YouSaid · the spoken record

Del Ponte

lines on the record: 252
first: 1999-11-10
most recent: 2007-12-10
sittings or episodes: 13
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“We particularly requested protection for a release that we opposed - but which was granted nonetheless - because we felt that the situation was highly threatening to our witnesses. There are witnesses who refuse to appear in court because they have received threats. That is a problem we face, but one which we generally hope to solve on a one-by-one basis. Regarding transfers of cases under rule 11 bis, only one decision has been made, but has not yet been implemented because it is under appeal. We are awaiting the appeals court decision, so it has not yet taken effect. As to how we might save time by joining cases, we are required in every single trial to prove the basic crime.”
2005-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5199 (2005) · source
“It is true that an effective reconciliation could be made when the States not only accept the truth emerging from our trials, but also allow their own national systems to proceed with their own war crimes trials. As to witness protection, it must be said that it is of constant concern to the Office of the Prosecutor. The situation varies depending on the region. The major problems are with issues relating to Kosovo. We found one individual, who was actively involved in threatening witnesses, guilty of contempt of court a few weeks ago. We even had a case wherein a bomb was planted in a witness's car and he lost both legs. Thus, in the case of Kosovo, of course we rely primarily on the United Nations Mission in Kosovo and the Kosovo Force to protect witnesses.”
2005-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5199 (2005) · source
“I, too, would like to thank the members of the Security Council for their assessments and the views they have expressed today. I should also like to thank the representatives of the Balkan countries, in particular the representative of Serbia and Montenegro. This is indeed the first time that we can testify on both sides to cooperation that has begun between the Tribunal and that country. In fact, it answers the question raised about success in the Tribunal's activities in the region. I believe that the major success is not only the acknowledgement of what the Tribunal is doing in The Hague, but also the reciprocal cooperation of States with the Tribunal.”
2005-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5199 (2005) · source
“The international community must play its part in this process to ensure the success of international criminal justice. NATO and the European Union Force's (EUFOR) assets will be invaluable in bringing Karadzic and others to justice. The European Union's power of attraction remains a key political motivation for the countries of the former Yugoslavia, and this should remain the case. The Security Council must focus constant attention on our work. In mid-July, 10 years will have elapsed since more than 7,900 Muslim men and boys were summarily executed in what has been recognized by the ICTY as a genocide. A few weeks later, it will be 10 years since two main authors of that genocide, Karadzic and Mladic, have been at large. This situation cannot be tolerated any longer. Now is the time to end impunity.”
2005-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5199 (2005) · source
“While these internal measures increase the chances that the completion strategy will be successful, we have in past months seen dramatic improvements in external conditions with a strong impact on the completion strategy. Serbia and Montenegro, Croatia and Republika Srpska within Bosnia and Herzegovina are not yet cooperating fully with the ICTY. However, all of them have shown considerable progress in their cooperation. Prime Minister Sanader in Zagreb, Prime Minister Kostunica and Minister Ljajic in Belgrade, and Minister Matjasevic in Banja Luka have demonstrated a genuine commitment to resolving all remaining issues in their cooperation with the Tribunal. The current momentum has to be used so as to bring the remaining fugitives to justice.”
2005-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5199 (2005) · source
“By completing all its investigations by the end of 2004, my Office has demonstrated its commitment to the completion strategy. We have also immediately taken the necessary actions in terms of resources. More than a third of the posts in the investigation division were abolished. Redeployments from the investigation division to the prosecution division are proposed in the context of the 2006-2007 budget, so as to keep within the investigation division only those staff members necessary for the support of trials and for the transfer of cases to domestic jurisdictions. Those movements of personnel will also allow us to cope with a heavier workload in the prosecution division and in the appeals section. Our attention is now fully focused on the conduct of efficient trial and appellate proceedings.”
2005-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5199 (2005) · source
“During my recent trip to the region, I became convinced of the fact that the so-called Vukovar Three case is extremely sensitive and that any decision by the Chambers to transfer it would provoke deep resentment in one or the other country considered for the transfer - Serbia and Montenegro or Croatia. Therefore, I came to the conclusion that a transfer either to Belgrade or to Zagreb would not be in the interests of justice. In View of these new developments, the best option is to try the "Vukovar Three" at The Hague. The Chambers took their first decision on a rule 11 his motion on 17 May, whereby they granted the prosecution motion to transfer the Stankovic case to Bosnia and Herzegovina. My Office is still considering the transfer of a few additional cases.”
2005-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5199 (2005) · source
“Moreover, in response to my request, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) decided on 19 May to cooperate with my Office in the monitoring of cases transferred to the region. Those positive developments have allowed my Office to further implement its policy of submitting rule 11 bis motions to the Chambers for the referral of such cases to local jurisdictions. Four additional motions have been filed since I last reported. All in all, 10 such motions have been filed so far concerning 18 accused. Very recently, I decided to withdraw one of those motions, concerning three persons accused of crimes committed in Vukovar. That case long ago drew the attention of the international community, since it was the object of Security Council resolution 1207 (1998), back in 1998.”
2005-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5199 (2005) · source
“Furthermore, we have participated in the significant efforts made to improve judicial cooperation among prosecutors from Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro. Last week, we took part in a meeting held in Brijuni, Croatia, aimed at reaching agreements regarding the transfer of proceedings between the countries of the former Yugoslavia. The objective is to ensure that those countries' legal impediments to the extradition of nationals do not lead to impunity. As a result of those combined efforts, capacities have been developed throughout the region to take over mid- and lower-rank cases that, in accordance with Security Council resolutions, cannot be tried at The Hague.”
2005-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5199 (2005) · source
“Joining cases is a method that my Office intends to use whenever possible so as to save court time while preserving all guarantees of due process. Joining cases is clearly more efficient, since the same crime base does not have to be proved repeatedly and, therefore, the witnesses need to come to The Hague only once. Three motions for joinder were presented so far; a few others are under consideration. This is one of the areas where my office has placed emphasis so as to do the maximum to implement the second phase of the completion strategy. Another major development in that context is the referral of cases to domestic jurisdictions. My Office has continued to help build credible domestic jurisdictions by contributing its expertise to training judges and prosecutors.”
2005-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5199 (2005) · source
“Until Gotovina is in The Hague, or until Croatia provides the precise whereabouts of that fugitive, it is impossible to say, however, that Croatia is fully cooperating with the ICTY. The transfer to The Hague of the 10 remaining fugitives is the most serious obstacle to the completion strategy. It creates uncertainties that are hampering the proper planning of the trials. It may oblige the Court to conduct several trials where a joint trial would have been possible. For instance, Djordjevic could be joined with the six other indictees accused of crimes committed in Kosovo by Serbian forces. Tolimir could be joined with eight other indictees accused of the Srebrenica genocide. Karadzic and Mladic - should they be transferred in the same time period - could be tried together.”
2005-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5199 (2005) · source
“There were also media campaigns, sometimes based on confidential documents leaked to the media, that tried to discredit the Tribunal or our partners in Zagreb. That indicates that Gotovina can still count on active support networks, including within the State institutions. In April, Croatia presented an Action Plan aimed specifically at locating Gotovina. It is my assessment that further serious progress in the implementation of the plan should lead to Gotovina. Prime Minister Sanader assured me of his strong personal commitment in that regard. A few more months will, however, be needed to determine whether the Croatian authorities are, this time, indeed doing their utmost to arrest and transfer Gotovina.”
2005-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5199 (2005) · source
“The Russian authorities are confident that the persons who have committed grave crimes to be tried at the ICTY should be the subject of search and prosecution. The Russian authorities also expressed their readiness to further render their assistance to the Tribunal in the investigation and prosecution of the indicted persons. I remain concerned that the Croatian authorities have not fulfilled their obligation to locate, arrest and transfer Ante Gotovina. In the first part of this year, the efforts made by the authorities were neither proactive nor focused, and several incidents occurred when sensitive information was manipulated so as to obstruct the investigation against Gotovina and his protective networks.”
2005-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5199 (2005) · source
“It is encouraging that in Brussels and Sarajevo I was assured by NATO and EUFOR commanders of their full commitment in respect to this issue. All my information continues to show that two fugitives, Vlastimir Djordjevic and Dragan Zelenovic, are in Russia. I have passed the relevant information on those two fugitives to the Russian authorities and have expressed my readiness to travel to Moscow to further discuss the matter with them. On 7 June I received a reply from them informing me that the competent authorities continue to conduct their investigative actions with regard to the persons accused by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), including Mr. Djordjevic and Mr. Zelenovic.”
2005-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5199 (2005) · source
“Prime Minister Kostunica gave me assurances that his Government will deliver on these remaining fugitives, and I expect him to fulfil his commitment. However, I understand he is not willing to carry out arrest operations. Since 25 April, when Nebojsa Pavkovic was transferred to The Hague, there have been no further transfers. That seems to indicate that the policy of voluntary surrenders preferred by the Serbian authorities has reached its limits. It is essential that the authorities in Podgorica and Banja Luka cooperate more closely with Belgrade and also with NATO and the European Force (EUFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. That is the most promising way to locate Radovan Karadzic. Also, the political support of the international community remains of paramount importance.”
2005-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5199 (2005) · source
“Access to documents, including military files, and to witnesses is continuously improving. However, the process remains very slow and cumbersome. Most importantly, following my last address to the Council, Serbia has finally started to transfer fugitives and newly indicted persons. Since December 2004, the Serbian Government, alone or with the assistance of the Minister of the Interior of Republika Srpska within Bosnia and Herzegovina, has transferred 14 accused, including half a dozen who have been indicted for Srebrenica. Another seven fugitives are within reach of the Serbian authorities, alone or in cooperation with Montenegro and Republika Srpska within Bosnia and Herzegovina: Karadzic, Mladic, Tolimir, Hadzic, Milan and Sredoje Lukic, and Zupljanin. Karadzic, Mladic and Tolimir are the three accused most responsible for Srebrenica.”
2005-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5199 (2005) · source
“Despite all the progress made, it is obvious that the great expectations placed by the victims in the international community and in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia have not been met and will not be realized until Karadzic and Mladic are in The Hague. In less than a month, ten years will have passed since Srebrenica happened. There will be commemorations in Srebrenica itself and elsewhere. All those attending will wonder why the individuals primarily responsible for the genocide are still at large, ten years after the fact and ten years after they were indicted. As a sign of protest and in respect for the victims, I have thus decided not to participate in any commemoration of the genocide unless Karadzic and Mladic are arrested. There has been a major change in the attitude of the Serbian authorities.”
2005-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5199 (2005) · source
“Last but not least, the lifting of the recruitment freeze has allowed my Office to hire the staff necessary for efficient preparation for and conduct of the remaining trials and appeals. Unfortunately, those positive developments are overshadowed by the continuing failure of the relevant authorities to arrest and transfer ten fugitives, including those mentioned several times by the Security Council in resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter. As long as Radovan Karadzic, Ratko Mladic and Ante Gotovina manage to escape justice and defy the international community, the work of this Tribunal will remain unfinished. Ten days ago, I visited Belgrade, Zagreb and Sarajevo to discuss cooperation with the relevant authorities. In Sarajevo, I also met families of victims of the Srebrenica genocide.”
2005-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5199 (2005) · source
“While there is no going back and we are fully committed to the completion strategy, I simply want to underline to the Council the importance of supporting the national jurisdictions and following their work closely to ensure that justice is indeed done. There have been a number of positive developments since my last report. No fewer than 20 accused have been surrendered since November, including ten who had been fugitives for an extended period. The prosecution has continued to file motions under rule 11 bis for referring indicted cases involving mid- and lower-level perpetrators to domestic judiciaries. Motions were also filed proposing the joining of cases with the same crime base so as to avoid repeating trials with similar evidence and witnesses.”
2005-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5199 (2005) · source
“Ms. Del Ponte: It is a great honour to be here again to provide an assessment on the progress made in the implementation of the completion strategy. A written assessment has been distributed, and I now intend to concentrate on the major issues. Significant progress can be reported on the key components of the completion strategy. All investigations were completed and the last indictments issued by the end of 2004. However, the Council should know that many victim groups, as well as representatives of civil society, simply do not understand how investigations can be closed at this stage. I receive many NGO reports and letters from victims arguing that there are many more individuals who should be indicted and expressing concern about the capacity of the domestic jurisdictions to render justice fairly and effectively.”
2005-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5199 (2005) · source
“I would like to associate myself with President Meron's words of thanks to the President and members of the Security Council for their ongoing support. We certainly hope that 2005 will be a successful year, especially in connection with the arrests of persons with primary responsibility, especially as regards the Srebrenica genocide. I very much hope, 10 years after the commission of that crime, that we will finally be able to apprehend Mr. Karadzic' and Mr. Mladic' and begin their trials.”
2004-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5086 (2004) · source
“We eagerly await the beginning of work by the Special Chamber in Bosnia and Herzegovina: beyond the ll-bis cases - on which indictments exist - there are many other files on suspects, containing sufficient evidence to bring them to trial. This is all to say that we remain firmly against impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes.”
2004-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4999Resumption1 (2004) · source
“Secondly, with respect to the transfer of cases, when President Meron refers to cases under rule 11 bis, these are cases in which we already have indictments. I have about 100 cases in which I still have no indictment or in which I was prepared to issue one but did not do so after the Security Council adopted its resolution. These are so-called mid-level cases, but nevertheless involve defendants or suspects who are guilty of very serious crimes. We are considering transferring those cases to national judicial authorities. We are currently working with the Belgrade Prosecutor on the transfer of a very important case on which I have already prepared an indictment, which I have not submitted, and the Belgrade Prosecutor has agreed to take on that case. This will be a test. It will be a test with Belgrade, and it will be a test with Croatia.”
2004-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4999Resumption1 (2004) · source
“I, too, wish to thank all members of the Security Council for their comments and assessments, and in particular for the message I have received from some that Karadzic, Mladic and Gotovina must be tried in The Hague. Of course, it does me, my colleagues and the entire Tribunal good to hear such a message. President Meron answered all the questions and I have nothing to add, other than two important points. I note that Serbia and Montenegro intends to resume cooperation, and I do mean "resume" because, as I have reiterated since December, we have had none at all. The intention is a good one and I await immediate results. The situation is urgent. Belgrade can begin its cooperation forthwith. Of course, I need an interlocutor, since Belgrade has been unknown to me until now.”
2004-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4999Resumption1 (2004) · source
“This period should not become simply an "end-game", with an abrupt closing, regardless of whether or not the top leaders are apprehended and tried before the ICTY. That would negate all the efforts that have been devoted to the process and all the results already obtained. I join President Meron in urging the members of the Council to continue their support for the Tribunal and to ensure that it is given the means necessary to fulfil its promise and its full potential. I thank you for your attention and for your continued support.”
2004-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4999 (2004) · source
“In resolution 808 (1993), it stressed its determination to put an end to the widespread crimes occurring within the territory of the former Yugoslavia, including reports of mass killings and the practice of ethnic cleansing, and to bring to justice the persons most responsible for those crimes. Eleven years later, thanks to all the efforts made by the international community to halt those crimes and redress them judicially, these objectives have almost been achieved. It is perhaps ironic that, just when the ICTY is gaining momentum and reaching cruising speed, so much time is being spent discussing its end. But the completion of the mandate is now within reach, and we can see the final years ahead of us.”
2004-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4999 (2004) · source
“How long will it be tolerated that these leaders are escaping justice? How long will it be tolerated that they are making a mockery of both justice and the repeated commitment of the Security Council to have them arrested and tried? Please allow me to stress once again how important the Council's support is for the success of the Tribunal. The factors that have a real influence on the completion strategy of the ICTY are threefold: the financial needs of the Tribunal, the timely arrest of the fugitives, and the support needed to establish credible domestic jurisdictions. All three are beyond the Tribunal's control, but they can and must be addressed by the international community. When it established the Tribunal in 1993, the Council proved its commitment to justice and the rule of law.”
2004-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4999 (2004) · source
“We urge the Council to act and to put an end to this pattern of non-cooperation. If this situation is allowed to continue, it will endanger the completion strategy as well as the legacy of the Tribunal. The message of the Victims of the worst crimes known to humankind remains constant, regardless of their community of origin. Their concern is to see that justice is done, not simply because they wish to see the criminals punished, but also because they understand that the achievement of stability and peace in their countries depends on the judicial process. As we approach the 10-year commemoration of both the Srebrenica genocide and the signing of the Dayton Agreement, we simultaneously approach another anniversary: Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic have been at large for almost 10 years.”
2004-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4999 (2004) · source
“Also, certain international institutions, such as the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, have an important role to play in the arrest and transfer of fugitives. The last time a fugitive was arrested in Bosnia and Herzegovina by SFOR was in July 2002. I hope that the new arrangements regarding the future of international forces in that country will be more effective in the search for, and arrest of, indicted criminals. As Prosecutor, my only recourse, in the case of a State's failure to comply with its obligations, is to report it to the President of the ICTY, who, in turn, can bring it to the attention of the Security Council. On 4 May 2004, a report concerning the consistent failure by Serbia and Montenegro to comply with its legal obligations was forwarded by President Meron to the Council.”
2004-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4999 (2004) · source
“Several statements were made by high-level officials to the effect that that cooperation would restart after the presidential election, which took place on 13 and 27 June. We will therefore be able to assess very soon whether these authorities are serious or simply buying time. In the absence of a significant number of transfers of fugitives in the weeks to come, I will have to conclude that Serbia and Montenegro continues to be unwilling to abide by its international legal obligations. The support of the international community as a whole and of all States Members of the United Nations remains crucial in securing the cooperation of the States of the former Yugoslavia.”
2004-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4999 (2004) · source
“Now I am even reluctant to pass on any information concerning the fugitives to the Serbian authorities, because the last time I gave precise information regarding a high-level fugitive charged with the Srebrenica genocide, I was told by the Serbian authorities that, due to the political circumstances, it was not opportune to arrest him. I have learned that he has since disappeared. There has been no progress either in other areas in which the cooperation of Serbia and Montenegro is being sought. A few waivers allowing witnesses to testify before the ICTY were granted in the past month, but they concern mainly defence witnesses, and not prosecution witnesses. Well over 50 requests for waivers are still outstanding.”
2004-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4999 (2004) · source
“That cooperation must continue, and I expect Croatia to locate and transfer Gotovina to The Hague as soon as possible - hopefully, prior to my next appearance before the Council. Since December, the authorities of Serbia and Montenegro have provided almost no cooperation, and that country has become a safe haven for fugitives. At least 15 accused who are at large, including Ratko Mladic, spend most of their time there. According to information recently obtained, fugitives who were believed to reside in Republika Srpska have moved across the border.”
2004-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4999 (2004) · source
“Because that untenable situation is directly influencing the completion of our mandate, we urge the Council to support us in our efforts to solve this very serious problem. The third main challenge encountered by the ICTY remains the issue of the full cooperation of all States. The cooperation of the States of the former Yugoslavia is not only a legal obligation; it is also of Vital importance for a successful completion strategy. Beyond the arrest of indicted criminals, States have the obligation to grant access to witnesses and documents. The written assessment on the status of cooperation provided by the countries of the former Yugoslavia remains up to date. The Croatian authorities are, at this point in time, fully cooperating with my Office.”
2004-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4999 (2004) · source
“Moreover, the cash-flow crisis that emerged this spring, leading to a temporary freeze on new recruitment imposed by the Secretariat, prevents us from recruiting, and even from replacing, essential personnel who leave the Tribunal. And, as other international judicial institutions are expanding, notably in The Hague, the ICTY is losing staff at an alarming rate. The combined effect of those factors has had a considerable impact on morale, making it, in turn, even more difficult to retain experienced staff. These financial restrictions directly affect the completion strategy, as the scarcity of investigative resources will inevitably slow down the preparation and conduct of trials.”
2004-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4999 (2004) · source
“In this context, a statement that the ICTY will remain open as long as necessary to ensure that the fugitives mentioned in Security Council resolutions 1503 (2003) and 1534 (2004) are tried would serve the interest ofjustice. A second problem for the completion strategy is the dire budgetary and financial situation of the Tribunal in general and of my Office in particular. We have been badly hit by the deferred consideration of the 2005 budget for the investigative support for trials and appeals. Consequently, we have been unable since the beginning of this year to extend the contracts of the staff who will provide investigative support to trials and appeals beyond 31 December 2004.”
2004-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4999 (2004) · source
“Our ability to envisage other joinders is limited not only by the difficulties faced in ensuring timely surrender, but also by the size of the courtrooms, which would make it difficult to conduct trials with more than six or seven accused. The failure to arrest or surrender fugitives seriously affects the strategic planning of the prosecution. Indeed, we face the dilemma of choosing either to focus on the accused already in the custody of the Tribunal or to plan for the trial of such senior accused as Karadzic, Mladic, Gotovina and others who may unfortunately remain at large. An unintended consequence of the completion strategy is that fugitives and their protective networks are trying to buy time until 2008 in the hope of evading justice, as they believe that the deadline for them to be tried in The Hague will soon expire.”
2004-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4999 (2004) · source
“That figure does not include two accused whose indictments and arrest warrants are sealed. The failure to obtain the arrest of fugitives has a number of consequences for the completion strategy. It prevents the Tribunal from joining cases that could be tried together. It therefore obliges us to conduct separate trials on the same crime base, which leads to substantial losses of court time. For instance, had Radovan Karadzic been arrested early this year, it would have been possible to join his trial with the trial of Krajisnik, another former senior member of the Bosnian Serb leadership currently being tried. In that particular case, we most likely lost the equivalent of one courtroom for well over a year.”
2004-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4999 (2004) · source
“Following my recent Visit to Bosnia and Herzegovina, I received letters from victims' associations expressing their grave concern and even disagreement in connection with the completion strategy. They asked me to pass along those letters to the members of the Council, which I would like to do. Allow me to focus now on the three key challenges that must be met to ensure that the ICTY mandate is properly and successfully achieved. These challenges are the arrest of fugitives; our finances; and issues of States' cooperation. The first key challenge is the failure of the relevant authorities, in particular in the Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Serbia and Montenegro, to arrest or obtain the surrender - voluntarily or through coercive measures - of those 20 indicted who are still at large.”
2004-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4999 (2004) · source
“The support of the international community, including regional organizations, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, is of paramount importance in this process. For the time being, following the guidelines set by the Security Council, I do not actively consider the possibility of transferring any high-level cases. However, the Council must be aware that, even if the Chambers consider positively all 12 requests to which I referred earlier, this may not be enough to meet the 2008 deadline. We will continue to do our utmost to meet this target date. The Council should also take into account that the completion strategy may be resented by the Victims, mainly because their trust in domestic courts is very limited.”
2004-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4999 (2004) · source
“The first category concerns ICTY indicted cases that could be transferred pursuant to rule 11 bis of the rules of procedure. In strict adherence to the guidelines provided by resolutions 1503 (2003) and 1534 (2004), 12 cases, concerning 22 accused, have been identified for possible transfer to domestic jurisdictions, subject to the judges' approval. All those concerned held low- and mid-level positions in their respective hierarchies, and were predominantly indicted in the early days of the Tribunal. The transfer of mid- and low-level cases to domestic jurisdictions would free court resources for senior accused leaders. Efforts have yet to be invested in the establishment of domestic jurisdictions capable of trying war criminals.”
2004-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4999 (2004) · source
“Nevertheless, we are actively collaborating with the President, the Chambers and the Registry to update the trial calendars for the coming years. The completion strategy is twofold. First, the International Tribunal must try those bearing the gravest responsibility for the crimes, including the high-profile fugitives, and thus complete its activities in a swift and efficient, yet fair and impartial, manner. Secondly, the domestic jurisdictions of the territories of the former Yugoslavia must be reformed and equipped to complete the work of the International Tribunal and take over the remaining cases. The written assessment submitted to the Council highlights three types of cases identified to be transferred to domestic courts.”
2004-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4999 (2004) · source
“As far as the Office of the Prosecutor is concerned, a number of measures have already been taken to improve the efficiency of the prosecution in the preparation and presentation of cases. They include significant procedural and technological improvements, and have been detailed in the written assessment submitted to the Council. Great savings of court time have been achieved by guilty pleas, obtained through the active involvement of my Office. We remain open to exploring with the defence the possibility of accused persons pleading guilty to all or some of the charges against them. However, ultimately the Office of the Prosecutor can only comply with the Chambers' instructions on scheduling cases, and obviously has no control over the swift conduct of the defence case or the writing of judgements.”
2004-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4999 (2004) · source
“All trials should be completed by 2008 and all appeals should be reviewed by 2010. The Office of the Prosecutor remains strongly committed to meeting those two objectives. However, unlike the conduct of investigations - over which the Prosecutor has a large measure of control - the main responsibility for the scheduling, administration and conduct of trials and appeals extends well beyond the Prosecutor. Although my Office will continue to take all possible measures to further streamline our trial and appeals activities - notably by strictly limiting the number of charges and prosecution witnesses - we must stress that we do not control a number of factors, such as the timely arrest of fugitives, the appearance of witnesses and the emergence of crucial evidence, as we rely on States to obtain these.”
2004-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4999 (2004) · source
“As a consequence, we are completing six remaining investigations involving a maximum of 11 targets. On this basis, a maximum of six new indictments could be prepared before the end of 2004 for submission, first to the Bureau for review of the seniority of the suspects, and then to the judges for confirmation. These indictments could result in a maximum of four new trials only, given the possibility of joining some of the indictments. With this major achievement - the completion of all new investigations in sight - we are now in a better position to plan the rest of our activities. The Tribunal knows exactly how many cases will have to be tried. We remain at the disposal of the President and the judges to schedule the remaining trials. The next completion dates foreseen by the strategy to achieve the Tribunal's mandate are 2008 and 2010.”
2004-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4999 (2004) · source
“One of them will be presented in a sealed form to the relevant authorities very soon. The other indicts a Croatian general for crimes committed in 1993 against Serb civilians in the so-called Medak pocket. It is our intention to request that this case be referred to Croatia. Not all of our inquiries resulted in indictments. We continually reviewed the strength of the evidence in each case. In January 2004, I decided that the investigations concerning seven targets would be suspended, not indicted before the Tribunal, and eventually referred to domestic local prosecutors in the former Yugoslavia. Investigations concerning two more high-level suspects were discontinued after their deaths. Furthermore, we decided not to continue the investigations concerning two other targets, due to insufficient evidence.”
2004-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4999 (2004) · source
“The Tribunal's completion strategy relies on three major dates, the first concerning the conclusion of all new investigations by the end of this year, 2004. This date thus entirely relies on the activities and efforts of the Prosecutor and her Office. I am therefore pleased to report that this first major milestone will be reached as planned. By the end of this year, the investigation of our outstanding targets will be complete and the last of our new indictments will be presented. In furtherance of my commitment to completing these investigations, we have spared no effort in streamlining the investigations and focusing them on only the most senior leaders responsible for the worst and gravest crimes. Since my written assessment, two indictments were confirmed.”
2004-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4999 (2004) · source
“Ms. Del Ponte: It is a great honour for me, too, to address once again the Council to present new developments at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the key challenges that the Office of the Prosecutor faces in the implementation of the completion strategy. On 21 May 2004, President Theodor Meron transmitted to the Council an assessment of the progress made by the Tribunal in the implementation of its mandate and of its completion strategy. As one of the organs of the Tribunal, the Office of the Prosecutor contributed and reported its continued efforts to fully and in a timely manner implement the completion strategy that we defined in 2002 and that was subsequently approved by the Council, notably in resolution 1503 (2003).”
2004-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4999 (2004) · source
“I believe that next year we will be able to be more specific. The transfer of cases will begin only in 2005. When we complete our investigations, we will be able to begin those transfers and be more specific next year. I can say, however, that the beginnings have been very positive and we are following them up.”
2003-10-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4838 (2003) · source
“I simply wish to note the importance of States' being able to take on such cases, because on the day when the local judicial authorities in Serbia and Montenegro, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina are in a position to judge and try accused persons of any ethnic group, that is when we shall be able to say that reconciliation has been achieved in those countries. We are very far from that, but the beginnings are promising. Prosecutorial specialists in war crimes have been appointed and are currently drafting laws. We are already cooperating with these prosecutors, who have come to us. We assist them in their work and cooperate usefully with them. We also support their investigations, because it is important in those countries that cases and, above all, investigations be undertaken with the utmost respect for equity.”
2003-10-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4838 (2003) · source
“I shall be very brief, as President Meron has already answered almost all the questions. I should just like to touch upon two issues. First, I believe that the Security Council's attention to our activities is very important. I would ask the Council to continue its attention to the work of the Tribunal and the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, as this is a very delicate moment. Therefore the success of our completion strategy will depend upon the support that the Council extends to our work. Secondly, as for the possibility of States' assuming cases, I shall not go into detail.”
2003-10-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4838 (2003) · source