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Churkin

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2006-05-16
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2017-02-02
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un-security-council

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  1. Mr. Churkin (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Colleagues are well aware of the fact that the Russian delegation is not a fan of the monthly wrap-up sessions. There is too much reiteration of well-known positions and too many attempts to glorify approaches that are not objective ones. For example, today a number of statements contained a one-sided interpretation of certain issues relating to the situation in Syria. In November, some members of the Council, at the earlier experts stage, blocked work on a proposed presidential statement by the Russian delegation on the danger ofthe potential use by terrorists of chemical weapons in Syria and in Iraq. If Damascus is always going to be blamed for everything, that means giving a free hand to the terrorists; this is something that we should be quite clear about.

    2014-11-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7325 (2014) · source

  2. We categorically oppose arbitrary, expansive interpretations of the Security Council sanctions regime. Unfortunately, there has been a number of attempts via unilateral restrictions to circumvent the Security Council. We believe that such actions only undermine the system of international relations and torpedo political and diplomatic efforts in the quest to resolve crisis situations. Moreover, such actions are often of an extraterritorial nature, violating the sovereignty of third States and their lawful interests, in particular with regard to foreign trade. The Russian Federation stands ready to participate in the collective task ofimproving the sanctions regime. However, such an undertaking will have added value only if certain well known States abandon the futile practice of unilateral restrictions.

    2014-11-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7323 (2014) · source

  3. The Secretariat has nothing to do with issues relating to the implementation and development of relevant recommendations. If Member States require any kind of assistance in implementing a given sanctions regime, they are fully entitled to directly address the relevant sanctions committee with regard to necessary clarifications and assistance. That is all the more true inasmuch as each sanctions regime is, by its very nature, unique and specific. In discussing the issue of sanctions, we should not overlook other important issues, such as the illegitimacy of unilateral sanctions or the fact that it is unacceptable to use existing Security Council sanctions to arbitrarily intensify or develop restrictive measures at the national or regional levels.

    2014-11-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7323 (2014) · source

  4. Moreover, what we detect in such initiatives is not simply the danger of creating excessive red tape but an attempt to consolidate the approaches of a narrow group of States with regard to the issue of sanctions, as well as to infringe on the exclusive prerogatives of the Security Council itself with respect to sanctions. Nevertheless, in the spirit of constructive discussion of ways to improve the effectiveness of sanctions. we might explore the underutilized mechanism of the Informal Working Group on General Issues of Sanctions, whose work, in its day, made a significant contribution to improving the work of the relevant Council committees. We firmly believe that the issue of sanctions falls within the purview and exclusive competence of the United Nations Member States.

    2014-11-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7323 (2014) · source

  5. We do not share that concern. There may be some problems, but they are not of a systemic nature, as some would like us to believe, including the apologists who would like to tighten the so-called sanctions screw. Instead, they are linked to an absence of good will on the part of certain Member States with respect to fulfilling their obligations under the decisions of the Council. We look favourably on all rational proposals concerning ways to optimize the practices for upholding Security Council sanctions, but we believe that it would be unwise and harmful to periodically toss around ideas, especially those not supported by convincing arguments, regarding the creation of additional bureaucratic barriers, whether inter-State or at the level of the Secretariat.

    2014-11-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7323 (2014) · source

  6. We should not create a situation in which sanctions cause unacceptable suffering for civilians, especially the most vulnerable, when they effectively turn into an instrument for human rights violations. Sanctions must be targeted and calibrated. In that regard, we believe that any sanctions decisions of the Council should necessarily be open to periodic adjustment, suspension or lifting in the light of the humanitarian situation and of whether those targeted have responded to the Security Council's demands. They must be able to see a light at the end of the tunnel. Lately, there has been much talk of the need to improve the effectiveness of the mechanism of the Security Council's restrictive measures and to strengthen the capacities of Member States with respect to their implementation, which has allegedly been inconsistent.

    2014-11-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7323 (2014) · source

  7. They should not be allowed to be a mechanism for collective punishment affecting the well-being of the population of a given country, and undermining the legitimate interests of third countries. Given all the possible negative consequences of sanctions, their introduction should be a last resort to be taken only in cases Where all other methods of political persuasion have been exhausted, and when the Security Council determines the presence of a genuine threat to international peace and security. Both at the preparation stages and in the implementation of sanctions, it is critical to make an objective assessment of the socioeconomic and humanitarian impact of the measures introduced.

    2014-11-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7323 (2014) · source

  8. Mr. Churkin (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Under-Secretary-General Feltman and INTERPOL Secretary General Mr. Stock for their interesting briefings. For our part, we would like to note the following. Sanctions are one of the most important instruments at the disposal of the international community in the interests of resolving crisis situations. Moreover, in introducing them it is the exclusive prerogative of the Security Council to identify clear and precise objectives, as defined by the Charter of the United Nations. In taking an appropriate decision, the Security Council needs to take into account that sanctions must be proportionate to the threats to international peace and security. Theimpositionofsanctions,especiallycomprehensive ones, is a very harsh and a double-edged measure.

    2014-11-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7323 (2014) · source

  9. Mr. Zagaynov (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Given the lateness of the hour, I shall make only a brief comment. Some delegations in today's meeting have made inappropriate allusions to, and interpretations of, matters that have nothing to do with the topic under consideration. We believe that this distracts members from the Council's discussion of the dangerous threat posed by terrorism and from the options for collectively countering it, which is our subject today. We suggest that the Security Council be used not for sharing random ideas but for participating in constructive discussions on agenda items.

    2014-11-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7316 (2014) · source

  10. We welcome the role of CTED in providing assistance to the Counter-Terrorism Committee and commend the Directorate's swift preparation of a preliminary analysis of the gaps in the implementation of resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005) that make it harder for States to combat the threat of foreign terrorist fighters. We believe that the central focus of CTED under its updated mandate should remain to provide support to the CTC, monitoring the implementation of the previously mentioned resolutions and coordinating the provision of technical assistance to Member States.

    2014-11-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7316 (2014) · source

  11. In that regard, we would like to reiterate that resolution 2178 (2014) sets out a commitment for airlines to provide passenger name records only in cases where individuals under sanction by the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011), concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, have sought to leave or enter countries. Therefore, the instruction to the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) contained in today's presidential statement to prepare for the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) an overall report on measures to monitor the movement of air passengers and on the preparation of the relevant recommendations, without tying it to a specific Security Council sanctions list, breaches the terms of resolution 2178 (2014).

    2014-11-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7316 (2014) · source

  12. In that regard, we regret that our delegation's proposed draft presidential statement on chemical weapons in Syria was effectively blocked by a number of delegations, which sought to amend it for one purpose alone - to shift all the focus on issues related to the chemical demilitarization of Syria. The text in question was also omitted from the presidential statement adopted today. We stress that shielding terrorists at a time when they are becoming increasingly proficient at synthesizing, producing and using substances for military purposes is unacceptable and very dangerous. In the light of the new tasks assigned to the Security Council's counter-terrorism bodies, the need for the subsidiary organs of the Council and its expert groups to comply in their work with existing procedures takes on particular importance.

    2014-11-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7316 (2014) · source

  13. We are also troubled by reports of ISIL's seizure of humanitarian assistance earmarked for needy Syrians. We must prevent situations in which humanitarian assistance is distributed under the black flag of the Islamic State, which strengthens its authority in territory under its control. Another worrisome issue is the growing battle capabilities of the terrorists, above all ISIL. They already have access to chemical weapons of mass destruction. There is much eyewitness testimony of their use by terrorist militants in Iraq and Syria. There is a genuine danger that they may gain access to the Libyan and Iraqi chemical arsenals. We believe that the Council must take a decisive stand on this issue and make it clear that the use of chemical weapons by whomsoever will carry consequences.

    2014-11-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7316 (2014) · source

  14. Objectively, they merely complicate the living conditions of people living in those regions. Oil tankers go about their business; makeshift pipelines are up and running; and shady dealers and middle-men are helping get crude oil onto the black market. The Security Council's requirements of Member States, as set out in resolution 2170 (2014) seem to have gone unheeded - a situation that requires the Council's focused attention. In that context, we cannot help but note that in April 2013 the European Union partially lifted the series of restrictions imposed on Syria and authorized the purchase of Syrian oil by non-State traders. In so doing, it indirectly facilitated the financial strengthening of ISIL and the Al-Nusra Front, which control the oil fields in north-eastern Syria. Brussels should acknowledge that.

    2014-11-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7316 (2014) · source

  15. It is vital that States pursue their efforts under the auspices of the United Nations system's work in those areas. Presidential statement S/PRST/2014/23, adopted today, points us in the right direction. Another cause for concern is terrorist income, one of the most important sources of which is the illegal trade in Syrian and Iraqi oil. In Syria, jihadists are exploiting as many as 10 oil fields. ISIL is producing almost 30,000 barrels a day. In Iraq, that terrorist organization controls 14 oil fields and is exporting up to 50,000- 60,000 barrels a day. Terrorists' total daily income from the oil trade is approaching $3 million. Moreover, air strikes on the oil facilities seized by the terrorists in Iraq and Syria have barely made a dent in the level of illegal sales.

    2014-11-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7316 (2014) · source

  16. Leniency towards the activities of extremist groups has jeopardized the future of entire States, as is clear in the examples of Iraq, Syria and Libya. Lebanon, Yemen, Mali and the Central African Republic are also on the firing line. Terrorist activities on the Afghanistan- Pakistan border continue to be linked to Al-Qaida, as stated in the reports of the Monitoring Teams of the Committees established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) and resolution 1267 (1999). In that regard, we support focusing the efforts of the Security Council on combating the radicalization that fuels terrorism, the replication of terrorist ideology and violent extremism, and the use of the media and the Internet for terrorist purposes, and on banning incitement towards terrorism and countering the appeal of terrorist activities.

    2014-11-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7316 (2014) · source

  17. We believe that such double standards are unacceptable in the fight against terrorism. The report published recently by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, created by the Human Rights Council, explicitly notes that weapons and support provided from abroad to so-called moderate armed groups in Syria have time and again fallen into the hands of more radical elements, including ISIL. Extremists have enjoyed foreign financing, including through charitable organizations and private individuals. The document paints an appalling picture of the current consequences of such short-sighted - to put it mildly - activities, especially for civilians, including women and children.

    2014-11-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7316 (2014) · source

  18. Two months, following the adoption of resolution 2178 (2014), aimed at cutting off the oxygen for all activities of foreign terrorist fighters, the Council has once again been compelled to focus on the problem of terrorism - a threat that is not going away. Posing a threat to all regions of the world, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the Al-Nusra Front (ANF) and other terrorist groups have long been active in the Middle East. They have acquired additional capacities for their criminal activities due to the weakening of State institutions, courtesy of foreign intervention in no small measure, and to the support of various foreign sponsors. Moreover, so long as the ISIL and ANF extremists were fighting Government forces in Syria, certain States did not seem especially bothered.

    2014-11-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7316 (2014) · source

  19. Mr. Churkin (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): I welcome you to the presidency of the Security Council, Madam. We thank the Secretary- General for his comprehensive statement and the Permanent Representatives of Australia and Lithuania for their briefings on the efforts of the Committees they lead in undertaking the tasks mandated by recent decisions of the Council. We continue to believe that the activities of those entities are an important contribution to strengthening the central coordinating role of the United Nations and the Security Council in international counter-terrorism cooperation.

    2014-11-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7316 (2014) · source

  20. Instead of piling on its shrill rebukes of the Republika Srpska, the international presence should give greater attention to the growing threat of militant Islam in the country and to problem of radical Islamist fighters leaving Bosnia and Herzegovina for the Islamic State and other terrorist organizations active in Iraq and Syria. In that context, we welcome the efforts of Sarajevo to strengthen the criminal responsibility of fighters, illegal armed formations abroad and their accomplices. Following the end of the destructive armed conflict in 1995, Bosnia and Herzegovina was able to achieve concrete results towards a settlement. That is why the decisive vector of the peace process should remain the transfer of responsibility for what takes place in the country to the Bosnians themselves.

    2014-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7308 (2014) · source

  21. There is no need to seek artificial reasons to preserve the mechanism. On the contrary, we should work towards its timely conclusion. We note once again that the standard criticism of the leadership of the Republika Srpska repeated in the reports of the High Representative is unwarranted, destructive and harmful. The continuous accusations levelled against Bosnian Serbs and Croats, undermining the Dayton foundations of the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, add further tension to relations among the Bosnian sides and interferes with their dialogue.

    2014-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7308 (2014) · source

  22. In the post-conflict settlement process in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the finalization of the implementation of the 5+2 agenda remains of priority importance. We deem it unacceptable to infuse it with new concepts related to the integration of the country into the European Union and NATO. The High Representative must definitively and finally reject the use of his emergency Bonn powers. Like other problems that remain unresolved within the framework of the 5+2 agenda, issues of fundamental importance to the future of the country must be resolved by the Bosnians themselves through inclusive dialogue and on the basis of the consent of the three peoples of the State. We are convinced that the potential of external oversight of the situation by the mechanism of the High Representative has exhausted itself.

    2014-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7308 (2014) · source

  23. We agree that the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina remains stable. October's elections were democratic and recognized as successful. They again reaffirmed the ability of local parties to resolve their issues without relying on the international protectorate. We deem it important that the process of forming new bodies of authority in the country should take place without external interference, first and foremost that of the High Representative. In the post-electoral period, the international community should prioritize efforts to promote the development of inclusive inter-Bosnian dialogue and the search by both sides for mutually acceptable options for socioeconomic and structural reform, in keeping with the Dayton mechanisms and principles.

    2014-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7308 (2014) · source

  24. Mr. Churkin (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We welcome the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mr. Valentin Inzko, who has briefed us today. To paint an objective picture of developments in the Bosnia and Herzegovina process, we recommend that the members of the Security Council carefully familiarize themselves with the twentieth report of the Republika Srpska to the Secretary-General and the Security Council, in which the commitment of Bosnian Serbs to international law and the spirit of Dayton is clear. We sympathize with the leadership and population of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which in May and August experienced catastrophic flooding. Russia backed international efforts to alleviate the consequences, and our Ministry of Emergency Situations sent substantive volumes of humanitarian shipments to both entities.

    2014-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7308 (2014) · source

  25. At the same time, I would like to emphasize that the Russian Federation supports maintaining the Dayton Peace Agreement and strengthening the role of the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council and is against the destruction of their foundations.

    2014-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7307 (2014) · source

  26. Besides that, a number of the country's major political leaders believe, not without foundation, that a decision on NATO membership can be taken only through a national referendum. Nor should we ignore the overall improvement of the regional security situation, which, in particular, will enable the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, at its forthcoming meeting in Basel, to transfer the review under article IV of annex 1B of the Dayton Agreement to the Balkan countries themselves. Against that backdrop, yet another wordy resolution on Althea seems an anachronism.

    2014-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7307 (2014) · source

  27. Such a far-reaching decision cannot be imposed from outside. It should be the result of the sovereign choice and free will of all three peoples that make up the country, the more so because, as we all know full well, there is no consensus on the issue of Euro-Atlantic integration in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We do not have to look far to find unfortunate examples of external pressure for a European perspective. We should also recall that according to the final statements of the Steering Committee on Bosnia and Herzegovina, almost none of the European Union's priority requirements seen as conditions for applying for candidate status have been met, that is, they have not been approved in a country-wide consensus.

    2014-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7307 (2014) · source

  28. Mr. Churkin (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): The Russian Federation was obliged to abstain from voting because the draft resolution did not take into account the substantive criticisms we expressed during the consultations. We recognize the importance of continuing the work of Operation Althea of the European Union led- peacekeeping force in providing security for Bosnia and Herzegovina in the context of implementing the Dayton Peace Agreement. At the same time, however, we are against maintaining an international presence in the sphere of security that could be viewed as a tool for accelerating the country's integration into the European Union and NATO. Using a resolution of the Security Council based on Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to push Bosnia and Herzegovina in that direction is unacceptable.

    2014-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7307 (2014) · source

  29. As for the many civilian casualties as a result ofNATO airstrikes, which breached the terms of resolution 1973 (2011) and was not in line with its goals, the ICC Prosecutor continues to distance herself from consideration of this issue, for unknown reasons. We would like to hear clarification in that regard, if there is in fact an explanation for this. We call for all instances of the use of disproportionate or indiscriminate force during the conflict that resulted in civilian victims to be investigated, without any exception. In conclusion, we are forced to note that the experience of referrals to the ICC related to Libya cannot be considered a success to date, neither in terms ofprovidingjustice nor in terms of assisting the process of national reconciliation.

    2014-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7306 (2014) · source

  30. Crucial to strengthening the authority of the Court is its ability to impartially carry out investigations into the acts committed by all parties to the conflict, including in Libya. There has still been no significant progress in that regard. As we have already noted, there is sufficient information on the crimes allegedly committed by representatives of the Al-Qadhafi regime as well by insurgents. However, judging by the report, no real steps have been taken against the insurgents. There is no information on specific actions by the ICC with regard to the ongoing practices of torture and ill- treatment in Libyan detention centres. There is unfortunately no news on the fate of the 30,000 Touaregs.

    2014-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7306 (2014) · source

  31. We support efforts aimed at bringing to justice those who committed serious crimes during the events in Libya since 2011. We hope to see progress in the work of the ICC in this matter, however we see little sign for optimism in that regard. On 24 July, the ICC Appeals Chamber took a decision confirming the conclusion of the lower court that Libya was able independently to carry out an investigation into the Abdullah Al-Senussi case. Although we do not question its competence on these issues, we still find no material justification for such an approach in the light of the entirely contradictory decision in the SaifAl-Islam Al-Qadhafi case and the aforementioned assessment of the ICC Prosecutor with regard to the situation in the country.

    2014-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7306 (2014) · source

  32. Mr. Churkin (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We have taken note of the eighth report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) on its investigation of the situation in Libya, and we thank Ms. Bensouda for her presentation of the report. We cannot help but be concerned about the information in the report on the continuing violence in Libya and the complex displaced-persons situation. The report details unlawful arrests and detentions, the torture of prisoners and abductions and murders of civilians. Lawyers and judges working on internal Libyan trials concerning former associates ofMuammar Al-Qadhafi continue to be persecuted, and flagrantly unjust decisions have been handed down, including cases where the death penalty has been imposed.

    2014-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7306 (2014) · source

  33. We expect specific actions for the voluntary implementation of the Minsk agreement from the Ukrainian authorities, Western partners and the OSCE. Today there is an opportunity to use the 2 November elections, not for a reckless and unjustified exacerbation of the confrontation, but rather to move things along in a constructive way with a mutually respectful dialogue and a search for compromise on the basis of a balance of legal interests of all Ukrainian parties, as required by the document signed in the framework of the Minsk process.

    2014-10-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7294 (2014) · source

  34. The Russian side firmly calls for such a turn of events to be averted and for everything possible to be done to ensure that the elections of 2 November are a step towards the further normalization of the situation and a comprehensive settlement of the internal Ukrainian crisis. We recall that, before the beginning of the Minsk process, the militia leaders publicly stated their negotiating positions, which in part stressed that the conduct of free elections on those territories, based on the principles of national self-governance, would pave the way for joint efforts to retain a united, economic, cultural and political space in Ukraine. Russia will help to ensure that the winner in the elections for leader of the south-east adheres to that line.

    2014-10-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7294 (2014) · source

  35. Attempts to impose artificial ultimatums and reduce the whole package of the Minsk agreement due to just one aspect, such as the date of the elections, or to use the conduct of either side as a criterion could undermine the entire process of peaceful resolution, making it hostage to certain geopolitical ambitions. We cannot rule out the possibility that those who put forward such ultimatums are seeking to undermine the Minsk agreement, just as the agreement of 21 February was undermined, and creating a pretext to settle the conflict in south-eastern Ukraine by force.

    2014-10-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7294 (2014) · source

  36. Against this backdrop, the position of the militias regarding the holding of elections, in particular those of 2 June, is justified and fully in line with the Minsk agreement and its provisional timelines. There is an urgent need for a full-fledged governing body in south- eastern Ukraine to resolve practical issues relating to daily life and law enforcement. Efforts to resolve the situation in south-eastern Ukraine are being undertaken in the most difficult and unfavourable conditions. It is important now to do our utmost to support the tenuous ceasefire, the onset of the economic and humanitarian rebuilding of the region and the launch of sustainable political dialogue.

    2014-10-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7294 (2014) · source

  37. The statement issued by the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine concerning the refusal to carry out the law signed by President Poroshenko on 16 October is not constructive. There have been constant violations by Kyiv of the Minsk agreement on other matters as well. Shelling continues of areas controlled by the militias, in violation of the ceasefire. Promised acts of amnesty and security guarantees for militia negotiators have not been enacted. The provisions on the decentralization of power and the continuation of the national dialogue are not respected. The Kyiv authorities have totally undermined the improving humanitarian situation in the Donbas and placed artificial obstacles in the way of humanitarian convoys from Russia.

    2014-10-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7294 (2014) · source

  38. The law signed by President Poroshenko on 16 October regarding the so-called territories and their special autonomy, establishing 7 December as the date of the elections, runs counter to the Minsk agreement. The date of 7 December was included in the law arbitrarily and unilaterally, without any discussion with the militias. Moreover, that law cannot be applied in practice, as it does not define the specific regions of its coverage. This issue must remain pending until an additional decision is taken by the Verkhovna Rada. Such a decision cannot be made because Kyiv withdrew its signature to the document defining the boundaries between the Ukrainian forces and the militias.

    2014-10-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7294 (2014) · source

  39. We have, unfortunately, heard similar attempts made in certain statements to rewrite the agreement reached between the Kyiv authorities and the representatives of the south-east. These statements distort the idea behind the Minsk agreement and paint the intentions of the people in the south-east to hold elections on 2 November in a disingenuous light. We have heard similar statements in Kyiv and some Western capitals. This requires us to make an important corresponding clarification. In line with the Minsk agreement achieved in September between representatives of the President of Ukraine and representatives of the militias in the south-east, with the participation of Russia and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) , it was agreed to hold such elections between 19 October and 3 November.

    2014-10-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7294 (2014) · source

  40. Mr. Churkin (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): I could not resist the pleasure of taking the floor one more time under your presidency, Madam President. The representative of France just said that all members of the Council have called for the full implementation of the Minsk agreement on Ukraine. We should have liked that to be the case, but unfortunately it is not because when the Minsk agreement was made, the Russian delegation swiftly proposed the adoption of a statement to the press in support of it. However, we came up against attempts by a number of delegations to rewrite the Minsk agreement. They proposed amendments to the simple and brief statement in support of the agreement that would have rewritten the content of the agreement. The Council therefore did not take a stance in support of Minsk agreement.

    2014-10-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7294 (2014) · source

  41. Due in large part to the unwavering efforts of the Argentine chairmanship in overcoming attempts at obstruction made by other Council members, the Working Group agreed upon an item initiated two years earlier, namely, a note by the President concerning statements made in the Council. It is our hope that the activities of the Working Group to strengthen transparency and democracy in the Council will continue. Some relevant initiatives remain on the table, including on the topic of conducting Arria Formula meetings and procedures for preparing the Council's annual report to the General Assembly. In conclusion, I wish every success to the Australian delegation in harmoniously guiding the Council in the month of November.

    2014-10-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7294 (2014) · source

  42. We note the meeting on the working methods of the Security Council (see S/PV.7285), which is traditionally a matter of great interest to the broader United Nations membership. It makes perfect sense that it was convened by the Argentine presidency, as Argentina heads the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions. Indeed, in the past month the Working Group continued its active work. For our part, we actively participate in those endeavours, consistently call for increased transparency in the Council's working methods, and encourage the implementation of useful initiatives.

    2014-10-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7294 (2014) · source

  43. The meeting on the situation in Ukraine (see S/PV.7287) underscored that it is only through inclusive, nationwide dialogue based on the Minsk protocol, the Minsk memorandum and the Geneva document of 17 April that the fractured Ukrainian society will overcome the far-reaching internal crisis and return to sustainable harmonious development in the interests of all political, regional and ethnic groups. Today, Ukraine is navigating a most crucial period that will require careful and balanced action and the Ukrainian sides to continue the political dialogue. In that regard, we call on all internal and outside actors to refrain from ill-considered, much less provocative declarations or activities.

    2014-10-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7294 (2014) · source

  44. We are encouraged by the first briefing of the Security Council by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, Mr. Staffan de Mistura, and by his assessments of the situation. We shall provide firm support to his efforts to move forward a political settlement to the Syrian crisis. Africa remained in our focus this month. On 24 October (see S/PV.7286), the Security Council adopted the comprehensive resolution 2182 (2014) on the situation in Somalia and Eritrea. In spite of its significant shortcomings, which made it hard for us to support it, we hope that the resolution will help facilitate peace in the Horn of Africa.

    2014-10-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7294 (2014) · source

  45. Their sustainable solution will be possible only through inclusive dialogue, without intervention or the imposition of ready-made solutions from the outside. Unfortunately, there is no reason for optimism in the Middle East peace process. The situation in Yemen remains volatile. Iraq and Libya have reached a boiling point. As a result of blatant outside interference in Syria and irresponsible pandering to the armed opposition, a new regional threat has arisen in the form of the Islamic State ofIraq and the Sham, which has even more global ambitions. The zone of risk now includes United Nations peacekeepers serving the region for decades. All ofthis demonstrates the danger not only to Syria but to the entire Middle East of pursuing the reckless destruction of the foundations of society and governance.

    2014-10-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7294 (2014) · source

  46. Mr. Churkin (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): The activities of the Security Council in October have been marked by high intensity and productivity, to a great extent thanks to the initiatives and effective work of the Argentine presidency. I congratulate Ambassador Perceval and the entire delegation of Argentina on their success. The Security Council continued to closely follow the developments in the Middle East and North Africa. The situation there continues to be marked by high volatility, and its stabilization will be impossible without achieving a political and diplomatic settlement of the regional crises. That applies to new crises as well as to those that have dragged on for decades.

    2014-10-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7294 (2014) · source

  47. A necessary precondition for success in achieving that is strengthening the authority of a unified Palestinian leadership structure, one which controls the whole territory of a Palestinian State, including the Gaza Strip. We also hold out the hope for a rapid resumption of full-fledged Palestinian- Israeli negotiations on a final status for the Palestinian territories. We stand ready to work actively with the protagonists, both in bilateral and multilateral formats, to advance the cause of achieving a fair and long-term peace in the region.

    2014-10-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7291 (2014) · source

  48. Its attempts to more actively involve itself in resolving the Palestinian problem to a large extent are very important for the region, but are blocked as a result of the actions of a single delegation. It behooves us to recognize that the pooling of efforts goes beyond even the Middle East Quartet itself. Therefore, we have long urged involvement in this work by the League of Arab States. At the current stage, we champion the continuation in Cairo of indirect contacts between Israeli and Palestinian representatives, with an active role being played by Egypt, to achieve agreements on the long-term settlement of the situation concerning Gaza.

    2014-10-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7291 (2014) · source

  49. The situation on the ground continues to deteriorate, and obstacles on that path remain just as numerous. Attempts at discrete negotiations on the sidelines with American mediations repeatedly fail. Against that backdrop, the Security Council could play a much more substantive role in terms of assisting the sides and implementing its previous decisions. There are a great many options in this situation. We have the Security Council mission to the Middle East, something that the Palestinian and other Arab delegations asked us to do three years ago. The same applies to the adoption of a draft resolution that would spell out the parametres for a cessation of the occupation and a timeline, proposed by Palestine. We also hope that the Council will be able to break out of the impasse.

    2014-10-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7291 (2014) · source

  50. This problem is one that impacts and touches the feelings of millions of believers throughout the world, and it must be resolved within the framework of the cluster of issues related to the definitive status of the Palestinian territories. It is one thing to remember that resolution 478 (1980) states that measures aimed at altering the make-up of Jerusalem are null and void and must be rescinded. Attempts to impose a fait accompli through facts on the ground, along with the imposition of unilateral decisions, undermine the prospects for a settlement on the basis of the two-State concept. The occupation of Palestinian territories must cease. The Quartet road map set out a time frame of two years to achieve that, providing for a definitive settlement of the conflict by 2005. We stand now on the threshold of the year 2015.

    2014-10-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7291 (2014) · source