YouSaid · the spoken record

Dmitry Polyanskiy

lines on the record
257
first
2020-04-07
most recent
2021-05-12
sittings or episodes
33
sources
un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

  1. We recall that the provision of such aid must not be biased in character. We are convinced that the problem of the SFO SAFER oil tanker can also be the subject of a decision that is free of any political motivation. We call on the actors involved, including the United Nations Office for Project Services, to take onboard one another’s interests and act in a constructive spirit. In conclusion, let me emphasize that the process of a political settlement in Yemen directly impacts upon the entire region. For the purposes of de-escalation, we call on our colleagues to engage in constructive interaction that promotes peace and stability, including on the basis of the resolution 598 (1987) and the Russian collective security concept, which envisages an inclusive and collective approach to problem-solving.

    2021-05-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/465 (2021) · source

  2. We intend to further support the relevant United Nations efforts and the tireless work of Special Envoy Griffiths. We encourage President Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi Mansour and the leadership of the Ansar Allah movement to act constructively and be ready to make a compromise when addressing the existing controversies. Humanitarian assistance to the population of Yemen must be a priority track of our joint efforts. We are concerned that a lack of financing impedes the implementation of United Nations programmes for the provision of basic assistance, including those focusing on food security, access to water and medical services, which are in high demand amid the pandemic. In this context, we call on donors to enhance the much-needed financial support for United Nations humanitarian assistance.

    2021-05-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/465 (2021) · source

  3. In this context, we welcomed the recent proposals by the Saudi leadership for a peaceful settlement of the crisis and called upon the opposing sides to look into those proposals thoroughly. We stated it previously, and our position remains the same: the prolonged armed confrontation in the country must end to give way to sustainable stability and national consensus. We remain convinced that a comprehensive and lasting settlement in Yemen is possible once the interests of all leading political forces in the country are adequately accounted for. The lifting of the sea, air and land blockade of separate territories would largely contribute to this goal, as well as other urgent steps aimed at improving the critical socioeconomic and humanitarian situation in Yemen.

    2021-05-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/465 (2021) · source

  4. We thank Special Envoy Martin Griffiths and Under-Secretary-General Mark Lowcock for the comprehensive reviews they presented of the situation in Yemen. We are closely following the acute military and political crisis in the Republic of Yemen, which, regrettably, has now lasted for more than six years. We are particularly concerned by the situation around Ma’rib. Continuing attacks on civil facilities — including on the territory of Saudi Arabia — are very worrisome. We strongly urge all parties to uphold the provisions of international humanitarian law, put an immediate and complete end to combat activities that ruin non-military infrastructure and lead to victims among civilians and to seek ways to settle the conflict by political and diplomatic means.

    2021-05-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/465 (2021) · source

  5. Again I have to begin my statement with words of regret regarding the virtual format of this meeting. In the eyes of the global community, our working in front of our personal computers looks strange given the sustainable positive dynamic in the epidemiological situation in New York. Nothing bars the members of the Security Council from resuming the practice of in-person meetings in the Council Chamber, which meets all the social distancing requirements. We call on our Security Council colleagues to remember that the Council must set an example and also set the tone of efforts to maintain international peace and security, rather than hide behind a virtual format. We strongly request the Chinese presidency to show initiative and take the Council back to its traditional modus operandi.

    2021-05-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/465 (2021) · source

  6. We call on all external stakeholders interested in stabilization in Iraq to refrain from taking actions that might negatively affect the situation in that country. We appreciate Baghdad’s efforts to build good relations with its neighbours. Hopefully, Iraq and other regional actors will deliver on their diplomatic potential in order to collectively promote peace and stability in the entire Middle East region on the basis of resolution 598 (1987) and the corresponding Russian position.

    2021-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/474 (2021) · source

  7. One of priority tasks of Prime Minister Al-Kadhimi’s Cabinet is to prepare for early parliamentary elections scheduled for October. We expect Iraq’s leading political forces to achieve the much-needed unity on that issue. We welcome that Iraqis addressed the Security Council with a request to engage UNAMI in monitoring the parliamentary elections. In view of the extension of the UNAMI mandate, we are ready to have a targeted discussion on that issue in the Council. The commitment of Baghdad and Kuwait City to promptly resolve all the outstanding issues in the Iraq-Kuwait file and the stable positive momentum of this process deserve our special support. We reaffirm our consistent position that Iraq must not turn into an arena for regional confrontation.

    2021-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/474 (2021) · source

  8. Socioeconomic and humanitarian aspects of the situation in Iraq require the attention and assistance of the global community, especially in the light of the pandemic and the need to restore areas devastated by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. We therefore welcome the adoption of the 2021 budget, which will help resolve several pressing issues, among them the organization of elections, the distribution of oil revenues and the implementation of social projects. Combating terrorism remains highly relevant. Despite Iraq’s progress in counter-terrorism, the security situation in the country remains fragile, inter alia due to a resurgence of underground terrorism. All those involved in the fight against terrorism in Iraq must remain committed to sovereignty of the Iraqi State and coordinate their actions with Baghdad.

    2021-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/474 (2021) · source

  9. We again reiterate our support for the activities of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) across all aspects of its mandate. We are concerned about the numerous challenges that friendly Iraq faces. The deteriorating socioeconomic situation is inciting protests among the population. The state of affairs is further exacerbated by decreasing State revenues caused by plummeting oil prices and the spread of the coronavirus disease. Against that backdrop, underground terrorist units continue conducting raids. We support the efforts of the Iraqi Government, under the leadership of Prime Minister Al-Kadhimi, to improve the situation in Iraq by ensuring safety and law and order in the country. At the same time, we understand that the authorities are facing problems that cannot be solved overnight.

    2021-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/474 (2021) · source

  10. At the outset, let me express our deep regret that we again have to convene a meeting in an informal video-teleconference format, since nothing keeps us from returning to in-person meetings in the Security Council Chamber that meet all social- distancing requirements related to the coronavirus pandemic. The epidemiological situation in New York is gradually improving and the city is getting back to normal. Nevertheless, the hesitation of some of our colleagues to return to in-person meetings puts at risk the Security Council’s. We request the Chinese presidency to make efforts to ensure that the Council can get back to its traditional form of work without further delay. We thank Ms. Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq, for her briefing.

    2021-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/474 (2021) · source

  11. As we are seeing, the truth is hard to hide — it will come to light all the same. Thus their tricks, including those used today, will lead to nothing. Instead, let us enhance trust and cooperation within the OPCW. To repurpose a phrase of an American President, let us make OPCW great again.

    2021-05-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/446 (2021) · source

  12. Of course, there were no chemical weapons there, and everything that followed was meant to twist the facts and make them fit the Western agenda. I call on the United States to adopt a constructive approach and to stop politicizing the OPCW and using it as a tool to punish. Again, only six Security Council members supported their decision. And that is not a bad result for them, because real scepticism about what Western States are up to regarding the OPCW is only growing. It is not one or two unknown specialists who have questions for Director-General Arias and the Technical Secretariat. My colleagues know about the letter of the “Courage Foundation”; they are aware of the position of former Director-General Bustani, whom they tried to deprive of a say at the Security Council.

    2021-05-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/446 (2021) · source

  13. That is simply not true. We repeatedly refuted those allegations, as is well known. In the meantime, it would be great if they could explain why the United States, the United Kingdom and France had hit the alleged chemical weapons-production facilities in Syria before the inspectors could work with it. If the inspection team was about to arrive, would it not have been better to ensure the best possible conditions for its work? Instead, in the absence of any facts or concrete evidence, they bombed the facilities they alleged were used to manufacture chemical weapons. Thus, in the first place, they may have destroyed evidence. Moreover, if we suppose for a second that there were chemical weapons at that location, by bombing it they exposed Syria to the risk of a chemical disaster.

    2021-05-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/446 (2021) · source

  14. Is the United States against the CWC being effective? Their words imply as much. What they said about the Douma incident was a very weak attempt. The report of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria (FFM) is not the only one to which we draw attention. In my statement, I addressed at least three reports that we have questions about, and, in fact, there are more. All of them have one and the same problem: they were prepared in violation of the working principles of the Technical Secretariat that I mentioned. First of all, those are principles relating to the collection of data and evidence. For example, the Saraqib report contains the same irregularities as the Douma report. Of course, it will be just as unconvincing and useless as the one on Douma. My colleague from the United States blamed us for impeding the visit of the FFM team.

    2021-05-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/446 (2021) · source

  15. But it must be understood that, apart from being adopted, the decision will need to be implemented. In fact, fewer States supported it, which means there will be problems at the implementation stage. Consensus is not mandatory, but it is a good tradition, and consensus-based decisions are far more likely to be successfully implemented. Instead of seeking consensus, the United States and the co-sponsors did their best to destroy it. In my statement I mentioned the catches and provocations that were employed to adopt this decision in violation of the CWC norms and practices. They ruined the consensus instead of “mending” the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and helping it carry on with its mandate. It is they, not we, who politicize the OPCW. Again, all we are calling for is observance of the CWC.

    2021-05-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/446 (2021) · source

  16. To be frank, when he took the floor I rejoiced, because I thought he was going to answer the question I had asked regarding the words of Mr. Aaron Maté, who, by the way, is a fellow United States citizen and a competent expert. However, the representative preferred not to answer, instead seeking to cast a shadow, totally unsuccessfully, over my statement. On the contrary, what he said only proves that he sought to depict the decision adopted by the Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention as one of consensus among almost the entire global community. I call on our colleagues from the United States to stop these attempts, because they are unconvincing and pitiful. Yes, the decision formally complied with Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) requirements.

    2021-05-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/446 (2021) · source

  17. The Security Council cannot afford to be a passive bystander, watching as one of the pillars of the non-proliferation regime for weapons of mass destruction is destroyed by politicization. Restoring trust in the OPCW and strengthening its authority must be our shared goal. We hope that all sensible members of the Council will support us to that end. As for the anti-Syrian decision so vigorously promoted by our colleague from the United States, it is a step in the opposite direction. Second statement by the First Deputy Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, Dmitry Polyanskiy [Original: Russian] In response to the representative of the United States, I would like to react to the attempt by my colleague from the United States to shift responsibility — a good try, if unconvincing.

    2021-05-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/446 (2021) · source

  18. It would be enough if its Technical Secretariat dealt with its mandated tasks — namely, monitoring observance of CWC provisions and carrying out professional and unbiased investigations — and if States parties did not interfere with the work of the Technical Secretariat. In other words, strict compliance with the CWC would be enough, because its provisions clearly state what I just said. Observance of the CWC is all Russia is calling for. That is why it is even stranger to hear our Western colleagues blame us for “shattering and undermining the OPCW authority”. According to their logic, the organization would harm itself if it observed the Chemical Weapons Convention. Rather twisted logic, is it not? We are striving to restore the OPCW’s good name and seeking answers to questions relevant to everyone.

    2021-05-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/446 (2021) · source

  19. During our Arria Formula video-teleconference in April, he addressed the representatives of the United States of America and the United Kingdom, asking if they would support the fraud around the FFM report being taken up by the OPCW Scientific Advisory Board, with the participation of the original team of experts. I recall that, under paragraph 45 of article VIII of the CWC, the OPCW Director-General is responsible for the activities of that Board. We promised Aaron that we would repeat his question at a formal Security Council meeting. Hopefully, our colleagues will answer it today. In conclusion, let me underscore that it would not take much to improve the prevailing dire situation in the OPCW.

    2021-05-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/446 (2021) · source

  20. There is an outrageous double standard with regard to Syria and unacceptable politicizing of independent mechanisms designed to promote the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Let me stress that Russia, as a responsible State member of the OPCW, categorically condemns the use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere and for any purpose. We have supported the OPCW since its creation, which we were part of. That is why we are determined to ensure that all developments are clarified. There have been too many questions. The widespread violations, particularly with regard to the Douma investigation, call into question the validity of any further conclusions of the Technical Secretariat inspection missions. Mr. Aaron Maté, whom I already mentioned today, briefed the Council twice regarding the Douma incident.

    2021-05-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/446 (2021) · source

  21. Nakamitsu to address the issue I raised. We cannot let the OPCW or any other specialized international platform become a tool to punish the undesirable by making baseless accusations with regard to the use of weapons of mass destruction. Any State can end up in Syria’s place if Western colleagues decide to use the chemical leverage against them. One must only look at the most recent report of the United States Department of State on the implementation of the CWC. The report cites not only Syria, but also Iran, Myanmar and even China among the violators. However, while assuming the role of judge, our American colleagues do not mention that the State that possesses the largest chemical weapon stockpiles, and is in no hurry to get rid of them, is the United States itself.

    2021-05-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/446 (2021) · source

  22. We expect the leadership of the OPCW to provide exhaustive explanations of why the Technical Secretariat, which is said to deal with purely technical analysis, would so blatantly go beyond its mandate and engage in unabashed speculations. It would only be logical if this and many other questions that we asked in December 2020 and that received no response were answered by the Head of the OPCW, Director General Arias himself. By the way, he was scheduled to participate in today’s meeting, but he declined on the pretext of being busy. In the light of this, I would kindly request the upcoming Estonian presidency to send Mr. Arias an invitation to the next meeting on resolution 2118 (2013) in June well in advance, and to find a date that would fit into his schedule. In the absence of Director General Arias, I would request Ms.

    2021-05-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/446 (2021) · source

  23. Luhan in 2013 that the OPCW would never study samples that had been collected by anyone other than OPCW inspectors in the field. What do we see today? The Technical Secretariat is openly violating its own principles and does not hesitate to admit it in its report. How then can we trust its work at all? As if all that were not enough, the new IIT report contains an element that goes beyond any conceivable limits. One paragraph of the report states that one of the most probable motives for the launch of the chlorine airstrike was to establish “a ‘punishment’ for the downing of the Russian aircraft Su-25”. The IIT draws this conclusion with reference to an anonymous military expert.

    2021-05-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/446 (2021) · source

  24. From the point of view of basic common sense, let alone military tactics, why would Damascus use chlorine in Saraqib and set itself up for international criticism if it would yield no military or other advantage? And I am not even raising other small, but glaring inconsistencies. Suffice it to mention the cylinder, half of which corroded within 12 hours after hitting the ground. We have many such questions, and we will present them in detail once our experts have completed their analysis. Let me remind you of the quote by former OPCW spokesperson Michael Luhan, to which independent journalist Aaron Maté referred at a Security Council Arria Formula video-teleconference on 16 April. Mr. Mate recalled a statement by Mr.

    2021-05-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/446 (2021) · source

  25. First, based on the report, it appears that the IIT never visited the scene of the incident. All the evidence was collected by the infamous “White Helmets” non- governmental organizations. What chain of custody can we talk about? Half of the witnesses who were questioned are “White Helmets”. Secondly, chlorine causes more damage when used on a massive scale. During the First World War, in order to inflict greater damage on the French army, Germany had to use 180 tons of chlorine. In its Saraqib investigation, the IIT cites the use of just one cylinder of chlorine, which allegedly caused minor injuries to 12 people, all of whom were discharged from the hospital within two hours of admission.

    2021-05-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/446 (2021) · source

  26. And so this document was the formal basis for the decision to suspend the rights of Damascus in the OPCW. Let me draw your attention to another prediction of ours that has also come true. You may remember that, since early 2021, we have been saying that by the time the April session of the Conference of the States Parties begins, the IIT will have come up with another propaganda product so as to stir up anti-Syrian sentiment. That is exactly what has happened. Prior to the vote in The Hague, the IIT “threw in” another report — on the incident in Saraqib in February 2018. In order to get an idea of the quality of the report, it is enough to say that it repeats all the mistakes that have been repeatedly ripped apart in the FFM report on Douma and the first IIT report. I will offer specific examples.

    2021-05-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/446 (2021) · source

  27. The culmination of these intrigues is the creation of an illegitimate Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) in the Technical Secretariat, thereby defying the long- standing norms and practices of the OPCW — first and foremost, the principle of consensus. Like the FFM, the IIT has disregarded the principles of investigations, especially those pertaining to the collection of evidence and preservation of physical evidence and has produced a report replete with factual and technical errors, accusing the Syrian authorities of using chemical weapons on two occasions. The report does not stand up to criticism. Nevertheless, the Technical Secretariat leadership turns a blind eye to the opinions of renowned experts about this report and about the report on Douma as well.

    2021-05-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/446 (2021) · source

  28. Over the course of several years, the work of the Technical Secretariat’s inspection teams has been paving the way for this punitive decision of the Conference of the States Parties. As we know from the witnesses — former OPCW inspectors, who have spoken of that in the Security Council and elsewhere — the leadership of the Technical Secretariat has been doing this under the pressure from Western delegations. As a result, outrageous violations were committed, as repeatedly attested to by the independent experts, during the investigations of the incidents in Khan Shaykhun in April 2017 and Douma in April 2018; the findings of the Fact-Finding Mission in Syria (FFM) regarding this incident were blatantly falsified, and the dissidents who refused to participate in this fabrication were openly suppressed and intimidated.

    2021-05-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/446 (2021) · source

  29. It is the first time a sovereign State that faithfully complies with the CWC has been incapacitated by the OPCW. It severely undermines the credibility of the OPCW, and the consequences of this reckless step have yet to be realized. Could it be that the instigators of the anti- Syrian campaign intended to make Syria a pariah in the OPCW? After all that has happened, are they planning to conduct business as usual with Damascus? The goal of the Western sponsors of this decision has now become even clearer. No, they do not want to ensure that no one ever uses chemical weapons on Syrian territory. Their real goal is to provoke Damascus to take rash steps and, in so doing, achieve their own political objectives. We have warned that this idea was carefully premeditated.

    2021-05-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/446 (2021) · source

  30. Our Western colleagues are already boasting about the statistics, as we have just heard from the representative of the United States, but in fact fewer than a half of OPCW member States voted in favour of this document. With regard to support for Russia’s position, dear Richard Mills, Deputy Permanent Representative of the United States, I would like to underscore that only six members, all of whom represent Western States, of the current composition of the Security Council voted in favour of the decision. The others either abstained or voted against it. Quite a number of former members of the Council who were present at Council discussions of the Syrian chemical issue last year and know the situation well took the same position. As the saying goes, no comment is necessary. This was a totally unprecedented decision.

    2021-05-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/446 (2021) · source

  31. At its twenty-fifth session, held in April, the Conference of the State Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, with the encouragement of Western delegations, adopted the decision to suspend the rights of the Syrian Arab Republic in the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). To achieve that, our Western colleagues once again violated the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) norms and the OPCW’s long-standing practice of consensus. This draft decision was presented to the Conference of the States Parties and put to vote there without prior consideration by the Executive Council, as required under the Chemical Weapons Convention.

    2021-05-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/446 (2021) · source

  32. First of all, let me say how disappointed we are to be having this meeting in video-teleconference format once again. We are firmly convinced that there is nothing preventing us from returning to in-person meetings. The best location for meetings is the Security Council Chamber, which meets all social distancing requirements related to the coronavirus disease pandemic. Meeting there in person would send an important and much-anticipated signal to the global community. We kindly request the Chinese presidency to take immediate steps so that we can resume our traditional forms and methods of work. Unfortunately, what we predicted at the previous meeting on this agenda item (see S/2021/337) has come true.

    2021-05-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/446 (2021) · source

  33. In conclusion, I would like to express our deepest regret regarding the major technical issues that occurred during this video-teleconference, mostly impacting our American colleagues. This clearly demonstrates that the Security Council cannot fully rely on the Internet in its work. We trust this is a good reason for all of us to finally make a decision to resume our in-person meetings in the Security Council Chamber. As you know, Russia has consistently uphold this position since October last year. We call on the Vietnamese presidency and its Chinese successor take practical steps to resolve this long-overdue question.

    2021-04-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/404 (2021) · source

  34. Palestinians need assistance in responding to acute humanitarian and socioeconomic problems on the occupied territories and in Gaza, especially amid the spread of the coronavirus disease. It is particularly important that Palestinians and Israelis engage in the interests of countering the pandemic, including in the context of vaccination. We attach great importance to the continuation of the effective work of United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), which renders support to Palestinians both on the occupied territories and in the neighbouring Arab States. We call on the international community to mobilize resources to support the Agency. Russia provides assistance both to UNRWA and to Palestinians bilaterally.

    2021-04-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/404 (2021) · source

  35. This is especially relevant in the light of the recent elections in Israel and those forthcoming in the Palestinian territories. We hope that the electoral process will foster internal consolidation on both sides, including regarding the need to relaunch negotiations. We proceed from the understanding that Palestinians throughout the entire territory must be guaranteed a right to elect and be elected. We note the positive impact of the elections on overcoming the internal Palestinian disagreement on the Palestine Liberation Organization platform, as well as the role of our Egyptian friends in this regard. We are ready to provide assistance to these efforts. We are concerned over Israel’s continuing settlement activity, including in East Jerusalem. It undermines the prospects of creating a territorially contiguous Palestinian State.

    2021-04-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/404 (2021) · source

  36. For our part, we are taking steps to support the collective efforts aimed at achieving equitable peace in the Middle East. We continue to engage with all interested stakeholders in the region, the Security Council and the Quartet of international mediators. Among other things, we are negotiating the convening of a ministerial meeting of the Quartet as well as organizing a meeting in the “Quartet plus” format, which would outline key tracks for our joint work aimed at overcoming the standstill in the Middle East peace process. Also, we believe it reasonable to support the initiative of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to convene an international conference on the Middle Eastern peace process. We call on the sides to exercise restraint and refrain from any provocative steps that may undermine the settlement efforts.

    2021-04-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/404 (2021) · source

  37. We thank Special Coordinator Tor Wennesland and Director of the Coordination Division of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Rein Paulsen for briefing us on the status of the Middle East peace process and the humanitarian situation in the Palestinian territories. We advocate for finding a just solution to the Palestinian problem on the basis of the two-State principle and the internationally recognized legal framework for creating an independent Palestinian State within the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. Through direct negotiations, the sides should also agree on other final-status aspects, including the problems of borders, refugees and water resources. Israel’s security concerns must be taken into account in this process.

    2021-04-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/404 (2021) · source

  38. The relative peace in the country is too fragile whereas the number of factors that are negatively affecting prospects for peace are increasing. That is why the Secretary-General, the Security Council and the guarantors of Colombia’s peace process are directing their efforts at the consistent implementation of the peacebuilding tasks stipulated in the Final Agreement. International support for that historic accord involves trusting the Colombian people to strictly abide by the provisions of the agreement. As a member of the Permanent Five, Russia is ready to render further assistance to the Colombian peace process in order to make it sustainable and irreversible.

    2021-04-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/401 (2021) · source

  39. Sustainable peace cannot come to Colombia unless all key stakeholders embark on the path thereto. As concerns the initiative to extend the mandate of the Mission and mandate it to monitor the implementation of certain separate decisions of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, we took note of the information that was shared in a letter from the Secretary-General dated 25 February. The Council also discussed that issue repeatedly. We assume that at this point we have a shared understanding of the fact that such a step is needed, especially now that we have a corresponding direct dialogue between the Colombian sides. In conclusion, the report indicates that it would be premature to state that the peace process in Colombia is irreversible.

    2021-04-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/401 (2021) · source

  40. Once again, we were rather perplexed to see that the report mentions the challenges that the LGBT community faces. We do not quite understand what that information has to do with the peace process and overcoming the consequences of the internal armed conflict. The Council would derive greater benefit from receiving information about social security and the safety of families with children where the breadwinner has been the victim of the conflict or an attack. Single-parent families represent a truly vulnerable group in a post-conflict environment. In addition, the report gives scant information on the resolution of disputes between the Government and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional with regard to the resumption of direct dialogue without preconditions.

    2021-04-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/401 (2021) · source

  41. At the same time, the implementation of the agreement itself is proceeding too slowly. The same can be said about, inter alia, the comprehensive land reform under way, land allocation, crop substitution and the work of the National Reintegration Council. We believe that Colombia’s Government and society should focus primarily on the implementation of the provisions of the agreement. Failing that, the prospects of lasting peace in Colombia will remain ever more elusive. I turn now to the report and the work of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia. It is well known that unresolved security issues can drive people to take up arms once again. That is why we believe that it is important that report reflect the evolving number of so-called dissidents. Those figures can be indicative of the effectiveness of the peace process.

    2021-04-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/401 (2021) · source

  42. One of the most urgent issues is ensuring the safety and security of civilians, including participants in the peace process, their family members and representatives of civil society. We regret that murder statistics have not declined and that insufficient progress has been made in related investigations. In addition, the crime rate has increased, causing the environment to deteriorate in previously safer districts. Security threats are so high that in January-February this year 13,500 people were forcibly displaced, as noted in the report. For comparison, that number equals as many people as all those officially enrolled in the peace process. Members of the Security Council receive regular information on the progress that Colombia’s Government achieved in carrying out those programmes that are not stipulated in the agreement.

    2021-04-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/401 (2021) · source

  43. We call on the Colombian sides to maintain constructive contacts at all levels in order to ensure transparency at all steps and their compliance with the letter and spirit of the agreement. Unilateral measures that have not been agreed on cannot advance the peace process. That point is valid for each out of five priority tracks that the Secretary-General highlighted in his report and that cover almost all aspects of the settlement. We agree with the statement in the report to the effect that the progress made on those five tracks is insufficient. We are counting on Bogotá to make additional efforts within its obligations under the agreement to improve the situation.

    2021-04-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/401 (2021) · source

  44. Let me recall that the agreement put an end to the half-century-long internal armed conflict and could receive broad international support owing to the fact that it was the outcome of a painstaking direct dialogue and the concrete agreements reached by the Colombian parties, with the United Nations Mission there to observe their implementation. That historic document should not be perceived as a unilateral statement of intention, and therefore its implementation must be accompanied by a continual dialogue among its signatories. In that context, we welcome the meeting between President Duque Márquez and the leader of the Comunes party, Rodrigo Londoño, on 10 March, as well as the decision to extend the mandate of the trilateral Commission for the Follow-up, Promotion and Verification of the Implementation of the Final Peace Agreement.

    2021-04-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/401 (2021) · source

  45. We thank the Head of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, Carlos Ruiz Massieu, for presenting the report of the Secretary-General (S/2021/298) on the situation in that country. Unfortunately, the report confirms the lack of progress in the implementation of the key provisions of the Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace, which the Security Council mandated the Mission to monitor. That is cause for growing concern, especially in view of the pending electoral cycle.

    2021-04-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/401 (2021) · source

  46. We therefore call on the donors, including in the region, to enhance the required financial support for United Nations programmes that are providing basic assistance, including those ensuring food security for the population and non-discriminatory access to clean water and medical services. We are convinced that mutually acceptable solutions, free from any political implications, can also help solve the problem of the FSO SAFER tanker. The entire Persian Gulf area needs to de-escalate. We therefore recall that the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the Russian collective security concept can lay the groundwork for advancing the international efforts aimed at stabilizing this subregion.

    2021-04-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/372 (2021) · source

  47. The numerous humanitarian challenges cannot be addressed effectively unless there is progress on the political track. That includes lifting the sea, air and land blockade of the country and other urgent practical steps aimed at improving the critical socioeconomic situation. Broad-based assistance from the international community is needed to counter famine and disease. We are concerned over United Nations reports that since March 2021 Yemen has witnessed an increase in the incidence coronavirus disease and related deaths. According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance, the 2021 humanitarian response plan for Yemen has been financed only to the level of 13 per cent.

    2021-04-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/372 (2021) · source

  48. We are going to further support the corresponding efforts of the Special Envoy and encourage President Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi Mansour and the leaders of Ansar Allah movement to stick to a constructive approach and be ready for compromise. We welcome the constructive role of States of the region, including Oman, in the mediation efforts. An important step towards promoting the implementation of the Riyadh agreement of 5 November 2019, which was designed to normalize the situation in the south of Yemen, was taken in December 2020 when a new coalition Government was formed to include representatives of the Southern Transitional Council. We hope that the implementation of the agreements mentioned will enhance public safety and security and allow for a focus on acute socioeconomic and humanitarian problems in that part of Yemen.

    2021-04-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/372 (2021) · source

  49. We welcome the initiative of Saudi Arabia aimed at a peaceful resolution of the crisis through terminating armed action, resuming operations at the Sana’a International Airport, allowing humanitarian and commercial vessels to enter the Al-Hudaydah port and starting inter-Yemeni negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations that should define the future political structure of the country. This initiative is in line with the previously announced plan of Special Envoy Griffiths. We proceed from the understanding that a comprehensive long-term settlement of the conflict can be achieved once the interests of all key political forces in Yemen are taken into account.

    2021-04-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/372 (2021) · source

  50. We thank Special Envoy of the Secretary-General Martin Griffiths and Under Secretary-General Mark Lowcock for the reviews of the political and humanitarian situations in Yemen. Unfortunately, the negative trends still persist in Yemen, and there has been no breakthrough that would bring closer the political settlement of the crisis. We are concerned over the continuing escalation in Ma’rib, reported armed action in other parts of the country as well as strikes against the territory of Saudi Arabia. We once again call on the sides to look for political and diplomatic solutions in order to resolve the conflict.

    2021-04-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/372 (2021) · source