YouSaid · the spoken record

Del Ponte

lines on the record: 252
first: 1999-11-10
most recent: 2007-12-10
sittings or episodes: 13
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“Ms. Del Ponte: It is an honour to be given the opportunity to report once more to the Council. Appearing before the Council is an important duty and a good opportunity to report on the completion strategy. This time, however, I believe it is essential to also seek fresh guidance on fundamental issues of the completion strategy - namely, a strong message is needed from the Council in relation to the fugitives, especially Karadzic and Mladic. And that message should be that their trial can begin in The Hague at any time until 2010, and a mechanism will be established for them to be tried in The Hague after that date. Since my last assessment, in June, my Office has been working productively with the Chambers to speed up trials, while trying to maintain the highest standards of fair trial and due process.”
2006-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5594 (2006) · source
“Since no one else seems to have the political will to locate and arrest Karadzic and Mladic, I will have no choice but to seek from the Security Council the powers to arrest fugitives wherever they are and to allocate to my Office the resources necessary for that. Ultimately, I do not see any other way for the ICTY to fulfil its mandate and satisfy the victims' legitimate expectations of the United Nations.”
2006-06-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5453 (2006) · source
“Very recently there have been some indications that UNMIK is willing to take a more constructive attitude in its relations with my Office. In my last report I explained at length why Karadzic and Mladic are still at large more than 10 years after they were first indicted. My assessment remains the same today. Serbia has to do much more to arrest and transfer Ratko Mladic. The arrest of Radovan Karadzic is a shared responsibility of Serbia, Republika Srpska, NATO and the European Union-led peacekeeping force (EUFOR). It is pathetic that today nobody is actively searching for Karadzic. The planned downsizing of EUFOR will further aggravate the situation.”
2006-06-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5453 (2006) · source
“Djordjevic is accused of very serious crimes committed by Serbian forces in Kosovo. The long and unexplained delays in the transfer of Zelenovic, who has been detained in Russia since August 2005, do not allow for optimism regarding the future of the ICTY's cooperation with the Russian Federation. It is also worrying that a sister organization of the Tribunal, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), refuses to cooperate fully with the Tribunal. These days, my Office has more difficulties gaining access to documents belonging to UNMIK than it does gaining access to documents in any other place in the former Yugoslavia. Furthermore, UNMIK's leadership is encouraging a climate that deters witnesses from talking to my investigators when it comes to the Albanian perpetrators.”
2006-06-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5453 (2006) · source
“Now that a new team is in place, the search for Karadzic must rapidly intensify. My office has maintained a positive working relationship with Montenegro for over a year, and I expect that cooperation to continue at full speed. Part of Karadzic's family is living in Montenegro, and he can count on numerous supporters there. I am particularly disappointed about the lack of movement regarding another important fugitive, Vlastimir Djordjevic. The investigation carried out by the Russian authorities, as they told us, has failed to produce results. That will have negative implications for the completion strategy, because if Djordjevic is not surrendered within the next weeks it will be impossible to try him together with his six co-accused. Resources will therefore have to be wasted in a separate trial.”
2006-06-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5453 (2006) · source
“There is serious political and administrative resistance within the system, and strong political will is needed to overcome those obstacles. On the basis of the facts in my possession, I cannot be convinced that Serbia is ready to arrest Mladic. For a number of reasons, the authorities may still prefer to force him to surrender voluntarily. Republika Srpska, within Bosnia and Herzegovina, also has to substantially increase its efforts to locate and arrest fugitives. While it is unclear whether Radovan Karadzic still sometimes resides in or travels through Republika Srpska, it is certain that part of his network and part of his family remain there. In the reporting period, the cooperation provided by Republika Srpska to my Office has somewhat decreased, because of political reasons and the reshuffling of police personnel.”
2006-06-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5453 (2006) · source
“In our cooperation with Belgrade, we have not managed so far to achieve the level of trust and transparency that we have achieved with other countries. I will continue to engage the Serbian Government in the months to come, trying to establish more confidence and better communication. As for the other aspects of the cooperation with Belgrade, a mission was sent in the second half of May to test the new arrangement agreed upon with the Government of Serbia and Montenegro regarding access to archives. That has been a long-standing problem. The first accounts that I have received from my staff are encouraging. To sum up, the cooperation provided by Serbia to the ICTY has been and remains very difficult and frustrating.”
2006-06-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5453 (2006) · source
“Since the beginning of this year, it seems that further actions have been undertaken. In particular, his support network has been targeted and several of his supporters arrested. These actions have sometimes been spectacular; they fed many news articles, but they lacked the necessary discretion that would have permitted the acquisition of information leading to Mladic. The most blatant dysfunction is the total lack of cooperation between the military and the civilian authorities. The inconsistencies that I could identify in the various reports provided to me came as another surprise and forced me to suspect that some of the information contained in those reports had been doctored for political reasons.”
2006-06-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5453 (2006) · source
“The fact that Mladic was an active officer of the army of Yugoslavia until May 2002 - a year and a half after the fall of Milosevic and seven years after he had been indicted - adds to Belgrade's responsibility for its failure to deliver the former General. Over the past 12 months, the Serbian authorities have repeatedly promised that Mladic would be delivered soon. I was told regularly by Serbian officials that the circle was closing in around him. At the end of April, in View of Serbia's failure to achieve the promised results, I reassessed the whole operation and found out that it had been suffering from grave defects. During 2005 there was no real attempt to locate and arrest Mladic; time was wasted in trying to encourage him to surrender voluntarily.”
2006-06-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5453 (2006) · source
“I want to stress again before the Council that impunity for these two most serious architects of the crimes committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, both of whom are accused of genocide, would represent a terrible, terrible blow not only to the Tribunal and its success or failure, but to the future of international justice as a whole. Serbia has the main responsibility to locate, arrest and transfer all six fugitives. According to my information, Mladic, Tolimir, Hadzic and Zupljanin are in Serbia. Furthermore, there are established leads connecting Serbia to Karadzic, whose location is unknown, and to Djordjevic, who is still believed to be in Russia.”
2006-06-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5453 (2006) · source
“Doing either would mean that I would be presenting only half the picture of the serious crimes that took place in Srebrenica. How can I justify presenting only half the picture of the brutal crimes that took place in the former Yugoslavia? Those are choices that, as a Prosecutor who is also representing the victims, I am not ready to make. It would introduce an unacceptable disparity in the treatment of the persons accused by the Tribunal. There must be no justice a la carte. Speeding up the proceedings is a top priority of my Office; obtaining the arrest and transfer of the remaining indictees at large is another. It has been said a thousand times that it is inconceivable that the ICTY could close its doors with Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic at large.”
2006-06-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5453 (2006) · source
“My mandate, given by the Security Council, is to prosecute the most senior officials, that is to say persons who were most often far removed from the crime scenes and whose responsibility can be established only by examining a number of different crimes, often in different geographical areas. Removing one or several counts artificially may seriously undermine the prosecution case. It eventually leads to impunity for certain crimes and does not do justice to the victims, who are already puzzled by the completion strategy. Allow me to cite an example: Srebrenica. Which counts should I eliminate - those referring to the killings of over 7,000 men and boys, or those relating to the forcible transfer of 25,000 women, children and elderly people?”
2006-06-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5453 (2006) · source
“In view of the checks and balances contained in the Statute, and particularly the duties and responsibilities of the Prosecutor under the Statute, such directions by the Chambers can be interpreted only as purely advisory in nature. Only the Security Council has the power to modify the ICTY Statute, which guarantees the independence of the Prosecutor and assigns to her the responsibility of determining which charges to bring in a prosecution. I am continuously reviewing our cases, and I will not hesitate to cut counts when there are clear judicial reasons for doing so. It is, however, impossible to arbitrarily cut and slice cases which are complex by their very nature.”
2006-06-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5453 (2006) · source
“I have also taken the lead in promoting the efficient use of time at trial. For example, in the Prlic case, the prosecution has put forward a 10-point plan to streamline the trial, within the time limit set by the President of the Trial Chamber, for the prosecution and defence, respectively, to present their cases and undertake cross-examination. That plan was accepted by the Trial Chamber, and its implementation will have serious positive effects. During the judges' plenary on 30 May, an amendment to the rules was unfortunately adopted that would allow a Trial Chamber to direct the Prosecutor to cut counts in an indictment.”
2006-06-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5453 (2006) · source
“For instance, it is important that a decision be rendered very soon on a motion regarding the disclosure of materials in electronic or hard copy that I filed in the Seselj case over two years ago. I have also proposed that a much more dynamic approach be taken on adjudicated facts. Such facts have been proven in previous trials, and the Chambers have the power to decide that they must not be proven again in a given trial. The instrument of adjudicated facts is therefore a key tool to reduce the scope of the trials. For instance, the prosecution has proven an international armed conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina no less than five times, wasting months and months on proving the same facts, sometimes with the same witnesses, in case after case. We will have to prove it again, for the sixth time, in the ongoing Prlic trial.”
2006-06-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5453 (2006) · source
“There are no other cases at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) that could be transferred to the region, as, according to the criteria set by the Council, they all concern the most senior leaders responsible for the most serious crimes. Thirdly, I have been working with the judges in taking all possible measures to ensure that the Tribunal's own process is as efficient as possible. I have put forward packages of reforms that, if implemented, would significantly accelerate the pre- trial and trial proceedings. Given the seriousness of the cases at the ICTY, it is essential to urgently improve pre-trial management, so that issues are narrowed before the trials start and trials can focus on truly contested matters. Decisions on key issues must be made long before the beginning of a trial.”
2006-06-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5453 (2006) · source
“Later this year, a consolidated trial, with nine accused charged with crimes committed in Srebrenica, will start, as will another, with six leading political and military figures indicted for crimes committed by Serb forces in Kosovo. My second initiative has been to propose the transfer of cases involving mid- and lower-level perpetrators. That undertaking was met with strong opposition from some victims' groups. However, my assessment of the local judiciaries is that they are now capable of trying such cases. I have thus filed 13 motions, beginning in September 2004, requesting the transfer of cases to the domestic jurisdictions of the former Yugoslavia.”
2006-06-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5453 (2006) · source
“Ms. Del Ponte: Thank you very much, Madam President, for having given me the opportunity to provide the Council with my assessment of the progress made in the completion strategy and to highlight the problems that we continue to face. A written assessment has already been delivered; I intend to focus on the main issues. A number of steps were taken internally to increase the efficiency of the Tribunal while maintaining the highest standards expected from an international court created by the United Nations. In this regard, I have proposed the joining of cases with a similar crime base. I have filed four motions for that purpose, three of which have been accepted by the Chambers. One trial with six accused has already begun.”
2006-06-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5453 (2006) · source
“For much of that time, the cats have chosen to wear blindfolds, to claw at each other and to allow the mice to run from one hole to another. It is time now for the cats to remove their blindfolds. It is time for the international community and the local governments, especially in Serbia and Montenegro and Republika Srpska, to take concerted action to find the places where those fugitives are hiding, to arrest them and to turn them over to the ICTY, so that it can administer the justice that the Security Council promised the people of the former Yugoslavia in 1993. It is time now for the cats to stop suffering the ridicule of the mice.”
2005-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5328 (2005) · source
“After the operation was launched, we received well over 100 reports from various Croatian agencies which were, for the most part, of a good professional quality. Those reports were reviewed in The Hague and suggestions were made so as to direct further action. The mix of political will and operational effectiveness leads to results. In conclusion, for 10 years we have been facing grave systemic deficiencies in the efforts made to capture Karadzic and Mladic. There is no coordination mechanism; there is not even a desire to coordinate the various activities, to say nothing about sharing the most basic information. For 10 years the international community has been playing cat-and-mouse with Karadzic and Mladic.”
2005-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5328 (2005) · source
“After the European Union postponed, in March this year, the beginning of accession talks with Croatia, the authorities drew up, together with the ICTY, an operational plan, and its implementation started in April. The operation was coordinated on the Croatian side by a very limited number of highly motivated, highly professional individuals under the leadership of the State Prosecutor, who had received proper, strong backing from the political leadership. They were entitled to instruct all relevant services. A solid relationship of trust, based on full transparency, was established with my Office. Only a small number of individuals from my Office were involved - first and foremost the Chief of my Investigation Division.”
2005-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5328 (2005) · source
“The successful outcome of that operation shows that the methodology was correct. That can serve as a model to help us to overcome the difficulties facing us in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Serbia and Montenegro. The key to success was a combination of international incentives, provided mainly by the European Union's consistent policy of conditioning European Union accession upon full cooperation with the ICTY, and an effective joint operational plan between Croatia and the ICTY. The United States also provided valuable support by insisting that Croatia could not join NATO before Gotovina was at The Hague. With the exception of Spain, since the end of September there has been no involvement by outside actors.”
2005-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5328 (2005) · source
“On 29 September, the Croatian authorities provided me with indisputable evidence that Ante Gotovina was in Spain. Croatia established immediate contact with the Spanish authorities, and we quickly learned that he was in the Canary Islands. I had told the Council in June that Croatia would be considered to be cooperating fully if either Gotovina was in The Hague or if Croatia provided me with actionable intelligence on his whereabouts. Since the latter condition had been met, on 3 October I was pleased to inform the European Union Task Force for Croatia that, indeed, Croatia was fully cooperating with us. For operational reasons, however, details were limited to a small circle in Zagreb, Spain and The Hague. As all Council members know, Gotovina was arrested on the island of Tenerife on 7 December.”
2005-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5328 (2005) · source
“The size of the investigation division has been reduced by 37 per cent, or 79 posts. Furthermore, in the context of the 2006-2007 budget, the redeployment of 15 posts from the investigation division to the prosecution division and the appeals section has been proposed. I wish to express my thanks to the Governments of Croatia and of Spain for having brought Ante Gotovina to The Hague. My gratitude also goes to the European Union and its member States for having provided the ICTY with the political support that contributed so much to that result. Gotovina's arrest will also be positive for the completion strategy. I will request the Chambers to join his case with those of Cerrnak and Markac, two other former Croatian generals who are currently on provisional release. We will save a substantial amount of court time and resources.”
2005-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5328 (2005) · source
“One motion involving seven accused, including Djordjevic, who is, unfortunately, still at large in Russia, was approved by the Chambers. Another motion involving nine accused, including Tolimir, who is at large in Serbia, was also approved by the Chambers. Both trials are scheduled to begin towards the middle of 2006. Thirdly, we have taken steps to adapt the structure and management of the Office to the evolution of the completion strategy. Next year, 2006, will be the busiest period in the Tribunal's history. We expect to have some 33 accused on trial, as compared with 2005, when 12 were on trial. Despite that increased activity, significant reductions in staff were made in the Office of the Prosecutor following the conclusion of the first phase of the completion strategy.”
2005-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5328 (2005) · source
“First, we have continued to pursue consistently our policy of referring cases involving mid- and low- level perpetrators to domestic jurisdictions. Three cases involving four accused have already been transferred to the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to Croatia. Six other motions involving 12 accused are pending before the Chambers. We are also preparing for the transfer of non-indicted cases to Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. It will be up to the local judiciaries to decide whether to complete the investigations and prosecute the cases. Secondly, we have undertaken to save time and resources by proposing to the Chambers that they join certain cases where there are similar crime bases.”
2005-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5328 (2005) · source
“In the Limaj case, several witnesses eventually refused to appear and testify in front of the court, or withdrew or changed their testimony because they were intimidated or afraid. The arrest of the remaining six fugitives and access to key documents and witnesses are issues deeply affecting the completion strategy. They are largely beyond our control, even though my Office continues to use all means at its disposal to try to make progress towards their arrest. We are confronted with powerful structures that see no interest in cooperating with the ICTY. Among the issues which are under the control of the ICTY, let me mention three areas where significant progress has been achieved since my last report.”
2005-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5328 (2005) · source
“From whom did they obtain them, if not from those who refuse to provide them to us? In Kosovo, too, my Office encounters difficulties in accessing documents from the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). They are at times redacted or delivered in such a way that they cannot be used in court. The cooperation provided by UNMIK in the protection of witnesses has also been sometimes less than optimal. Furthermore, my Office is not convinced that UNMIK is properly exerting its control over the conditions set by the Chambers for Haradinaj 's provisional release. Indeed, as was also noted by Ambassador Kai Eide in his recent report, the intimidation of witnesses is a grave problem in Kosovo. It is widespread and systematic and has a very serious impact on court proceedings at the ICTY.”
2005-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5328 (2005) · source
“However, on other issues - such as access to military documents, for instance, Mladic's military and medical files, or documents related to Kosovo - the military authorities of Serbia and Montenegro obstruct cooperation with my Office, despite the admirable efforts of the National Cooperation Council's President and the assurances given to me by the civilian authorities. I would note that, on my recent visit to Belgrade, the authorities again gave assurances that we would be given full access to those materials, but it remains to be seen if those assurances will be honoured. However, in view of the authorities' unwillingness thus far to provide me with those materials, I have requested the Chamber to issue binding orders. The irony is that some of the materials are sometimes produced by defence witnesses in the Milosevic case.”
2005-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5328 (2005) · source
“Moreover, there is a lack of coordination between the State Union authorities and the two Republics' Governments, and the rivalry between the involved agencies is palpable. The information passed to my Office is scarce and unconvincing. The army of Serbia and Montenegro continues to hamper, both actively and passively, the cooperation of Serbia and Montenegro with the ICTY. Serbian civilian authorities admit today that the army as an institution was protecting Ratko Mladic until as late as at least May 2002. They contend that that is not the case anymore.”
2005-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5328 (2005) · source
“That assessment reflects the situation regarding Karadzic, Mladic and the other fugitives who are within the reach of Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Goran Hadzic, Zdravko Tolimir and Stojan Zupljanin are all within reach of the authorities of Serbia and Montenegro. Tolimir should be tried together with his eight co-accused for the crimes committed in Srebrenica. Djordjevic's transfer is urgent because his trial, too, is due to open towards the middle of next year. Regarding Zupljanin, my plan is to have a joint trial with an accused, Mico Stanisic, who has already appeared before the ICTY. Serbia and Montenegro's cooperation has, unfortunately, deteriorated in the past months. There is no serious, well-articulated action plan on the fugitives.”
2005-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5328 (2005) · source
“However, there is no domestic judicial system in which the prosecutor has such limited coercive powers and cannot instruct police forces to collect intelligence or arrest accused individuals. Let me stress that, under article 29 of the Statute, all States are legally obligated to comply without undue delay with any request for assistance. Moreover, resolution 1534 (2004) of 26 March 2004 calls "on all States to intensify cooperation with and render all necessary assistance to the ICTY, particularly to bring Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic... and all other indictees to the ICTY". (resolution 1534 (2004), para. 1) If the States having the power to locate them are not interested in providing information or in otherwise cooperating with my Office in the search, then it certainly makes the fulfilment of the Tribunal's mandate impossible.”
2005-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5328 (2005) · source
“Experience shows that political pressure from the European Union and the United States is the most significant factor encouraging the States of the former Yugoslavia to transfer indictees to The Hague. The first half of 2005 demonstrated how efficiently international pressure works. Unfortunately, a number of deadlines have passed in the second half of the year, including the commemoration of Srebrenica, the anniversary of the Dayton-Paris accords, and the beginning of negotiations between the European Union and Serbia and Montenegro, but no progress has been recorded on Karadzic and Mladic. As the two most important leaders responsible for the worst crimes are still at large, the international community must remain fully committed. As the Prosecutor of the ICTY, I am expected to do my utmost to bring all indictees to justice.”
2005-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5328 (2005) · source
“Secondly, the current efforts aimed at breaking the support networks protecting Karadzic and Mladic must be further aggressively pursued. My Office is in contact with NATO and EUFOR in Sarajevo, and we are working on a joint programme in that context. However, the strategy will be much more likely to bear fruit should it be complemented by efficient intelligence and operational activities. Furthermore, it comes very late in the day. Such comprehensive strategies should have been put in place long ago. Thirdly, the States of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro must be held accountable for their failure to bring Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic to justice. At the end of the day, the responsibility is theirs, and the international community will increasingly want to limit its involvement to a supportive role in that process.”
2005-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5328 (2005) · source
“Since last spring, I have taken the initiative to encourage Serbia, Montenegro and the relevant services in Bosnia and Herzegovina to intensify their cooperation, both among themselves and with my Office. That has already produced some results, but further energy should be put into that effort. I would expect all international assets present in the region also to take part in that coordinated effort. International actors must finally cooperate with each other and with the ICTY, not only promptly sharing information on the location of fugitives, but also coordinating operations against fugitives or their support networks. I have developed a fruitful relationship at the highest levels with the civilian and military leadership of NATO in that context, and I believe that the situation has begun to improve very recently.”
2005-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5328 (2005) · source
“I am ready to provide the Council with more details, but they should not be discussed in a public meeting. On the basis of this assessment, I would like to offer as possible remedies a few suggestions relating to efforts that I have been pursuing in recent months despite my limited resources. First, mechanisms must be set up or revived that offer the possibility for meaningful planning and exchanges of information between those involved in intelligence-gathering activities. The relevant national authorities, inside and outside the region, and international organizations, including the ICTY, should join forces in setting up such a framework for sharing information on Karadzic and Mladic.”
2005-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5328 (2005) · source
“That has now changed, at least at the level of rhetoric. Numerous statements have been made by Serb and Bosnian Serb political, and even religious, leaders saying that Karadzic and Mladic must be brought to The Hague. However, those intentions at the top have not necessarily filtered through all the layers of the institutions involved. To sum up this most crucial issue, my main partners in the hunt for Karadzic and Mladic are now the Government of Serbia and Montenegro and the relevant authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The international community, through the use of conditionality, is providing political incentives for local authorities to arrest those indictees. On operational issues, however, the involvement of the international community has been minimal, at least over the past two years.”
2005-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5328 (2005) · source
“That should be taken advantage of Exclude any kind of communications except through couriers. I think that, from what can be found in various manners, some action aimed at capture is nevertheless of a limited nature, and they will avoid risky, spectacular actions". He planned well indeed. Thirdly, the capture of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic is no longer such a high priority for the international community that it would justify allocating substantial technical and human resources to it. Most international intelligence assets have left the Balkans. We must therefore rely principally on local authorities in Republika Srpska and Serbia and Montenegro to carry out the arrests. Until recently, there was no political will on the part of either of those parties to aggressively go after Karadzic and Mladic.”
2005-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5328 (2005) · source
“At that point in time, and without consulting or informing my Office, a third party interfered to request those authorities to discontinue those measures. My attempts to receive explanations were never answered. Such communication gaps feed the confusion and cannot lead to positive results. Karadzic in particular is fully aware of the unorganized way in which the international community is proceeding against him, and he is taking full advantage of it. In an undated letter that reached my Office only recently, but which was probably written shortly after he disappeared, one of his close supporters wrote to him, "I found out from a source that SF OR forces take action in certain cases exclusively on the basis of approval by their Governments and not from some centre.”
2005-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5328 (2005) · source
“Furthermore, the Office of the Prosecutor has in recent years proven that it can handle intelligence adequately so as to facilitate surrenders by national authorities. Data provided by my Office prompted the surrender of Ljubisa Beara, Momir Nikolic and Milan Lukic, to name just a few. The Council may recall that my staff took pictures of Goran Hadzic while he was tipped off and as he fled. My second point is that, beyond the sharing of data itself, there is also a lack of coordination of efforts, which has counterproductive effects. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, for instance, since we were unable to learn who was doing what to track Karadzic and Mladic, we asked local authorities to implement certain surveillance measures.”
2005-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5328 (2005) · source
“Sometimes, my Office learned through the media about the existence of key documents seized by the international forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The reasons given for those unhelpful practices are the necessity to protect sensitive sources and methods of work, as well as the suspicion that such documents and intelligence could be leaked should they reach the Office of the Prosecutor. A high degree of confidentiality is an understandable condition for intelligence activities when early disclosure could threaten the lives of individuals involved or jeopardize arrest operations. However, most of the information collected in the course of search operations or intelligence-gathering activities is not that sensitive from an operational standpoint. Still, it is rarely shared with others.”
2005-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5328 (2005) · source
“Intelligence-gathering efforts are carried out at the national level, and the products of intelligence are jealously guarded by the various national authorities for themselves. Generally, information, especially when it is relevant, is not shared with other actors - and certainly not with my Office. As a consequence, we cannot compare sources and knowledge that would allow us to make progress towards locating Karadzic and Mladic. It was only after cumbersome procedures and long delays that recently my Office was finally given partial access to useful information obtained by NATO and, previously, SFOR. Those materials are of interest in drawing up a profile of Karadzic's and Mladic's movements, contacts and networks.”
2005-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5328 (2005) · source
“From 1998 onwards, Karadzic's movements became more discreet and his whereabouts became unknown, while Mladic probably moved his permanent residence to Serbia at that time. Efforts were made in 1998 and 1999 to arrange for Karadzic's voluntary surrender, but eventually he broke off all contacts. It was only after the fall of Milosevic, in 2000, that the international community expressed the political will to bring Karadzic and Mladic to justice. However, that political will was never translated into the creation of the effective operational instruments that would be necessary for that purpose. What are the principal shortcomings? First, the circulation of information among the interested actors, domestic and international, is inadequate.”
2005-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5328 (2005) · source
“It is obvious to all informed observers that in the first years after indictments were issued there was no political will, on the part of either local authorities in Republika Srpska and Serbia or the international forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to arrest Karadzic or Mladic. It was perceived that arrest operations against either of them could undermine the stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the security of international troops there. It is particularly well documented that, two years after they were indicted, Karadzic and Mladic were moving freely in Republika Srpska. Karadzic was even giving interviews and running party and State business with the full knowledge of the international community. Mladic even participated in military ceremonies.”
2005-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5328 (2005) · source
“Unfortunately, we rarely get any feedback on the information we provide. It was only recently that my Office began to receive some information. As far as I know, neither those States nor international organizations have ever managed to come close to the arrest of Karadzic or Mladic. Until recently, they have been unwilling to provide the ICTY with useful information about those fugitives or to coordinate efforts. I could give many examples to illustrate that dysfunctional situation, but this is not the place or the time to go into detail. But after 10 years of failures, it is legitimate to ask ourselves what we did wrong and what we can do better.”
2005-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5328 (2005) · source
“It was therefore essential for the Office of the Prosecutor to build a small, but effective, in-house capability. Our tracking activities are meant to remain of a mainly coordinating nature, because my Office cannot and will not build up the technical and human resources that would allow us to carry out sophisticated intelligence operations. Despite our limited resources, we were successful in locating fugitives on a number of occasions. But when significant resources are required, we have to turn to the relevant States, inside and outside the region, or to NATO and the European Union-led peacekeeping force (EUFOR) - and previously to the Stabilization Force (SFOR) - in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We are systematically passing on our information to those national and international bodies.”
2005-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5328 (2005) · source
“However, the Tribunal, and in particular its Prosecutor, has a responsibility to ensure that arrest warrants are executed and that indictees are tried. Since trials in absentia are not permitted at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the accused must be brought to The Hague, through either arrests or voluntary surrenders. In 2001, I decided to begin carrying out small- scale tracking activities for a combination of reasons. First, many arrest warrants were left unexecuted. At that time, 24 accused were at large. Secondly, I was not receiving any information from the other relevant actors. Finally, since the completion strategy was being developed at the time, it became clear that the arrest of fugitives would be a key condition for successful implementation of the strategy.”
2005-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5328 (2005) · source
“There was a momentum at that time, and it was legitimate to believe that the issue of fugitives could be resolved once and for all in a matter of a few months. The Serbian Government, in particular, had raised expectations that Ratko Mladic would be transferred to The Hague before the commemoration of the Srebrenica genocide on 11 July, or at the latest at the beginning of October. That did not happen. There was also hope that, once Mladic was in The Hague, efforts would focus on Radovan Karadzic. As far as I know, there is no reliable or confirmed information on either of those two accused, and I am not aware of any credible attempt to locate and apprehend them. The Office of the Prosecutor has no explicit mandate to arrest indictees.”
2005-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5328 (2005) · source
“Ms. Del Ponte: It is a great honour to be here again to provide an assessment of the progress made in the implementation of the completion strategy. As members know, a written assessment has previously been distributed, and I intend to concentrate today on the major issues. For six years now, I have had to report to the Council that the failure to bring Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic into the custody of the Tribunal is the major impediment to the success of our work. As we advance in the implementation of the completion strategy, it is becoming more crucial every day to bring those two indictees to The Hague, because any further delay will impact on the completion strategy. On 13 June (see S/PV.5199), I presented my last assessment to the Council, and it was cautiously optimistic.”
2005-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5328 (2005) · source
“If the basic crime is proven once, as I have said, and does not need to be repeated for every indictee, it saves us time because the proof of the basic crime and the repeated testimony of witnesses are the most time- consuming tasks. We therefore believe that, with regard to Srebrenica, for instance, instead of undertaking three trials at each of which we have to prove the same massacre that has already been confirmed under appeal as genocide, there could be only one instance requiring proof of the genocide in Srebrenica.”
2005-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5199 (2005) · source