YouSaid · the spoken record

Del Ponte

lines on the record: 252
first: 1999-11-10
most recent: 2007-12-10
sittings or episodes: 13
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“Let me also reiterate that I am grateful to the members of the Council for their support and trust. That support remains crucial, notably to encourage States to cooperate fully with the ICTY and to foster the creation of reliable domestic judiciaries in the region. Ultimately, we will all benefit if justice, the rule of law and reconciliation prevail in the former Yugoslavia.”
2003-10-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4838 (2003) · source
“It would appear that Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia and Montenegro each understand the need for domestic war crimes prosecution, and that this involves a long-term commitment. This is highly commendable and is essential if true reconciliation and a lasting peace are to be achieved. However, without cooperation between them in terms of bilateral legal assistance, provisions for the protection of witnesses and evidence, and, finally, mutual agreements on the extradition of accused persons, any realistic prospects of dealing with the cases referred by the ICTY to the domestic courts of the former Yugoslavia will be slim. Let me assure the Council once again of my determination to implement the objectives set by the Security Council. In so doing, I will continue working closely with the President.”
2003-10-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4838 (2003) · source
“None of the States of the former Yugoslavia have a legal obligation in their national legislation to recognize and act upon the indictments issued by the ICTY, in particular those transferred to the domestic courts for prosecution. The same can be said about the status of the non-indicted cases I intend to refer to the domestic courts, together with the evidence I have gathered during the course of my investigations. This, obviously, constitutes a serious impediment to the transfer of cases from ICTY to domestic jurisdictions, and it is my hope that the international community will assist in providing the necessary input for the relevant changes in domestic legislation to occur.”
2003-10-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4838 (2003) · source
“I am relieved to hear that the donors conference for the War Crimes Chamber in the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina will take place soon. My office is obviously prepared to assist in this process. When considering which cases to refer back, the main problems confronting us are the absence of adequate domestic witness-protection arrangements and the lack of legislation in any country in the region to enable evidence gathered by the Tribunal to be admissible in the domestic courts. We are already facing this situation in a case which is to be referred to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The witnesses who were prepared to testify at The Hague are not willing to do so before the domestic court.”
2003-10-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4838 (2003) · source
“Finally, I have to share my concern that the 2004 deadline set in the completion strategy, instead of speeding up cooperation, may well, on the contrary, encourage States in the region to buy time and to place additional obstacles in the way of cooperation with the ICTY. As is clear, lack of cooperation by the States concerned can endanger the completion strategy. Another key development that will influence the implementation of the completion strategy is the ability of the countries of the former Yugoslavia to prosecute lower-level perpetrators themselves, including suspects or indictees that the ICTY might wish to refer to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, or Croatia - and they will not be low-level perpetrators; they will be mid- and high-level perpetrators.”
2003-10-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4838 (2003) · source
“To conclude my comments on the level of cooperation on the part of the States and entities of the former Yugoslavia, I must mention the Bosnian Croat party to the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. For several years now, my office has received very little cooperation from the Bosnian Croat authorities in respect of cases involving Bosnian Croat perpetrators. The reality is that there is no cooperation in these cases, and there have been no steps or efforts to comply with the Tribunal's requests. Although my Office has received some assistance in the location of witnesses, there has been no response to requests for relevant documentation - in fact, there has been consistent and deceitful denial of the existence of such material. Much remains to be done on the part of the Bosnian Croat party to the Federation.”
2003-10-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4838 (2003) · source
“Unfortunately, we received very limited feedback after such intelligence was passed on, and it was not convincing. In relation to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the authorities of the Republika Srpska still have not located or arrested a single indicted fugitive to date. Karadzic is known to be constantly moving between the Republika Srpska and Montenegro. Additionally, we cannot obtain full access to the necessary documents or individuals, while certain archives and their contents are, clearly, being hidden from my investigators. It appears that there are still influential elements in the police and army structures in the Republika Srpska that actively protect and support the fugitives and war crimes suspects.”
2003-10-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4838 (2003) · source
“There is no true commitment for cooperation or readiness to take difficult steps, which are badly needed, and not only from the point of View of the Tribunal. The authorities are unanimous in stressing the necessity to cooperate with the Tribunal; however, when it comes to tough decisions or the need to provide sensitive documents, we face obstruction and negative attitudes. I have reason to believe that, among the 17 fugitives remaining at large, well over half of them, including Ratko Mladic, reside in Serbia and Montenegro. The authorities now concur with me that at least seven accused are in Serbia. On a number of occasions this year, my Office has transmitted very precise information to the Serb authorities, in the expectation that it could lead to the arrest of fugitives.”
2003-10-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4838 (2003) · source
“As an example, we have been asking for Ratko Mladic's personal file for about two years now, and, while a file is not a fugitive, we still cannot get it. Moreover, witnesses still have to go through a lengthy process whereby they have to be granted waivers by the authorities. That process, which exists only in Serbia and Montenegro, has proved to be extremely slow and painful, and it has an obvious detrimental effect on the trials and on our efforts to reduce their length. For example, to this day, over 60 such requests for waivers are pending a decision. I was inclined to speak about some improvement in Belgrade's cooperation with the ICTY before my visit to Belgrade last week, but I am not in a position to do so.”
2003-10-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4838 (2003) · source
“It is actually a counter-proposal that is totally unacceptable, since it would forbid my staff to have access to the documents for the whole period from 1991 until the end of 1995, which obviously corresponds to the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina - the core of the ICTY's mandate. In the Milosevic trial and other cases, I sense a willingness on the part of the authorities to retain crucial material that could prove the implication of the then Belgrade authorities - the former regime - in the crimes committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Belgrade invokes national security concerns in regard to these materials, but in fact such an approach is limiting or slowing down the Tribunal's access to critical evidence. This goes against the interests of justice and truth, and also does not help in terms of our completion strategy.”
2003-10-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4838 (2003) · source
“It is understood that protective measures ought to be reasonable and not contradict the public interest and the principle of transparency of the trials. It is regrettable that the requested documents only started to arrive in my Office in recent months and only as a result of binding Court orders issued by the Trial Chamber, not as a result of my requests for assistance or voluntary contribution. Also, I proposed a mechanism in February this year to ensure proper access to key archived documents by my staff, respecting the Government's confidentiality concerns. It took more than seven months to receive a reply, which arrived only last week.”
2003-10-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4838 (2003) · source
“We agreed to work together in order to locate and arrest him, and I received firm assurances from the Government in this respect. Until we see results, though, Croatia's obligations in accordance with Security Council resolution 1503 (2003), in particular its paragraph 2, will remain to be fulfilled. Our cooperation with Belgrade remains very difficult and heavily politicized, whether in regard to arrests and transfer of fugitives or access to documents and waivers for high-level witnesses. I continue to face serious problems regarding access to key documents, in particular those held in various archives. 1 showed understanding for the Serbian concerns regarding protective measures for some materials, even providing the Government with my written commitment in the Milosevic case.”
2003-10-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4838 (2003) · source
“The Croatian Government recently submitted reports to the Registrar, pursuant to ICTY rule 59, providing additional explanations and pointing to the conclusion that the accused Gotovina was outside Croatian territory. Most of the information provided in these reports was already known and outdated. In the meeting I had this week with Prime Minister Racan, I shared information available to me about the whereabouts of Gotovina, which comes from various sources, concurring that the accused is in Croatia. I also gave details about the protection that he is receiving in Croatia from persons within the institutions. In front of me, the Croatian authorities - the President and Prime Minister - did not deny that the accused could be in Croatia, despite public statements saying that he would be in a European country.”
2003-10-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4838 (2003) · source
“The backlog of important benchmark requests has been cleared just recently. It is regrettable, though, that on average it takes more than a year to process a request from my Office. It is also noteworthy that when it comes to important international deadlines, when the status of cooperation is in the limelight, the speed and quality of compliance with my requests increase considerably. I hope - and, indeed, I have received assurances from the Government on this matter - that with the new requests from my Office there will be no undue delays. At the same time, the Croatian authorities bear the responsibility for the failure to arrest and transfer General Ante Gotovina.”
2003-10-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4838 (2003) · source
“Full cooperation by the States in the former Yugoslavia is of crucial importance to speeding up the trial process. Providing access to documents and witnesses, as well as carrying out arrests and transfer of fugitives, remains the most basic contribution of these States to the completion strategy. It is also their international legal obligation to do so. Following my address to the Security Council on 29 October 2002, I regret to have to report that Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, Republika Srpska and the Bosnian Croat party to the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina have not so far achieved full cooperation with the Tribunal. In the case of Croatia, 1 can report that most of my requests to the Croatian Government regarding access to documents and witnesses are now being treated seriously and professionally 4 now.”
2003-10-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4838 (2003) · source
“In the meantime, in relation to the cases remaining in The Hague, I will also continue to work closely with the President and the Registrar to identify other methods to improve the efficiency of the Tribunal, to shorten the length of trials, and to maximize the use of the courtrooms. It is, and it will of course be, up to the Security Council to provide us with the necessary framework that will allow us to implement the completion strategy, while maintaining the necessity to have independent and impartial justice. In this connection, allow me to elaborate briefly on two key issues directly related to the success of the completion strategy: full cooperation by the States of the former Yugoslavia and fostering reforms and support of national courts.”
2003-10-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4838 (2003) · source
“For these reasons, I believe that we should continue on the road indicated by the Security Council last August, bearing in mind that, by the end of next year, all remaining indictments will have been issued. At that stage, at the very beginning of 2005, we will, with the President, review the situation to determine which cases should remain in The Hague and which should be referred to domestic jurisdictions. This solution conforms with the guidelines provided by the Council in resolution 1503 (2003) and our firm commitment to conclude our investigations by 2004 and the subsequent dates of our completion strategy. We will continue to work diligently towards that end.”
2003-10-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4838 (2003) · source
“This would not be possible for non- indicted cases. As I said before, my remaining investigations cover the region and concern all the main parties to the conflict. By completing these investigations, the ICTY will have proved that it worked impartially towards achieving justice, peace and reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia. I kindly invite the Council to consider the political conclusions that some might draw if I were forced to cease investigations at this juncture. This option would ensure that the international community has succeeded in maintaining the highest standards of criminal justice in the operations of the ICTY, in particular those involving the independence of the Prosecutor, as expressed in Article 16 of the Statute.”
2003-10-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4838 (2003) · source
“In close cooperation with the President, and on the basis of the guidance provided by the Security Council, it will then be possible to decide which cases should be prosecuted in The Hague and which cases could properly and responsibly be referred back to the domestic jurisdictions, in accordance with the procedure foreseen in rule 11 bis of the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Among the many reasons in favour of this option, I would highlight the following. Referring ICTY-indicted cases to the domestic jurisdictions offers better guarantees that these cases will actually be tried, rather than referring non-indicted cases, as would be the case if I stopped all investigations now. Namely, it would enable the ICTY to use its primacy and call back cases if serious flaws were noted.”
2003-10-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4838 (2003) · source
“Now, according to the latest calculations made jointly with the Registrar and the President, it will not be possible to prosecute in The Hague before the end of 2008 all the suspects and accused who will have been indicted by the ICTY by the end of 2004. I take this situation very seriously, and, to supplement the conclusions drawn by the President, I would offer the following possible approach for the Council's further consideration. By the end of next year, we will have a precise View of what remains to be done. All remaining indictments will have been issued and will most probably be public. The Tribunal will know the status of the current list of fugitives and will also know how many additional fugitives there will be, arising out of the new indictments. It will also be much clearer which cases will result in pleas of guilty.”
2003-10-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4838 (2003) · source
“It is very likely that some of these trials will result in guilty pleas, while others could be referred to the domestic courts in the former Yugoslavia. That is the scope of the ICTY's potential trial load. The Council has heard the accurate and realistic report of President Meron regarding the dates for the completion strategy. I obviously share his estimates, which are the result of a very fruitful and transparent process of coordination, in which all three pillars of the Tribunal are closely associated. My Office is committed to continuing this dialogue with the President as closely as possible, so as to ensure that the Tribunal as a whole can fulfil the objectives defined in its mandate and in the various Security Council resolutions, not least in resolution 1503 (2003) of 28 August.”
2003-10-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4838 (2003) · source
“The great attention we and the international community have devoted to the referral of cases to domestic jurisdictions demonstrates a general concern that no impunity should be tolerated. There are currently three ongoing trials before the ICTY, involving four accused. Another 18 cases, involving 27 accused, are at the pre-trial stage. There are also currently 17 indicted fugitives remaining at large, and if all were surrendered to the Tribunal in a timely fashion, there could potentially be an additional 10 trials, not taking into account that some joinders with other trials or guilty pleas may also be possible. The bottom line with all these cases is that there could be between 40 and 45 trials to be completed by the Tribunal, including the three ongoing trials, by 2008.”
2003-10-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4838 (2003) · source
“They involve approximately 30 individual suspects, all at the highest levels of responsibility. At this stage, there is hardly any prospect that these cases could be assumed locally. In addition to these 13 top-priority investigations, my office has conducted 17 additional investigations that were suspended at the end of last year as a result of my decision to focus solely on the most senior perpetrators. They involve 62 suspects who will not be formally indicted by the ICTY. I expect these cases to be referred to domestic courts for further investigation and prosecution according to the following distribution: 12 cases involving 48 suspects to be referred to Bosnia and Herzegovina; three cases involving eight suspects to be referred to Croatia and two cases involving six suspects to be referred to Serbia and Montenegro.”
2003-10-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4838 (2003) · source
“There are now 13 investigations remaining that, in my judgement, must be completed by my office before it can be said that the investigative mandate entrusted to me and my predecessors by the Council has been completed in a responsible manner. I constantly review these investigations. As things stand today, it is possible that not all of them will result in new indictments. All these cases involve the remaining individuals who held the highest possible levels of responsibility, for very serious crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia, and involving most of the parties to the conflict spanning the period from 1991 to 2001. Even if all these investigations resulted in new indictments, they would lead to nine additional trials, because some could be joined with other future trials.”
2003-10-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4838 (2003) · source
“This is also reflected in our budget submission, which proposes significant cuts in the Investigation Division during 2005. I am confident that the remaining most senior leaders who are suspected of being most responsible for crimes falling within the ICTY's jurisdiction will have been indicted by the end of 2004. Following the information provided to the Council by President Meron, I would like to give members some information regarding the nature of the cases that remain under investigation. It will be understood that I cannot give precise details about these cases, as that would compromise the investigations.”
2003-10-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4838 (2003) · source
“Ms. Del Ponte: I am most grateful to have once again the opportunity to address the Council. As requested in resolution 1503 (2003), I intend to explain my plans to implement the completion strategy of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). In this context, I will also focus on some essential conditions that must be implemented for a successful completion strategy, including the full cooperation of the States in the former Yugoslavia and the deferral of cases to domestic jurisdictions. In resolution 1503 (2003), the Security Council provides my office with clear guidance regarding the time frame of my investigations. 1 can report that necessary measures are continuously being taken to ensure the completion of all remaining investigations by 2004.”
2003-10-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4838 (2003) · source
“We have estimated that, on average, over 8,000 - I repeat, 8,000 persons - committed crimes that fall under our jurisdiction in the former Yugoslavia. Out of 8,000 suspects, we are confining our activity to 108. Truly, I believe that follows the mandate given to us by the resolution. The suspects under investigation have been essential links in the committing of these crimes of war, genocide and crimes against humanity.”
2001-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4429 (2001) · source
“As for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the division of labour between the Tribunal and local jurisdictions, of course this presupposes a certain number of preconditions, which unfortunately have not yet been met - for instance, the protection of witnesses; the independence of these Tribunals 4 whether Trial Chambers or Appeals Courts; and, in general, the process of reform in the local judiciary apparatus. I think it is up to the international community to encourage the development of an independent justice system in the former Yugoslavia. As I see it, this is a prospect for the future, but it is a future that, with your support, may be the near future. I would like to recall that our investigations do not concern those who merely carried out orders. I have provided a list of 108 suspects.”
2001-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4429 (2001) · source
“Of course, even if the information on proceedings could be transferred to Rwanda, most of the persons accused are not in Rwanda - they are abroad. Thus the problem of extradition to Rwanda arises. With regard to a transfer of the Tribunal to Kigali, this measure is being pressed, but a motion has not yet been presented. However, could begin by at least holding hearings there to facilitate access to testimony, so that witnesses who cannot travel to Arusha could be heard in Kigali. There were problems in arranging for a hall, which have been resolved. But that is certainly the right direction. It would be very positive if the Tribunal could be transferred to Kigali for the last years of its activities.”
2001-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4429 (2001) · source
“This means that, according to the Government of Rwanda itself, there are over 2,800 in the category of persons highly responsible, whereas on our own list there are 136. Of course some of them have died; in the case of others, we will be unable to get the necessary evidence; and still others have disappeared. Thus we will have even fewer indictments - perhaps some 100. As far as the transfer of cases to a national Tribunal is concerned, there is a problem with Rwanda, as I said. Rwanda still has the death penalty, so it is impossible to transfer these cases there, even without considering that Rwanda has 2,899 persons accused of genocide who need to be brought to trial and cannot go through the gachacha system.”
2001-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4429 (2001) · source
“I will be very brief. I also want to express thanks for the comments that have been addressed to me. I must say that I agree completely with some of them. As for others, I have some doubts, but this is not the right time to discuss them. I would like to say a few words on the situation of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. One hundred and thirty-six investigations means 136 suspects under investigation. Some doubt has been expressed as to whether these are major perpetrators. I will give you the information that we have from the Government of Rwanda; it has placed on its official list of first-class category perpetrators of genocide 2,899 persons: planners, organizers and supervisors.”
2001-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4429 (2001) · source
“Finding long-term and comprehensive solutions for criminal justice in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda does not lie within the mandates or the powers of the International Tribunals themselves. As Prosecutor, appointed by the Security Council, I will fulfil whatever mandate is given to me in the pursuit of international peace and security.”
2001-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4429 (2001) · source
“I therefore appeal to the Council for its continuing support for the work of my Office, and especially ask the Council to insist upon the arrest of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, whose continuing liberty is an affront to the authority of the Council and mocks the entire process of international criminal justice. If we are seriously resolved to enforce the rule of law against those who commit acts of genocide or crimes against humanity or terrorism, and if we want long-term stability in the Balkans, we simply cannot allow Radovan Karadzic or Ratko Mladic to escape justice and we cannot talk in any meaningful way about the completion of the mandate of the International Criminal Tribunal unless they are brought to trial with the others in The Hague. Those are the key issues I wished to bring to the attention of the Council.”
2001-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4429 (2001) · source
“The Council will be well aware of the situation in that country. Despite the fact that all parties involved in the recent conflicts have agreed that the existence of the Tribunal has already had a very positive deterrent effect, I have to admit that I am deeply worried. Until now I have experienced no problems with activities of my Office in that country. I have had full cooperation from the Government so far, and I was assured by the President and the Prime Minister that I could count on their full cooperation in regard to any of my investigations. But the real test will come when investigations are pursued and if indictments are confirmed.”
2001-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4429 (2001) · source
“The argument all too often put forward by Belgrade and Banja Luka, and to a lesser extent by Zagreb, that cooperation with the ICTY is threatening the political stability of the country is one which should not be taken at face value. Is it easy for the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to transfer a former chief of staff of the army or generals who are still widely regarded as war heroes? Although the authorities in Sarajevo stress the political difficulties that may arise from their cooperation with the ICTY, they do not invoke them as excuses for not cooperating. Last week I visited Skopje in order to inform the authorities of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia about two new investigations opened by my Office in regard to alleged war crimes by National Liberation Army (NLA) and Government forces.”
2001-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4429 (2001) · source
“The support of States is essential for the work of both Tribunals and I would also like to record my gratitude to those countries that assisted in the recent tracking and arresting of several accused for the ICTR in Arusha. Turning to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the most problematic issue is still cooperation with Republika Srpska. A law on cooperation was recently passed, and we are now very keen to see the concrete results of its implementation. As for the authorities of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, they have once again confirmed their full commitment to cooperation by the swift transfer to The Hague of four indicted senior Bosniac military staff.”
2001-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4429 (2001) · source
“The list of wanted persons sheltered in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has grown longer and, instead of giving clear, unambiguous support for the Government of Serbia and of taking a clear stand on cooperation with Tribunal, the federal authorities are doing everything possible to stop even limited cooperation by the republican authorities, who have been most helpful. I have not had occasion to address the Council since the arrest and transfer of Slobodan Milosevic. I would like to express my gratitude to members of the Council and to all other States, without whose insistence and support the transfer of Milosevic would not have happened. Last week, a third indictment was confirmed against Milosevic, covering crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including genocide.”
2001-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4429 (2001) · source
“In November 1998, the Council adopted resolution 1207 (1998) stressing that no State may invoke provisions of its domestic law as a justification for its failure to cooperate and calling for the arrest and transfer of the three Vukovar accused. Nevertheless, the Army continues to harbour them with the approval of the federal Government. Instead of compliance with the specific demands of the Security Council, these indictees are allowed to defy the Tribunal publicly by making presentations of their books.”
2001-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4429 (2001) · source
“And, while the Yugoslav federal authorities continue to claim that an internal law must be enacted in order for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to be able to cooperate with the Tribunal, I see no effort on their part to ensure adoption of such legislation. The contrary is true. Moreover, I regret to inform the Council that Ratko Mladic is residing in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia under the official protection of the Yugoslav Army. As an officer of the Yugoslav Army, General Mladic is said to enjoy military immunity and is being shielded from both national and international justice. To give another glaring example, the Council will recall the efforts we have made for years now to obtain the transfer of the three accused indicted for crimes in Vukovar.”
2001-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4429 (2001) · source
“Working with Prime Minister Djindjic and the Serbian authorities at the republican level, we have experienced good results in terms of arrests and access to evidence. The transfer of Slobodan Milosevic to the Tribunal was a groundbreaking event and a courageous step by the Serbian Government, but cooperation at the federal level appears to be blocked for reasons of domestic politics. Despite their declarations, the federal institutions obstruct the work of my Office. State cooperation does not begin and end with the surrender of accused. We need access to documents, archives and witnesses. At the federal level, access to these important sources of evidence is being denied to us on the pretext that no domestic legislation authorizes it.”
2001-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4429 (2001) · source
“At present, I can reiterate that, in some areas, we have managed to make advances with the Croatian Government, but there are still areas where progress is very slow, especially in the production of documents. I am constantly in a constructive dialogue with Zagreb. I expressed my disappointment about the non- apprehension of General Gotovina and was assured that the Government remained committed to arresting him and transferring him to The Hague. However, it appears that General Gotovina has been allowed to escape arrest and I wish to bring that unsatisfactory situation to the attention of the Council. I also call on Croatia to overcome any remaining obstacles and to stand firm on the path of full cooperation. With the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the picture is very complex and often discouraging.”
2001-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4429 (2001) · source
“I would not, however, be ready to hand over prosecution of my cases to national courts as they now operate. War crimes cases are still politically sensitive in the region and the international community must promote equitable national jurisdictions and legal institutions. The United Nations must have an important role to play in this regard. I must speak also about State cooperation with the Tribunal, which remains problematic. It takes a great deal of time and effort to achieve cooperation and we do not yet enjoy full cooperation across the board in the former Yugoslavia. Some time ago, the Council was seized of the issue of non-cooperation by Yugoslavia and then by Croatia. Last year, I was able to report that the situation with Croatia had improved, but that full cooperation was not yet forthcoming.”
2001-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4429 (2001) · source
“The idea of a national forum involving the participation of international prosecutors and judges to deal with war crimes cases has so far been well received by the Office of the High Representative, by the Presidency in Bosnia and Herzegovina and by certain States. Much work would have to be done to establish the required prosecutorial and judicial mechanism. My Office stands ready to assist the development process in any way possible, since I am aware of the international community's desire to see both Tribunals finish their work in a timely fashion. If we began to design a special court in Bosnia and Herzegovina now, it might well be up and running by 2004 and able to begin taking accused in the kind of cases we have identified for our own investigations as being suitable candidates for national prosecution.”
2001-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4429 (2001) · source
“Adequate measures have yet to be taken for the protection of witnesses. As the majority of the cases are from Bosnia and Herzegovina, I have therefore suggested in Sarajevo the idea of designing a special court in Bosnia and Herzegovina that would have an international component or of developing an existing state court to perform this special task. That court would deal with cases referred to it by the ICTY either during or after the completion of our mandate, and it might also deal with other sensitive war crimes cases, which are presently submitted to my office for review under the "Rules of the Road" scheme following the Rome Agreement of 18 February 1996.”
2001-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4429 (2001) · source
“These 10 have been suspended pending a review in a year's time. The 16 remaining investigations are active and are now being resourced according to their priority. Together, the active and suspended cases involve 108 potential accused and an estimated 34 new indictments, approximately half of which might appropriately be dealt with by national courts. The deadline is still to complete the outstanding investigations by 2004. There is an interesting possibility for an ICTY exit strategy - namely, as I have just suggested, that some cases might be referred to courts in the former Yugoslavia for prosecution. The Tribunal's rule 11 bis already envisages the referral of cases, but it has not yet been used and it is doubtful whether a suitable judicial process exists at the national level.”
2001-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4429 (2001) · source
“If we do that, in my estimation, the close of 2008 might be a realistic date for the end strategy for the trials in the ICTR. If I might now turn to specific issues for the ICTY, I can inform the Council that, in The Hague, we are also planning strategically for the future. Our programme of outstanding investigations, publicly revealed in 1999, is under constant review. Four investigations relating to Kosovo and Macedonia have been added to the original list of 36, bringing the total to 40. A review of the status of these investigations has been carried out in recent weeks. Four have been successfully completed; a further four have been incorporated into other ongoing cases; six have been discontinued; and a further 10 have been identified as potentially suitable for prosecution at the national level.”
2001-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4429 (2001) · source
“In the Office of the Prosecutor we are prepared to aim at such a date, even if that means adjusting the content and presentation of the later trials accordingly. I am determined to address the quality and focus of our prosecutions. I have already set about changing the whole approach of my staff so that the emphasis at all times is on making the best use of resources. We must ensure that all activity, both in investigations and in prosecutions, is especially directed towards meeting the evidential and legal needs of the Chambers. I am resolved to present cases with much greater precision and focus than in the past and to explore all available avenues to speed up the proceedings without losing the essential fairness of the trial process.”
2001-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4429 (2001) · source
“In addition, individual cases are constantly reviewed as to their viability and suspended or discontinued if need be. No reason or principle can be found based on the public interest in the pursuit of justice that would justify a radical departure from the existing policy. But I hope we shall not come to that point. Ad litem judges are required to deal swiftly with existing business, irrespective of the future court programme. If the capacity of the Tribunal were to be increased for this reason, there would certainly be a substantial shortening of the Tribunal's life. I agree with the estimate that existing trials could probably be completed by the end of 2004, and that the remaining trials could be dealt with by the end of 2008.”
2001-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4429 (2001) · source
“The success of those inquiries will be especially affected by the degree of support we have from the Rwandan Government. The extent of their collaboration remains to be seen. We also intend to move away from our policy of sealed indictments to a policy of greater use of circulating arrest warrants openly through the INTERPOL red notice procedure and taking advantage of reward programmes for information leading to arrests. We are particularly interested in the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and have begun to explore with the authorities in Kinshasa whether we can trace suspects there. It is essential that we do so. I believe that in these circumstances my investigative strategy is fully justified by the facts. I am satisfied that cases are being carefully and properly selected for prosecution in the international forum.”
2001-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4429 (2001) · source
“This year, we are largely on course to meet our investigative targets. Nineteen cases are reaching the indictment stage now, and 21 other investigations are ongoing. It is true that some of these are suspects who were involved at the local level, but to cite just a single example, one of these targets is believed to be implicated in the killing of between 20,000 and 30,000 people. That demonstrates the scale of the crimes we are continuing to address in Rwanda, even in our new cases. For those ongoing investigations, we will depend upon the close cooperation of States, including Rwanda itself. One new area that we are addressing concerns allegations of crimes committed during 1994 by members of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) forces.”
2001-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4429 (2001) · source