-fire be restored promptly, and that the factions act quickly to resolve their differences over the Council of State and to implement the accords.”
1995-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3517 (1995) · source
“Peace in Angola would end Africa's longest- running conflict, one that has cost up to a million lives, crippled 100,000 people and left 7 million refugees and displaced persons. With our decision today we have advanced substantially the prospect that the hope of the Lusaka Protocol, and the promise of peace in Angola, can be realized.”
1995-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3499Resumption1 (1995) · source
“In closing, let me reiterate my Government's determination to key our support for this operation in Angola to the actions of the Angolans themselves. If Angola's leaders are prepared to make peace by taking concrete steps towards disarmament and demobilization of troops, then the United States will support efforts to keep that peace. If they are prepared to help offset the significant costs of this operation, we will continue to support it. For we have learned elsewhere that United Nations peace- keeping can be effective only when the psychology of war gives way to a commitment to peace. My Government hopes that such a transformation has truly taken hold in Angola. Many have worked hard to mediate an end to decades of civil war and to foster reconciliation in Angola.”
1995-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3499Resumption1 (1995) · source
“will conclude its operations by February 1997 - that is giving the Angolans enough time to hold elections scheduled to take place once the peace process has been completed. The Angolan Government has offered to help offset the cost of UNAVEM. III, including by providing free or at- cost petroleum, aircraft and buildings, in addition to the usual waivers of customs duties and other fees. The resolution we have adopted calls for active exploration with both parties of substantial additional contributions to help cover the costs of peace-keeping. It also requests the Secretary-General to report information on such contributions. It is fitting and fair that the rich natural resources of Angola be made available to support UNAVEM. III.”
1995-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3499Resumption1 (1995) · source
“This recalcitrance must end, for without the input and active cooperation of the parties, the peace-keeping effort we are about to embark upon can have no more success than past efforts, and it will not be sustained by this body. We also need to ensure that the support of the international community is used effectively by the Angolan parties and that the United Nations presence does not become an excuse for failure to move forward. The initial mandate of the operation will be for six months, and the Council will be in a position to review progress before reviewing the mandate. The peace process detailed in the Lusaka Protocol is scheduled to be completed in May 1996. We have in this resolution declared the Council's expectation that UNAVEM.”
1995-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3499Resumption1 (1995) · source
“Both the Government and UNITA must, to quote the Lusaka Protocol, "furnish the United nations with details concerning their respective forces to include number of men, composition and type of force, type of equipment and specific location." (S/1994/144], annex, p. 13, para. (c)) As the Protocol itself notes, "This will allow the United Nations to install the appropriate verification, monitoring or control mechanisms." (ibid) The Protocol signed by the parties themselves lays out what they must do. But, as we have seen in the past, and in Mr. Savimbi's remarks today, the parties are sometimes reluctant to carry out their agreements.”
1995-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3499Resumption1 (1995) · source
“can assist the process of political reconciliation, but it is up to the parties themselves to demonstrate by their actions the political will to fulfil the Lusaka Protocol. That is why we think it important that the Secretary-General inform the Council every month of progress in deploying UNAVEM. III and in implementing the Lusaka Protocol, and why it is important to express our intention to review the role of the United Nations in Angola if the cooperation required from the parties, upon which UNAVEM. III is based, is substantially delayed or not forthcoming. It cannot be stressed often enough that the parties must take action to live up to their commitments. The Lusaka Protocol clearly sets out a timetable, on which the parties have already fallen more than a month behind.”
1995-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3499Resumption1 (1995) · source
“We mean to hold the Angolan parties to their commitment to complete the process. The people of Angola deserve our support in helping to end the war. The Lusaka Protocol offers a genuine opportunity to construct a lasting peace, and the coordinated involvement of a United Nations peace- keeping force is vital to its implementation. A return to peace will help protect the impressive democratic movement throughout southern Africa and provide an opportunity for the Angolan people to realize the economic potential of their rich land. Despite the war, Angola provided major oil exports. Diamond mining and excellent agricultural lands offer the hope of prosperity. Peace will end the bloodshed and waste that Angola has endured for more than 30 years. But we have to be vigilant in providing this support. The United Nations and UNAVEM.”
1995-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3499Resumption1 (1995) · source
“Therefore, our message to all parties is very clear: do not make a serious mistake at this crucial time. Do the right thing for your people and for the future of your country. This resolution represents the international community's confidence in the Angolan people. We hope that in the coming days it will not be undermined by any of their leaders. The mission of UNAVEM. III has clear objectives, as described in the Lusaka Protocol: to monitor disarmament and demobilization of combatants, to assist military and police integration and to facilitate the incorporation of UNITA into the Angolan Government. When these objectives have been achieved, UNAVEM. III will end its mandate. We have been clear in stating in the resolution our expectation that all of this can be accomplished within two years.”
1995-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3499Resumption1 (1995) · source
“The third United Nations Verification Mission in Angola (UNAVEM. III) will form an integral part of that process. However, there is disturbing news today that Mr. Jonas Savimbi is casting doubt on the Lusaka Protocol. The resolution, in its twelfth preambular paragraph, stresses the need for President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi "to meet without delay with a view to building the necessary political momentum for the successful implementation of the Lusaka Protocol". That meeting now becomes more critical in the light of Mr. Savimbi's remarks. We strongly urge both leaders to meet immediately. My Government wishes to emphasize that any deployment of infantry units in UNAVEM. III cannot proceed without the Secretary-General's report that the Lusaka Protocol is being effectively implemented.”
1995-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3499Resumption1 (1995) · source
“Today the Council has taken an important step to support peace in Angola and the tide of democracy sweeping southern Africa. The Lusaka Protocol, signed on 20 November 1994, has, we hope, brought an end to the long civil strife that has plagued Angola. It is an agreement that meets the legitimate concerns of both Angolan parties. It provided concrete guarantees of UNITA's political and physical survival, through its participation in all sectors of the Government, the military and the police. And it ensures that UNITA will voluntarily relinquish its armed forces and assume its legitimate role as an opposition political party. The Lusaka Protocol and the efforts of the Angolan parties to fulfil their commitments are vital and promising steps on the road to a lasting peace in Angola.”
1995-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3499Resumption1 (1995) · source
“Mr. Minister, we are honoured by the fact that you have chosen to chair this important meeting. We congratulate Botswana on its ascension to the presidency of the Council and look forward to working closely with Ambassador Legwaila as he wisely guides us through this month's work. We are also most appreciative of the outstanding management of the Council by the Ambassador of Argentina last month. His efficiency and humour were invaluable to our work. I should also like to welcome the Foreign Ministers of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to our proceedings. We very much appreciate their presence and support. Finally, I should like to welcome our good friend, the Foreign Minister of Angola, to these very important proceedings.”
1995-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3499Resumption1 (1995) · source
“As the resolution we have approved today recognizes, the future of Haiti rests, as it must, in Haitian hands. Democratic institutions cannot be imposed upon a society; they must be nurtured from within. The road ahead remains an uphill road, but the international community can be satisfied that those with the commitment to build a free Haiti now have that opportunity. By allowing that chance, this Council has kept faith with the people of Haiti, with the cause of freedom and with the Charter of this great institution.”
1995-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3496 (1995) · source
“Criminal forces may see this transition and the upcoming election campaign as an opportunity for bolder action. But let no one doubt: if this United Nations force is pushed, it has the leadership, the mandate, the fire-power and the will to push back. The economic reconstruction of Haiti is not part of the United Nations peace-keeping mission, but efforts to that end are complementary. My Government joins with the Secretary-General in calling upon nations, development agencies, the United Nations system and regional and non-governmental organizations to work together with the Haitian Government to implement the emergency economic recovery programme. The door to private investment must be open. There is no better answer to inequality, corruption and strife than freedom, jobs, basic education and food on the table.”
1995-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3496 (1995) · source
“More than half of the military personnel and about one third of the civilians in UNMIH will be veterans of the Multinational Force. Overall, there will be no dramatic alteration in mission size, troop capabilities or quality of command. The United Nations troops will have the right to use force to defend themselves, including the right to oppose forcible attempts to impede the discharge of their functions. As the Secretary-General noted in his most recent report to the Council, "there is a feeling of liberty and a sense of security [in Haiti] which did not exist previously." (S/1995/46, para. 13) The organized and semi-organized bands of thugs operating under official protection have been disbanded. But Haiti is by no means a tranquil land. The greedy, the embittered and the desperate retain the capacity for violence.”
1995-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3496 (1995) · source
“A new police force is being recruited, and the Haitian army is being reduced and reformed. We are approaching now the second phase. Today, we have authorized the Secretary-General to recruit and deploy up to 6,000 military personnel and 900 civilian police to continue the tasks thus far so well advanced. The United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) will work with Haiti's Government and other donors to build a new civilian police force. It will assist the Government of Haiti in assuring public order. It will help establish an environment conducive to free and fair elections, and it will complete its assigned tasks by February 1996. My Government has worked hard with the Multinational Force and the Secretariat staff to ensure a seamless transfer of responsibility - a transition without marked change.”
1995-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3496 (1995) · source
“Mothers no longer fear that their sons will be shot or their daughters raped by the keepers of official order. Police stations are used now for training, not torture. Boats are built for fishing, not flight. And political activity has resumed. The threads of economic life have been identified and now must be rewoven. Last July, the Security Council responded to the unique circumstances in Haiti with a strategy in two parts. In the first phase, the Multinational Force was to create a secure and stable environment within which democratic institutions could begin to function. The Multinational Force has achieved that purpose. The illegal leaders departed peacefully. President Aristide and the legitimately elected Government have returned to power. More than 21,000 weapons have been purchased or seized.”
1995-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3496 (1995) · source
“We note with satisfaction the strong bond that has developed between the forces and the Haitian people. We thank also the members of this Council, the Friends of Haiti and the Secretary-General and his staff for their commitment to respond dynamically and creatively to the Haitian crisis. Together, we have served well the United Nations Charter's pledge to pursue "social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom". Over the past four months, because of our efforts, those of the Organization of American States, the wisdom of Haiti's leaders and the resilience of the Haitian people, welcome changes have been achieved. Once-dormant markets are now Vibrant with life. Neighbourhoods once shadowed by terror echo now with laughter and renewed hope.”
1995-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3496 (1995) · source
“Today marks a planned and important point of transition in Haiti's journey from tyranny to democracy. The Multinational Force authorized by the Council last July has fulfilled its mission. Planning for the transfer of responsibility to a United Nations force is well under way. Today's vote verifies that the transition will occur by the end of March. The men and women of the Multinational Force deserve our recognition and gratitude. They have performed difficult tasks with consummate skill. To the family of Sergeant First Class Gregory Dale Cardott, we acknowledge a special debt. Our hearts and prayers are with them. My Government is pleased to have led the Multinational Force, and we thank warmly the other nations that have contributed to it.”
1995-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3496 (1995) · source
“I would hope that our discussion of peace-keeping will continue in both open meetings, such as this one, and in informal consultations. Clearly, this issue will also continue to be of great interest in my own Government. Our national dialogue will continue, and I commit myself to work to bring these discussions to the best conclusion possible.”
1995-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3492 (1995) · source
“Rather, I want to stress that, as the Security Council has learned some of the lessons of successful peace-keeping, it has grown more determined to apply them to proposals for new missions, or extensions of existing ones. At the same time, other tools and options, such as preventive action and diplomacy or regional initiatives within a United Nations framework, are emerging, and some have been effective. This is the direction I see for the future: an international community that has more and better choices for peace and security action but that provides reliable support for actions it asks the United Nations to undertake. In closing, let me say that I have listened carefully to the comments of other members of the Council and I will listen to those by other members this afternoon.”
1995-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3492 (1995) · source
“Finally, let me make a point that is sometimes overlooked. While it is common to talk about the dramatic rise in peace-keeping, beginning in early 1992, the reality is that the growth has slowed and levelled off. In 1994 total peace-keeping personnel peaked at over 90,000. But during the past year the Security Council voted to end three missions, no major new operations were begun, and by year's end peace-keeping personnel had declined to 63,000. Nearly two-thirds of those now deployed on peace operations are in the former Yugoslavia. More than half of the current missions consist of fewer than 200 observers or peace-keepers. I emphasize this trend not because we expect peace- keeping forces and costs to fall to historic levels. After all, the imminent mission in Haiti and the potential one in Angola will temporarily reverse this decline.”
1995-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3492 (1995) · source
“As such, it serves as the principle international legal and political barrier to nuclear proliferation. It is my hope that those countries represented here today will join in giving the strongest support to the Treaty at the upcoming NPT Review Conference by voting for its unconditional extension. Few acts would go as far in promoting global peace and stability. In addition, as the Secretary-General indicates in his report, we need to take steps to control the proliferation of weapons that may kill in smaller numbers but contribute hugely to the violence and destruction we see today in so many corners of the world. In this regard, my Government welcomed warmly the General Assembly resolution calling for a global moratorium on and eventual elimination of all anti-personnel landmines.”
1995-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3492 (1995) · source
“On a related matter, as my Government explained in a detailed statement to the General Assembly on 12 December 1994, the United States will work with other Members to devise a more fair and reliable system for financing peace-keeping, including a reduction in the United States share to 25 per cent. These remarks on the United Nations peace and security role would not be complete without underscoring the importance my Government attaches to the issue of proliferation. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the indispensable cornerstone for assuring a more stable environment. The NPT entered into force in 1970, and today, with nearly 170 Parties, is the most widely adhered to arms control agreement that is global in scope.”
1995-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3492 (1995) · source
“In particular, standardization of personnel costs and better systems for peace-keeping mission cost control, accountability and procurement must be adopted. The question of finance is critical to the United Nations ability to meet its peace and security responsibilities. One important dimension of this relates to the authorization of expenditures for new peace-keeping missions. Since 1992 the Secretary-General and groups of Member States repeatedly have emphasized the need to streamline start-up funding in a way that preserves accountability but avoids costly and dangerous delays in beginning missions. This remains essential; action should be taken this year. We also hope to see further movement towards annualization of peace-keeping budgets and the introduction of a unified budget for all peace-keeping activities.”
1995-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3492 (1995) · source
“We do, however, welcome efforts to eliminate costly delays in deploying United Nations missions once they have been authorized. For example, we support a rapidly deployable Headquarters team, a composite initial logistics support unit and an effort to develop a contracted standing lift capability. We also look forward to improvements in the quality and readiness of United Nations forces through regional initiatives and bilateral cooperative arrangements, and for improving United Nations public affairs support for peace-keeping in theatre. The Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations has highlighted the need for action in many of these areas. Along with such enhancements in peace-keeping capacity, further steps to assure more efficient use of peace-keeping funds are necessary.”
1995-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3492 (1995) · source
“Much has been accomplished over the last two years. We now have a reinforced Headquarters staff, Offices of Operations, and of Planning and Support, a 24-hour Situation Centre, a Training Unit, a Policy and Analysis Unit, a Mission Planning Service, peace-keeping stand-by arrangements and a forward logistical base and storage depot. Despite these advances, further major progress is required. Readiness, as our experience in Rwanda so sadly demonstrated, is another. On this point, my Government questions whether the rapid reaction force proposed in the Secretary-General's paper is the right course of action at this time. Setting aside national forces for this exclusive purpose may result in high continuing costs at relatively little benefit.”
1995-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3492 (1995) · source
“And if there is humanitarian suffering as a result of sanctions, let us place blame where it belongs - not on the Security Council but on the Government whose policies caused us to act. Procedures designed to mitigate the unintended effects of sanctions should not be allowed to obstruct or so mitigate their effect as to render them useless as a means for influencing the behaviour of a Government that is defying the international community and law. Sanctions may be a blunt instrument, but they can be a useful one, and they are less blunt than the alternative, which is, all too often, the use of military force. My Government hopes that this fiftieth anniversary year of the United Nations will mark continued improvements in the overall capacity of the United Nations to conduct and manage peace operations.”
1995-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3492 (1995) · source
“We must widen the scope of related issues and increase options for addressing them. A modest, but consequential, step, which I proposed some 18 months ago, would be to explore a mechanism whereby the Economic and Social Council could work in partnership with the Security Council to better identify and address economic and social tensions before the outbreak of conflict or after its conclusion. The Secretary-General's paper contains also a valuable discussion of the Security Council's use of economic sanctions. My Government shares the concern expressed in the paper about the desirability of avoiding or reducing unintended and harmful collateral effects of sanctions. It should be noted, however, that every sanctions regime approved by the Council permits delivery of humanitarian supplies.”
1995-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3492 (1995) · source
“When peace-building is an element of peace-keeping, the task of coordinating human rights activities, targeted aid such as jobs programmes, judicial and other institutional reforms, development of social organizations has been difficult for the United Nations. Moreover, when a peace-keeping mission ends and there is no special representative to serve as the focal point, the continuity and coherence of peace-building efforts can be lost. None of these problems is insurmountable. We should, however, be realistic in our expectations. Some situations may require more assistance than the international community can reasonably provide. But even seeking to accomplish realistic objectives requires reorganizing the way the international community responds to security- related concerns.”
1995-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3492 (1995) · source
“Given the experience, it is important we work together to develop reliable procedures for making such coordination operate more smoothly and effectively in support of Council objectives. Another potential tool of conflict resolution is peace- building: the use of economic and social measures directed at the seeds of conflict. While a component of several recent multi-functional missions and of various aid programmes, the strategy has not been fully developed or exploited. The obstacles are familiar ones. Reluctant Governments may resist preventive measures or a continuing United Nations role after a conflict. Independent donor organizations must be persuaded to adjust policies and programmes.”
1995-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3492 (1995) · source
“In Haiti, the multinational force led by the United States has restored democratic rule, eased the humanitarian crisis and created a stable and secure environment. It is essential, of course, that when the Council does turn to individual Member States or coalitions it retain the capacity to monitor such operations to ensure that they are conducted in accordance with accepted international principles. The Secretary-General's paper discusses only briefly one element of enforcement action that merits more consideration: the collaboration of regional military bodies, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), with United Nations peace-keeping forces, such as UNPROFOR).”
1995-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3492 (1995) · source
“The Secretary-General's paper maintains, and we fully agree, that peace-keeping and peace enforcement are not adjacent points on a continuum. The challenge of keeping peace is far different and far simpler than the challenge of creating a secure environment in the midst of ongoing conflict. The precedent of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia, where peace-enforcement tasks were given to a lightly armed force equipped only for peace-keeping, should not be repeated. Instead, the Council may continue, at times, to look to regional organizations or to individual Member States or ad-hoc coalitions when peace enforcement is required. The recent French action in Rwanda helped to stabilize the situation there and saved thousands of lives.”
1995-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3492 (1995) · source
“It is the Council's responsibility to create peace operations, to extend them, to alter them if necessary, and to terminate them if warranted. Those decisions can be made only on the basis of complete, accurate and timely information provided by the Secretariat. There should be no question about providing such information. As I indicated in my original comments, we must also guard against any inclination to suggest that every time a United Nations operation succeeds it is due to the United Nations as an organization but when a mission runs into trouble it is the fault of the Member States. A third important area of United Nations experience in recent years relates to the appropriate use of force by United Nations peace-keepers.”
1995-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3492 (1995) · source
“The new policy is working, and has resulted in fewer and smaller new operations, and better management of existing ones. The success of our policy is the result of hard work by the Member States, the Security Council and the Secretary- General. All of us should be pleased. But I also believe we need to work harder to define more clearly the relative roles and responsibilities of the Security Council and the Secretary-General in the area of peace operations. There should be no doubt about the Security Council's responsibility for peace operations. I cannot accept the statement by the Secretary-General that the Security Council is engaged in micro-management because it seeks information about a peace operation.”
1995-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3492 (1995) · source
“At the same time, we must ensure that missions have adequate support in the areas of transportation, communications and logistics to ensure that timely and appropriate responses to developments occur. Another important lesson of recent years is the need for rigorous decision-making in deciding whether, and how, to initiate a peace operation. Over the past year, the Security Council has begun, with my Government's strong support, to ask tough questions about the cost, mandate, scope, risk and duration of proposed operations before Council action occurs. The goal is to ensure that United Nations missions have clear and realistic objectives, that peace-keepers are equipped properly, that money is not wasted and that an endpoint to United Nations action can be identified.”
1995-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3492 (1995) · source
“More generally, United Nations experience from Angola, Liberia and Somalia, and elsewhere, suggests additional adjustments in tactics. One of these should be a willingness to delay the start of a mission until the parties accept and observe for a trial period military and political steps towards a negotiated settlement. Refinements in the composition and resources provided to peace-keeping missions in intra-State conflicts are also needed in order to increase their political capacity while reducing costly and sometimes less critical military elements. Broadly speaking, this may mean more observers and others with specialized skills, and less infantry.”
1995-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3492 (1995) · source
“They complicate prospects for mission success and they may result in missions that fail to meet expectations. The reality is that we will continue to face situations in which we will want to conduct peace-keeping in accordance with the traditional rules but where there will be no guarantee that operations so conducted will be adequate. The recent successfully concluded mission in Mozambique, however, may help point the way. An extremely able and activist Secretary-General's Special Representative was supported by a well-organized and tightly coordinated donor community willing to apply leverage at key points, by intense diplomatic activity on the scene by a handful of influential countries with long- standing relations with the parties, and by a strong and supportive community of non-governmental organizations.”
1995-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3492 (1995) · source