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Churkin

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3,923
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2006-05-16
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2017-02-02
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un-security-council

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  1. That appointment, the presence of unidentified armed groups and military equipment, and the inabaility of the power structures of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea to effectively control the situation on the territory of the Republic have led to disorder and the use of firearms." I will now quote the statement issued today by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Russia. "On the night of 1 March, unknown armed people sent from Kiev attempted to storm the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. As a result of those perfidious provocations, there were casualties. The decisive action of self-defence groups prevented the attempt to overrun the Ministry. These developments confirm the aspirations of certain well-known political circles in Kiev to destabilize the situation on the peninsula.

    2014-03-01 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7124 (2014) · source

  2. That has created great concern in the eastern part of the country, especially in the Republic of Crimea. In those circumstances, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Crimea, Mr. Aksyonov, made a statement that was referenced today by Mr. Eliasson, in which he said: "In spite of the agreement that was reached with the central authorities concerning the inadmissibility of the appointment of leaders of power structures without the consent of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, in violation of the norms of the Constitution of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the Ukrainian laws governing the police, yesterday, 28 February, Mr. Igor Avrutsky was appointed chief of the local Crimean militia.

    2014-03-01 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7124 (2014) · source

  3. This was not the result of a political coalition or process. One opposition leader sought to assert himself, claimed victory and tried to impose his will on the people. I would not venture to estimate their numbers, but there are a number of political groups whose membership includes radical extremists working in the field of Ukrainian security. What has occurred over the past few days, which is the reason for our meeting today? A very difficult situation has arisen in Crimea and the eastern part of Ukraine in recent days. There has been a lot of concern, and in Crimea in particular. People have come in from Kiev with the clear intention of repeating what they have done in Kiev and in the western Ukraine by replacing the regional governments.

    2014-03-01 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7124 (2014) · source

  4. Under the agreement, a national unity Government was to be formed within 10 days, constitutional reforms were to be undertaken, a new constitution was to be adopted, and presidential elections were to be held by December 2014. The opposition and its leaders pledged not use force. They were to surrender their weapons to whomever was supposed to keep them. Why was that agreement not implemented? Why were threats aimed at President Yanukovych that resulted in his having to leave Kiev? Why, with all the traumatic changes that have taken place, was the first action of the Ukrainian Parliament and its new membership a decision to change the law on language, which accorded Ukrainian minority communities - not only Russians but others as well - the right to use their own languages? Why was that decision taken the very first day?

    2014-03-01 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7124 (2014) · source

  5. Why do those armed militants need to throw Molotov cocktails at the police? Why are they going after the police? Have we heard any censure of these activities from the Western supporters of democracy in Ukraine? We, for one, have heard not one word from any of the many institutions that promote democracy. It is therefore unclear why they even exist, if they do not react to such manifestations. As a result of the emergence of the crisis, an agreement between President Yanukovych and the opposition was signed on 21 February. It contained the signatures of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Germany, France and Poland. It was a very important agreement. At a later stage, it would have provided an opportunity to defuse the crisis.

    2014-03-01 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7124 (2014) · source

  6. Yatsenyuk, was offered the post of Prime Minister. Why did he not accept that proposal? Why continue to escalate the situation? Mr. Yatsenyuk could have formed a Government. If he had wanted to sign an association agreement with the European Union, he could have - and then he would have been responsible for the catastrophic economic consequences for the country if he had done so. Moreover, there will be presidential elections in Ukraine in 2015, and if the people do not like President Yanukovych's position, they can elect another President. That has happened before. Mr. Yanukovych lost an election and other Presidents were elected in Ukraine. Why continue to whip up the situation? Why are some of our Western colleagues trying to prolong the confrontation? Why are they bringing armed militants into the streets?

    2014-03-01 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7124 (2014) · source

  7. This raises a question: Why did that problem need to result in street demonstrations? Why do those street demonstrations need to be encouraged from abroad by members of the European Union? Why did the representatives of several countries of the European Union need to appear at those meetings, which were ignited by protests against a decision taken by the Ukrainian leadership? Why did some officials need to talk about stirring up the public and opposition leaders? Why did there have to be such crude interventions in the internal affairs of a sovereign State? There is another question that must be asked. I do not want to condone the actions of President Yanukovych during the crisis in reaction to the protests. Many things could be said in that regard, but I will just reiterate the facts. A leader of the opposition, Mr.

    2014-03-01 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7124 (2014) · source

  8. In particular, it needed to decide whether to join or Sign an association agreement with the European Union. That is a complex decision. One of the mistakes made the Ukrainian leadership was perhaps its last-minute recognition that this association agreement could have significant economic consequences for Ukraine. In such conditions, the Ukrainian leader, President Yanukovych, took a completely constitutional decision that was fully in line with the prerogatives of the Head of any State, namely, to refrain from signing an association agreement with the European Union. That did not mean, as many have said, that there was a complete repudiation of a European orientation; he simply had to weigh the circumstances that had arisen at that time. Therefore, I repeat, his decision was fully within the prerogatives of the Ukrainian leadership.

    2014-03-01 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7124 (2014) · source

  9. Unfortunately, I must note that my Ukrainian colleague did not choose to follow that advice, and what I heard in his statement was a number of terms characterizing the situation in Ukraine and the actions of the Russian Federation to which we cannot agree at all. We are discussing a crisis that should not have taken place. There was no objective reason whatsoever for it to happen. There was and remains our fraternal country of Ukraine, our neighbour. If we talk about this in terms of the situation last autumn, it has a democratically and legally elected President, Mr. Yanukovych. He undertakes his functions on basis of the parliamentary majority in a democratically elected Parliament. His country is certainly dealing with serious economic challenges, and the leadership of Ukraine had serious decisions to make.

    2014-03-01 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7124 (2014) · source

  10. Mr. Churkin (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): At the outset, I would like to express my sympathy to you, Madam President, because under your presidency we have just wasted two hours discussing the format for this meeting. We agreed that only three people would speak in an open format: Mr. Eliasson, my Ukrainian colleague Mr. Sergeyev, and the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation. As I understand it, some of my Security Council colleagues already intend to depart from that agreement, but what can we do when there is a game without rules? I would like to thank Mr. Eliasson for his briefing and I support his conclusion that, in the current situation, cool heads must prevail.

    2014-03-01 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7124 (2014) · source

  11. We call on all parties in the crisis in Ukraine to show maximum responsibility, not allow any further deterioration in the situation, return the situation to the legal track and crack down on the activities of all extremists.

    2014-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7117 (2014) · source

  12. We must note that we see no concern, in the position of several of our Western partners, for the fate of Ukraine, but rather a unilateral geopolitical agenda. We hear no principled condemnation of the acts of extremists, including of neo-Nazi and anti-Semitic manifestations. Furthermore, whether deliberately or not, such actions are being further encouraged. We get the lasting impression that the 21 February agreement, with the tacit consent of its foreign sponsors, is being used as a smokescreen for promoting forced regime change in Ukraine by creating facts on the ground, without any kind of wish to seek out a common Ukrainian consensus that is in the interest of national reconciliation. We are particularly concerned by attempts to get international structures, including the United Nations Secretariat, to support that line of reasoning.

    2014-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7117 (2014) · source

  13. There have been calls for a virtual ban on the Russian language, the impeachment of leaders, the dissolution of parties and organizations, the closing of certain unwelcome media stations and the lifting of restrictions on neo-Nazi propaganda. There is a policy of muzzling dissidents in various regions of Ukraine through dictatorial and sometimes terrorist methods. There are now threats being made against Orthodox shrines. National radicals continue to vandalize memorials in various cities in Ukraine and, in some European capitals, their supporters have been vandalizing memorials to Soviet troops. Such events are undermining the 21 February agreement. They discredit its initiators and guarantors and pose a threat to civil peace, the stability of society and civil security.

    2014-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7117 (2014) · source

  14. It is clear that, for the success of that reform, all political forces in Ukraine from all regions of the country must take part, and its results should be put to a referendum. We believe in the need to fully reflect the concerns of deputies from the eastern and southern parts of Ukraine, Crimea and Sevastopol, which were presented at the meeting in Krakow, Poland, on 22 February. We are particularly concerned about the legitimacy of the actions being taken by the Ukrainian Supreme Rada. Basing their actions merely on simple revolutionary expediency, they are issuing so-called decisions and laws there, including some geared towards infringing on the humanitarian rights of Russian and other national minorities living in Ukraine.

    2014-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7117 (2014) · source

  15. The 21 February agreement is not being implemented, despite the fact that its signing was witnessed by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Germany, Poland and France. The United States, the European Union and other international organizations welcomed that document. The rioting militants have not been disarmed. They refuse to leave the streets of the city, which they are effectively in control of, or to leave administrative buildings. Their acts of violence continue. We are surprised that a number of European politicians have already been quick to state that presidential elections will be held in Ukraine in May, although the 21 February agreement provides that elections should take place only after the conclusion of constitutional reform.

    2014-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7117 (2014) · source

  16. The OSCE Chairperson-in-Office spoke approvingly of the 21 February agreement, which was signed by a number of representatives, such as the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Germany, Poland and France, and allegedly by the representative of the Russian Federation. I would like to make it clear that the Russian representative to the talks on that agreement did not sign it. There were misgivings that the 21 February agreement would serve only as a smokescreen for subsequent unconstitutional action, and that is indeed what transpired. I would now like to share with the participants in today's Security Council meeting a bit of the text of the statement released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation with regard to the situation in Ukraine. The Russian Federation is seriously concerned by developments in Ukraine.

    2014-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7117 (2014) · source

  17. Moreover, United Nations-OSCE cooperation does not cover a large number of important problems where there is significant room for increased cooperation, including ensuring the rights of children, which is an area in which the United Nations has extensive experience. Another such area is protecting traditional values, which is a subject under consideration by the Human Rights Council. The situation in Ukraine was mentioned in the briefing by the Chairperson-in-Office and in a number of other statements we heard today, but it is still not clear how violent, non-constitutional regime change in that country is consistent with OSCE principles, or indeed the rule of law, which is such a fashionable subject to speak about in the Council.

    2014-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7117 (2014) · source

  18. We note the prospects for cooperation on a relatively new track for the OSCE, namely, developing confidence-building measures and using information and communications technologies, where the Vienna- based organization complements global United Nations efforts in the area of international information security. At the same time, we are alarmed by attempts to introduce into OSCE practice monitoring mechanisms similar to those set up at the United Nations and to implement, through the OSCE, non-consensual documents of the General Assembly and the Human Rights Council. We are concerned about the intention of some countries to incorporate concepts derived from resolution 1325 (2000) into the work of the OSCE, despite the absence of armed conflict in its territory.

    2014-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7117 (2014) · source

  19. The priority areas for cooperation are well known: combating drug trafficking and the illegal trade in small arms and light weapons, cooperation on implementing resolution 1540 (2004) and fighting terrorism, organized crime, corruption, money laundering, human trafficking and illegal migration. It is clear that the added value of the OSCE lies also in its ability to tackle humanitarian issues, including combating human trafficking and illegal migration and encouraging tolerance and inter-civilizational dialogue. It can also help to combat xenophobia and discrimination, in particular in terms of ensuring the rights of national, religious and language minorities, which, as we know, is a particularly serious problem in a number of European countries.

    2014-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7117 (2014) · source

  20. In our view, the greatest potential is for cooperation on combating transnational threats, international terrorism, organized crime and illegal drug trafficking. We note the high level of practical interaction between the OSCE secretariat's transnational threats department and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Their joint initiatives are yielding concrete results. In our view, at the heart of the cooperation in that area should be efforts to combine the comparative advantages of each organization, namely, the regional format of the OSCE and the global capacities of the United Nations, thereby avoiding duplication and wasting resources, in particular in regions where both organizations are very active. That is the case, for example, in Central Asia.

    2014-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7117 (2014) · source

  21. As part of the "Helsinki+40" process, in particular with a view to ensuring the development of European cooperation and security principles and to adapting the OSCE to the challenges of the twenty-first century, we reaffirm our readiness to consider the possibility of organizing an OSCE summit in 2015, if substantial results in those areas are achieved. We support developing the interaction between the United Nations and the OSCE on the basis of the 2006 declaration on cooperation. We believe that the OSCE, bearing in mind the coordinating role of the United Nations, can make a significant contribution to international efforts to ensure peace and security in its area of responsibility.

    2014-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7117 (2014) · source

  22. We note the willingness of the Chairperson-in- Office to take into account Russian priorities and approaches, including combating transnational threats such as terrorism and drug trafficking, protecting the rights of national minorities, supporting traditional values and combating neo-Nazism and extremism, as well as OSCE reform, including rationalizing the election monitoring work carried out by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. In the context of providing regional stability and removing existing dividing lines, we think that the OSCE could be called upon to harmonize integration processes in Western and Eastern Europe and to ensure freedom of movement, including the streamlining of visa regimes, particularly as the OSCE was originally established to remove such dividing lines.

    2014-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7117 (2014) · source

  23. The OSCE complements the work of the United Nations and facilitates the implementation of mechanisms agreed at the global level in its area of regional responsibility and as part of its mandate. Russia intends to cooperate constructively with the Swiss Chairperson-in-Office, who, we trust, will implement a balanced course in the interests of all Member States. In general, we support the Chairperson-in-Office's three priorities for 2014, namely, strengthening security and stability, improving people's lives and reinforcing the capacities of the OSCE. The programme of work in those three OSCE dimensions appears to be balanced, covering the military, political, economic, environmental and humanitarian spheres.

    2014-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7117 (2014) · source

  24. Mr. Churkin (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We are pleased to welcome the President of Switzerland to the Security Council in his capacity as Chairperson-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). We thank him for his comprehensive briefing. The Russian Federation has consistently supported developing and improving cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional mechanisms on the basis of the Charter of the United Nations, in particular Chapter VIII. Cooperation between the United Nations and the OSCE should be rest on that same foundation. Cooperation between the two organizations is regular and multilateral in nature. It covers all aspects of security, as well as cross-dimensional issues.

    2014-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7117 (2014) · source

  25. A central element of the resolution is its strong anti-terrorism component, which is in line with the June 2013 declaration adopted by the Group of Eight Heads of State and Government meeting at Lough Erne. It calls on all Syrian sides to break with terrorists. In that regard, we underscore the need for the opposition groups not only to assume their responsibilities but to support the fight against terrorism in Syria in order to eradicate the problem and to work together with the Government to overcome that challenge. We believe that the Security Council should swiftly proceed to discuss a further draft document on countering terrorist activities in Syria.

    2014-02-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7116 (2014) · source

  26. We believe that an improvement in the humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic, just as a solution to the problems that are causing the ongoing and bloody conflict in the country, will be possible only through a comprehensive political settlement. That is possible by ensuring sustainable progress in negotiations among the Syrian parties based on the Geneva communique of 30 June 2012 (S/2012/522, annex). That document is based on the understanding that decisions on fundamental matters of developing the Syrian State will be taken by the Syrian people themselves, based on mutual consent. Only decisions taken in such a way can be viable and lead to the settlement of the conflict in the country, which has already suffered so much.

    2014-02-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7116 (2014) · source

  27. We believe that humanitarian workers will adhere to those rules and the Secretary-General will bear this in mind in his reports to the Security Council. We trust that Syrian authorities and the opposition will implement the resolution appropriately by freeing besieged areas and so-called remote regions. The Security Council, irrespective of the progress achieved by this resolution and its implementation by all sides, can consider further steps. However, we would like to underscore that the resolution does not provide for an automatic imposition of sanctions - the Security Council would not have allowed that. The resolution once again draws attention to the fact that, given the lack of a political settlement, the humanitarian situation will continue to deteriorate.

    2014-02-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7116 (2014) · source

  28. Similar activities by the opposition to undermine humanitarian operations must be swiftly and firmly condemned by all members of the international community. We believe that the resolution appropriately assesses such actions, and the appropriate signals will reach those who are sabotaging humanitarian efforts in Syria. The resolution adopted today focuses on the need to provide humanitarian access based on a mutual, unpoliticized and impartial approach and in line with the guiding principles of the United Nations in the area of providing humanitarian assistance. That fully applies to the provisions of the resolution regarding the provision of humanitarian assistance across front lines and the borders of neighbouring countries.

    2014-02-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7116 (2014) · source

  29. Vaccination campaigns against polio have been successfully carried out throughout the country, reaching over 3.4 million children. Despite the difficult conditions on the ground, areas that are difficult to access in Aleppo, Idlib, Homs, Hama and Dayr Al-Zour and Raqqa have received more than 51 convoys. Work is under way to normalize the humanitarian situation in the Palestinian Al-Yarmouk camp. However, the armed rebels in Syria are continuing to plunder convoys, kill humanitarian workers and attack civilian facilities, using civilians as human shields and carrying out terrorist attacks. There is still no way to provide assistance to the besieged areas of Nubul and Zahra, besieged by the rebels, in Aleppo, Fuah and Kifarya in the Idlib governorate, Adra in the suburbs of Damascus, and the northeast province of Hasakah.

    2014-02-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7116 (2014) · source

  30. Progress is being made on the reconstruction of the infrastructure in all the population centres mentioned, and soon there are going to be functioning medical centres and schools. Progress in improving the difficult situation for civilians has shown the value of effective humanitarian operations and of providing support with the coordinated action of all participating parties. That experience needs to be expanded to other areas of Syria as well. There need to be agreements on localized ceasefires, access for humanitarian supplies and the exchange of prisoners. There have also been other advances. An air bridge to provide humanitarian access to Qamishli has been organized. Humanitarian terminals have been opened.

    2014-02-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7116 (2014) · source

  31. In order to achieve that, all parties must cooperate with international humanitarian agencies. Those agencies, in coordination with the Syrian authorities and with the active assistance of the Russian Federation, are carrying out difficult, painstaking work in very difficult conflict conditions. That work has seen positive and concrete results, although not as quickly as we would have liked. There has been a gradual opening up of the population centres. Recent examples include the southern suburbs of Damascus - Yalda, Babila, Bayt Sahm and Aqraba - where until very recently, residents were firing weapons against soldiers. They are now patrolling with them and pooling their efforts to combat banditry and terrorism. The established ceasefire in Barzeh and Moadamiya is important. Thousands of civilians have returned home.

    2014-02-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7116 (2014) · source

  32. Mr. Churkin (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): The Security Council decided relatively recently to consider the humanitarian situation in Syria, and only after it became clear that attempts to use the deterioration of the humanitarian situation to effect regime change were unsuccessful. The Russian Federation supported the resolution just adopted (resolution 2139 (2014)) because, in the process of negotiating its text, many Russian considerations were taken into account, and the resulting document was thus of a balanced nature. The main aim of international efforts concerning the humanitarian crisis in Syria, including today's resolution, is to improve the situation in Syria and facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance to the population in need.

    2014-02-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7116 (2014) · source

  33. We hope that that position will be consistently maintained in practice, without any threat of sanctions or competition to promote the European values of external actors with regard to who should be the ministers in a future Ukrainian Government. We also believe that the European Union could share its experience with regard to how one should respond to street protests. In conclusion, I would like to underscore that, despite the increasing need for effective mechanisms for the division of labour between the United Nations and regional organizations, including the European Union, the primary role of the Security Council in maintaining international peace and security remains unshakeable. That is enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and cannot be reviewed.

    2014-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7112 (2014) · source

  34. Given that resolution 1244 (1999) remains fully valid, those powers, in international legal terms, remain within the competence of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo and cannot be transferred to a third party, particularly a self- proclaimed Pristina structure. The Serbian leadership holds a similar view, as stated in the Chamber as recently as 10 February (see S/PV.7108) by the Prime Minister of Serbia. In that connection, we are concerned about the mention of plans to reconfigure or even draw down EULEX. Ms. Ashton recently touched on the Ukrainian issue. We share the view that a solution to the crisis must be found by the Ukrainians themselves.

    2014-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7112 (2014) · source

  35. Lifting those sanctions would truly help to alleviate the suffering of the Syrian people. In general, imposing unilateral sanctions without Security Council authorization is counterproductive. Recognizing the importance of European Union efforts to establish dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina, we would like to underscore that any arrangements between the two sides should be reached by the parties themselves without any pressure and without undermining the United Nations role. Resolution 1244 (1999) remains fully in force and is the internationally legally recognized basis for a settlement in Kosovo. With Security Council approval, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo has transferred to the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) a number of powers that it cannot support.

    2014-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7112 (2014) · source

  36. We share the approach of the European Union to finding a settlement in the Middle East, and we support reaching an acceptable final status agreement for Palestinians and Israelis on the internationally recognized basis of the Security Council resolutions, the Madrid principles, the road map and the Arab Peace Initiative. We intend to continue to constructively cooperate with Brussels, within the Middle East Quartet, in fully supporting the peace process by involving with the parties to the conflict and regional actors. We acknowledge European Union efforts to provide humanitarian assistance to the internally displaced persons and refugees in Syria, but the positive effect is largely being eroded by its unilateral sanctions on that country, which only further exacerbate the already difficult humanitarian situation there.

    2014-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7112 (2014) · source

  37. That is integral to the authority of the Security Council, on the basis of which our European Union partners so successfully and resolutely managed to gain approval for its operation in the Central African Republic prior to the African-led mission's being deployed. We will not conceal the fact that we were somewhat surprised by reports that, to date, there is still no clarity as to exactly which countries will provide peacekeepers and that most of those countries may not be members of the European Union. We are concerned that that may have an impact on the management of the European Union operation in an already chaotic situation in the Central African Republic.

    2014-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7112 (2014) · source

  38. The conclusion of such a document would not only help to strengthen the capacity for security cooperation between Russia and the European Union but also significantly contribute to stepping up joint capacities for crisis prevention and management. We support the call of the Secretary-General to strengthen international efforts to find a settlement to the situation in the Central African Republic. In that context, we trust that Brussels will pay due attention to the recommendation that the EU should scale up its peacekeeping presence in the Central African Republic, including by accelerating the deployment of its mission to that country.

    2014-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7112 (2014) · source

  39. That will help to remove some of the most difficult concerns about Tehran's nuclear activities and to ensure that Iran can exercise all its rights as a State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, including its right to enrich uranium. With regard to crisis management, the European Union and its members should strictly abide by the decisions ofthe Security Council. On that basis, Russia remains open to establishing practical cooperation with the European Union on crisis settlement. We continue to be interested in developing a bilateral cooperation agreement on the basis of the equal rights of both sides in that area.

    2014-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7112 (2014) · source

  40. Objectively speaking, one can say that the European Union is one of the key political and economic actors on the international stage and contributes to strengthening multilateralism, with the United Nations playing the leading role in combating new threats and challenges, guarding against the impact of natural disasters and eradicating poverty. We note the efforts of the European Union to find a peaceful settlement to the situation surrounding the Iranian nuclear programme. We are convinced that, through joint constructive efforts, we can ensure that the initial steps stemming from the Geneva arrangements will continue to be successfully implemented, together with the joint plan of action of the 5+1 group, dated 24 November 2013.

    2014-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7112 (2014) · source

  41. Mr. Churkin (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We are pleased to welcome you, Mr. Minister, as President of the Security Council. The briefings by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of the European Union to the Security Council have become a good tradition. We would like to express our gratitude to Ms. Ashton for today's briefing. The Russian Federation has consistently advocated the development and strengthening of United Nations cooperation with regional and subregional organizations. That cooperation must be based on the firm foundation of the Charter of the United Nations, in particular Chapter VIII. On that basis, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 65/276, of May 2011, there should be cooperation arrangements between the United Nations and the European Union (EU).

    2014-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7112 (2014) · source

  42. To Member States, it is clear that further radicalization, both in the Western Balkans and in the European Union, is inevitable in that regard.

    2014-02-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7108 (2014) · source

  43. We await the end of the EULEX investigation into allegations of illegal organ harvesting, identified by the Council of Europe Special Rapporteur Dick Marty, and the beginning oftrials. All those found guilty of serious crimes must be brought to justice. Proceedings must be carried out objectively and impartially, and should not be guided by dubious criteria of political expediency. We are also seriously toubled by reports of the participation of Kosovo Albanians in the Syrian armed conflict in the ranks of Al-Qaida affiliated terrorist groups, such as Jabhat Al-Nusra and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. Sadly, such facts have not been condemned by religious and political leaders in the province. We call on them to consider the serious consequences that could arise once the militants return to the territory of Kosovo.

    2014-02-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7108 (2014) · source

  44. Such a situation reflectes the inabilitiy of the international structures, above all the Kosovo security forces and the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), to effectively counter provocative actions by the Kosovo Albanians. We are seriously concerned by the signs coming from Pristina with regard to the drawdown of EULEX activities as early as June. The Mission was deployed with the consent of the Security Council. With that approval, it received several mandates from UNMIK that the European Union Mission was unable to cope with unilaterally. As resolution 1244 (1999) remains fully in effect, those powers are assigned to UNMIK under international law and cannot be transferred to a third party, particularly not to Pristina's self-declared institutions.

    2014-02-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7108 (2014) · source

  45. Chaloka Beyani, with regard to the continued discrimination against minorities on ethnic grounds: high unemployment, restrictions in education and problems recovering property stolen by the Kosovo Albanians. Such a situation has also been confirmed by the representatives of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and by the Kosovo Ombudsperson. People are afraid to go to Kosovo because of ethnically motivated threats ofviolence and the absence of security guarantees and protection of their rights by the local authorities. Sadly, there has been a trend of attacks by Kosovars on Serb worshippers travelling to Kosovo for Christmas.

    2014-02-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7108 (2014) · source

  46. The creation of an effective structure duly representing the interest of Kosovo Serbs is important in terms of ensuring security for the Serb community and maintaining stability in Kosovo as a whole. In that regard, the Kosovo Albanian authorities and the international presence should strengthen efforts to develop interethnic dialogue and build an atmosphere of trust. Without that, any talk of the multiethnic nature of Kosovo society seems unrealistic. The plight of the Serb minority in Kosovo remains disturbing. There has been no progress in efforts to return internally displaced persons. In that regard, we note the conclusions of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons, Mr.

    2014-02-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7108 (2014) · source

  47. No one is entitled to hinder the implementation of its mandate. We condemn the attempts to undermine the role of UMIK, including those that took place during the November and December 2013 municipal elections. We call on UNMIK to fully and proactively carry out its mandate, and to focus, inter alia, on tackling challenges in such important areas as the rule of law, the protection of the rights of ethnic and religious minorities, forging intercommunity dialogue and the protection of orthodox shrines and cultural buildings. We note the intensification ofdialogue at the highest political level between Belgrade and Pristina. Priority has been given to issues linked to the establishment of a community of Serb municipalities in Kosovo and to clarifying their authorities.

    2014-02-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7108 (2014) · source

  48. Mr. Churkin (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We welcome the participation in today's meeting ofthe Serbian Prime Minister, Mr. Ivica Dacie. We share his views. We took note of the statement by Mr. Thaci. We are grateful to Mr. Zarif for introducing the Secretary-General's report on the activities of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) (S/2014/68) and for his assessment of the situation in the province. Russia's position on Kosovo remains consistent. We support Serbia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. We believe that resolution 1244 (1999) remains fully in effect and is still the universally binding, international legal basis for a settlement of the Kosovo issue. The United Nations Mission is the main international presence in the province.

    2014-02-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7108 (2014) · source

  49. Mr. Pankin (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): The statement made today by the representative of Georgia was most unfortunate. Such attacks on my country call into question the solidity of the current Georgian leadership and its desire to normalize relations with Russia. If we desire stable peace, as has been said today by a number of delegations, we must recognize the new geopolitical realities in the Caucasus and the emergence of the two sovereign, independent States of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. They must be engaged in dialogue on equal footing in order to ensure stability and prosperity in the region.

    2014-01-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7105 (2014) · source

  50. Despite the great complexity of today's international relations, we are witnessing encouraging progress in some areas. I am talking about the first agreement reached between the P-5 plus one and Iran regarding the latter's nuclear programme, the decision to destroy the Syrian chemical arsenal and the convening - at the initiative of the Russian Federation and the United States - of a conference to settle the devastating conflict in Syria. Those undertakings must be successfully and fully implemented. Such efforts would mark an important step towards a permanent peace, which will be secured only through more hard work by the international community, building on the existing potential for cooperation.

    2014-01-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7105 (2014) · source