YouSaid · the spoken record

Dmitry Polyanskiy

lines on the record: 257
first: 2020-04-07
most recent: 2021-05-12
sittings or episodes: 33
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“Is it the doctor who provides diagnoses and treatments, often including procedures that are unpleasant for the patient, or is it the person who convinces the patient, contrary to objective facts, that they are perfectly healthy? Unfortunately, the OPCW is not healthy. Let us find the right treatment together. In conclusion, I would like to assure the Security Council that we intend to continue fighting to restore trust in the OPCW and strengthen its authority, defend the foundations of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction regime and actively oppose misinformation and blatant lies. In all that, we count on the support of every one of our colleagues in the Security Council.”
2021-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/22 (2021) · source
“In fact, the problem is much broader and of a systemic nature; indeed, the crisis of confidence in what was once a most authoritative international organizations, which is unfortunately turning into an instrument of political manipulation and punishment for those who are not to the liking of some, is gaining momentum. That is an extremely dangerous trend, and we have a collective responsibility to counter it. The OPCW is gravely ill with politicization, and those who call for it to be ignored are only exacerbating the situation. I would like to ask our colleagues who are so fond of accusing Russia of trying to undermine the credibility of the OPCW: who really wants to do good for the patient?”
2021-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/22 (2021) · source
“In order to avoid misunderstandings, I would like to stress that Russia, like any other responsible State member of the OPCW, categorically condemns the use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere, for any purpose whatsoever. That is why it is important for us to ensure that the organization is capable of fully discharging its mandate. The problem is global and not limited to Syria. The Syrian chemical investigation was a kind of litmus test that revealed all the problems that complicate the current work of the OPCW Technical Secretariat.”
2021-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/22 (2021) · source
“In short, there is every reason to believe that Syria’s initial declaration is not exceptional and the agitation around it is being artificially created by the OPCW Technical Secretariat and Western delegations. We therefore called on Director- General Arias in December to explain why the Technical Secretariat is blatantly resorting to double standards by forgiving minor flaws in the initial declarations of some countries while inciting accusations against others. We have not received any response. Instead, we see in the report another allegation that Syria does not cooperate actively enough with the OPCW in resolving the issue.”
2021-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/22 (2021) · source
“Our German colleagues in particular, who are known to make the most strident anti-Syrian objections at the Security Council, themselves belatedly declared, in 2013, a facility in which nitrogen mustard gas was produced in 2011 and 2012. The alleged reason for the omission was that Berlin was unaware of the OPCW requirements. As Council members can see, no one is immune from making mistakes. As for the problems with initial declarations, we need only mention that some 500 undeclared munitions were found in Libya in 2012, while Iraq’s initial declaration was not confirmed at all and was made only on the basis of available United Nations documents. However, in those cases, the OPCW Technical Secretariat overlooked the errors in those countries’ initial declarations.”
2021-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/22 (2021) · source
“However, as a general comment, I would like to point out that, according to the established practice of the OPCW, the initial declaration is a dynamic instrument. The “redeclaration” of stockpiles happens all the time and is not an anomaly. Old, abandoned chemical weapons or chemical agents used for riot control can always turn up. There are many examples of that. My United States colleague is surely aware of the fact that the United States regularly updates its declaration, which has caused its declared stockpiles to grow steadily, although only slightly. Canada, Belgium, France, Germany and other countries do the same.”
2021-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/22 (2021) · source
“I would also like to recall the same expert’s assessment that in the initial stage of joining the Chemical Weapons Convention, many of the signatory States, when filing their declarations, had problems similar to those Syria has experienced, but those problems were treated as minor shortcomings that did not prevent the signatory States from confirming the integrity of their declarations. I will not now go into the details of the issues surrounding the initial declaration as such, since the debate on the subject is the prerogative of The Hague, where the necessary technical expertise is available. Such expertise does not exist at the United Nations Secretariat, so it is doubly incomprehensible to us why it is pushing that topic so vigorously.”
2021-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/22 (2021) · source
“We hope that the majority of delegations at the Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in April 2021 will refuse to participate in that provocation and that the essentially punitive decision initiated by a group of Western countries will not pass. As for the Director-General’s report on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013), we are seriously concerned that it also contains accusatory passages about outstanding issues from the original declaration. As we learned at the Arria Formula meeting from the former OPCW inspector I mentioned, Ian Henderson, the Technical Secretariat management gave explicit instructions to the Declaration Assessment Team to keep the investigation open. Following that approach, no matter how the Syrians justify themselves, the Team will not be allowed to close that part of the file.”
2021-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/22 (2021) · source
“Nevertheless, that highly questionable report formed the basis of the accusatory anti-Syrian decision of the OPCW Executive Council, which was adopted in July 2020 with the minimum number of votes required. That decision ordered the Syrian Arab Republic to comply with obviously impossible conditions — to declare the remaining chemical weapons and related facilities that it was alleged to have, but which Syria simply does not have. Naturally, the country was unable to comply with that ultimatum. As a result, our Western colleagues are now trying to initiate the process of undermining Syria’s rights at the OPCW.”
2021-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/22 (2021) · source
“The report of the Ltamenah investigation and identification team in 2017 represents a culmination of all the unscrupulous efforts of the Technical Secretariat. It is a politically biased, factually unreliable and technically inconclusive document that has been discredited by experts. We have already set out our detailed criticisms, and our arguments were circulated in a document of the Security Council last June (S/2020/551). However, one does not need to be an expert to understand that the hypothetical use of chemical weapons by Syrian Government forces was not necessary at the time, because in that period the Syrian army was successfully advancing and had already regained control of up to 75 per cent of the territory of the country.”
2021-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/22 (2021) · source
“I urge anyone interested in forming an objective view on that subject to study the submissions made by independent experts at the 28 September 2020 Arria Formula meeting I mentioned previously. They show that the Technical Secretariat conclusions on Khan Shaykhun and Duma violate the elementary laws of physics. I would also ask Council members to note the testimony of Ian Henderson, a former OPCW inspector directly involved in the investigation of the Duma incident, who stated that the Technical Secretariat leadership, under direct pressure from Western countries, “fudged” its conclusions about the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic. Members have the summary of the that Arria Formula meeting and, upon our request, it should shortly be issued as documents of the Security Council and of the General Assembly.”
2021-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/22 (2021) · source
“When some of its most responsible officers, who were not willing to overrule their conscience, sounded the alarm and refused to participate in direct forgery, the Technical Secretariat management resorted to repression, intimidation, distortion of facts and repression of dissenters in every possible way. Yet by early 2021 the evidence of direct fabrication, manipulation and internal irregularities within the OPCW Technical Secretariat itself had grown past a critical point. It would take me hours to list them all. The most glaring examples are the egregious irregularities in the investigations into the Khan Shaykhun incidents in April 2017 and Duma in April 2018.”
2021-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/22 (2021) · source
“At first, we had hopes that it could stick transparently to its technical mandate and investigate in an impartial manner the alleged use of chemical weapons in Syria. Those hopes, however, were quickly dashed. The inconsistencies in the reports of the OPCW Technical Secretariat date back to the very first reports of the Fact-Finding Mission, in which shells were found to have hit ventilation shafts of the same diameter, unguided bombs mysteriously hit the targets from as far as five kilometres from them, instead of hitting them in freefall, and White Helmet activists collected sarin samples with their bare hands. It got even worse. The Technical Secretariat abandoned even the appearance of respecting normal practices and procedures of evidence collection, including the so-called principle of preservation of physical evidence.”
2021-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/22 (2021) · source
“During all those years, a number of States have continued to use the chemical card to build up pressure on the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, which they unsuccessfully tried to overthrow, riding the wave of the so-called Arab Spring. I will not go into details, but the fact is that Western countries continue to make extremely serious accusations against Damascus, citing unconvincing evidence, to put it mildly, such as videos from social networks or “testimonies” of knowingly biased witnesses from the anti-Government opposition or the notorious White Helmets. Yet evidence to the contrary, provided not only by Syria and Russia but also by a number of independent experts and organizations, is persistently ignored. Unfortunately, the OPCW’s Technical Secretariat plays an increasingly negative role in that process.”
2021-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/22 (2021) · source
“Syria voluntarily joined the OPCW, complied with the original declaration under the Chemical Weapons Convention and disposed of all chemical-weapon stockpiles, at Russia’s instigation. In 2014, the Syrian chemical-warfare programme was completely shut down, chemical-weapon stockpiles eliminated and chemical- weapon production facilities destroyed. The OPCW has repeatedly confirmed that. Since then, Syria has cooperated fully with the OPCW, its Technical Secretariat, including the Declaration Assessment Team, and all investigative missions on the ground. Unfortunately, the hopes that all that would help to dispel the accusations against the Syrian leadership with regard to the use of chemical weapons against its population have not been realized.”
2021-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/22 (2021) · source
“As a result, the Director General avoided answering the questions from the audience during the open part of the meeting, even though such an approach runs counter to the normal practice of briefer interventions at the Security Council. We hope that unpleasant situation for the Council will not be repeated. We hope that in the near future Mr. Arias will have the courage to reappear before the Council and answer our questions publicly. The members of the Council who were present at the discussion on 11 December have a list of questions that we plan to recirculate for the information of new members. Let me briefly update the new Council members and explain why the debate on the Syrian chemical dossier is generating so many emotions and opposing views in the Council. Let us look at the facts.”
2021-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/22 (2021) · source
“By insisting on his invitation, we had hoped that the esteemed Director General of the OPCW would finally clarify the issues that have accumulated about the work of the Technical Secretariat of that organization, including the numerous and ever-more resonant inconsistencies and violations concerning the Syrian chemical weapons case. Unfortunately, that did not happen. The Director General confined himself to a formal reiteration of general positions that were already well known. We heard nothing new from him in the open or closed parts of the December event. Besides, Mr. Arias could not deliver a full-fledged briefing, as the open video- teleconference was suddenly interrupted and transferred to a closed format. No one was able to explain why it happened.”
2021-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/22 (2021) · source
“In October, upon Russia’s initiative, the Council heard the assessments of former OPCW Director General José Bustani, a professional with an impeccable reputation and many years of experience in leading the organization. His statement, which we had to read out because of the unconstructive position of Western delegations (see S/PV.8764), gives an objective “cross section” of the internal situation in the OPCW, which is fraught with serious problems with regard to its reputation and effectiveness. For several months we have been advocating for the current OPCW Director General, Fernando Arias, to be invited to the Security Council discussion on the Syrian chemical case, which he avoided for a long time under various pretexts. Finally, in December Mr. Arias spoke before the Council (see S/2020/1202).”
2021-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/22 (2021) · source
“At our initiative, the Council’s meetings on this subject have been open since September, allowing everyone interested in the subject to obtain first-hand information. It is gratifying that not a single member of the Council objected this time. That is certainly a positive signal, an indication that all Council members have realized the importance of a transparent discussion of the subject. Transparency and a non-judgmental, fact-based approach are two of the principles that Russia promoted in the Council throughout 2020 in the context of the Syrian chemical weapons case. To that end, we held an Arria Formula meeting of Security Council members on 28 September, with the participation of independent experts Ian Henderson, Theodore Postol and Aaron Maté.”
2021-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/22 (2021) · source
“I am pleased to welcome you, Sir, to this first Security Council meeting of the New Year. We congratulate our Tunisian colleagues on their assumption of the presidency of the Security Council. I would like to assure you, Mr. President, that you can count on our full support. I would also like to extend a special welcome to the five new non-permanent members as they begin their two-year tour of duty in the Security Council and wish them a successful and productive tenure. I thank Mrs. Izumi Nakamitsu for presenting the eighty-seventh monthly report of the Director General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013) (S/2020/1300, annex). It is highly symbolic that we begin our work this year by discussing the Syrian chemical weapons case in an open format.”
2021-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/22 (2021) · source
“As for the so-called Navalny poisoning case, I should like to remind our German colleagues that both our numerous specific questions to the German side as well as the five official requests for legal assistance from the Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation remain unanswered. It is therefore ridiculous to say that the German side is taking that story seriously. I ask him to please keep that in mind as he plays along with Mr. Navalny’s new phantasmagorical revelations. Sooner or later, that smear campaign unleashed by Berlin at his behest will have to be answered for. Finally, I would like to leave Mr. Heusgen with an aphorism from recently departed writer Mikhail Zhvanetsky: “What a pity that you are finally leaving.” We will honestly miss him. I wish him good luck in whatever career he decides to pursue and all the best.”
2020-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1324 (2020) · source
“We read the press, of course, but we do not take journalists’ claims as the absolute truth, especially when they rely on sources long known to be a kind of journalistic arm of Western intelligence services. We trust only facts that are not in doubt. In this case, however, the degree of absurdity of the journalistic assertions he mentions is simply off the scale. It is even embarrassing that Mr. Heusgen, a political diplomat with a reputation as a serious, yet very emotional, man, would promote such base and unprofessional nonsense. Perhaps the many years of intensive reading of The New York Times is taking its toll. Not everyone’s sanity can handle the strain of fake news. We warned him about that.”
2020-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1324 (2020) · source
“We will continue our work together in the General Assembly and other United Nations organs. Second statement by the First Deputy Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, Dmitry Polyanskiy [Original: Russian] I am compelled to take the floor once again, although I had not planned to do so, to respond to my German colleague, Mr. Christoph Heusgen. During his time on the Security Council, he seems to have developed a peculiar addiction to criticizing Russia at every meeting, even if it is not relevant to the topic at hand. I hope that unhealthy symptom will disappear after 1 January. Mr. Heusgen quite inappropriately mentioned the Navalny blogger story a few minutes ago and recommended that we read the recent piece in Der Spiegel.”
2020-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1324 (2020) · source
“We hope that we will be able to continue that discussion in the near future — not in general terms but with a view to reaching concrete solutions. The Gulf region, it seems to us, is ripe for a pragmatic and reasonable conversation among all interested parties. For our part, we are ready to do everything we can to start such a dialogue as soon as possible. I would like to take this opportunity to thank the delegations of all five countries leaving the Council on 1 January for working together. We are grateful S/2020/1324 for their contribution to the work of the subsidiary bodies of the Security Council that they chaired. It is a pity that we were not able to meet in person, because the occasion undoubtedly warranted it. I wish our colleagues good luck in all of their endeavours.”
2020-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1324 (2020) · source
“Of course, the situation in the Persian Gulf cannot be seen only through the prism of the JCPOA. Steps are needed to strengthen mutual trust among neighbours of the region, prevent crises and mitigate the risk of military clashes. To that end, Russia proposes a regional dialogue on security issues in the Persian Gulf. In October, under our presidency, the Security Council held a separate open meeting on this topic (see S/2020/1037), which allowed us to ascertain that there is a demand from virtually all players for finding real ways to stabilize the situation in the Persian Gulf. Once again, I would like to emphasize that regional security issues are a separate topic, above and beyond the JCPOA situation. However, that does not diminish its importance.”
2020-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1324 (2020) · source
“We hope that the United States side will eventually reach the right conclusions for itself. No one asked the United States to take on the role of world policeman. Today attempts to conform to it look anachronistic. So does an irresponsible and arrogant policy of unilateral pressure that will ultimately backfire on its practitioner. That is why the most logical step for the United States would be to fully and unconditionally return to the agreements previously reached under the JCPOA, without preconditions. We trust that the new United States Administration will realize that and take the right steps in the near future. The whole world would benefit from that. We also pay tribute to the statement of the Iranian leadership that it is ready to return immediately to the full implementation of the JCPOA as soon as the United States does so.”
2020-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1324 (2020) · source
“That is what led to the strict factual reporting of the work of the format. We know that compromise on the Facilitator’s most recent report (see S/2020/1244) was not easy. We cannot say that the final version can be considered fully balanced, as the text would have needed to reflect Tehran’s position more fully and fairly. We hope that the future Facilitator will consider those shortcomings and serve as an honest broker by giving the parties equal opportunity to express their views in the report. In Russia there is a saying: “it is much easier to break than to build”. Over the past six months, we have seen with our own eyes the fragile balance of interests and checks and balances that underpin the 2015 nuclear deal. So far, we have been able to preserve the deal through our joint efforts.”
2020-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1324 (2020) · source
“The Secretary-General’s report has further illuminated the futility of attempts to expose Iran’s violations of annex B of resolution 2231 (2015) on the special procedure for arms transfers to and from Iran, as well as of the section on missiles. In that regard, we would like to emphasize once again that attempts to portray Iran as the source of all troubles in the region and a threat to its security lack any clear justification. If we do not provoke Iran and do not exacerbate the situation, then the problems in the region would be considerably fewer. We are grateful to the Belgian Facilitator for his efforts to organize the work of the 2231 format. The period of his mandate has been extremely turbulent. However, Belgian diplomacy has proved effective in taking very seriously its responsibilities as Facilitator.”
2020-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1324 (2020) · source
“We have not seen that mentioned in previous reports, and there has generally been an understanding — as far as we know — that the Vienna platform is being discussed in Vienna alone, as New York lacks the expertise for that. As the Council is well aware, for a year now Russia has been calling on the Secretariat to strictly follow its administrative and technical mandate regarding the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). We do not support any investigations under its auspices, or any other non-transparent activity by the Secretariat behind S/2020/1324 the backs of Security Council member States. The staff of the Secretariat simply do not have the authority to carry out such activities. We would ask our United States colleagues, who are trying to ignore that fact, to duly consider it.”
2020-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1324 (2020) · source
“For the second time, we are struck by the cynical language of the Secretary- General’s report on the assassination of the Iranian representatives. The report contains not a word of condemnation of those acts or any mention of their potential negative consequences. Just as in the case of Qasem Soleimani, there is not a word of regret about the death of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, save the mention that he was on the sanctions list. It is hard to call it anything but cowardice. It is also difficult for us to find an explanation for the Secretary-General’s sudden increased interest in the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency on the Iran dossier, in particular with regard to monitoring the implementation of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.”
2020-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1324 (2020) · source
“The problem is the same as before: one side cannot be called to return to full implementation of an agreement without the other, especially since it is clear to all of us that Iran’s retreat from its commitments is a direct response to the destructive and provocative actions of the United States. Moreover, the Iranian side warned about those consequences in advance, as stipulated in annex A, paragraph 26, of the JCPOA. We regret that the United Nations leadership again lacked the courage to clearly issue a call for the United States to return to full and unconditional compliance with resolution 2231 (2015) and the JCPOA, as well as to rescind the steps the United States has taken that run counter to them.”
2020-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1324 (2020) · source
“In particular, we welcome the call to fully support and use the procurement channel, which continues to be a key confidence-building measure in the context of the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). We note with satisfaction that, in his report, the Secretary-General regrets the withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA and the subsequent steps that followed those actions as contrary to the objectives of resolution 2231 (2015). Equally important is the Secretary-General’s conclusion that such actions could have a negative impact on the implementation of the resolution by other parties. Nevertheless, the Secretary-General’s report still cannot be called fully balanced.”
2020-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1324 (2020) · source
“We see those phantom pains in the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly, where the United States delegation is trying to secure in the draft United Nations budget for next year financing for a sanctions committee that exists only in its imagination. We hope that a majority of General Assembly members will be just as reasonable as Council members and reject those absurd attempts. The tenth report of the Secretary-General (S/2020/1177) on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) provides yet further confirmation that the snapback does not exist in reality. The report makes it abundantly clear that the only State that claims otherwise is the United States. The others regard those claims as devoid of any legal basis, and therefore without any political, legal or practical consequences.”
2020-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1324 (2020) · source
“The Foreign Ministers of the countries participating in the JCPOA put the matter to rest just yesterday — 21 December — in their joint statement at the end of their meeting. Those are the facts. Whether our American colleagues like them or not is another story. But they will still have to accept the reality determined by the collective political will of the majority of the members of the Security Council. Another uncomfortable reality for our American colleagues is the fact that the S/2020/1324 special regime for arms transfers to or from the Islamic Republic of Iran expired on 18 October. We regret that the process of “psychological adaptation” by our colleagues to this reality is taking too long.”
2020-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1324 (2020) · source
“We are proud to note that, in those six months, the authority of the Security Council in relation to the Iranian case has only increased. Since there has been no snapback, the international legal regime established by resolution 2231 (2015) remains fully in place and the document itself continues to be implemented in accordance with the previously agreed parameters and time frames. The illegitimacy of the claim of the United States to launch the snapback process has been confirmed by 13 Council members. The Presidents of the Council for August and September clearly indicated that they were not authorized to take any follow-up action. The Secretary-General unequivocally took the same position. The Russian Federation, which assumed the presidency of the Council on 1 October, also publicly stated that the snapback would not take place.”
2020-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1324 (2020) · source
“There are certainly varying and nuanced positions among Council members in their assessments of the Iranian dossier, including among our colleagues with regard to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), but all of them objectively pale in comparison to the degree of absurdity and destructiveness that the United States has shown over the past six months in effectively opposing all the other members of the Council. To its credit, the Council did not succumb to provocation by Washington, and acted exactly as it should by remaining committed to international law and its obligations to strengthen international peace and security, strictly following the letter and spirit of resolution 2231 (2015) and employing common sense.”
2020-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1324 (2020) · source
“Then they claimed that they had the right to unilaterally reinstate the United Nations sanctions against Iran, which had been in effect until 2015, through a so-called snapback. Our American partners have been tightening the screws against Tehran almost daily, seeking to convince themselves and the rest of the world that a policy of maximum pressure on Iran was the only way to solve all the issues that had arisen. All those attempts failed. I would like to stress that this file was the rare case in the Security Council where its members were overwhelmingly unanimous in opposing the United States. That is a very telling point.”
2020-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1324 (2020) · source
“I would like to thank Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo, Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, Mr. Olof Skoog, Head of the Delegation of the European Union, and Mr. Philippe Kridelka, Permanent Representative of Belgium and Security Council Facilitator for the format under resolution 2231 format (2015), for their briefings. The past year has not been easy for any of us, and not only because of the coronavirus. Beginning in June, attempts by the United States to punish Iran at any cost — or rather, to punish a regime that is inconvenient for the United States — have become reckless and increasingly irrational. Our partners in Washington, D.C., first tried to force Security Council members to impose an unprecedented harsh arms embargo against Iran by means of a new draft resolution (S/2020/797), without any convincing grounds.”
2020-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1324 (2020) · source
“We will continue our efforts in that area by providing assistance to our Egyptian friends. In addition, the international community must take active steps to improve the dire humanitarian situation in Gaza, especially against the backdrop of the coronavirus disease pandemic. We are extremely concerned about the reports of the difficult financial situation currently facing the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), whose work spans not only the humanitarian but also the political dimension and acts as a stabilizing influence on the Palestinian territories and the Middle East as a whole. The leadership of UNRWA is taking steps to enhance performance and reduce overheads, which are commendable.”
2020-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1275 (2020) · source
“Construction in the area of East Jerusalem threatens to further undermine the territorial contiguity of the Palestinian State as envisaged by United Nations resolutions. We reaffirm our principled position that Israeli settlements in the West Bank are unlawful. We call for an end to settlement activity and the policy of demolishing Palestinian property. We are also concerned by the statistics provided by the United Nations, which indicate that in 2020 the number of buildings demolished increased by 72 per cent as compared with the previous year. At the same time, violence and rocket launches against Israeli territory must stop, and joint efforts should be undertaken to counter the threat of terrorism. The task of restoring Palestinian unity remains as relevant as ever.”
2020-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1275 (2020) · source
“President Abbas has reiterated his readiness for dialogue under the auspices of the Quartet of international mediators. We call on our partners in the Quartet — the United Nations, the European Union and the United States of America — to step up their cooperation to that end. We are ready to involve key regional players in those efforts. We need to pool our efforts and use the entire potential of collective diplomacy. We are extremely concerned by the information received about the progress in implementing resolution 2334 (2016). We understand from the Secretary-General’s report (S/2020/1234) that in October and November the Israeli authorities endorsed one of the largest-scale plans to date for the construction of new housing units, including in Area C and deep into the occupied Palestinian territories.”
2020-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1275 (2020) · source
“At the same time, we will maintain our consistent and principled position in favour of a just solution of the Palestinian question on the basis of the international legal framework endorsed by the United Nations, including its resolutions, the Arab Peace Initiative and the fundamental principles of the two-State solution. That foundation provides for creating an independent, sovereign and territorially contiguous Palestinian State within the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital, living in peace with Israel. Annual votes on relevant resolutions in the General Assembly clearly demonstrate the continuing international consensus that there is no alternative to that recognized foundation for a solution. All final-status issues must be resolved through direct negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis.”
2020-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1275 (2020) · source
“We thank Special Coordinator Nickolay Mladenov for his briefing. We express our appreciation for the diligent work he has done in his nearly six years in office, which were extremely complex years for the Middle East peace process and required substantial efforts — not to achieve progress, unfortunately, but rather to maintain the central role of the United Nations and the international legal basis for a peaceful solution of the Palestinian question. We wish Mr. Mladenov every success in his new endeavours, in which he has our full support. We also stand ready to render comprehensive support to the new Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process.”
2020-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1275 (2020) · source
“We will also remember him as a very cynical man who promoted double standards in the Security Council and someone who regularly reads The New York Times and tries to draw conclusions based on the contents of that newspaper, which I reiterate frequents our rubbish bin. In that sense, we will definitely miss him. In conclusion, I have to say that many of our colleagues at the United Nations received the news that Germany would be a non-permanent member of the Council with great anticipation. However, thanks to the Permanent Representative, they widely came to question whether the Council really needed so much dissent, division and negative emotion. Therefore, I understand from my contacts here that the number of those who welcomed Germany’s tenure in the Council seems to have decreased dramatically.”
2020-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1257 (2020) · source
“We hope that they will investigate all the atrocities committed by him and by other “White Helmets”, without any double standards. Otherwise, the situation is simply impossible. I would like to thank Mr. Heusgen once again: he has made today’s meeting his swansong, his legacy. We will remember him, and we will miss him personally. Everyone has come to know his manner of engaging in discussion and putting questions to briefers on every occasion, except in the case of Director-General Arias, when he asserted the contrary — that ostensibly it was not normal practice to put questions to a briefer.”
2020-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1257 (2020) · source
“Recently, that magazine published very alarming information that one of the leaders of the notorious “White Helmets”, Khaled Saleh, was transferred to Germany. That S/2020/1257 man is a well-known terrorist; his reputation leaves no doubt. There is evidence of his affiliation with extremist activity and the killing of foreigners. That is why the German Ministry of Home Affairs, as we know, for quite a long time has been objecting to that man being admitted to Germany. But the Foreign Ministry insisted, and he was not just admitted to Germany; he was brought there onboard a Government aircraft as a guest of Germany. Incidentally, that reminds us of another very curious individual who was similarly transported to Germany recently. They may wish for political reasons to turn a blind eye to that man’s crimes, but that will not work.”
2020-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1257 (2020) · source
“We completely agree with his conclusions and diagnosis, but we do not agree with his vision of why that is happening. That is all. I would like to note that, as he continuously mentions the “Koblenz trial”, it has almost become his calling card. I realize that people who are in his country’s hands, from whom they may extract statements, can say much that is of interest because they want to save their own skins. That is why all those horrors and all that evidence that he refers to — and it is astounding — must be double-checked as to the sources of the information. At least, that is what we normally do. This is a good opportunity to show that in Germany, as he was saying, no one goes unpunished. There is a magazine — though I do not know if he reads anything besides The New York Times — called Der Spiegel. We read it occasionally.”
2020-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1257 (2020) · source
“In response to the representative of Germany, before this meeting we had a little discussion as to how Ambassador Heusgen was most likely to behave during this meeting. We even placed bets on it. Some of my colleagues thought that Ambassador Heusgen would read out a statement on behalf of humanitarian co-penholders and that would be it. I thought otherwise, and so I won; I thank Mr. Heusgen. In general, I agree with much of what he said. He said that the Security Council had failed Syria and that human suffering there continued. We do not argue with that. The Council has indeed failed Syria, and the reason for that is he and Western countries — their hypocritical position and their attempts to say that black is white. All of that continues with regard to Syria, and that is why people are still suffering.”
2020-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1257 (2020) · source
“Reports on the humanitarian situation in Syria clearly show that Damascus is upholding its responsibility to deliver humanitarian assistance on a non-discriminatory basis across contact lines to all parts of the country. What kind of assistance is the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs referring to here? Some may not like it and continue to attempt to impose political conditions, but the facts speak for themselves: the situation in Syria has changed and will never revert to its conflict-ridden past. I would like to take this opportunity to state very seriously the following: the lack of progress in establishing not one-off but regular cross-line humanitarian deliveries to Idlib will cause unjustified harm to the cross-border mechanism, which has been extended until 2021.”
2020-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1257 (2020) · source
“We would like to stress that Russian military personnel are present in Syria at the request of the legitimate Government, provide food assistance on an almost daily basis and are involved in rebuilding civilian infrastructure. That work will continue. In conclusion, let me once again raise the issue of a cross-line humanitarian convoy to be dispatched to Idlib. We deem it totally unacceptable that there has been no solution to that issue. We are not satisfied with the passive stance of the United Nations, the hackneyed talk about coronavirus and the eight-month-long negotiations to agree on modalities for the convoy. The silence of the proponents of the cross-border mechanism and the lack of appropriate discussion with those forces responsible for obstructing the convoy are also baffling.”
2020-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1257 (2020) · source