YouSaid · the spoken record

Brahimi

lines on the record: 382
first: 1992-07-15
most recent: 2021-09-07
sittings or episodes: 17
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“There is no substitute for the legitimacy that comes from free and fair elections. Therefore, Iraq will have a fully representative Government only after January 2005. As I said earlier, a United Nations electoral team has already started work in Baghdad and has made a number of field visits. In the near future, the Secretariat will be in a position to brief the Security Council separately, and in detail, on the observations and findings of the electoral assistance team's work to date with regard to the preparations for those elections. Meanwhile, the question obviously arises as to whom the Coalition Provisional Authority will yield power by 30 June. The 15 November 2003 political agreement and the Transitional Administrative Law call for the dissolution of the Iraqi Governing Council by 30 June 2004.”
2004-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4952 (2004) · source
“In the end, the solution to Iraq's problems will have to come from the Iraqis themselves. The sooner a credible Iraqi Government is in place to lead the way, the better, especially because the absence of such a sovereign Government is part of the problem in the first place. For that reason, among others, Virtually every Iraqi with whom we met urged that there be no delay in bringing an end to the occupation - by 30 June at the latest. They maintain that view even though they understand that a democratically elected, and therefore fully legitimate, Government will not be in place by that date. The elections scheduled to take place by January 2005 are the most important milestone in the process. Until that time, any Iraqi governing body that exists will, by definition, be less than fully representative.”
2004-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4952 (2004) · source
“So, is it possible for the process to proceed under such circumstances? Will it be viable? Will it be credible? I put it to the Council that there is, in fact, no alternative but to find a way of making the process Viable and credible. Between security on the one hand, and the end of occupation, the restoration of sovereignty and independence and the advent of a legitimate Iraqi Government and political regime on the other, there is a dialectical link that is obvious. Security is essential for the process to be completed. A Viable political process is no panacea; it is a powerful contributing factor to security - hence the importance of a credible Iraqi Government being in place, leading the way in the completion of the next phases of the political process.”
2004-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4952 (2004) · source
“It is important to note, in this context, that the limited task we are presently engaged in - which is only the formation of an administration to assume responsibility as of 30 June - is part of a much broader political process, and that this political process has to be seen against the background of the realities that made it necessary: namely, war and occupation and, before that, a very harsh and brutal regime, and severe, even crippling sanctions, not to mention two earlier devastating and costly wars. The political process aims at restoring Iraqi sovereignty and independence, preserving the country's unity and territorial integrity and making the Iraqi people truly the masters of their own destiny, with the political system of their choice and control over their own natural resources.”
2004-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4952 (2004) · source
“Even under those circumstances, however, our team was able to meet with a large number of Iraqis drawn from across society - politicians, civic and religious leaders, women's groups, academics, intellectuals, artists, and businessmen and merchants, among others - not only in Baghdad, but also in Mosul and in Basra. We were humbled by the many Iraqis who faced the perils of travel in today's Iraq and even inside Baghdad in order to meet with us. We are profoundly sorry that we failed, because of security constraints, to meet with some of them. A key question is whether a credible political process is even viable under such circumstances.”
2004-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4952 (2004) · source
“We join our voices to those of the many respected religious leaders and others in Iraq who have been appealing for respect for the rule of law and for an early, peaceful resolution of this crisis. The nature of these dynamics, together with the general insecurity prevailing in the country, certainly had an impact on our visit. It prevented us from meeting a number of important religious, political and tribal figures whose advice and views are of great importance. In addition, our movements, even within Baghdad, were severely restricted. Had the Coalition Provisional Authority not dedicated a great deal of manpower, time and attention to our visit, the latter might well not have taken place at all. I take this opportunity to express our sincere appreciation to the Coalition Provisional Authority for all the support that it provided.”
2004-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4952 (2004) · source
“They had secured an uneasy ceasefire, which, I am afraid, has now been overtaken by events, as I said earlier. Nevertheless, the Coalition Provisional Authority is well aware that, unless the standoff - and now the fighting - is resolved through peaceful means, there is a great risk of a very bloody confrontation. The Coalition Provisional Authority knows as well as - indeed, better than everyone else - that the consequences of such bloodshed could be dramatic and long-lasting. The same is true of the extremely precarious and complicated situation in Najaf and in Karbala. They are among the holiest and most beloved of cities for millions of Shi'a in Iraq and around the world. They are places for worship, not for military confrontation.”
2004-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4952 (2004) · source
“The United Nations is not in a position to verify those figures or the causes of death and injury, but there is little doubt that many lives have been lost and much suffering endured by civilians. You also saw on television screens yesterday images of yet another mosque which had taken a direct hit. Reports today of attacks from and on that mosque are a source of shock and dismay. The United Nations has been active in trying to do whatever it can, appealing for restraint and working with Iraqi non- governmental organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and others to provide some humanitarian relief to the civilian population. However, that is just a stopgap measure. Talks between the Coalition Provisional Authority and representatives from the city have been ongoing for some time now.”
2004-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4952 (2004) · source
“The hopes for a peaceful resolution to the stand- off in Fallujah which the Secretary-General has repeatedly expressed in the past weeks, including to the United States Secretary of State, Colin Powell, have not yet materialized. As a matter of fact, just before coming in, we saw that major fighting was taking place, and therefore my remarks on the subject of Fallujah seem to have been overtaken by events. On 22 April, staff of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), now based in Amman, received a delegation from Fallujah. That delegation claimed that several hundred of Fallujah's inhabitants had died and that well over 1,000 had been wounded - many of them women, children and the elderly.”
2004-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4952 (2004) · source
“Furthermore, I have now had a chance to brief the Secretary-General more fully and to obtain his guidance and advice. But our plans for the way forward remain very much a work in progress. I think that, before getting into the details on possible avenues for the way forward, it is important to describe for the Council the context within which this Visit took place. The security situation, above all else, was and remains extremely worrying. An atmosphere of great tension and anxiety persists in the face of the siege of Fallujah, the Mahdi army's uprising in the south, and the general increase in violence up and down the country.”
2004-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4952 (2004) · source
“I very much appreciate this opportunity to brief the members of the Council on our Visit as well as to outline a few ideas on the potential way forward. I look forward to hearing the Council's reactions and advice. As the Council is are aware, I previewed some of my tentative thoughts in public on the eve of my departure from Iraq, on 14 April, at a joint press conference in Baghdad with the Chairman of the Interim Governing Council for this month, Mr. Massoud Barzani. I had wanted to be as transparent as possible and to give the Iraqi leaders and public at large as clear an idea as possible of those preliminary thoughts. Thus, much of what I will outline today should not come as a surprise. The Council will note, however, that some ideas have been clarified based on the reactions that we are already hearing from various quarters in Iraq.”
2004-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4952 (2004) · source
“On the way back to New York, I was able to have an audience in Rome with President Ciampi and Prime Minister Berlusconi, and in Paris with President Jacques Chirac, in addition to meeting separately with the respective Foreign Ministers of both countries. In Paris, I met also with the Foreign Minister of Iran, who was himself visiting a number of European capitals, and the Prime Minister of Lebanon. While in Iraq, I was accompanied by my spokesperson and three political advisers, who had been in Iraq for approximately one week in advance of my arrival in order to help prepare for the visit. Concurrently with our visit, Carina Perelli, the Director of the Electoral Assistance Division in the Department of Political Affairs, was leading an electoral mission composed of a similarly sized team.”
2004-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4952 (2004) · source
“Joschka Fischer, as well as with the representatives of other Security Council member States, including the Foreign Ministers of China and of the Russian Federation, the Foreign Secretary and the State Secretary for International Development of the United Kingdom, and the Secretary of State of the United States of America. In addition, in Berlin, I met with the Foreign Minister of Ireland, which now holds the presidency of the European Union; the Deputy Foreign Minister of Iran; the Japanese Prime Minister's Special Representative; as well as the External Relations Commissioner of the European Union and His Highness the Agha Khan. On route back from Iraq, in Kuwait City, I had a chance to meet with the Foreign Minister of Kuwait.”
2004-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4952 (2004) · source
“As members will also recall, the Secretary- General took that decision in response to explicit requests from the Iraqi Governing Council and the Coalition Provisional Authority, on 17 March 2004, for United Nations assistance in those two specific areas. Accordingly, as instructed by the Secretary- General, I Visited Iraq from 4 to 15 April. Prior to reaching Iraq, I was privileged to represent the Secretary-General at the International Conference on Afghanistan, held in Berlin on 31 March and 1 April. There I had the opportunity to discuss the situation in Iraq with Chancellor Schroder and his Foreign Minister, Mr.”
2004-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4952 (2004) · source
“Mr. Brahimi: I am delighted to speak under your presidency today, Sir, in order to brief the Council on Iraq. Members will recall that the Security Council, in its presidential statement of 24 March 2004, unanimously welcomed and strongly supported the Secretary-General's decision to dispatch a team, which I was privileged to lead, as well as an electoral assistance team, in order to lend assistance and advice to the Iraqi people in the formation of an interim Iraqi Government to which sovereignty will be transferred on 30 June 2004, as well as in the preparations for direct elections to be held before the end of January 2005.”
2004-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4952 (2004) · source
“I would like to recognize, too, our colleagues here at Headquarters: the Deputy Secretary-General, the Executive Office of the Secretary-General, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Political Affairs and all other departments, as well as those in other parts of the United Nations - the agencies, funds and programmes - for the unfailing support we received from all of them. Last but not least, may I say how deeply indebted I feel to the Secretary-General. Throughout these very long months - first in New York when we were preparing the Bonn Conference, then in Bonn and, later, in Kabul - he was always there for us, ever supportive and protective, always encouraging us and reassuring us in moments of doubt.”
2004-01-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4893 (2004) · source
“It is also my pleasant duty to say a word about colleagues and friends in UNAMA and the rest of the United Nations country team in Afghanistan. Speaking the other day in Kabul, I said that the secret of whatever success I had been fortunate to achieve in Afghanistan was that I had a team of particularly talented and dedicated colleagues - I just watched them work and took the credit for their achievements. To all of them, I will simply say, "Thank you, my very dear friends and colleagues, and may God protect you as you continue the good work you are doing in Afghanistan".”
2004-01-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4893 (2004) · source
“Many have become close friends, and I wish them well. It is also important to me to salute, from here, the people of Afghanistan. I am proud, and I believe that the Council and the United Nations at large can be proud, too, of the confidence that the overwhelming majority of the people of Afghanistan have in the United Nations. A few days ago, at a particularly tense and difficult moment during the Loya Jirga, a delegate, speaking from the rostrum, said that they, the delegates, had full confidence in UNAMA. That was humbling to all of us, and we are grateful to the people of Afghanistan for the warmth of their feelings towards this Organization and towards the men and women - Afghans and non-Afghans - who are working for the United Nations over there.”
2004-01-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4893 (2004) · source
“The coherent and sustained support of the Council, and the generosity and close collaboration of the wider international community, have been essential to the progress made. Furthermore, I cannot conclude today's briefing without a few words about the people whom I left behind in Afghanistan - first, an expression of profound gratitude, respect and admiration to President Hamid Karzai. It was a privilege to know and work with such an Afghan patriot, dedicated to his country and his people, modest, honest and selfless. I cannot thank him enough for the frank, open and close cooperation I have consistently enjoyed with him. I would like, from here, to wish him, once again, success in his noble mission. My thanks go also to the members of President Karzai's Government for their cooperation and patience.”
2004-01-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4893 (2004) · source
“The paper noted that a second Bonn-type conference was one possible way to re- energize the commitment of all concerned to address the three gaps in the peace process that I just mentioned. Some interlocutors observed that there may be other means to address these gaps, and that a large conference is perhaps not necessary. However, what is important and, I personally believe, very urgent, is that some means are identified in order to improve and accelerate the performance of the Government and its international partners in implementing the Bonn process, lest these gaps undermine the progress that has already been made. As I near the end of my far-too-long briefing, I would like to thank the Council once again for the remarkable support that it has shown for Afghanistan.”
2004-01-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4893 (2004) · source
“In the economic field more generally, the Minister of Finance has noted that the hurried estimates carried out at the height of the crisis for the 2001 Tokyo conference need to be revisited, and he is conducting a re-costing exercise to determine actual investment needs in order to achieve basic financial sustainability and to prevent the domination of the national economy by the narcotics industry. Following its visit to Afghanistan in early November, the Council recommended that the Secretary-General explore ways to give new impetus to the Bonn process. His report discusses some of the possibilities, and he again alluded to them in his statement a moment ago. UNAMA circulated a non- paper on the subject in Kabul to the Government and the diplomatic corps.”
2004-01-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4893 (2004) · source
“On the security front, those indications are many, and they have been detailed often to the Council. Concerning the base of popular support for the Government, for example, there were clear indications at the Loya J irga of disaffection among Pashtuns who thought they were not receiving a fair degree of representation in the Government. On the reconstruction front, the assistance in the south, the east and the south-east is slowly decreasing because of insecurity.”
2004-01-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4893 (2004) · source
“The success of the Constitutional Loya Jirga and of the political debate that has begun does offer hope, but it is a success that must be quickly capitalized on, lest it do no more than raise false expectations. And I believe the key challenges that must quickly be addressed remain the same today, after the Loya Jirga, as they were described in the Secretary- General's report before the Loya Jirga: broadening the popular base of the Government and strengthening a system of governance based on the rule of law; improving security; and increasing the pace of reconstruction and service delivery. There are many indications that, in those three areas, not enough progress is being made, and some of the gaps may even have widened over the past year.”
2004-01-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4893 (2004) · source
“However, as is recognized by the Afghan national drug control strategy, the problem will not be solved over the long term without development and achievements being made in other sectors, including in providing alternative livelihoods, in building up the judicial and penal systems and in reducing demand for opium derivatives both domestically and abroad. The Government; the United Kingdom, as lead nation; and the UNODC are working together and with others to meet those formidable challenges. At the outset, I said that Afghanistan had achieved much in the past two years. However, as I believe I have said before to the Council, those achievements also mean that there is now even more to lose and more to protect. The Afghans and their international partners - including the Council - will have to chart the way forward carefully.”
2004-01-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4893 (2004) · source
“The central Government has shown a commitment to tackling the problem. But to date, efforts have concentrated on building the capacity of Government institutions such as the Counter-Narcotics Directorate and the counter-narcotics police of Afghanistan and on drafting legislation. While those activities are indeed essential in the long-term fight against drugs, they have not had an immediate effect on the amount of opium cultivated or trafficked. Drug interdiction campaigns will also have to be intensified. That responsibility is shared by all authorities involved in law enforcement, including the counter-narcotics police, the border police and all military forces in the country.”
2004-01-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4893 (2004) · source
“The Afghanistan Opium Survey 2003, conducted by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), estimates that the income of opium farmers and drug traffickers in 2003 - totalling an estimated $2.3 billion - was equivalent to more than 50 per cent of the country's gross domestic product. It is also estimated that, in 2003, 1.7 million people - representing approximately 7 per cent of the population - were involved in farming the opium poppy. Also in 2003, the opium poppy was grown in 28 out of the country's 32 provinces. Those statistics are all the more alarming when one considers that, according to the preliminary results of the UNODC farmers' intentions survey, conducted in the latter half of 2003, farmers are intent on growing the opium poppy again in 2004 and with greater intensity.”
2004-01-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4893 (2004) · source
“As the Secretary-General notes in his report, it might be possible to hold presidential elections with a few areas of the country remaining off limits, although that has its risks. Doing so with legislative elections, however, would mean disenfranchising people along ethnic lines, and that would not be tenable. Therefore, I would urge the members of NATO and other countries contributing troops to ISAF to take all measures possible to provide ISAF with the resources necessary to expand sooner rather than later. I have taken much of the Council's time, but, if I may, I should like to say a few words about drugs. One of the most worrying aspects of the drug trade is how much the Afghan economy - and therefore the population - is coming to depend on it.”
2004-01-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4893 (2004) · source
“While I continue to believe that the PRTs are a "second best" to a straightforward expansion of ISAF's peacekeeping functions, I do hope that they will be given the resources and the mandate to help accelerate security sector reform, participate in the Government's and UNAMA's efforts to manage and defuse local tensions and, more generally, help coordinate security support for the Bonn process - all the more so if there is some capacity for ISAF to conduct forward deployments of more robust forces when and where necessary, as I understand is being considered. It is cause for concern, however, that the pace of PRT deployment is running behind that of the political process. The presidential elections will require improved security, and the legislative elections even more so.”
2004-01-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4893 (2004) · source
“UNAMA, along with almost all Afghans, received with great anticipation the news of the resolution adopted by the Council providing for the expansion of ISAF. The recent launch of the German provincial reconstruction team (PRT) in Kunduz is a welcome sign that some form of expansion is beginning in earnest. My colleagues and I at UNAMA have met with NATO planners on the ground, and we look forward to the creation of more ISAF-led PRTs. Also welcome is the intention of the United States to create a broader PRT presence in the south. The PRT concept has proved to be of value, particularly where they have focused their activities on improving security conditions.”
2004-01-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4893 (2004) · source
“The prominence at the Loya Jirga of leaders who continue to wield personal control over factional forces raises serious concerns in this regard and reminds us once again of the need for accelerated security sector reform, for DDR and for increased international security assistance. It is too early to draw lessons from the first two years of the Bonn process, but I firmly believe that one clear lesson relates to the difficulty of carrying out post-conflict transitional processes without equivalent and dedicated security assistance. Until Afghan security institutions are further built up, there will be a need in other parts of the country for the sort of assistance that the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has so ably given in Kabul.”
2004-01-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4893 (2004) · source
“Electoral teams must go to the voters, and each eligible and willing voter must be served directly at the village level. UNAMA and the interim electoral commission are planning to absorb into the Afghan Electoral Commission's secretariat staff from the constitutional secretariat. They may be better able to travel and work locally than international staff. However, if the process itself is targeted, then I am afraid that Afghan nationality may not be a sufficient source of protection. Furthermore, successful electoral exercise will require more than security for electoral staff; it will require an environment that allows for a fair political contest.”
2004-01-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4893 (2004) · source
“As the Secretary-General makes clear in his report, the deterioration in security continues at precisely the time when the peace process requires the Government and the United Nations to broaden their presence in the field, to complete the electoral registration and other activities, such as the census and ongoing reconstruction programmes. As the report further points out, throughout the constitutional process, the threat was mitigated by limiting exposure, by not holding new district level elections and by concentrating activities in urban centres protected by available security resources. However, recent attacks in urban areas are challenging that approach for the registration of voters. Naturally, the national electoral registration and, later, polling exercises cannot be conducted from behind a hardened compound wall.”
2004-01-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4893 (2004) · source
“The Government, along with UNAMA, United Nations agencies and international security forces, is working out integrated packages to improve district level governance, strengthen the formal and traditional justice system, increase the presence of police and reach out with focused reconstruction assistance to communities. These so-called "provincial strategies" will focus first on areas in the south and elsewhere suffering from insecurity, poor governance, marginalization for geographical or political reasons and a sense of isolation. There is also more that the Government can do to reach out to those individuals and groups that have not been part of the process so far but that are not responsible for criminal activities and are willing to participate peacefully in the rebuilding of their country.”
2004-01-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4893 (2004) · source
“The strong bonds of history, religion, and culture that unite Afghanistan and Pakistan are well known. Officials and common people alike, in both countries, are well aware that conflict and strife in one country will unfailingly and directly affect the other. The growing cooperation between the two countries against terrorists, criminals and other spoilers deserves to be recognized, encouraged and strongly supported. I should also note here that, in my View, much more can and should be done by the Government of Afghanistan to ensure that in the areas where the Taliban and other extremists are operating they do not gain from dissatisfactions in the population.”
2004-01-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4893 (2004) · source
“UNAMA will require further funding for these and other protective measures. The costly and intensive efforts by the United States and Pakistan to interdict extremist elements at the border deserve recognition. At the same time, there are also press reports, generally in the Pakistani press itself, relayed by the media worldwide, about "infiltration of terrorists" from Pakistan, and other reports claiming that Taliban leaders are moving more or less freely in and between cities in Pakistan. It is encouraging that Pakistani and Afghan authorities are now discussing these issues of concern in a positive and constructive manner. I believe it is Vital that the two countries continue to cooperate and take all possible measures to address this situation.”
2004-01-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4893 (2004) · source
“These attacks coincide with clear signals that extremist elements calling themselves Taliban or supporters of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar are reorganizing, issuing statements and trying to rally support against the peace process. For months now, these attacks have constricted the area of operations of the United Nations and the non-governmental organization community in the south, east and south- east. This has the effect of blocking reconstruction and development activities and limiting the presence of the Government in the affected areas. A number of measures have been taken in response. The United Nations Security Management Team has taken steps to minimize United Nations staff exposure to risk, including by increasing security measures at our compounds and reducing staff in high- risk areas.”
2004-01-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4893 (2004) · source
“In the period since I last briefed the Council, a number of serious attacks have occurred, including, last November, a car-bomb attack on the United Nations compound in Kandahar and the tragic and revolting murder in Ghazni of Bettina Goislard, a staff member of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. A bomb exploded against the external wall of a UNAMA guesthouse in Kabul mercifully produced no victims. And, on 6 January, another bomb in Kandahar, aimed at Afghan militia forces, killed and injured innocent children and civilians. The recent attacks and threats must be taken to confirm that the United Nations, as such, is now a target in Afghanistan.”
2004-01-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4893 (2004) · source
“It will be necessary to look at an increased incentive structure for mid- and senior level commanders, but I fear that without better cooperation from the faction leaders - who, let us remember, are Government officials - the problem of factionalized armed units will continue to bedevil the peace process. Having said that, the threat factional forces pose to the peace process has been increasingly compounded by the terrorist tactics of extremists aimed at causing the peace process to fail altogether. The pattern continues of challenging the central Government's authority and disrupting the peace process by attacking targets of opportunity, irrespective of their civilian status, be they Government, non-governmental organization, United Nations or ordinary citizens.”
2004-01-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4893 (2004) · source
“Involuntary disarmament may be contemplated if one has at one's disposal the forces necessary to compel cooperation. Voluntary disarmament, on the other hand, such as we are pursuing, requires fully cooperative partners. And, so far, cooperation has been measured, at best. With the experience of the pilot projects in Kunduz, Gardez, Mazar-I-Sharif and Kabul to draw upon, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) will be reviewing the DDR programme with its Government and international partners to see whether improvements might be made and acceleration of the process achieved.”
2004-01-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4893 (2004) · source
“As we have discussed before, the security institutions will need to be seen as truly national, rather than factionally dominated, if the national army, the national police and intelligence are to replace the factionalized forces that continue to dominate the landscape. Disbanding the factional structures will also depend on successful disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), and thus the disarmament and demobilization of the factions and the building of a national army and police are really part and parcel of one and the same effort. Now, I am afraid that the DDR programme has also not progressed far enough and this, too, is due in large measure to insufficient cooperation from key partners. There can be only two ways to conduct a DDR programme.”
2004-01-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4893 (2004) · source
“But I am sure these partners will not disagree that, two years into the Bonn process, we are not as far as we should be if the central Government is to assert its authority. Further gains could certainly be made if the effort to reform the national security institutions, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of the Interior and the intelligence services were to pick up pace as this, too, has been slower than required, in large measure because of limited cooperation in key parts of the Government. The appointment of a new top cadre of 22 Ministry of Defence officials, welcome as it was, is not enough reform to show for two years of trying. I believe the Afghan people expect more, and so should the international community.”
2004-01-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4893 (2004) · source
“Addressing them will also create the conditions for the success of the national electoral exercises, the legislative drafting processes and the other tasks that are more directly called for in the implementation of the Constitution. The programmes that make up the security sector reform initiative for Afghanistan are well known to this Council and they are updated in the report of the Secretary-General. Over the past two years of the Bonn process, the creation of a capable, unified and loyal national army and police has certainly shown progress, with the able and committed assistance of the United States and France on the army-building side, and Germany and the United States for the police.”
2004-01-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4893 (2004) · source
“Thus, if expectations have been raised, they are likely to focus on the needs that have been there since the start of the peace process and remain unmet: the disarmament of factional forces, the protection of the basic rights of every Afghan citizen, the demand for increased reconstruction, the reform of national institutions so that they are more professional and more representative, and reform, also, across the Government to ensure that all Afghans feel that it better represents them. These are the first major challenges in implementing the Constitution because they remain the challenges of the peace process as a whole.”
2004-01-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4893 (2004) · source
“From that perspective, the new constitutional order will have meaning for the average Afghan only if security improves and the rule of law is strengthened. And for too many Afghans, the daily insecurity they face comes not from resurgent extremism associated with the Taliban - destabilizing as that is - but from the predatory behaviour of local commanders and officials who nominally claim to represent the Government.”
2004-01-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4893 (2004) · source
“This is, of course, the challenge of any constitutional order. However, in Afghanistan, where State institutions remain weak, the capacity of the Government to fulfil the promises of the new Constitution requires a lot of hard work from the Afghans themselves and sustained international assistance. This is all the more pressing because the debate at the Loya Jirga has raised the expectations of Afghans that their Government and its international partners will now deliver on their promise of peace and stability. The fact that Afghans reached agreement on the new Constitution is a great accomplishment, but ultimately the test of each element of the Bonn process will be whether or not Afghanistan is moved forward towards what I have referred to previously before the Council as the irreversibility of peace.”
2004-01-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4893 (2004) · source
“They have proved that, despite the adversity they continue to face, a peaceful constitution-making process could be achieved. The fundamental law they have newly written should, if implemented, provide a solid foundation upon which to continue the task of addressing the real needs that face Afghans on a daily basis. There is so much to be done that, unfortunately, Afghans and their international partners cannot afford to rest long on the laurels of a successful Constitutional Loya Jirga. From the Loya Jirga itself a number of major tasks immediately present themselves. First is the task of implementing the Constitution to give life to it. At the closing ceremony of the Loya Jirga, I made the point that President Karzai, his Government and all Afghans will now have the challenge of making of the Constitution they adopted a living reality.”
2004-01-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4893 (2004) · source
“For example, the strong presidential system has been revised to give the National Assembly greater oversight over presidential appointments. Also, although Pashto is the language of the national anthem, the Constitution recognizes minority languages as official in the areas where they are the language of the local majority. This Constitution requires adherence to international instruments and mandates the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission to protect and promote human rights. Significantly, the political participation of women is greatly enhanced by the Constitution. At least 25 per cent of the seats of the lower house of Parliament will be reserved for women. I believe that the new Constitution and the process that achieved it should be a source of pride for the people of Afghanistan.”
2004-01-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4893 (2004) · source
“The Pashtun contingent represented a majority in the Loya Jirga and was particularly intent on redressing some of the perceived political disenfranchisement of the past two years. Its unity of purpose may well influence the remaining stages of the political transition. On other issues, there were complaints that Jihadi leaders used domineering tactics to push for their own agenda, but not with much success. As the Loya Jirga extended beyond its originally planned 10 days into a third week, there were real concerns that agreement might not be reached. In the end, the delegates proved willing to reach compromises and to make concessions in order to arrive at a text that all could accept, and the Constitution they ratified reflects this balancing of concerns.”
2004-01-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4893 (2004) · source
“Much of the Constitutional Loya Jirga unfolded before the country on live radio and television broadcasts, providing a type of public debate not seen in the country for many, many years. The Loya Jirga reached early consensus on some 120 of the 160 articles of the draft constitution, but it saw difficult debate and hard bargaining on a number of issues. Many of these were issues one would expect to be contentious in any constitutional process: the form of Government, the role of the courts in constitutional review and their relative power versus the executive and Parliament. Other issues were particular to the current Afghan context and were related to local and national identity, including various issues related to language. There were somewhat worrying but not unexpected signs of polarization along ethnic lines.”
2004-01-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4893 (2004) · source
“Security conditions had deteriorated since the Emergency Loya Jirga, and extremists had repeatedly threatened to disrupt the Loya Jirga process. Furthermore, with insufficient security sector reform and practically no disarmament done, factional leaders were left with leverage in the political contest. The elections also showed a resurgence of some of the factional groupings, with stronger showings than for the Emergency Loya Jirga. This has potential consequences for the forthcoming legislative elections. Jihadi parties organized themselves well in the North- East. Jumbish, a mainly Uzbek organization, took the lead in forming a block of votes from the North, while in Badghis and Herat, for example, the majority were Jamiat, the mainly Tajik party, and Ismael Khan supporters.”
2004-01-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4893 (2004) · source