YouSaid · the spoken record

Brahimi

lines on the record: 382
first: 1992-07-15
most recent: 2021-09-07
sittings or episodes: 17
sources: un-security-council

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“Mr. Brahimi: I thank you very much, Sir, for inviting me to take part in today's debate. Your concept paper for today's debate sets the problem very accurately and very clearly. When a peace agreement has been signed and a United Nations peacekeeping operation moves in, there are certain critical needs that must be swiftly addressed if we are to have a real chance of building a sustainable peace, and yet we continue to face many of the same challenges that existed a decade ago and more. In the limited time available to me, I shall address only two issues: funding and civilian capacity. I shall do so briefly and draw exclusively on my past personal experience.”
2008-05-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5895 (2008) · source
“All of the work that needs to be done now - especially with respect to security - must be focused on the objective of creating the conditions for genuine and credible elections to be held by January 2005. In order to create the right conditions for elections, as well as to face the enormous challenges before them, the people of Iraq urgently need the help of the international community. Iraq needs the clear and united support of its neighbours. Iraq needs the generosity of its creditors. Iraq needs the patient, strong and sustained support of this body, the Security Council, and that of the United Nations as a whole.”
2004-06-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4984 (2004) · source
“Some are more cautious, and in some quarters there may be stronger opposition, but the Iraqi people seem to be willing to give the Government a chance to prove itself. There should be no illusion, however. The days and weeks ahead will severely test this new Government, and the solutions to Iraq's current challenges will take years, not months, to overcome. On 30 June, Iraq will reach a new phase of the political process, not the end of that process. The fact remains, however, that neither the interim Government nor the National Council that we expect to be chosen by the National Conference will be elected bodies. And only an elected Government and an elected legislature can legitimately claim to represent Iraq.”
2004-06-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4984 (2004) · source
“In that connection, I feel that I must convey the justified demand of the Turkomen to be recognized as the third-largest community in Iraq. Similar demands have been formulated by other, smaller communities. I believe that those legitimate demands should be heeded and that they can be accommodated in the forthcoming constitution. In conclusion, as the Secretary-General said a moment ago, the United Nations has completed its task for this particular stage in full and on time. After a long, complicated and delicate process that took place under less- than-optimal conditions, Iraq now has two institutions that are essential for the next phase: an interim Government and a national Independent Electoral Commission. As Council members may have seen through the media, that Government is generally found to be acceptable by the Iraqi people.”
2004-06-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4984 (2004) · source
“Massoum and his colleagues on the Preparatory Committee will recall that the Governing Council was established strictly on a quota basis, which was universally decried and rejected. Yet all wanted fair representation for their communities and groups. It was not possible at this stage to avoid reproducing the balance of the Governing Council in the interim Government. But everyone said that that should not be a precedent and that, in future, Iraq may well have a Kurdish President or an Arab Sunni Prime Minister or, indeed, that it may see those positions occupied by individuals from smaller communities. We believe that the National Conference should not be convened on the basis of any quota system, although care should be taken to reflect the country's diversity.”
2004-06-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4984 (2004) · source
“It will need to reach out to those who have been vocal critics of this past year's process and engage them in dialogue. It will need to resist the temptation to characterize all who have opposed the occupation as terrorists and "bitter- enders". The National Conference provides an ideal opportunity to start that process of outreach and to build a genuinely national consensus on how to address the prevailing insecurity. Mr. Fouad Massoum will head the Committee that has been charged with preparing the National Conference, to be held in July. Mr. Massoum has already started to reflect on the composition of the Committee, drawing on numerous recommendations that my team and I have passed on. During that process, I am sure that Mr.”
2004-06-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4984 (2004) · source
“In that context, it is encouraging to hear that the Prime Minister has reached agreement with the concerned parties for the dissolution of militias. That, as members may recall, was listed among the urgent confidence-building measures that we recommended after our second visit to Iraq. An equally important and urgent matter is the grave issue of the prisoners detained in the notorious Abu Ghraib detention centre and elsewhere. It would greatly help the new Government if that problem were to be completely solved even before 30 June. We must also bear in mind that the majority of Iraqis with whom we met stressed that the problem of insecurity cannot be solved through military means alone. A political solution is required. The interim Government will need to lead the discussions on what that political solution should comprise.”
2004-06-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4984 (2004) · source
“At the same time, the Iraqi people will ultimately judge the interim Government on the basis of what it does. The interim Government will need to start taking ownership of the solutions that must be found to the grave insecurity that continues to affect the country. Iraq will need an effective police force and a well- trained and professional army. Efforts to bring those about must be expedited. So, too, must the right legal, political and practical arrangements be worked out between the interim Government and any foreign forces that are sought to assist with the maintenance of security in the meantime. How that relationship is managed will greatly affect the interim Government's credibility in the eyes of the people.”
2004-06-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4984 (2004) · source
“There are also new political figures in the Government from constituencies that had not been well represented on the Governing Council. The Council of Ministers is composed largely of technocrats, although some of them are politically affiliated, as is often the case in many countries. I am also pleased to note that almost 20 per cent of the Council are women. Those women are known for their competence, their expertise and their dedication to the empowerment of women in public life. Taken as a complete package, the interim Government has a great deal of talent and is well positioned to bring the country together during the next seven months or so. As Ayatollah al-Sistani recently said, it deserves to be given a fair chance and full support.”
2004-06-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4984 (2004) · source
“But there are also many new faces, including the Ministers for Defence, Interior, Trade and Finance. Almost two thirds of the Cabinet is new, and only two former members of the Governing Council will be taking up Cabinet positions. The newly appointed Ministers include some of Iraq's most highly qualified and educated professionals. For example, few in Iraq can dispute the fact that the new Ministers of Oil, Health, Housing and Construction, Justice and Transport, among others, are among the most qualified people in their respective fields. The Council of Ministers reflects to a large extent the rich regional, ethnic and religious diversity of the country. Very able Ministers from the Turkomen and Caldo-Assyrian communities are represented in the Cabinet.”
2004-06-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4984 (2004) · source
“Adnan Pachachi, the former Foreign Minister of Iraq, and Sheikh Ghazi Mashal Ajil al-Yawer, who, as President of the Governing Council during the difficult month of May, earned the support and respect of his colleagues. In the end, Mr. Pachachi declined the position and Sheikh Ghazi became President. I am confident that the President and his two Deputies will demonstrate the leadership and the example of unity required to help bring the country together as we travel the difficult road ahead. As for the Council of Ministers, it is full of promise. It includes some of the best-performing incumbents, such as Ms. Nasreen Berwari, Minister of Public Works, and Mehdi Al-Hafidh, Minister of Planning. They will help bring continuity to the work already started over the past year or so.”
2004-06-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4984 (2004) · source
“Ayad Allawi's selection as prime minister and that we were ready to work with him in the selection of the cabinet. The list of the full Cabinet was finalized on Tuesday, 1 June, on the basis of the recommendations that we had formally handed over to Mr. Allawi. Prior to describing to the Council the nature of the Cabinet, I should say a word about the manner in which the three-person Presidency Council was formed. Although some very difficult compromises and statesmanship were required on all sides, consensus eventually emerged on the choice of Mr. Ibrahim J aafari and Mr. Rowsch Shaways as Deputy Presidents. Both men command a great deal of respect and enjoy popularity in their respective communities and beyond. As for the position of President, the field narrowed relatively quickly to two candidates: Mr.”
2004-06-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4984 (2004) · source
“His resume understandably provokes controversy, but whose name, in connection with the post of prime minister, does not in today's Iraq? The case of Mr. Hussein Shahrastani is a good example of how difficult it is to build consensus around anyone's name. Here was a brilliant scientist and head of a charity who spent 11 years in jail. He is secular, but a devout Muslim. He is close to religious leaders and he has been active and effective in providing aid and relief to the needy. Yet his name provoked strong opposition from almost all quarters, not least among those who later opposed strongly the selection of Mr. Ayad Allawi. Be that as it may, we made it clear to the members of the working group that we were ready to respect the emerging consensus on Mr.”
2004-06-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4984 (2004) · source
“Our discussions in the working group, as well as with many groups outside of it, revealed difficulty, at first, in reaching consensus on any one particular name. At the end of the day, the name that appeared to be gathering the most support within the Governing Council and the CPA, as well as with key communities, was that of Mr. Ayad Allawi. Though his political party is not religiously based, he maintains good relations with important religious figures. Though known for his attempts to overthrow the former regime, with outside help, he has in the past year been publicly critical of the CPA's approach to the de-baathification policy and the manner in which the former army was disbanded. Though a Shia, he enjoys good relations with key Kurdish and Arab Sunni actors alike.”
2004-06-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4984 (2004) · source
“Tragically, just one day after the working group had met in Erbil, Ezzedine Selim was assassinated in Baghdad on 17 May 2004. His death was not only a blow to the process, but a real loss for the country. He was a remarkably thoughtful and decent man who had no particular personal agenda other than to help move his country in the right direction. Soon thereafter, we invited Mr. Hamid Majid Moussa, Chairman of the Governing Council's Committee on the Transfer of Sovereignty, to replace Ezzedine Selim on the working group. While we discussed options for different positions in the interim Government, people around the country, as well in the international community at large, were particularly focused on the prime minister.”
2004-06-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4984 (2004) · source
“Nevertheless, we did meet, during our three visits, with thousands of Iraqis from around the country - many of whom travelled to Baghdad, Erbil, Mosul and Basra to see us - when we could not go to them. I sincerely apologize to all those who sought to see us and were unable to do so. We made a particular effort to seek out the views of the extreme critics. We also tried to give a voice to those who had been relatively silent to date, including by their own choice. One of their concerns that we kept at the forefront of our minds during the working group's discussions was a desire to avoid the reinforcement of a purely sectarian mindset in the new Government. This working group proved to be a reasonably effective forum for thrashing ideas out.”
2004-06-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4984 (2004) · source
“Furthermore, the CPA was running the country and the Governing Council had been officially recognized by the Security Council as the highest Iraqi institution in the country. However, the CPA and the Governing Council members themselves recognized that they could not legitimately claim to speak for all Iraqis. It was for that reason, among others, that they called on the United Nations to assist in the process in the first place. Both parties accepted, therefore, that the United Nations would introduce into the discussions the views we had been hearing from Iraqis around the country. To be sure, due to time and security constraints, we did not consult as visibly or as widely with a sufficient number of the many civic associations or the several hundred political parties that are said to exist.”
2004-06-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4984 (2004) · source
“It would have been impractical to include all 24 members of the Governing Council in this working group. So, instead, we suggested working with a troika of the past, present and future Presidents of the Governing Council. They were Massoud Barzani, a Kurd; Ezzedine Selim, an Arab Shia; and Sheikh Ghazi Al-Yawer, an Arab Sunni. It was in that forum that we began to discuss formally the criteria for determining which names would be considered for the positions in the interim Government, including the post of prime minister. That the CPA and the Governing Council would need to be formally included in the discussions was, of course, a foregone conclusion for us from the outset. After all, it was they who had requested the United Nations assistance and not the other way around.”
2004-06-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4984 (2004) · source
“They added that the magnitude of the challenges the Government would face from the outset made it imperative for its composition to be as inclusive as possible. The interim Government could ill afford to start its work with influential opposition surrounding it on all sides. Inclusion thus meant the inclusion of the larger political parties as well, and there were plenty of highly competent professionals within their ranks. The key would be to ensure that the participation of political parties did not lead to rising sectarianism, the crowding out of competent independent candidates or the disproportionate influence of any one political party in the Government. When the time came to start discussions on actual names, we proposed the idea of forming a working group comprised of the United Nations, the CPA and the Iraqi Governing Council.”
2004-06-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4984 (2004) · source
“Thirdly, if the round table failed to reach agreement on the composition of the Government by 30 June, then the termination of the occupation would be delayed. This would not be acceptable to anyone in Iraq. At the end of the day, there was no getting away from the fact that the interim Government would not be elected. It would be an imperfect and ambiguous process of selection, and it would not be fair to the people of Iraq to pretend otherwise. As concerns the participation of political parties in the interim Government, we discovered that the leaders of those parties were not alone in support of their participation. Quite a few independent Iraqi figures argued in favour of it. They stressed that, by definition, any composition of the Iraqi Government selected through these means would be controversial.”
2004-06-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4984 (2004) · source
“On both sides of this debate, it was argued that if sufficient time were not available for a credible national conference to be convened by 30 June, then we should take six weeks or so to bring together an even smaller round table of notable figures, who would be charged with selecting the interim Government. Our concerns with this suggestion, however, were three-fold. First, if we left the formation of the Government until the eve of 30 June, then it would not have sufficient time to prepare to take power or the opportunity to engage in the discussions on the draft resolution now before the Council. Secondly, the choice of who should participate in the round table would be influenced by foreigners and would be no less controversial than the choice of the Government itself.”
2004-06-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4984 (2004) · source
“It had the merit of simplicity while containing enough positions of real and symbolic importance to allow most, if not all key constituencies to feel represented. There was debate, however, on two key issues. First, how was this Government to be selected? Secondly, to what extent should political parties be represented in it? The idea that an Iraqi Government could be even partially selected by foreigners, understandably, did not sit well with some. On the other hand, many voices were heard demanding that the United Nations alone be involved in this exercise, without the participation of the CPA and the Governing Council.”
2004-06-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4984 (2004) · source
“A few days after I briefed the Council, my team and I departed again from New York, arriving in Baghdad on 1 May, for our third and final visit. Our immediate task was to gauge the reactions to the preliminary ideas that we had presented. After all, these were not ideas that we had come up with on our own, but rather were a reflection of what we heard Iraqis telling us. Did they believe that it was a faithful reflection? With the benefit of some time to think about the proposals, did they have additional views? If they were on board with the framework, what names did they see best matching up with the positions? These are the questions we put to our interlocutors during this third visit as we resumed our consultations. What we found was that there was virtual consensus on the structure of the Government.”
2004-06-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4984 (2004) · source
“Within this context, we suggested that a national conference be convened once sovereignty had been restored, in order to provide a forum for Iraqi men and women around the country to debate and hopefully to forge consensus on the challenges that they face for their immediate and long-term future. We also proposed that this conference, bringing together 1,000 to 1,500 people reflecting the diversity of the country, should select a smaller national council that could continue the discussions and advise the interim Government throughout its short tenure. In order for this national conference to be well prepared, we recommended that a diverse preparatory committee should be formed as quickly as possible.”
2004-06-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4984 (2004) · source
“In that briefing, members will recall, I added that, ideally, those serving in the Government would choose, themselves, not to stand as candidates in the elections for the National Assembly that is to be elected by next January. I also stressed that the formation of the interim Government alone would not be sufficient to help turn the tide of violence. Confidence-building measures would also be needed, in tandem, to address such controversial and divisive issues as the manner in which the new army would be formed, de- Baathification, and the issue of detainees and due process.”
2004-06-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4984 (2004) · source
“Outside of the Governing Council there was a call for the Government to consist of honest and competent people who would effectively run the country for seven months or so while preparations for elections were being made. Once again, the people of Iraq, in all quarters, stressed that the elections were the most important milestone for them. On 14 April, I informed the Iraqi public of the status of our work in progress at a joint press conference with the then President of the Governing Council, Mr. Massoud Barzani. After returning to New York for consultations with the Secretary-General, I briefed the Security Council in greater detail on 27 April.”
2004-06-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4984 (2004) · source
“For that reason, they favoured transferring sovereignty by 30 June to themselves or to an expanded version of their Council. On the other hand, our extensive consultations with people outside the Governing Council revealed a desire for a more pronounced change. In the end, the Governing Council itself recognized that the 15 November 2003 agreement, as well as the Transitional Administrative Law, had called for its dissolution, along with that of the Coalition Provisional Authority, by 30 June. A consensus appeared to emerge on the formation of an interim Government composed of a President, two Vice- Presidents and a Cabinet of ministers headed by a Prime Minister.”
2004-06-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4984 (2004) · source
“In a letter dated the same day, Ambassador Paul Bremer indicated to the Secretary-General his hope that my team and I would "return to Iraq to help build consensus among Iraqis on the powers, structure and composition of the interim Government and the process for its establishment" (S/2004/225, annex IV). The Secretary-General informed the Security Council the following day of the letters that he had received, as well as of his positive response to them. Against that backdrop, my team and I returned to Iraq for a second time, from 4 to 15 April. On arrival, we found that some members of the Governing Council were arguing that continuity above all would be required to face the magnitude of the challenges that would persist through the next phase of the transition.”
2004-06-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4984 (2004) · source
“Article 2(B)(1) of the Transitional Administrative Law stated that the interim Government to take power by 30 June would be "constituted in accordance with a process of extensive deliberations and consultations with cross-sections of the Iraqi people conducted by the Governing Council and the Coalition Provisional Authority and possibly in consultation with the United Nations". Then, in a letter to the Secretary-General dated 17 March 2004 (S/2004/225, annex II), the President of the Iraqi Governing Council reaffirmed that the Governing Council welcomed United Nations consultation in the national dialogue on the shape and scope of the interim Government.”
2004-06-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4984 (2004) · source
“There was therefore no alternative but to accept that restoration of sovereignty by 30 June would be made to a non-elected Government. What was the alternative to the caucus-style system that had been rejected? It was naturally not possible to present a preferred option from the United Nations. It was up to the people of Iraq to reflect on this question, free of the sometimes politically motivated rhetoric that had surrounded the debate on whether credible elections could be held by 30 June. This was not a time to hastily push through a solution, especially because, as we pointed out in the fact- finding team's report, the country was so divided. The Council will recall that the Transitional Administrative Law was adopted by the Governing Council and the Coalition Provisional Authority on 8 March 2004.”
2004-06-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4984 (2004) · source
“That report, which the Secretary-General transmitted to the Security Council on 23 February (S/2004/ 140), made clear that there was an overwhelming desire on the part of Iraqis for an elected Government to take over from the Coalition Provisional Authority. But there was also an understanding that such a Government would not be viable if the elections held for it were not genuine and credible. Our technical assessment was that the conditions simply were not there for this to happen before 30 June. Eight months at the very least would be needed to organize a proper election from the time that an electoral authority and an electoral framework had been put in place. Naturally, delaying the end of occupation was not an option.”
2004-06-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4984 (2004) · source
“My own personal involvement commenced with the fact-finding team I was privileged to lead to Iraq in the beginning of February. During that visit, the first of three in total, my team and I began a process of consultations with Iraqi political parties, professional associations, trade unions, religious and tribal leaders, women's groups and youth movements, intellectuals and academics, amongst others. It was on the basis of those consultations, in addition to those with the Coalition Provisional Authority and the Governing Council, that we formulated the observations and recommendations in the fact-finding team's report.”
2004-06-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4984 (2004) · source
“Mr. Brahimi: It is, as ever, a privilege to address the Security Council, and I am particularly honoured to be speaking under your presidency, Mr. Ambassador. The Secretary-General has been far too kind and generous, and I thank him on behalf of my colleagues and on my own account for his confidence, his encouragement and his support. I am also deeply grateful for the assistance that the members of the Security Council have given us. The Secretary-General mentioned that the process of forming the interim Government that is poised to take power in Iraq by 30 June did not begin in May, but much earlier. I hope the Council will permit me to describe that process in some detail, especially as concerns last month's events. The United Nations account of how the process has unfolded should be a matter of public record.”
2004-06-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4984 (2004) · source
“The tasks that the Security Council has welcomed and strongly supported us in doing at this juncture - namely, to assist with the establishment of an interim Government by 30 June 2004 and with the preparation of elections to be held by January 2005 - will not be easy. To the contrary, there will be potentially dangerous pitfalls and massive obstacles at every step of the way. But the job is doable so long as we set principled but realistic targets and move towards them with deliberate steps, and so long as we are not alone as we take those steps. In particular, we will need the Security Council to be united behind us and with us.”
2004-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4952 (2004) · source
“Once broad support for the framework is evident, we will then proceed to help to facilitate an Iraqi consensus on the actual composition of the caretaker Government and of the preparatory committee for the national conference. As I have indicated, I hope all of that can be completed before the end of May 2004. We will, of course, be consulting constantly with Iraqis inside and outside the Governing Council - as well as with the Coalition Provisional Authority - throughout this period. We plan also to intensify dialogue with interested Member States, Iraq's neighbours in particular, in order to seek their advice on and support for this political transition process. There is much to do, and time is short.”
2004-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4952 (2004) · source
“In general, I draw attention to those remarks as an illustration of the types of actions that we believe would begin to address very serious grievances raised by Iraqis around the country. In turn, that would help to improve - at least a little - the general atmosphere in which the political process needs to take place. Looking to the days, weeks and months ahead, our intention is to resume our consultations in Iraq as soon as possible. We earnestly hope that the next phase of consultations will help to consolidate a consensus around the ideas that I have just outlined. Adjustments may be required in order to build as broad a base of support as possible.”
2004-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4952 (2004) · source
“He indicated that action would be taken to address legitimate grievances about the way in which the "de- Baathification" policy has been implemented, and he mentioned measures to immediately address that with respect to desperately needed teachers, university professors and so on. If, as a result, thousands of teachers will indeed be able to go back to work, and if thousands more will indeed begin to receive their pensions, then that would be an important step towards the kind of reconciliation that people are currently discussing in Iraq. Such steps may well have a positive effect, even on the security situation. Another important step that the Coalition Provisional Authority has been considering is the dissolution of existing militias, including the Mahdi Army but of course not only that Army.”
2004-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4952 (2004) · source
“I have in mind in particular - as I mentioned in Baghdad - the manner in which the new army is formed, how the issue of "de-Baathification" is handled and how concerns about due process for current detainees are addressed. In that regard, I would draw the Council's attention to public remarks made recently by Ambassador Bremer. In those remarks, he indicated that more officers with honourable records - including officers from the former army - would be brought back, into the new army. He announced that beginning on 10 May the Coalition Provisional Authority would regularly post lists of detainees at police stations and courthouses throughout the country.”
2004-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4952 (2004) · source
“But what can be said at this stage is that no one, inside or outside Iraq, is thinking of bringing back the old regime or any of its leaders. Nor should anyone contemplate condoning, directly or indirectly, the gross abuses of the painful past or abandoning the principle of accountability for past crimes. National reconciliation is not a euphemism for impunity. The issues I have mentioned - including how Iraqis will come to terms with the past - ultimately need to be addressed by the Iraqi people themselves. But the actions that the Coalition Provisional Authority takes in the meantime will affect those discussions and could help to reduce existing tensions significantly.”
2004-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4952 (2004) · source
“It is a fundamental principle of democracy that the constitution should provide for majority rule but also protect minority rights." Finally, the conference will appoint a consultative council, which will be available to provide advice to the Government. The council would conduct plenary debates to convey the preoccupations of the people to the Government, and it would form committees, which would receive reports from ministers. As one can see, the convening of the national conference may ultimately constitute an important step towards many things, not least national reconciliation. Questions were raised by some of our Iraqi interlocutors about what that term - "national reconciliation" - actually entails and requires. Of course, the preparatory committee will have to address this issue in due course.”
2004-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4952 (2004) · source
“The fact is that the Transitional Administrative Law is exactly what it says it is: a transitional administrative law for the transition period. It is not a permanent constitution. Indeed, it is not a constitution at all. The Transitional Law - or any other law adopted in the present circumstances - cannot, in our opinion, tie the hands of the national assembly, which will be elected in January 2005 and will have the sovereign responsibility of freely drafting Iraq's permanent constitution. But, again as Ambassador Bremer said, "Iraqi unity requires a constitution that all of Iraq's communities can support.”
2004-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4952 (2004) · source
“They will no doubt discuss, first and foremost, the security situation and perhaps contribute ideas on how it should be addressed. They will also talk about the forthcoming elections and will contribute ideas on how to ensure that they are organized in a timely and successful manner. They will further discuss those aspects of the Transitional Administrative Law that are still the subject of much debate and misunderstanding. In that connection, I welcome the clarification made recently by Ambassador Paul Bremer, the Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority, who, among other things, stressed that "the interim Government will not have the power to do anything which cannot be undone by the elected Government, which takes power early next year".”
2004-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4952 (2004) · source
“Under the circumstances, it would seem that July would be the earliest time to convene the national conference. From preliminary discussions of this idea, we see the conference bringing together anywhere from 1,000 to 1,500 people representing every province in the country, all political parties, tribal chiefs and leaders, trade and professional unions, universities, women's groups, youth organizations, writers, poets and artists, as well as religious leaders, among many others. For the past three decades, Iraqis were not communicating with one another inside their country. "We were even afraid to talk in front of our children", many of them told us. The conference will, to begin with, allow such a wide and representative sample of Iraqi society to talk to one another and discuss their painful past as well as the future of their country.”
2004-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4952 (2004) · source
“In our View, however, the conference should be convened not by the United Nations or by any other external body, but by an Iraqi preparatory committee, which should be established as soon as possible. The committee should work towards identifying who should take part in the conference, when and where it should be convened and how it should be managed. The committee should comprise a small number of reputable and distinguished Iraqis - including prominent and respected judges - who are not seeking political office. The United Nations is ready to facilitate consensus among Iraqis on a suitable slate of names for the committee. In order to do a proper job, the committee will need at least one to two months to consult widely around the country.”
2004-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4952 (2004) · source
“Those preparations should include reaching clear understandings on the nature of the relationship among the sovereign caretaker Government, the former occupying Powers - the Powers that by then will be the former occupying Powers - and any foreign forces remaining in the country after 30 June, in addition to an understanding of what assistance, if any, might be required from the United Nations. How does the idea of convening a national conference fit in? Many Iraqis have suggested that the United Nations convene a national conference, consisting of at least 1,000 people, to engage in a genuine national dialogue on the country's challenges. We could not agree more that there is no greater priority than forging genuine national consensus, and that, to that end, it would be extremely worthwhile to convene a national conference.”
2004-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4952 (2004) · source
“Furthermore, there are honest and qualified people in every single political party and in every regional, ethnic and religious group. It should not be difficult to identify a list of extremely well- qualified candidates - men and women - for every single position who are representative of Iraq's diversity. The United Nations can certainly help the Iraqi people in that process, as requested, by meeting with as many of them as possible and identifying where points of consensus could be forged. Though it will certainly not be easy, we believe that it will be possible to identify by the end of May a group of people respected by and acceptable to Iraqis across the country, to form this caretaker Government. Those individuals would then have approximately one month to prepare to assume responsibility for governing the country.”
2004-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4952 (2004) · source
“It should therefore refrain to the maximum extent possible from entering into long- term commitments that can and should await decision by an elected Government. In moments of doubt on that question or when faced with potentially sensitive or divisive issues, it should err on the side of caution. It should also seek the advice of representatives of all parts of Iraqi society. To that end, we suggest the establishment of a consultative assembly or council, which would be available to the caretaker Government for this purpose throughout its short tenure. Who whould select the caretaker Government? Ideally, the Iraqi people themselves should select the Government. They know who is and who is not honest or qualified.”
2004-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4952 (2004) · source
“The caretaker Government, by definition, must be short- lived, as its sole purpose will be to tend to the day-to- day administration of the country in as effective and efficient a manner as possible, and only until such time as a democratically elected Government can be put in place. While they carry out these responsibilities, the members of the caretaker Government must be careful not to use their positions to try and give advantage to any political party or group. In order to prevent even the perception that they might do so, it would be best if the members of the caretaker Government, including the interim president, vice-presidents and prime minister, were to choose not to stand for election. The caretaker Government also needs to be mindful at all times of the fact that it has not been democratically elected.”
2004-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4952 (2004) · source
“On the other hand, many others strongly support this particular proposal and point out that useful lessons could be derived from the existence of a president and two Vice- presidents for the coming phases of the transition, as well as for the drafting of the constitution by the elected national assembly. In general, there are many permutations one could explore for the structure of the caretaker Government. But what we are suggesting here has the merit of enjoying the support of many of the Iraqis with whom we have met and is reasonably simple and straightforward. What should be the responsibilities of and constraints on such a caretaker Government?”
2004-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4952 (2004) · source
“Continuing with the Interim Governing Council, either in its present form or with some adjustment, is therefore by its own decision not an option. The majority of Iraqis with whom we spoke told us that, under the circumstances, they favoured the establishment of a new caretaker Government composed of honest and technically qualified persons. There is near unanimity that the Government should be led by a very qualified prime minister. We would suggest that a president should serve as head of State, with two vice-presidents. Some Iraqis are asking whether, at this stage and for such a short period, it is really necessary to have two vice-presidents in addition to the head of State. There are certainly people who feel uneasy about what they see as excessive and, indeed, negative concern with ethnic balance.”
2004-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4952 (2004) · source