YouSaid · the spoken record

Dmitry Polyanskiy

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257
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2020-04-07
most recent
2021-05-12
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33
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un-security-council

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  1. If KSF personnel take part in NATO military manoeuvres, that would help legitimize Kosovo’s unapproved so-called army. It is worth mentioning that back in 2018 NATO condemned Kosovo’s Parliament for adopting a legislative package aimed at transforming the KSF. In practical terms, however, NATO is increasingly involved in training Kosovo’s militia. In such unfavourable conditions, UNMIK’s activity remains in high demand. We stand for keeping the Mission’s budgetary and staffing capacities at current levels. We believe the frequency of open Security Council briefings on Kosovo should be maintained as negotiated. Moreover, we hope that the next report of the Secretary- General will reflect all the challenges that the province must face. The situation there remains volatile and requires the continued attention of the international community.

    2021-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/370 (2021) · source

  2. We have taken note of the so-called Kosovar Ministry of Defence’s pledge to create a military base for the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) in the municipality of South Mitrovica. In this way, the KSF would gain a position on the territory adjacent to the north of the province and would oust all non-Albanian populations from the area, in violation of resolution 1244 (1999). This would create new threats for peace and security in the Balkans. Furthermore, such activity undermines the supervisory mechanisms in favour of regional arms control set forth under the Dayton Accords as endorsed by resolution 1031 (1995). Another reason for concern is the news about KSF units and Camp Bondsteel, a military base that is situated in Kosovo, participating in NATO’s Defender-Europe 2021 exercise.

    2021-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/370 (2021) · source

  3. The issue of safeguarding the Serb religious and cultural legacy remains pressing for the province. We therefore would like to remind Council members that the responsibility for maintaining peace and security in this territory rests with the Kosovo Force and the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo. The return of refugees and internally displaced persons to their permanent places of residence has been at a desperate impasse for some time now. The authorities in Pristina make no efforts to preserve trust among the national communes that comprise the area. The situation with respect to the return to its lawful owners of Serb property usurped by Kosovo Albanians is absolutely unsatisfactory.

    2021-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/370 (2021) · source

  4. This appalling attack must not be dismissed; otherwise, it could affect the safety and security of peacekeepers across the globe. The investigation needs to be carried out to completion. The immaturity of Kosovo’s political system entails the lack of progress in implementing essential reforms in the province. The coronavirus pandemic has undermined its subsidized economy. The level of youth unemployment is extremely high. Further, Kosovo is turning into a hotbed of militant Islamism whose malignant influence is spreading to neighbouring countries. The terrorist attack in Vienna in November 2020 shows that clearly. We must say that national radicalism has led to a growing number of attacks on Kosovar Serbs and other non-Albanians, as well as on schools and other social facilities, while the Kosovo law-enforcement institutions overlook it.

    2021-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/370 (2021) · source

  5. Among positive developments, we note the work of the Specialist Court in The Hague with regard to military crimes, organ trafficking and crimes against humanity committed by members of the former Kosovo Liberation Army. All those guilty must be duly held accountable, despite all attempts of the Kosovo Albanians to discredit the Court’s activity in order to deflect the hit from reaching their leaders. The province of Kosovo remains home to many chronic problems, the most pervasive of which are corruption and organized crime. They appear to explain why Kosovo Albanian police officers, affiliated with the beating and detention of on- duty personnel of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) on 28 May 2019 — among them a Russian national, Mr. Krasnoshchekov — have not yet been held to account.

    2021-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/370 (2021) · source

  6. We are not greatly surprised that dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina is not moving forward because the domestic political situation in Kosovo is a never- ending series of crises, the most recent of which was the so-called parliamentary elections and their numerous irregularities. On a very far-fetched pretext, the Kosovar authorities suspended many pro-Serbian candidates from participation, including two incumbent members of parliament. In the meantime, 14 members of “parliament” with outstanding court convictions had found their way into keeping their seats. It took the movement “Self-Determination” three attempts and the active involvement of diplomats from “non-indifferent” States before it was possible to choose a “president”. To what “triumph of democracy”, in the words of some our colleagues, could this actually refer?

    2021-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/370 (2021) · source

  7. In addition, Kosovo Albanian leaders have recently started to refer more frequently to the possibility of a referendum on Kosovo integration with Albania, and to issue ultimatums demanding that Belgrade recognize Kosovo’s independence and pay certain “reparations”. As for the dialogue under the auspices of Brussels, Kosovars have put it on the backburner as a non- priority task. We call on the European Union to uphold the principle of impartiality. It is unacceptable to impose any time frames or ready-made scenarios, exert pressure on Belgrade alone — despite its proven deal-making capacity, in contrast to Pristina, which is not ready for any serious dialogue unless fostered from the outside. In the same context, we stand against Kosovo joining international organizations as a member.

    2021-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/370 (2021) · source

  8. We regret the lack of progress in the dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina under the auspices of the European Union, which was authorized to act as a mediator by a decision of the General Assembly (resolution 64/298). The main reason for this lack of progress is the unconstructive position Pristina has taken. Even though it has been 12 years since the Brussels agreements were signed, Kosovo Albanians have failed to recognize the futility of artificial ultimatums and of ignoring the obligations they had undertaken, central among which is the obligation to create a community of Serb municipalities in Kosovo.

    2021-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/370 (2021) · source

  9. Gërvalla-Schwarz’s choice of background — be it a flag or a photo of the Eiffel Tower — is not relevant and creates no precedent for the future. We thank Special Representative of the Secretary-General Zahir Tanin for briefing us on the situation in Kosovo. We welcome the participation of Serbia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Nikola Selaković. We agree with his assessments and the concerns he expressed with regard to the situation in the province. The Russian position in relation to the Kosovo settlement is principles-based and unchanging. The Kosovo problem can be solved only in the framework of international law, in particular resolution 1244 (1999).

    2021-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/370 (2021) · source

  10. Before I start, I would like to draw attention again to the disrespect for the Security Council and its decisions shown by the Kosovo Albanian representatives, who were invited to join this meeting in their private capacity. As you have just mentioned, we had to postpone the open video-teleconference to discuss this situation because, among other reasons, the Russian Federation and the majority of other members of the Council do not recognize Kosovo as an independent State. That is why displaying the flag of this non-recognized entity is unacceptable. Ultimately, our meeting was able to be resumed on the understanding alone that video- teleconferences of the Security Council take place in an informal and provisional format that is not fully covered by the Council’s rules of procedure. Accordingly, Ms.

    2021-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/370 (2021) · source

  11. If Syria’s opponents who at the same time oppose real eradication of chemical weapons throughout the whole of its territory achieve their goal, we will be living through very hard times, promising no good to the OPCW and international cooperation in this and many other areas.

    2021-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/337 (2021) · source

  12. These allegations are not backed up by anything. On the contrary, Russia struggles to revive the good name of the organization and seeks answers to the questions that are relevant to everyone. The Security Council cannot afford being a silent witness to how one of the pillars on WMD proliferation is ruined by politicization. It is our shared goal to work towards restoring trust in the OPCW and recovering its authority. We count on support of all Council members on that matter, inter alia, in terms of a response to the anticipated “political commissioning” of the Investigation and Identification Team, pending a vote at The Hague, and other devastating steps that might follow to undermine the OPCW and the non-proliferation regime on WMD.

    2021-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/337 (2021) · source

  13. A group of prominent public actors addressed Director-General Arias in a letter published on 8 February by a well-known non-governmental organization — the Courage Foundation — calling on the Technical Secretariat to investigate numerous malfunctions, including reported falsifications in the Douma report. We call on the Technical Secretariat to give a public response to this letter, because silence and understatement can only foster suspicions that the Technical Secretariat might have things to conceal. The fact that Director-General Arias hides behind Mrs. Nakamitsu’s back does not add to the authority of the OPCW in the light of the accusations that I mentioned earlier. I anticipate the traditional remarks from our Western colleagues blaming Russia for attempts to shatter and undermine the authority of the OPCW.

    2021-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/337 (2021) · source

  14. Our Western colleagues like to underscore the need for transparency in the work of the OPCW and to commend the leadership of the Technical Secretariat for upholding this principle. Do you think it is transparent to have Mrs. Nakamitsu trying to give answers to the concrete questions that are posed by a Security Council Member State, and which have to do with the topics discussed at The Hague platform? Is it transparent to have Mrs. Nakamitsu trying to answer to them, rather than the head of the specialized mechanism? In the meantime, the number of questions is growing, and they are coming not only from States. Let me give you a recent example.

    2021-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/337 (2021) · source

  15. It is the blatant violations during investigations of incidents in Khan Shaykhun in April 2017 and in Douma in April 2018. It is testimonies of former OPCW employees about the Fact-Finding Mission falsifying its conclusions under pressure from Western states. It is the practice of oppressing and intimidating the “dissidents” who refused to take part in this forgery. I will not cite all these facts again, because we gave a detailed account of this in our earlier statements. In December 2020, we submitted a list of questions to the Director-General of the OPCW, Mr. Fernando Arias, but got no answers to any of them, either during the Security Council meeting (see S/2020/1202) or afterwards.

    2021-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/337 (2021) · source

  16. But in order to find out the truth, we need the OPCW Technical Secretariat to do what it is supposed to: unbiased monitoring of States’ compliance with the CWC. Only then will we be able to expect professional and impartial investigations from it. The Technical Secretariat must not create inflated demands for one country while turning a blind eye to the shortcomings of others in analogous situations, and ignoring questions to non-State actors that inevitably pop up in this context. Unfortunately, the Technical Secretariat still has a long way to go until it embarks upon truly unbiased work. Besides, the bulk of proof of direct forgeries, manipulations and internal violations in OPCW Technical Secretariat with regard to Syria’s chemical file has reached a critical point.

    2021-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/337 (2021) · source

  17. By rejecting Syria’s incapacitation at the OPCW, you will reject double standards and protect an equitable world order, which has no place for the dictate of force. All States must be equal in terms of upholding international law. I stress that Russia, as a responsible OPCW member State, in strongest terms condemns the use of chemical weapons by whomever, wherever and for whatever purposes. We are determined to have all developments clarified, and both we and our Syrian colleagues have numerous facts at our disposal that point to the use, or attempted use, of chemical weapons by the so-called Syrian opposition. As the Secretariat is perfectly aware, Damascus has shared relevant findings with the OPCW.

    2021-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/337 (2021) · source

  18. Let me avail myself of this meeting of the Security Council, which reaches a broad public, to call on all delegations, both here and at The Hague, to act responsibly and stand up against the proposed draft decision, as it threatens to undermine the authority of the OPCW and of the Security Council, which is responsible for the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013). Neither the OPCW nor any other respectful venue must turn into a tool to “punish the unwanted” by hurling at them baseless allegations of the use of weapons of mass destruction. Any country could end up in Syria’s place, should our Western colleagues decide to use the “chemical- weapon leverage” to pressurize them.

    2021-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/337 (2021) · source

  19. I urge you to give it a thought — if Syria can no longer take part in OPCW decision-making, what is the point for Damascus to keep cooperating with the organization? What is the ultimate goal, after all? Is it to “crush” Syria, as was the case with Iraq after the United States Secretary of State here at the United Nations personally promoted a fake about Iraq possessing weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), or is it to make sure that nobody on Syrian soil has any chemical weapons?

    2021-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/337 (2021) · source

  20. But still, the fact remains that the dialogue is under way and there is progress in Syria’s interaction with the OPCW, inter alia, in terms of the initial declaration. Besides, as we learned from the report (see S/2021/200) of the OPCW Director- General at the March session of the Executive Council, the pandemic brought to a standstill almost all inspection activities by the organization. For example, the visit by the Executive Council to the United States has been rescheduled twice and is now expected no sooner than in 2022. The OPCW made only five country visits to the States that declared the discovery of some old stockpiles. Syria is almost the only country with which the Technical Secretariat maintains regular dialogue. How can it be the main “violator”, as our Western colleagues would try to assert?

    2021-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/337 (2021) · source

  21. Nevertheless, the Syrian authorities have continued cooperating with the OPCW all this time — despite the colossal pressure and terrible accusations coming from Western colleagues and the blatant acts of manipulation on the part of the Technical Secretariat, to say nothing of the emergency conditions of the pandemic. The current report of the Secretary-General is further proof of this. I would like to stress that its paragraphs 11 and 12 address the consultations that the Declaration Assessment Team and the relevant Syrian authorities held in February. These contacts included visits to the facilities, meetings with Syrian experts and surveys. The Syrian side provided explanations with regard to all the “outstanding issues”. Unfortunately, the response was that the Syrian initial declaration was “incomplete”, “imperfect” and so on.

    2021-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/337 (2021) · source

  22. It would prove that your methods of besmirching Damascus, without providing any substantiated or trustworthy evidence, have remained pretty much the same and that you will hardly score any extra points on that. Anyway, in summer 2020, Western delegations referred to the aforementioned politically biased and unconvincing IIT report to push through the OPCW Executive Council a knowingly unrealistic ultimatum for Syria, which demanded that it declare chemical weapons and production facilities that Syria simply did not have. It is obvious that these demands cannot be met. What comes next is a mere technicality. The Director-General ascertains Syria’s alleged incompliance with an Executive Council decision. Now the Conference of the States Parties is offered to “punish” Damascus by incapacitating Syria at the OPCW.

    2021-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/337 (2021) · source

  23. The report accuses Syrians of having used chemical weapons on two occasions. This report was well and truly discredited by independent experts. We shared our detailed argumentation on that matter in the General Assembly and the Security Council as early as June last year. However, the leadership of the Technical Secretariat remains deaf to this criticism. Apparently, it is a sign that, prior to the grand theatrical finale, the IIT will give us yet another surprise by reporting another “pseudo investigation” and its anti-Syrian results. We have little doubt about it. Neither do we doubt that our Western colleagues will rush to interpret that unscrupulous product as alleged proof of the use of chemical weapons by Damascus. Let me discourage you by saying that it would truly prove only one thing.

    2021-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/337 (2021) · source

  24. This proposed incapacitation would deprive Syria of its right to vote at the CWC Conference of the States Parties and in the Executive Council, be elected to the Council or host any events related to the Conference, the Executive Council and its subsidiary mechanisms. I will tell you frankly: it was clear from the very beginning that this entire idea had been premeditated. This theatrical performance had several acts. First, in violation of the long-standing norms and practices of the OPCW — first of all the principle of consensus — the Technical Secretariat created the illegitimate Investigation and Identification Team (IIT). The IIT defied the principles of investigation, including the so-called “chain of custody”, and produced a report rich in factual and technical mistakes.

    2021-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/337 (2021) · source

  25. At the outset, let me highlight that all delegations to the Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) are now watching what can be called the final act of a performance directed by our Western colleagues and staged at The Hague. In two weeks, the twenty-fifth session of the CWC Conference will resume its work. For several months on end, the Conference has been home to attempts to push through an unprecedented draft decision that would incapacitate Syria at the OPCW. This draft decision was introduced to the Conference counter to CWC norms and without prior consideration by the Executive Council.

    2021-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/337 (2021) · source

  26. Otherwise, our controversies at this non-proliferation platform will play into the hands of those whom resolution 1540 (2004) was designed to counter, namely, non-State entities, including terrorists, who seek to possess weapons of mass destruction and their precursors.

    2021-03-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/325 (2021) · source

  27. We believe that our main task is to preserve the spirit of cooperation that surrounds the resolution, which is particularly important considering the current turbulence in international affairs. The resolution remains one of the few islands of stability and non-confrontation in multilateral diplomacy. Provision of technical assistance to States should remain a priority track for the 1540 Committee. It is of principal importance that the Committee be the central coordinator of global efforts in relation to the resolution and that it be able to define the goals and priorities of this work. We believe that we all have an interest in enhancing the 1540 Committee’s effectiveness and that the Committee should rely upon the unifying principles set forth in resolution 1540 (2004).

    2021-03-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/325 (2021) · source

  28. Unfortunately, the circumstances of force majeure created by the coronavirus disease pandemic have had an ongoing negative impact on the work of the 1540 Committee, with many tracks on the non- proliferation agenda suffering as a result. We nevertheless remain convinced that the interruptions occasioned by this emergency must not undermine the effectiveness of the Committee in its efforts. We are faced with the pivotal task of completing the comprehensive review of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), which began last year pursuant to resolution 1977 (2011). We expect the review to be productive and enhance the effectiveness of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), as well as the work of the 1540 Committee and its Panel of Experts.

    2021-03-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/325 (2021) · source

  29. The successful implementation of the resolution at national levels should be promoted by the efforts of this specialized Security Council committee, which should monitor and coordinate global efforts to provide technical support to States in need upon their request. Although the 1540 Committee functions on the basis of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, it is not mandated to force any “services” on the States Members of the United Nations. The resolution does not restrict the sovereign right of States to define their own ways of implementing its provisions. Much needs to be done to meet the basic goal, which is the full and universal implementation of resolution 1540 (2004).

    2021-03-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/325 (2021) · source

  30. We thank the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), the Permanent Representative of Mexico, Ambassador Juan Ramón de la Fuente Ramírez, for his substantive briefing. As this was his first briefing in his capacity as Chair of the 1540 Committee, I would like to wish him every success in his work at the helm of this subsidiary body of the Council. We count on his honourably discharging his role as Chair and brokering the Committee’s negotiations work in a fair manner. Russia consistently and deeply relies on resolution 1540 (2004) as one of the few universal instruments in the area of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, the resolution has been incorporated as a priority into Russia’s foreign policy strategy.

    2021-03-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/325 (2021) · source

  31. The Russian side put forward a proposal to look into organizing a ministerial meeting of the Quartet. We are committed to continuing discussions with the interested sides to consider convening a meeting of the Quartet plus Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, plus Palestinians and Israelis, with the possible inclusion of Saudi Arabia, as the author of the Arab Peace Initiative. Such a meeting could provide a review of the current state of affairs and outline key tracks for joint work so as to get over the standstill in the settlement process. We hope this idea will enjoy broad support, and we encourage all interested sides to share their comments and proposals in order to ensure thorough preparatory work for the meeting.

    2021-03-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/302 (2021) · source

  32. We proceed from the understanding that the pending Palestinian elections also provide an opportunity to overcome controversies and strengthen power institutions. On our part, we take steps to support collective efforts aimed at achieving equitable peace in the region and maintain contacts with the key regional and international stakeholders. As per the previous agreement achieved by the members of the Quartet of international mediators, we work to put set meetings on a regular basis. Therefore, we convened another video-teleconference on 23 March, where we focused on the current situation in the region, the progress in preparations for the Palestinian elections and the situation in the West Bank and in Gaza. We stressed the need to resume direct Palestinian-Israeli negotiations in order to unlock prospects for a peace process.

    2021-03-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/302 (2021) · source

  33. Russia consistently supports the two-State principle that envisages the creation of an independent Palestinian State within the 1967 borders and with East Jerusalem as its capital, which should rest upon the international legal basis, including United Nations resolutions and the Arab Peace Initiative. There is no alternative to direct negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis on all parameters of the final settlement, including the problems of refugees, borders, water and the status of Jerusalem. At the same time, all Israel’s security concerns must be taken on-board. In conjunction with our Egyptian friends, we will continue to help Palestinians restore unity based on the platform of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

    2021-03-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/302 (2021) · source

  34. We call on the Israeli authorities to abandon unilateral steps that create irreversible developments on the ground. We also stress the need to assist the Palestinians in responding to acute humanitarian and socioeconomic problems in the occupied territories and in Gaza, especially amidst the coronavirus disease pandemic. We note the importance of Palestinians and Israelis interacting with each other in the interests of countering the pandemic, including in the context of vaccination. We attach great importance to the ongoing work of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East in support of Palestinians both in the occupied territories and in the neighbouring Arab States. We call for galvanized international support for the Agency’s activities.

    2021-03-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/302 (2021) · source

  35. We thank Mr. Tor Wennesland for his briefing. The Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process briefed us on the progress in the implementation of resolution 2334 (2016). In this context, we reiterate the principal position of that document, according to which the construction of Israeli settlements in the Palestinian territory that has been under occupation since 1967, including East Jerusalem, constitutes a violation of international law and one of the main obstacles to a settlement based on the two-State solution. We are gravely concerned by the fact that the pace of the issuance of construction permits and the expansion of settlements is not declining. The same can be said about the scope of demolitions, the expropriation of Palestinian property and evictions.

    2021-03-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/302 (2021) · source

  36. In conclusion, I would like to call the OSCE to engage in closer cooperation with the United Nations and its specialized agencies and various regional organizations — such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Eurasian Economic Union, the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, among others — on the basis of the Platform for Cooperative Security, adopted at the OSCE summit in Istanbul in 1999. We wish the Chairperson-in-Office effective work and hope that they will stick to the position of being an honest broker. Sweden can count on Russia’s support for the initiatives aimed at sustaining stability, restoring trust and galvanizing cooperation among OSCE member States.

    2021-03-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/256 (2021) · source

  37. We support the plans of the Chairperson-in-Office to promote the participation of women in economic activity — however, without a linkage to resolution 1325 (2000) that addresses women’s involvement in peace processes. Also, thematic and geographical imbalances in the humanitarian dimension need to be corrected. Countering racism, neo-Nazism, falsifications of history and incitement to interreligious enmity should rank among the priorities. The issue of collectively elaborating a unified methodology for observing elections retains high relevance.

    2021-03-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/256 (2021) · source

  38. We expect the Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office for the South Caucasus, Annika Söder, to facilitate constructive contacts among Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. We call on you, Minister Linde, to launch consultations to enhance the effectiveness of the OSCE, which Russia proposed last year. The envisaged goal is to increase the returns of the work of the OSCE Secretariat, its institutions and field missions, optimize the OSCE event programme and the preparations for the Foreign Ministers Councils, ensure a balance between the three OSCE “baskets” and improve the budgetary process. Overcoming the socioeconomic effects of COVID-19 is another vital track where assistance should be given to the affected branches of the economy, tourism included, as they recover from the coronavirus pandemic.

    2021-03-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/256 (2021) · source

  39. Before blaming us, please look in the mirror and stop turning a blind eye to blatant violations of human rights, the freedom of speech and the media and cases of glorification of Nazi criminals and their henchmen, which have become a sad reality not only in post-Maidan Ukraine but also in the Baltic States, in particular in Estonia. This would both do some good to your tarnished reputation and help restore an environment of trust and cooperation in the OSCE area of responsibility. Hopefully, under the leadership of Minister Linde, the OSCE will be able to make a meaningful contribution to a settlement on Nagorno Karabakh and give new impetus to the 5+2 negotiations on Transnistria. We positively assess the work of the United Nations and the OSCE as co-Chairs of the Geneva international discussions on the South Caucasus.

    2021-03-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/256 (2021) · source

  40. I would like to make a point regarding statements that some our Western colleagues made today that included a false interpretation of the situation concerning an internal Ukrainian settlement. Let me stress that it is their actions that pose the key security threat to the entire OSCE space, because such action supports Kyiv’s destructive steps that seek to undermine the Minsk agreements. We call on Western sponsors to address this matter and have those they sponsor stop distorting reality and engaging in acts of political provocation, and instead get down to restoring dialogue with the people of eastern Ukraine, as envisaged by the Minsk agreements.

    2021-03-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/256 (2021) · source

  41. Also, there is a need to keep track of, analyse and report on discriminatory initiatives by the Ukrainian leadership with regard to the Russian language, national minorities and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, as well as control the situation with regard to ensuring the freedom of speech and the activities of mass media. Infringement of the freedom of the media and oppression of national minorities, inter alia in terms of their civil and linguistic rights, have recently become a scourge in a number of OSCE member States. Since the regional mechanisms do not condemn this, the situation keeps worsening. We call on the Chairperson-in- Office and the specialized OSCE bodies to pay special attention to the deterioration in the area of human rights that is observed within the OSCE space and throughout its area of responsibility.

    2021-03-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/256 (2021) · source

  42. The OSCE is expected to take an objective approach to the settlement of the internal Ukrainian conflict, foster direct dialogue among the sides — Kyiv, Donetsk and Luhansk — and help implement the Minsk package of measures, which the Security Council endorsed in resolution 2202 (2015). We expect that Sweden, as Chairperson-in-Office, will ensure impartial work by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) in Ukraine and that the Mission itself will carry out well-balanced monitoring, inter alia with regard to human rights, on both sides of the contact line. The SMM mandate directly prescribes this.

    2021-03-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/256 (2021) · source

  43. We hope that the Chairperson-in-Office will firmly adhere to consensual approaches, work within the scope of decisions made by the OSCE Council of Foreign Ministers and the Permanent Council in 2002 and avoid making biased and imbalanced assessments and promoting concepts that do not enjoy broad support. At a time of widespread loss of mutual trust, regional organizations, including the OSCE, have a very special mission, namely, to revive the feeling of mutual understanding to help resolve crises in their respective regions. By all means, the main criterion for effectiveness in that matter is assistance in conflict settlement.

    2021-03-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/256 (2021) · source

  44. The volatile situation that has evolved around the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic overlaps with the growing crisis of confidence in the OSCE space. At the same time, its broad geographical coverage and its consensus rule turn the organization into a unique instrument for maintaining peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic space. We note the active stance that the Chairperson-in-Office assumed at the initial stage of their mandate and their eagerness to receive first-hand information about the situation on the ground. Minister Linde has already visited Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia.

    2021-03-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/256 (2021) · source

  45. We thank the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, Ann Linde, for briefing us on the activities of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), issues on its agenda and the priorities of the Chairperson-in-Office. Russia consistently stands for enhancing cooperation between the United Nations and the OSCE on the basis of the Charter of the United Nations and the 2019 framework agreement on cooperation and coordination between the United Nations and the OSCE, as well as 2006 declaration of the OSCE Permanent Council. It is our understanding that the OSCE should supplement the efforts of the United Nations throughout its area of responsibility. Sweden took over the Chair of OSCE amid complicated geopolitical and epidemiological circumstances.

    2021-03-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/256 (2021) · source

  46. As the Council knows, Russia created and registered the world’s first Sputnik-V coronavirus vaccine. That enables us to assist countries in need on a bilateral basis. In December 2020, the process of mass vaccination was launched in our country. President Putin’s proposal to provide Russian vaccines free of charge to United Nations staff remains in effect. We are ready to cooperate productively with all interested partners to effectively combat the pandemic and prevent vaccine discrimination.

    2021-01-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/90 (2021) · source

  47. In that context, we express concern over the increasing frequency of attempts to erase those fundamental provisions from resolutions extending the mandates of United Nations peacekeeping operations. We share the message of the resolution on the importance of an inclusive, comprehensive and global response to the coronavirus pandemic, with a coordinating role for the United Nations. The unconditional support of the World Health Organization (WHO) as the leading body for mobilizing States’ efforts in the fight against COVID-19 remains relevant. For its part, Russia continues to contribute to international efforts to combat COVID-19 as much as it can. It cooperates with WHO, the World Food Programme, the United Nations Development Programme and other organizations and mechanisms.

    2021-01-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/90 (2021) · source

  48. I would like to commend the professionalism of United Nations peacekeepers and the staff of United Nations special political missions, who continue to honourably carry out their duties despite the gravest of circumstances. It is encouraging that Blue Helmets continue to provide comprehensive support to host Governments in combating the epidemic. It is now more important than ever to ensure the uninterrupted delivery of humanitarian assistance to the most vulnerable populations. At the same time, such work must be carried out on the basis of full respect for the sovereignty of the recipient States and without any preconditions, that is, in strict compliance with the Guiding Principles on the Right to Humanitarian Assistance and General Assembly resolution 46/182.

    2021-01-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/90 (2021) · source

  49. It is important to bear in mind that a ceasefire is not the only thing that resolution 2532 (2020) calls for. In particular, it supports the Secretary-General’s call for the lifting of illegal unilateral sanctions, which limit the capacity of countries, especially developing and least developed countries, to respond to the challenges posed by the spread of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) and its socioeconomic impact. The persistent adherence by a select group of States to illegitimate and inhumane unilateral restrictions, adopted in defiance of the Security Council, is disappointing. In that connection, we recall the Russian President’s initiative to create “green corridors” free of trade wars and sanctions to deliver essential goods and medicine to countries in need.

    2021-01-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/90 (2021) · source

  50. We thank our speakers today for their briefings. Russia was among the first countries to support the call of Secretary-General Guterres, on 23 March 2020, for a global ceasefire and advocates strict compliance with resolution 2532 (2020). We continue to stress the need for an immediate cessation of hostilities and a humanitarian pause in conflict zones. However, that should not apply to operations being carried out against internationally recognized terrorist groups. Unfortunately, the full implementation of the resolution’s provisions is stalling. In particular, violent hostilities continue in various hotspots around the world, including those fuelled from the outside. We are seeing some terrorist groups seeking to benefit from the situation in order to gain an advantage on the ground.

    2021-01-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/90 (2021) · source