YouSaid · the spoken record

Doss

lines on the record: 197
first: 2005-03-28
most recent: 2010-04-13
sittings or episodes: 8
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“From the beginning, the United Nations has been a partner and friend of the Congo. I am confident that this relationship will continue as the country begins a new era of sovereign independence.”
2010-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6297 (2010) · source
“The adoption of that legislation, in particular as concerns the delineation of local constituencies and the national elections commission, is urgent in order to adhere to the constitutional calendar. As we reflect on the future, I would now like to recall some words from the past. "The end of all political effort must be the well- being of the individual in a life of safety and freedom. In the case of the Congo, as elsewhere, the means to this end are, in the first place, the independence, peace, integrity and prosperity of the country." (A/PV.906, para. 16) (spoke in French) Those words were spoken 50 years ago by Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold. They are still relevant today as the Democratic Republic of the Congo prepares to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of its independence.”
2010-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6297 (2010) · source
“This is why we need to reshape the Mission to enhance the capacity of the United Nations system and MONUC to assist the Government to address these challenges during and after the drawdown. These issues are the key to consolidating the peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and not only in the East. President Kabila has reassured the Congolese public of the Government's firm intention to hold elections in 2011. The Government is currently reviewing the calendar with the inter-institutional 6 forum. We have been informed that a timetable for the elections is to be published shortly, together with an indication of what support will be requested from the international community and MONUC. The legislature is currently working on the legislation needed to prepare those elections.”
2010-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6297 (2010) · source
“A recent strategic evaluation of the International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy, conducted in cooperation with key donors, is recommending increased support in order to sustain What needs to be a long-term undertaking to accompany the transition towards development. The sustainability of the peace process will eventually depend on the success of these efforts to stimulate recovery and reconstruction and to ensure the effective presence and authority of the State and the consolidation of democratic structures. But endemic poverty, lack of employment for demobilized combatants, the competition for economic resources - including land and minerals - and the return of internally displaced persons and refugees are all potential sources of tension and violence that need to be carefully managed.”
2010-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6297 (2010) · source
“As indicated in the Secretary-General's report, MONUC should also progressively shift its focus and structure towards post-conflict stabilization and peace consolidation, based on an expanded partnership with the United Nations country team. The Integrated Strategic Framework, which we are currently discussing with the Government, is intended as a road map to help us move in that direction, in line with Congolese priorities. We have already worked closely with the United Nations country team to provide coordinated support for the implementation of the Government's Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for conflict- affected areas, which is gaining momentum and producing results on the ground.”
2010-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6297 (2010) · source
“Strengthening the National Police is a critical dimension of the work to extend and reinforce protection. We are pleased, therefore, that the Government has requested MONUC assistance in this area. As regards the military dimensions of security sector reform, the Government has made it clear that it wishes to largely rely on bilateral aid for building up the capabilities of the army. However, the Government has also indicated that it would welcome MONUC assistance to train and deploy three military police battalions and build capacity for military justice, which would further enhance our ongoing protection work.”
2010-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6297 (2010) · source
“During the Council's forthcoming visit to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, I am sure that members will engage with the Government in order to determine how the drawdown can be best shaped and implemented without compromising the achievements of the past decade, for which we have all worked so hard. As regards the Mission's reconfiguration, again the Secretary-General's report puts forward a proposal which is meant to anticipate and address the remaining critical tasks. The protection of civilians under imminent threat of violence should remain a primary concern of the Mission. Protection requires continued support to build State capacity, reinforce the rule of law and bolster compliance with international humanitarian law, human rights and refugee law.”
2010-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6297 (2010) · source
“MONUC believes that this is operationally feasible. Following that stage, a review of the security situation in areas of MONUC deployment would be conducted by a joint Government/MONUC coordination mechanism to be established for that purpose. The first such review would take place in September this year and a second in March next year. These reviews would focus on progress on military operations against armed groups, the deployment of security forces to assume MONUC protection task, and the establishment of State authority in areas freed of armed groups. They would be the trigger for the planning of subsequent phases of the drawdown, based on the principle of national self- reliance put forward by President Kabila.”
2010-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6297 (2010) · source
“In the light of the team's findings, Under- Secretary General Le Roy, in his meetings with President Kabila and Prime Minister Muzito, urged a prudent approach to MONUC's drawdown. The President explained his vision for the future of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, emphasizing the need for the country to rely on its own capacities, and in that context presented a much briefer timetable to implement the drawdown, indicating that he would wish for the drawdown to be completed by June 2011. The essential elements of those discussions are outlined in the report of the Secretary-General, and there is no need for me to repeat them here. In acknowledgement of the President's vision, the Secretary-General's report recommends that the first stage of the drawdown be initiated before 30 June 2010, subject to the Council's concurrence.”
2010-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6297 (2010) · source
“We have also encouraged the Government to develop a national security policy and to build the capacities for national security coordination, including the oversight of the various components of the national security architecture. I would now like to speak about MONUC's reconfiguration and drawdown. In paragraph 2 of resolution 1906 (2009), the Security Council has referred to "critical tasks that need to be accomplished before MONUC can envisage its drawdown without triggering a relapse into instability". These tasks were assessed by the technical assessment team led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations that visited the Democratic Republic of the Congo in March. The findings of the team have been summarized in the Secretary-General's report before the Council.”
2010-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6297 (2010) · source
“In pursuance of the mandate that the Security Council has given MONUC in resolution 1906 (2009), we have established an ambassadors' forum in Kinshasa to facilitate a regular dialogue among partners and with the Government on various aspects of security sector reform, while emphasizing that the Government itself must take the lead role in coordination. We have encouraged the Government to engage its international partners in a strategic dialogue based on the army reform plan developed by the military authorities so as to dispose of a nucleus of well-trained forces that will take over MONUC's residual security responsibilities as its forces leave the Democratic Republic of the Congo.”
2010-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6297 (2010) · source
“Even in the absence of this legislative framework, there has been some progress in police training and deployment along the main axes in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as in army training by several bilateral partners. Key decisions have also been made concerning the establishment of garrisons in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Work is progressing on three sites in South Kivu and will soon start in North Kivu, These are important steps, but additional, harmonized efforts will be required to help build the capacities of the 10-31160 Government to fully ensure the protection of the population in years to come.”
2010-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6297 (2010) · source
“The Mission must be prepared therefore to offer logistic support, if requested and within the limits of its resources, to counter armed threats to the constitutional order or to help contain conflicts with the potential of escalating and threatening the security of civilians. As indicated in the Secretary-General's report (S/2010/l64), a set of laws has been submitted to Parliament covering defence and army regulation, together with a law for the National Police. We hope that this legislation will be adopted during the current session of Parliament as a basis for moving ahead with the reform plan for the army that was developed by the Government last year.”
2010-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6297 (2010) · source
“In the north-west of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a new and unanticipated challenged emerged late last year. A long-simmering ethnic conflict over fishing rights in northern Equateur province escalated with an attack of the rebels on the provincial capital Mbandaka on Easter Sunday. The attack was repelled by Government forces with the aid of MONUC. Unfortunately, the losses suffered by the civilian population and the security forces were quite high and, tragically MONUC, lost one soldier and two contractual agents. The capacity of the national security forces to respond to such threats in remote areas is still limited because of capacity constraints.”
2010-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6297 (2010) · source
“In the meantime, MONUC's efforts to sensitize the LRA rank and file have led to some surrenders - 53 since the beginning of last year, which is a significant number considering the overall size of the group still present in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This is encouraging, although the LRA continues with abductions to fill some its gaps, so the struggle against the LRA must continue. Small-scale rebel activity is present in southern Ituri in Orientale province, where MONUC is working closely with the FARDC to restore lasting security in the affected areas and to facilitate the deployment of the police. In recent weeks, we have assisted more than 2,000 villagers to return home after they fled military operations in this area.”
2010-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6297 (2010) · source
“But the LRA is an elusive enemy, and we cannot discount the possibility of renewed attacks against population centres and isolated communities, using hit-and-run tactics, as has been the case in the more remote areas, and notably, just before Christmas, in the area of Tapila, with disastrous consequences for that community. As long as the LRA commanders remain at large and are able to operate across borders in three countries, the group will continue to pose a serious protection challenge. The Governments of the countries affected, together with the international partners, need to work closely together in order to eliminate the LRA threat once and for all, which requires greater real-time intelligence sharing, enhanced air mobility and special force operations to interdict the movement of the armed bands.”
2010-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6297 (2010) · source
“But other provisions are still outstanding, notably the announcement of the outcome of the commission on military ranks, which has created dissatisfaction among officers who have been recently integrated into the FARDC from the armed groups. The LRA attacks in Orientale Province remain a serious concern as well. While we agree with the Congolese authorities that the number of LRA combatants has been significantly reduced, the extraordinary brutality of the LRA and the practice of turning abductees into new fighters continue to destabilize the territories of Haut- and Bas-Uele in Orientale Province. The FARDC, with the support of MONUC, has established security perimeters around the main population centres and secured the main roads through frequent patrols.”
2010-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6297 (2010) · source
“Elements of the Congres national pour la defense du peuple (CNDP) have continued to maintain parallel administrative structures and tax collection in Masisi 3 territory. This has provoked serious tensions with local communities as well as threats against MONUC by some former CNDP military commanders now integrated in the FARDC. A number of the provisions of the 23 March agreements - the amnesty law and the release of political prisoners, the treatment of the war-wounded, the signing of the tripartite agreement for the return of refugees from Rwanda and the appointment of territorial administrators - have been implemented by the Government.”
2010-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6297 (2010) · source
“The recent actions by the authorities in some European countries against the FDLR expatriate leadership are welcome and will help the efforts on the ground in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to dismantle the FDLR. Despite this progress, we cannot afford to relax in our common endeavour to end the menace of the FDLR. The FDLR leadership remains at large and the group is still carrying out violent reprisals against civilians, as well as abductions. As a result, the Amani Leo strategy has been designed to encompass both protection and offensive dimensions and must be sustained to ensure that the population is secured and that targeted operations against the FDLR command continue.”
2010-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6297 (2010) · source
“Unfortunately, however, violence against civilians is increasingly perpetrated by criminal elements in both North and South Kivu, which points to the need for an enhanced police presence to secure public order. MONUC's support to the Government in its struggle against the armed groups has focused on the FDLR, the ex-Interahamwe Rwandan forces, which is now the major source of violence and instability in the Kivus. Due to steady military pressure from the FARDC and outreach from the MONUC's disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation or resettlement (DDRRR) team - the reintegration support team - the FDLR continues to suffer a steady erosion in the number and capability of its forces.”
2010-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6297 (2010) · source
“These 10-31160 include persistent delays in the payment of salaries, insufficient supplies and a very low level of training of many troops, especially those who have been integrated from the various armed groups. These are issues that need to be addressed as part of the security sector reform effort. The humanitarian situation in the Kivus and parts of Orientale Province remains of deep concern, with a large number of internally displaced persons, high levels of sexual violence against women and attacks on humanitarian workers. But security has gradually improved in several territories in the Kivus and the economic tempo is picking up in consequence; close to one million internally displaced persons (IDPs) have returned to their areas of origin, and all the major IDP camps around Goma have now been closed.”
2010-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6297 (2010) · source
“The FARDC has taken some important measures to curb indiscipline and to fight impunity. Operational military courts have initiated around 42 trials over the past year and have condemned at least 25 officers and soldiers. The number of soldiers prosecuted for serious offences has increased substantially, but this is an area that still needs significant improvement, and MONUC, through the Joint Human Rights Office and the Rule of Law Section, is providing support for joint investigation teams and prosecution support cells in the FARDC. These initiatives warrant further assistance, and MONUC is working with partners to mobilize such assistance. Nevertheless, discipline is likely to remain a constant concern as long as the structural problems of the Congolese army are not fully resolved.”
2010-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6297 (2010) · source
“As regards the second objective, in line with President Kabila's declared zero-tolerance policy and the provisions of the policy governing MONUC support to the FARDC, MONUC now provides assistance to the 18 battalions specifically designated to carry out operations against the Forces democratiques de liberation du Rwanda (FDLR) in the context of Operation Amani Leo, and only when such targeted operations have been jointly planned to take account of civilian protection. In agreement with the High Command of the FARDC, the officers commanding these strike battalions and the chain of command have been screened to make sure they do not have a history of human rights violations, and they report directly to the North and South Kivu operations commanders of Operation Amani Leo.”
2010-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6297 (2010) · source
“Additional military bases, many of them located in very remote areas, have been established in the Kivus and the areas of Orientale Province affected by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), bringing their total number to 73; this has been accompanied by more frequent patrolling in the most security-sensitive areas. The deployment of these bases and the JPT missions is guided by the Rapid Response and Early Warning Cell, established at MONUC headquarters as well as in the field. These draw on information from a variety of sources and try to identify trends and emerging threats in order to direct our military resources towards prevention or response actions. The effective protection of civilians relies on this capacity to analyse and anticipate threats and to prevent them from materializing.”
2010-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6297 (2010) · source
“These efforts have been directed at two key objectives: first, increasing MONUC presence and situational awareness in the areas most vulnerable to violence; and secondly, working with the Forces armees de la Republique democratique du Congo (FARDC), the Congolese army, to improve conduct and discipline during forward operations. To achieve the first objective we have multiplied the deployments of the Joint Protection Teams (JPT). Eighty-seven Joint Protection Team missions have been deployed, including 22 since the beginning of this year, and as in the past, they have assisted the Blue Helmets in identifying, preventing and reacting to security 10-31160 threats, often through the establishment of local early warning committees.”
2010-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6297 (2010) · source
“Four months ago, the Security Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), emphasizing three essential tasks: the protection of civilian populations; the disarmament, demobilization and repatriation or reintegration of Congolese or foreign armed groups; and support for the Government's efforts to reform the security sector. Although progress has not been consistent across all these areas, we have, however, made considerable progress. Today I would like to outline some of the elements key to the implementation of our mandate and also describe the challenges we face. (spoke in English) As regards the first priority of the Mission, we have pursued and reinforced our earlier efforts to enhance the effective protection of civilians.”
2010-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6297 (2010) · source
“Contextual benchmarks encompass a broader set of goals, such as poverty reduction, that may not be achieved within the lifetime of a mission, highly desirable though they may be. Albert Einstein once remarked that all knowledge was experience. So I hope that my limited experience, which I have shared with the Council this morning, will serve to expand, if only marginally, our common knowledge about transition and exit strategies.”
2010-02-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6270 (2010) · source
“Benchmarks, indicators and outcomes are all useful as tools for assessing progress, but they must be kept simple and relatively easy to monitor. They should be accessible and comprehensible to our national partners. Ideally, they should incorporate goals and targets already adopted by the Government concerned and its partners. They need to be consistent and applicable across a variety of sectors. They should serve essentially as a set of traffic lights that are clearly Visible and easily understood. They should also draw a distinction between core and contextual concerns. Core concerns relate to the security and political mandates of a mission - the goals that must be achieved before a drawdown can be initiated or withdrawal completed.”
2010-02-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6270 (2010) · source
“More recently, the Council's determination to persevere with our efforts to put an end to armed violence in the Kivus has made a very significant difference. Let me add that the alignment of political forces behind a peace process must extend to regional actors. In each of the four countries in which I have been involved with peace operations, neighbouring States have either been part of the problem or part of the solution. They must therefore be engaged, in one form or another, from the outset. Finally, allow me to conclude with a couple of comments on processes, including benchmarks and the modalities for reporting to the Council on progress towards the achievement of the end state. Measuring and evaluating a peace process and the transition to an end state is not an exact science.”
2010-02-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6270 (2010) · source
“The Council and its faithful servants, the special representatives of the Secretary-General, therefore have to find middle ground between empathy and firmness as we seek to move a peace process forward. Most important, the messages sent by the Council through its resolutions and statements, and echoed by special representatives, must show a high degree of consistency and political resolve. Frequent changes in tone or intent encourage intransigence, leading spoilers to believe that the Council will quickly back off in the face of adversity or opposition. In mid-2000, when the Revolutionary United Front attacked the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, the Council's unanimous and speedy reaction helped to turn the tide.”
2010-02-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6270 (2010) · source
“Restoring peace and peacebuilding is an incremental process that rarely follows a straight and narrow path. That produces frequent frustration and occasional despondency. Most of us in the international community will be associated with a given peace process only for a limited time before we move on, and so we are impatient for success. But often we lack a full appreciation of the historical, cultural and economic factors that created the conflict in the first place. We do not always understand the complex personal relationships that may exacerbate underlying problems. Our institutional memories can be quite short, while the cast of characters is very large.”
2010-02-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6270 (2010) · source
“Coordination within the international community needs to be matched by a parallel relationship with national authorities, especially in the area of national security. That is especially important when contemplating drawdown. In Sierra Leone, we met regularly with the National Security Council to make district-by-district security assessments as the basis for decision-making on troop drawdown. Similar assessments were done in Liberia, and perhaps my colleague will speak to that. We will also be doing the same in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as we move forward on contemplating a drawdown. You have also asked us, Mr. President, to comment on political support for the peace process within the Council and beyond. Creating and sustaining political support for a peace process is a vital but sometimes elusive undertaking.”
2010-02-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6270 (2010) · source
“In Kinshasa, we have the so-called Security Council-plus format, which meets at least every two weeks and where we brief and discuss military and political developments and explore and exchange ideas on emerging issues of strategic importance, such as elections, security sector reform and upcoming reports of the Secretary-General to the Council. A broader coordination mechanism has been established for donors, in which the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund participate. There is also a mechanism for humanitarian coordination. I am not sure, however, that all those initiatives tie up as neatly as we might wish. That is especially of concern in the area of macroeconomic policy, where the impact of economic measures can have a very direct effect on security and stability.”
2010-02-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6270 (2010) · source
“The coordination of international efforts in the field has also been listed as one of the issues for discussion. I am tempted to say that coordination is the holy grail of the international community - much sought after, but never found. As peacekeeping missions have assumed a wider range of mandated tasks, the complexity of coordination has also increased within missions themselves, among United Nations partners, with Member States, donor partners and, of course, the Governments themselves. A great deal of energy is expended in the name of coordination, and not always with positive results. Coordination should be more than just information sharing. From personal experience, I would recommend the creation of light but systematic consultation structures.”
2010-02-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6270 (2010) · source
“We are trying out a variety of innovations to better direct our resources to where they can be most effectively used to protect people most at risk. To do that, however, our operational policies and procedures have to be adapted to get better value out of the resources that are available. Memorandums of understanding with troop- and police-contributing countries need to be more flexible to allow for quicker redeployment as operational situations develop. That also goes for our operational procedures. The way we manage our air operations, for example, is a case in point. Most important, out failure to equip missions with adequate tactical intelligence capabilities seriously reduces our operational effectiveness in conflict situations.”
2010-02-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6270 (2010) · source
“That is especially important when a mission is mandated to protect civilians, as we are in the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). When the Council gives a mission a protection mandate, it must make sure that this is a feasible proposition that can be achieved with the resources and capabilities available to that mission. Sometimes, I must say, there is a disconnect between the two, with the result that we create expectations that cannot be fulfilled. But there will always be constraints, physical as well as financial. We must therefore also look for capacity multipliers. In MONUC, for example, we have introduced the concept of smart protection, recognizing that we cannot be everywhere all of the time.”
2010-02-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6270 (2010) · source
“This is what we are currently doing in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Now, ifI may, allow me to make a couple of comments on capacities and resources. Resource constraints are a perennial problem of all peacekeeping missions. I doubt that we will ever have adequate resources. We therefore have to frame mandates that are manageable, and then ensure that missions make the best of whatever resources are available to them. As the concept paper points out, missions vary enormously in size and complexity. There is no obvious correlation between surface area, population size and the magnitude of a mission. While we should probably avoid a standard formula for determining mission size, we should try to ensure a reasonable fit between mandate and means.”
2010-02-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6270 (2010) · source
“The planning process as it is now practiced is not the best way to think about the future. We tend to get immersed in the details of mandate implementation and fail to see the broader strategic picture. Planning should ideally start with the assessment of future risk and probability. On that basis, we can plan for a variety of outcomes, not just one. In peacekeeping, we will always be faced with uncertainty, but we should try to look around corners and get a better fix on possible alternative end states and not only the end of the State. I hope that the development of integrated strategic frameworks will help us move in that direction, bringing together the analytical and operational capacities of the peacekeeping operation and the United Nations country team in a consultative process with national partners and other actors.”
2010-02-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6270 (2010) · source
“Progress is neither inevitable nor predestined. Sadly, it is just as possible to go backwards as it is to go forwards. On the other hand, it is possible to move ahead with recovery, State-building and even economic development while there is still active conflict somewhere in a country. Transition strategies therefore have to be flexible and opportunistic. The next topic is planning with reference to the end state, key tasks and the phased completion of the mission. In my View, planning in United Nations missions today - or at least peacekeeping missions - is largely geared to the reporting requirements of the budget and mandate cycle. In my experience, we do not sit down and think very far ahead. Inevitably, we are pulled into the immediate - the urgent displaces the important.”
2010-02-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6270 (2010) · source
“Perhaps we need to accept as well that most conflicts are not resolved through single solutions and certainly not in conformity with the timetable ordained by the international community. We must also acknowledge that peace agreements do not always make peace. In the four countries where I have served in peacekeeping missions, numerous accords were brokered, signed and then discarded. Not unsurprisingly, therefore, peacekeeping missions established in support of peace agreements can quickly become hostages to fortune. In such circumstances, planning for transition and exit can only be an iterative process subject to the vagaries of shifting political and military realities on the ground. This leads me to say that transition and exit strategies should not be conceived as a linear exercise with one step leading inexorably to another.”
2010-02-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6270 (2010) · source
“The collective mindset of the international community finds it hard to accept that some problems are not amenable to quick, time-bound solutions. Moreover, the United Nations is often pressed to intervene with haste in conflict-affected areas and countries, especially when there is daily media coverage filled with graphic images of human suffering. Yes, ideally our entry strategy would define our exit strategy and set out the benchmarks to guide that process, but reality usually reveals that, in failed or failing States, the predictability of progress is highly tenuous. Perhaps we need to accept this complexity and uncertainty and recognize that we will often struggle to find the right approach and that persistence and perseverance are indispensable tools in the peacekeeping tool box.”
2010-02-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6270 (2010) · source
“Mr. Doss: Thank you, Mr. President, for having invited me to speak at this meeting. As a graduate of four peacekeeping operations, I come labelled as a practitioner - a term which, in the hierarchy of intellectual achievement, is ranked only marginally above the sobriquet of diplomat. Nevertheless, I have a few frank and perhaps unorthodox thoughts to share with the Council this morning on the issues that have been outlined in the concept paper (S/2010/67). First, I shall say a word on the way in which mandates are drafted and the degree to which there is clear integration of transition and exit strategies. Rarely, if ever, do we plan the exit strategy at the outset of a mission. If we did, I suspect that we might not want to mount a mission in the first place.”
2010-02-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6270 (2010) · source
“(spoke in French) On 30 June 2010, the Democratic Republic of the Congo will celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of its independence. Shortly after the birth of the new State in 1960, the United Nations intervened to prevent the 6 break-up of the country. Many Congolese remember that United Nations intervention with gratitude. In the course of the past 10 years, MONUC has supported the Democratic Republic of the Congo in its slow emergence from the greatest crisis experienced by the country since Katanga's attempted cessation. In that time, MONUC has provided multifaceted support for the establishment of the current institutions and for the pursuit of the democratic process. It is important that we continue to pursue and strengthen that process.”
2009-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6244 (2009) · source
“On arriving, the helicopter was attacked by some of the insurgents. Members of the crew were wounded. They managed, nevertheless, to evacuate wounded soldiers who were guarding the helipad. The rotors were hit, the fuel tank was hit, and the crew still managed to take off and fly everybody to safety 130 kilometres away in the Republic of the Congo, across the river. Their heroism saved 25 lives. I think that is a good illustration of what the Mission does, day in and day out, that does not always get the attention of the public and the media. I would like to put on record our appreciation of the heroism of that Russian helicopter crew, who, as I said, saved the helicopter and its passengers from what almost certainly would have been a much worse situation - probably leading to the deaths of several of them.”
2009-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6244 (2009) · source
“During the first half of 2010, we expect to have more clarity on the evolving situation in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, the impact of measures to enhance the protection of civilians, the integration process and a timetable for elections. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations should then be in a better position to propose a realistic plan for MONUC and its reconfiguration. I would add, if I may, a mention of something that happened 10 days ago in Dongo, which the members of the Council may or may not be aware of. But I think it points to the work that MONUC does. Ten days ago, a helicopter with civilian staff, as well as some elements of the force, arrived in Dongo to resupply our military observers there, who were trying to see what was happening in the outbreak of violence.”
2009-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6244 (2009) · source
“In recent years, United Nations agencies have also focused on the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and have very few resources, including staff, allocated to the western part of the country. That means that they do not have the capacity to take over MONUC responsibilities without considerable additional support from the donor community. Before I conclude, let me say a few words on MONUC's future. MONUC's current mandate is elaborate, complex and covers a wide range of tasks. It has allowed us a valuable degree of flexibility in a rapidly evolving political and military environment. But sometimes it has raised expectations beyond the Mission's resources or capabilities. I would hope, therefore, that future mandates will simplify the range of tasks that the Mission is expected to undertake.”
2009-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6244 (2009) · source
“An integrated peacekeeping mission like MONUC can assist in creating a favourable environment in terms of peace and security and, together with the United Nations 09-65284 country team and other partners, help the Government to lay the foundations for longer-term recovery and development. The Integrated Strategic Framework, which is currently under preparation, is a pointer in that direction. As the Council requested in resolution 1856 (2008), we have now concentrated almost all our military forces in the east. More than 95 per cent are now in that part of the country. A significant number of United Nations police and civilian personnel have also been reassigned to the eastern provinces. The progressive transition to the East is therefore practically complete, although we are continuing to close some facilities in the western provinces.”
2009-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6244 (2009) · source
“The efforts to stabilize the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo can be sustained only if they are supported by nationwide efforts to consolidate democracy and to improve governance, in particular financial management, as well as to promote socio- economic recovery, and to encourage business investment and employment, a point recently emphasized by President Kabila in his state of the nation address. It is a truism that there can be no development without peace and security and that peace and security cannot be maintained in an environment of continued social and economic hardship.”
2009-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6244 (2009) · source
“The Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its three eastern neighbours, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi, are negotiating tripartite agreements under the auspices of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, with the support of the United Nations country team, is preparing support programmes for reintegration that will benefit not only the returnees, but also the communities that they are joining. While those negotiations are ongoing, ways of managing the flow of returns should be sought and a comprehensive mechanism put in place to address related land conflicts. We have urged the Government to establish the permanent conciliation committees foreseen in the 23 March agreements for that purpose.”
2009-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6244 (2009) · source
“In some return areas, security conditions are still very volatile and have been exacerbated by conflicting land claims and the competition for mineral resources. These problems have been aggravated by undocumented border crossings and by allegations that ex-CNDP elements have created protected areas for returnees. We need to be very clear on this: yes, returning IDPs and refugees have the right to protection, but it is the role of the State, and not of armed groups, to provide such protection. A privatization of protection tasks would only lead to the re-emergence of ethnic militias, with the potential to unravel the integration process and spark renewed ethnic violence.”
2009-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6244 (2009) · source