YouSaid · the spoken record

Doss

lines on the record: 197
first: 2005-03-28
most recent: 2010-04-13
sittings or episodes: 8
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“MONUC and other international partners are working with the Prime Minister in order to fund and support those priorities, and we in MONUC have realigned our stabilization strategy in support of the Prime Minister's initiative. The peace accord signed on 23 March by the Government and the CNDP, facilitated by Presidents Obasanjo and Mkapa, has laid the foundations to settle critical issues that have long bedevilled the Kivus. These issues include community cohabitation and absorbing the CNDP's parallel administrative structures into the provincial authorities and the national security services. Proper implementation of this agreement, monitored by the facilitation, would contribute greatly to improving relations among the communities and enhance the protection of returning IDPs and refugees.”
2009-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6104 (2009) · source
“They need to be put to work in order to avert future risks of remobilization. At the same time, it is important to relaunch economic recovery to mitigate ethnic tensions, which could be aggravated by the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees. A prosperous and dynamic North and South Kivu can absorb returnees, provided that conflicting land claims are managed carefully, but if the Kivus continue to struggle with mass poverty, unemployment and derelict infrastructures, new escalations of violence may emanate from the underlying tensions between ethnic communities. Prime Minister Muzito has launched an initiative to prioritize interventions in the area of security, State authority, humanitarian assistance and rehabilitation.”
2009-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6104 (2009) · source
“Copies of that strategy are available to the members of the Council and will be distributed after this meeting. The stabilization strategy aims to consolidate the improving security situation in the Kivus and Ituri by rapidly rehabilitating basic infrastructure, facilitating the return of law enforcement authorities and, generally, State authority. The extension of State authority and basic services also must go hand in hand with labour-intensive employment programmes to absorb disaffected combatants who cannot or do not want to join the army. The armed groups of North and South Kivu have declared a total of 47,000 combatants. There are doubts, perhaps, about the reliability of that figure, but it indicates how many unemployed youths are associated with armed groups for want of a better occupation.”
2009-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6104 (2009) · source
“Another encouraging element in our efforts to protect civilians is the adoption by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, United Nations agencies and other partners of a comprehensive strategy to combat sexual violence, which has been of great concern to this Council. The strategy contains four main components to address that scourge: fighting impunity, prevention and protection, integrating the fight against sexual violence into security sector reform, and improving access to assistance and legal services for victims. A lead entity has been identified for each of those four components, which will now be introduced at field level and implemented through provincial action plans and the United Nations security and stabilization support strategy.”
2009-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6104 (2009) · source
“There are residual pockets of insecurity, but recent incidents are more a matter of banditry than a military challenge to State authority. The implementation of the United Nations security and stabilization support strategy is now gaining momentum in Ituri and, I would add, in North Kivu. It will expand the presence of police and judiciary into remote areas, facilitate socio-economic recovery and, I hope, reduce unemployment, which feeds the militia's ranks. Ituri shows us that a sustained, multipronged effort by the FARDC, with the active support of MONUC and other partners, can break the cycle of violence and lead to peace and security. That has allowed us to redeploy some forces from Ituri both to the Kivus and to Haut Uele, and is a process that is currently under way.”
2009-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6104 (2009) · source
“However, improving the protection of civilians will mainly depend on the deployment of FARDC troops with the necessary mobility and fire support. Furthermore, it is essential not only that the FARDC and MONUC cooperate closely, but also that there be smooth and continuing cooperation with the SPLA and the UPDF. In both operations, Kimia and Rudia, I would like to add that MONUC has urged and requested the FARDC to establish joint operational centres so as to reinforce coordination and planning with, as necessary, the presence of liaison officers from Rwanda and Uganda. The situation in Ituri was for several years a major focus of MONUC. Our efforts to progressively restore peace in that district have been largely successful.”
2009-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6104 (2009) · source
“Most of those attacks occurred between Christmas 2008 and mid-January 2009. Altogether, about 1,100 civilians have been killed, hundreds have been abducted and some 200,000 people have been displaced. The number of attacks has gone down significantly in recent weeks, but there are indications that the LRA may be regrouping, and a new wave of attacks in the future cannot be ruled out. The protection of civilians in such a huge and inaccessible area is a major challenge. The FARDC has progressively reinforced its presence, and MONUC provides logistical and material assistance to the Congolese army in the context of operation Rudia II, launched to contain and to progressively neutralize the LRA. We are also establishing four operational bases in some of the most vulnerable areas of Haut Ue'le'.”
2009-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6104 (2009) · source
“However, we cannot allow those groups, in particular the FDLR and the LRA, to perpetuate their violent activities, which are accompanied by extortion, illegal taxation and an appalling level of violence against women and children. Those groups also remain a cause of concern for neighbouring States and a risk to subregional stability. In Orientale province, the LRA's gruesome reprisal attacks in the wake of the joint operation conducted by the FARDC, the Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) cannot be condemned too strongly. The LRA has dispersed into small groups that have sown terror and taken revenge by looting, raping, maiming, abducting and killing civilians in a vast area stretching from northern Ituri to the border with the Central African Republic and the eastern part of that country.”
2009-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6104 (2009) · source
“An example of those guidelines is being distributed to the Council this morning, and I would urge members to look at that as an innovative approach to dealing with the problem of prevention and the protection of civilians through peacekeeping. However, we should be aware that the continuing joint operations against the armed groups may lead to further attacks on civilians and new displacements. The Council must bear in mind that it is impossible to end the FDLR's control over large parts of both Kivus without any humanitarian consequences. Protecting civilians has been integrated into the planning of the joint operations with the FARDC, and we will do our utmost to minimize negative effects on civilians.”
2009-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6104 (2009) · source
“Their presence and contacts with the local population have greatly enhanced our situational awareness and response capacity. During the joint FARDC-RDF operations, for example, recommendations by joint protection teams led to the short-term evacuation of civilians from areas where they were at risk of getting caught in the crossfire, thus considerably reducing civilian casualties. In areas of FDLR presence, the joint teams have facilitated early warning and preventive deployment to avert possible reprisal attacks. We have also developed guidelines for the military units, so they are better advised on how to tackle the challenge of protection.”
2009-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6104 (2009) · source
“The timing and method of vetting must reinforce the peace process and ensure that all human rights offenders in police or army ranks are dealt with in a consistent manner. I have already broached this issue with the Government and urged the Ministers of Defence and Interior to put in place effective vetting mechanisms with the support of MONUC and other partners. Let me add that MONUC itself is adapting its policies and practices to enhance its work to protect civilians. MONUC has been deploying joint civilian protection teams, composed of staff from civil and political affairs, human rights, child protection and the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration sections. They operate in close coordination with MONUC military in vulnerable areas.”
2009-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6104 (2009) · source
“Along with resolving the crisis in the Kivus, the Council has instructed us to pursue the protection of civilians as the first priority of the Mission. As the 3 conflict between the Government and the CNDP has come to an end, protection demands are also changing. The main challenges are now to prevent FDLR reprisal attacks, to rein in undisciplined elements of the security forces, and to deal with the emerging threat of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in the Haut Uele district of Orientale province. Those tasks are intimately linked to consolidating the integration of the armed groups, as well as to the enforcement of civilian and military justice. Police and army reform has to introduce a vetting system to progressively remove known human rights offenders and to ensure that they face justice.”
2009-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6104 (2009) · source
“Operations will have to start as soon as FARDC and MONUC troops are deployed preventively to protect the main population centres. Continued military pressure against the FDLR by the FARDC and MONUC is very much needed, in particular to forestall or counter attacks against civilians and to deprive the FDLR of access to its economic interests. Such pressure has been instrumental in accelerating the surrender and voluntary return of combatants and dependants to Rwanda. Close to 7,000 Rwandans have now returned home since the onset of the joint FARDC-RDF operations and the follow-up with MONUC. Among them are more than 500 FDLR combatants, which is equal, I might add, to the entire total repatriated in 2008. The pace of surrenders has gone down slightly, but FDLR combatants continue to turn themselves in to MONUC across both Kivus.”
2009-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6104 (2009) · source
“The first objective of the operations is to prevent the FDLR from reoccupying areas where they have been pushed out by the joint FARDC-Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF) operations. Some of those areas, particularly along the border between the Masisi and Walikale territories, have seen a spate of reprisal attacks against civilians. MONUC has reinforced its presence there and continues to assist the FARDC in flushing out the FDLR in North Kivu, before starting operations in South Kivu. The next phase of Operation Kimia II will be particularly challenging. The FDLR is spread over large areas, many difficult to access, and has moved the bulk of its fighting force to South Kivu. We estimate its strength there to be around 4,500.”
2009-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6104 (2009) · source
“A significant success of the accelerated integration is MONUC's separation of almost 1,100 children associated with armed groups since the beginning of the process earlier this year. In all my meetings with the Congolese authorities and 09-29835 representatives of armed groups, I have consistently urged them to release immediately all remaining children within their ranks. As the integration is ongoing, the FARDC and MONUC have launched the next phase of the operations against the ex-Interahamwe/FDLR - Operation Kimia II. In addition to providing rations, MONUC assists in the planning, ensures medical evacuation and provides logistic and fire support to the FARDC. A company of MONUC forces is also co-locating with most FARDC battalions assigned to those operations in order to ensure monitoring and to facilitate the delivery of supplies.”
2009-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6104 (2009) · source
“MONUC provides rations to soldiers engaged in the joint operations and to those who will be sent for training by MONUC, but the Government now has to move quickly to cover the immediate needs arising from fast-track integration and to manage the transition towards long-term army reform. Secure areas have to be demilitarized by properly garrisoning contingents not involved in the joint operations or in patrolling and by deploying the police to maintain law and order. MONUC has trained police forces and is coordinating international assistance to facilitate the restoration of State authority and the provisional garrisoning of the FARDC, which should start in the coming weeks.”
2009-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6104 (2009) · source
“Most elements of the CNDP and other armed groups have been registered, but payments of salaries have been delayed and the provision of food and ammunition for the units engaged in the operations against the FDLR has been lagging behind. As a result, some elements of the newly integrated Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) have reverted to looting or illegal taxation. The FARDC command has, however, started addressing these issues with the assistance of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and other international partners.”
2009-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6104 (2009) · source
“This remarkable turnaround was made possible by the rapprochement of Kigali and Kinshasa, and we commend the two Governments for their courageous decision to overcome their previous distrust and to focus on common interests of the future. This, along with the reversal of the CNDP's position and the abrupt change of its leadership, has opened up entirely new perspectives for the peace process. But, as with all dramatic changes, they have also brought new challenges which must be carefully managed. The first of the challenges is the integration of the Congolese armed groups into the national army. The so-called fast-track integration had initially been a political gesture that is only now being followed up by practical implementation.”
2009-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6104 (2009) · source
“That being said, the integration process and ongoing operations against the FDLR are encountering considerable difficulties. Furthermore, tensions exist at the national level following debates on joint operations with the Rwandan and Ugandan armies, and at the local level, Where changing alliances have raised concerns, in particular in terms of land disputes which the return of more than 1 million displaced persons could provoke. (spoke in English) There has been a sea change in the situation in North Kivu since mid-January, when CNDP and the Coalition des patriotes re'sistants congolais, followed 09-29835 by other Congolese armed groups, declared an end to the conflict and their readiness to integrate immediately into the Congolese army.”
2009-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6104 (2009) · source
“The prospect of an end to the main conflict, which has dominated the situation in the Kivus for almost two years now, has created real hope that a lasting solution to the problems that have plagued this region of the Congo for more than a decade will finally be achieved. The first concrete results are encouraging. A large portion of the two territories that have been most affected up to now, Rutshuru and Masisi, is now more secure. The authority of the State is being re-established there. The FDLR in North Kivu have been pushed back from several zones they occupied previously and we have seen a significant increase in candidates for voluntary repatriation. Displaced persons are beginning to return home and the Government has launched an initiative to accelerate rehabilitation programmes in order to build peace in the Kivus.”
2009-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6104 (2009) · source
“Today, it is my honour once again to present to the Council the report of the Secretary-General (S/2009/ 160) on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and on the prospects and challenges of our peacekeeping mission. In late January, Mr. Edmond Mulet, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, informed the Council of significant events that took place in the context of bilateral meetings between the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda and of the statement on an end to the war by 10 high commanders of the Congres national pour la defense du peuple (CNDP). Since then, important progress has been made in integrating combatants of the CNDP and other armed groups and in joint operations against the armed Rwandan groups, the Forces democratiques de liberation du Rwanda (FDLR).”
2009-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6104 (2009) · source
“We have warned that these actions constitute war crimes and will be pursued. We look forward to an in-depth discussion with the Council members on the future role of MONUC, how it can adapt its mandate to the new realities, and how it can be more effective, especially in helping the 08-62035 Congolese people, consolidating peace and creating a better future for the country.”
2008-11-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6024 (2008) · source
“At the same time, we should be very aware that these additional troops will not be on the ground before a couple of months at the very earliest - and probably it may take longer - despite the efforts that are currently under way to mobilize and deploy those reinforcements as soon as possible. That is why we have and continue to support the calls for the deployment of a multinational force as a bridging measure until MONUC is fully reinforced. We should also be mindful that the MONUC's presence should not replace the national authorities and security forces in their responsibility to protect civilians and to protect the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We are particularly concerned at and deplore the recent attacks on civilians and unlawful killings of individuals in areas that have been overrun by conflict.”
2008-11-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6024 (2008) · source
“Already overstretched, the Mission has had to assume full responsibility for the protection of the major population centres in North Kivu and to support the delivery of humanitarian assistance. A major reconfiguration effort has been under way to reinforce MONUC's presence in North Kivu, including from within the province itself. We are therefore very grateful that the Council has authorized the additional resources that I had requested in early October. These reinforcements will provide us with some time and space for the political and diplomatic initiatives to go forward.”
2008-11-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6024 (2008) · source
“After consultations with the Secretary-General in New York this week, 08-62035 President Obasanjo will return to the region on Friday to resume his efforts for the parties and neighbouring States. President Obasanjo's mediation mission is also expected to address the continuing problem of the presence of Rwandan armed groups comprised of members of the former armed forces of Rwanda and Interahamwe and the Forces democratiques de liberation du Rwanda in the eastern Democratic Republic, as well as to follow up on the Nairobi communique. Recent events have had a profound effect on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and the way it implements its mandate.”
2008-11-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6024 (2008) · source
“It was the lack of will and capacity to implement the numerous inter-Congolese and regional agreements reached that led to the resumption of major hostilities at the end of October. We call on all parties to respect the agreements reached and return to the political process established by the Nairobi and Goma frameworks. We welcome in this regard the intensive international, regional and bilateral political efforts in the past few weeks to resolve the current crisis. I am pleased to report that, as a result of Special Envoy Obasanjo's first round of talks, a ceasefire has been established and the Congres national pour la defense du peuple (CNDP) and other armed groups have pulled back in order to create a zone of separation between the fighting forces in the northern part of the southern half of North Kivu.”
2008-11-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6024 (2008) · source
“Mr. Doss: I am very pleased to be able to join the Council today as it begins its consideration of the Secretary-General's fourth special report on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2008/728). This is a critical time for the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The fighting that has erupted in the eastern part of the country, along with its major humanitarian consequences, reminds us that overall peace and stability in the country cannot be attained without resolving the root causes of conflict in its troubled eastern regions. Over 250,000 people have been directly affected by the resumed hostilities. Overall, a quarter of the people of North Kivu are currently displaced.”
2008-11-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6024 (2008) · source
“Specific references were made and conveyed to the President of the Republic, the Speaker of the National Assembly and the Prime Minister. Our point was only to indicate that there was a difference between what was intended, as we understood it, and what was actually enacted. We, of course, have left it to the Ivorian authorities to decide whether they wish to take that any further. We have simply presented views based on our reading of the legislation. I think that those are the specific points that I would like to make at this stage. As I said earlier, most of the remarks made were very supportive, and we would like to thank the members of the Council for that support.”
2005-03-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5152 (2005) · source
“The issue of the delegation of powers, I think, referred to the fact that the report referred to the decree that was signed by the President but which has not been translated into actual effect. I think that there is still some confusion between what was envisaged and what has actually happened. We are simply noting that fact; we are not commenting on it. I think the report simply notes it. As concerns article 35, I will not go into that further. I believe that the mediation is dealing with this issue, and I am sure that it will be at the centre of the discussions in Pretoria. As regards the legislation, I think that both the mediation and the Linas-Marcoussis group, the Monitoring Committee, felt that, in some respects, the legislation adopted and promulgated was not in conformity with the spirit and letter of the Agreement.”
2005-03-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5152 (2005) · source
“Mr. Doss: I do not think that I have many comments to make. I think that the comments of the various delegations were very clear and largely go in the same sense. As regards the remarks of the representative of C6te d'Ivoire, I have taken note of the various points he made. I think that some of them result from, perhaps, a reading of the report that would not be mine and that perhaps some areas need to be clarified - for example, as concerns Logouale and the relationship with the National Armed Forces. In fact, in that incident and in one or two other incidents, there have actually been serving members of the National Armed Forces among those who were detained who were involved in those incidents, so there has been some relationship with those groups that have been conducting armed activities.”
2005-03-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5152 (2005) · source
“Despite the many difficulties that the Mission has faced since its inception one year ago, I believe that we have earned the confidence of the international community. This is due in large part, I would like to recognize, to the unwavering commitment of the UNOCI staff and team, as well as to other United Nations colleagues working in the country. We hope that, with the Council's support and guidance, we shall build on that record of service to assist cote d'Ivoire and its people to advance towards a better and more secure future.”
2005-03-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5152 (2005) · source
“I cannot conclude my remarks without speaking briefly to an issue that has greatly exercised the Council of late. I refer to the issue of sexual exploitation and abuse. During the recent visit of the Deputy Secretary-General, we were able to brief her on the very energetic measures UNOCI has been taking to tackle this problem. We have put in place a number of specific measures aimed at preventing abuse and exploitation, including expanded training and awareness programmes, vehicle curfews and the designation of off-limit areas. All staff - military and civilian - have been forcefully reminded of their responsibilities in this respect and of the penalties they may incur for non-compliance.”
2005-03-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5152 (2005) · source
“All the members of the Linas- Marcoussis Monitoring Committee are of one mind on this point. The present strength of UNOCI is, however, a cause for serious concern. We will not be able to respond effectively or adequately should two or more major incidents occur at the same time. The responsibilities deriving from resolution 1584 (2005) have also created additional demands on the Mission's limited resources. While we have made it clear to the forces in place that UNOCI will implement its mandate using the agreed rules of engagement, we must be sure that we have the means of our mandate so as to discourage any adventurism. In this regard, we hope that the Council will consider favourably the reinforcement requested in the third report of the Secretary-General, as well as the extension of UNOCI's mandate.”
2005-03-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5152 (2005) · source
“The key issues that must be resolved in order to ensure the long-term stability of Cote d'Ivoire are well known: eligibility of candidates for the presidency; disarmament of all armed groups, including the militia; and the organization of fair, free and open presidential and legislative elections. For that to happen, difficult but unavoidable compromises will have to be made by all the protagonists so that the legitimacy of State institutions can be fully exercised. Those issues can be resolved only in a secure environment that inspires the confidence of all parties. There is a peace to keep in Cote d'Ivoire, however fragile it may appear. The presence of the impartial forces is vital to prevent a complete breakdown in security, which would bring the political process to a halt and create more suffering for the people of Cote d'Ivoire.”
2005-03-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5152 (2005) · source
“However, in the absence of a functioning internal political process, external mediation and pressure must help move the country forward towards a peaceful resolution of the crisis. President Mbeki has consulted extensively with the key Ivorian actors and will hold talks with them again in early April. His representatives will report to the Security Council later this afternoon and will indicate the progress of the mediation at this time. The Council, however, may wish to consider the use of all provisions of resolution 1572 (2004) to support progress in the next key steps of this process. I wish to assure the Council also that UNOCI will continue to work closely with the mediator and his team, as well as with the Economic Community of West African States and the African Union, in a sustained effort to advance the peace process.”
2005-03-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5152 (2005) · source
“In order to introduce in the media environment of Cote d'Ivoire a neutral message and promote a culture of peace, UNOCI-FM. has progressively extended its broadcasts from Abidjan towards the centre and the north of the country thanks to transmitters located in Bouake and Daloa. But the development of that radio could be limited by the refusal of the National Commission of Audiovisual Communication to grant it frequencies in the interior of the country and because Ivoirian Radio and Television has threatened to suspend the frequencies already granted. (spoke in English) As the Secretary-General has underlined in his report, the ultimate responsibility for resolving the crisis in Cote d'Ivoire lies with the Ivorian political actors.”
2005-03-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5152 (2005) · source
“The Council has also received the report of the International Commission of Inquiry into allegations of serious violations of human rights committed in C6te d'Ivoire, and we hope that it will give the report all the necessary attention as soon as possible. It has been noted that the broadcasting by public and private media of hateful and xenophobic messages has decreased somewhat since the last report of the Secretary-General. However, that progress remains precarious. The adoption of a new law on restricting the press through the implementation of decrees could be used to control the public media and influence the private press on occasions such as that of November 2004. UNOCI continues to submit reports on the media's compliance with the provisions of resolution 1572 (2004).”
2005-03-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5152 (2005) · source
“Nevertheless, it is just as real, and the future of 3.5 million people is seriously threatened by the crisis. We therefore hope that donors will take that into account. Political uncertainty and the volatility of the military situation, together with impunity and the collapse of the judicial system in both the north and the south of the country, have led to serious violations of human rights. The setting of many incidents of abuse since the beginning of the conflict, the west of the country is going through a situation of great insecurity, with grave consequences such as the displacement of the civilian population. UNOCI's human rights section documents the serious violations, and, on several occasions, UNOCI has brought to the attention of the national authorities their responsibility to bring the perpetrators of those crimes to justice.”
2005-03-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5152 (2005) · source
“Under resolution 1584 (2005), the parties must, within the 45 days following the adoption of the resolution, provide UNOCI with a complete list of their military equipment. That measure has not been carried out in the set time, and we have formally reminded the parties concerned of their obligations in that respect. The humanitarian situation remains very precarious especially in the west and north of the country. In order to help the most vulnerable sectors of the population, the United Nations has launched a consolidated appeal for $39 million. To date, the appeal has not received the desired response from donors. Only 5 per cent of the amount requested has been received. The humanitarian crisis in Cote d'Ivoire is not as visible as those existing in other African countries.”
2005-03-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5152 (2005) · source
“In order to fight that scourge, the UNOCI civilian police, following the request of the Prime Minister, has organized, with the police prefectures of Abidjan, joint patrols to contribute to the security of those working-class neighbourhoods. That initiative has been very much welcomed by the residents of those neighbourhoods, where incidents of abuse have been notably reduced. Resolution 1584 (2005) of 1 February, entrusted UNOCI and the Licorne force with monitoring the arms embargo. In order to implement the resolution, the impartial forces have undertaken unannounced checks of certain sites and intend to increase their number. Thus, they inspected sites within the Abidjan airport and the Bouake airbase on 21 March without encountering any difficulties.”
2005-03-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5152 (2005) · source
“However, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process and the overall security environment are threatened and remain precarious because of the militia activities sometimes staged by political actors. We must also stress that the Forces nouvelles continue to make progress at the political level a condition for their participation in the disarmament process. In the framework of securing the territory, UNOCI has strengthened its operational cooperation with the United Nations Mission in Liberia in order to prevent the cross-border movement of arms and fighters. As well, the impartial forces must also deal with the increasing number of crimes, in particular in Abidjan, and with the abuses committed by certain elements among the security forces against the civilian population.”
2005-03-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5152 (2005) · source
“The Forces nouvelles have not yet accepted that proposal because they consider that the central power seeks to establish itself in the zone of confidence through that mechanism. The lack of trust is heightened by the lack of direct dialogue between the armed forces, despite the efforts to relaunch that dialogue made by the impartial forces and the South African mediatory effort. In January, with the support of the Prime Minister, the parties agreed on the principle of balanced representation on the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration and carried out an inspection of the cantonment sites in the two parts of the country.”
2005-03-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5152 (2005) · source
“Unfortunately, we have seen that such violations have not been punished by the existing authorities. Moreover, the militias activities, which have increased considerably during the period under review, constitute a growing danger for security in the country. The absence of judicial authority in the zone of confidence is of concern to the impartial forces, which do not have the mandate of supporting the judicial system. We have therefore proposed to the national authorities that exceptional measures be taken in order to deal with that gap, including through the nomination of temporary administrators. We have also proposed that the joint brigade composed of impartial forces, national forces and members of the Forces nouvelles be reactivated in order to patrol and combat rising crime in the zone.”
2005-03-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5152 (2005) · source
“As a result of the lack of trust among the parties and suspicions that the Constitutional Council and the Electoral Commission are not impartial, in a letter addressed to the Secretary-General dated 18 February 2005, the G-7 opposition parties requested that the United Nations organize the upcoming elections in order to ensure their credibility. In that context, characterized by the mutual mistrust of the parties, the temptation to resort to war as a solution to conflict is a constant danger. The UNOCI forces, supported by the Licorne force, remain vigilant, especially in the zone of confidence, where the situation has become very tense following the incident in Logouale on 28 February 2005. The impartial forces have strengthened their deployment in order to prevent incursions and to confiscate individual arms.”
2005-03-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5152 (2005) · source
“The difficulties encountered in the implementation of the peace agreements call into question the feasibility of the presidential election planned for October 2005. That election - which all parties to the peace process want to be fair, transparent, free and open - is at the heart of all political calculations. Although time is quickly ticking away, electoral tasks such as the resumption of identification efforts and the updating of electoral lists have yet to begin, and the Independent Electoral Commission is still being strenuously contested. There is increasing uncertainty about whether the general elections can be held in 2005 according to the agreed timetable. It is feared that failure to respect the timetable could lead to a greater crisis.”
2005-03-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5152 (2005) · source
“As the current report (S/2005/ 186) of the Secretary-General underscores, the security situation is volatile and the human rights situation continues to be a source of great concern, while the economic situation is daily worsening. In February 2005, the Forces nouvelles proceeded to rearrange the areas under their control by creating five new spatial entities, which were entrusted to new warlords. At the same time, the Secretary-General of the Forces nouvelles, Mr. Guillaume Soro, announced the creation of a police and customs school and the effective opening of a deposit bank in Bouake. Even though that operation does not indicate an immediate will to secede, it nevertheless reveals that the Forces nouvelles believe that this will be a long-term crisis.”
2005-03-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5152 (2005) · source
“Since the presentation to the Council of the third progress report (S/2004/962) of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI), dated 9 December 2004, the peace process in Cote d'Ivoire has not made any significant progress, and continues to suffer from the reverberations of the events of November 2004. As a result, the road map drawn up through the mediation of the African Union, under the leadership of President Mbeki, has gone largely unimplemented. The Government of National Reconciliation continues to lack ministers from the Forces nouvelles, and the military dialogue among the parties has been interrupted, thereby delaying the disarmament process.”
2005-03-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5152 (2005) · source