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2005-03-28
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2010-04-13
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un-security-council

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  1. Furthermore, funding for the continued reintegration of former combatants into civilian life will have to be secured. Eventually, all these efforts will have to be channelled into a comprehensive security sector reform process at the national level. The police component of that process is largely on track, with a three-year action plan and a longer-term strategic perspective. However, army reform is still in an embryonic stage, and justice sector reform requires renewed momentum. The Government's army reform plan is under examination in parliament. Once approved, the long-promised discussion with those international partners willing to 09-65284 assist in its implementation should be convened without further delay. The third challenge involves IDPs and refugees, who have started returning.

    2009-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6244 (2009) · source

  2. Now that the census of the army has been completed by the European Union Mission of Assistance for Security Sector Reform, salaries should be paid on time and mechanisms should be established to make sure that payments reach the rank and file. The garrisoning of troops who are not essential for ongoing operations and protection purposes should start immediately, and the FARDC should identify the battalions designated for training so that the FARDC and MONUC can proceed with vetting and with the separation of those who do not meet the standards of professional security forces in order to build a reasonably sized force that can progressively take over security responsibilities from MONUC, as the Secretary-General has recommended in his report. Newly deployed and integrated police should be regularly paid as well and properly equipped.

    2009-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6244 (2009) · source

  3. The Government needs to reach out to recalcitrant groups and to address their grievances, but all stakeholders have to understand that maintaining parallel structures or militias is incompatible with the peace process, and that the Government has the right to use appropriate means to impose its authority on those who continue to challenge it, albeit within the framework of international human rights and humanitarian law. At the same time, the Government should make every effort to overcome the shortcomings that have hampered military and police integration. The Commission on the Allocation of Military Ranks should strive for a rapid conclusion to its proceedings in order to clarify the status and function of all newly integrated officers.

    2009-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6244 (2009) · source

  4. There are two main reasons for that: residual armed groups which are reluctant to integrate or demobilize, and the ex-Congres national pour la defense du people (CNDP), which has not yet dismantled its parallel military and administrative structures in some areas that were previously controlled by the group. Lack of progress on outstanding issues related to the 23 March agreements is often used as a pretext for reluctance to complete integration and support the extension of State authority.

    2009-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6244 (2009) · source

  5. The Council is aware, however, of the dilemma faced by MONUC, which is inherent in the mandate that enjoins us to give the highest priority to the protection of civilians, while at the same time working with the FARDC, which includes elements that have been responsible for human rights violations, to disarm groups, such as the FDLR, that have been a constant threat to the people of eastern Congo for over a decade. There is no easy answer to that dilemma and we are looking to the Council for clear guidance in that respect. The second challenge is integration, which is tenuous and is creating renewed tensions and uncertainties in the Kivus.

    2009-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6244 (2009) · source

  6. In Bas Uele, where our presence is still limited, the deployment of an additional battalion will enable the Force to accompany humanitarian agencies on short-term missions to previously inaccessible locations where critical humanitarian conditions are reported. Fifty-eight of those forward bases are now operational. I have visited a number of them in some very remote parts of the Kivus, and I can assure the Council personally that local people greatly appreciate our presence and the protection that MONUC provides to them.

    2009-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6244 (2009) · source

  7. MONUC has finalized and is implementing, together with other United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations, a multifaceted protection strategy. Every day, in many areas of the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, MONUC is helping to protect tens of thousands of civilians under the threat of imminent danger. We have continued to deploy joint protection teams; we are mapping conflict and identifying "must protect" areas in cooperation with local military and civilian authorities; and additional mobile and temporary operating bases have been established in South Kivu, Ituri and both Ue'le' districts for the immediate protection of vulnerable populations.

    2009-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6244 (2009) · source

  8. Since my last briefing to the Council (see S/PV.6203), events on the ground in the Democratic Republic of the Congo have underlined the many challenges that we face in efforts to implement the provisions of the mandate that it has entrusted to us. The first challenge, of course, is protection. Human rights violations continue on a wide scale in the east, particularly in the Kivus. There have also been several cases of attacks on human rights defenders in other parts of the country. The humanitarian situation in the Kivus remains precarious, and overall displacement remains high despite recent returns by internally displaced persons (IDPs) from camps around 3 Goma. Sexual violence continues unchecked. Armed groups, together with uncontrolled elements of the FARDC itself, are responsible for most of those violations.

    2009-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6244 (2009) · source

  9. Unfortunately, with the recent round of integration and demobilization of Congolese armed groups, the problem of discipline in the FARDC has worsened. That is not a new problem, as previous waves of integration have brought many undisciplined and untrained elements into the army. That was the price of peace. It is essential, therefore, that security sector reform address this recurring problem through a structured process of vetting and training and by ensuring that the security forces are paid regularly and on time. MONUC is currently drawing up a vetting procedure, which we are sharing with our partners who are also engaged in military cooperation with the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

    2009-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6244 (2009) · source

  10. I urge other countries to follow Germany's lead by initiating legal proceedings against other members of the FDLR political leadership that are involved in supporting the crimes that are committed in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Council has stipulated that MONUC support for the FARDC is contingent upon respect for human rights, international humanitarian law and refugee law. In line with the guidance received from United Nations Headquarters, we have adopted a policy conditioning MONUC's support for any operations, a policy which is already being applied. That policy has been shared with the Government and underpins President Kabila's own zero-tolerance initiative, which is a vital ingredient in the fight against impunity and the protection of civilians.

    2009-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6244 (2009) · source

  11. But we should also recognize that the FARDC has dislodged the FDLR from its former strongholds and has not wavered in its determination to deal with the FDLR - which until a year ago was certainly not the case. However, the Government needs to move expeditiously to establish State authority in these areas while also prosecuting those who commit human rights violations. We welcome the arrest of two individuals indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda among the FDLR leaders in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, which was followed in November by the arrest in Germany of 09-65284 the Chairman of the FDLR and his deputy. This is the first time that FDLR leaders have been indicted for crimes committed by the group in the Democratic Republic of the Congo - crimes that continue unabated to this day.

    2009-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6244 (2009) · source

  12. The report also underscores the importance of cracking down on illegal trading networks that have funded the FDLR and other armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Governments of the region and beyond should work together and identify ways and means to control and regulate the trade in minerals and other natural resources to ensure that companies importing minerals from the Democratic Republic of the Congo exercise due diligence. At the same time the Congolese Government must ensure the progressive demilitarization of the mining areas and prevent its own armed forces from exploiting these resources. The Group of Experts has pointed to collusion by some FARDC elements with the FDLR, which we deplore.

    2009-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6244 (2009) · source

  13. As we have said before to the Council, the menace of the FDLR can be ended only by a combination of measures: military pressures allied to incentives for surrender; proper State control of the trade in mineral and other resources; and judicial proceedings against the expatriate elements that continue to fund, encourage and assist criminal activities in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. This is an agenda for action that obviously goes beyond MONUC's mandate and means and requires regional and international support The latest report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see S/2009/603) provides ample evidence of the critical role that expatriate leaders play in funding, organizing and directing the activities of the FDLR in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.

    2009-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6244 (2009) · source

  14. The FDLR remains a potent threat and they will seek to return to their former strongholds and punish the population for collaboration with governmental forces if they are allowed to do so. I am pleased to report therefore that a new directive was approved this morning by the Chief of Staff of the Forces armees de la Republique democratique du Congo (FARDC) and the United Nations Force Commander. Under this directive, the FARDC and MONUC will now concentrate on holding ground recovered from the FDLR and preventing attacks on civilians in areas of vulnerability, while undertaking 09-65284 focused interventions against any centres of command and control where the FDLR may have regrouped. Protection of civilians will be at the core of these operations.

    2009-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6244 (2009) · source

  15. There are also a growing numbers of LRA combatants surrendering; the most important was the surrender of Charles Arop, who commanded operations at the time of the Christmas massacre at Faradje last year Kimia II - the operation against the FDLR - will be completed on 31 December. The operation has focused on disrupting and dispersing FDLR forces in order to end their control of population centres and to weaken their capacity to exploit the country's natural wealth. That objective has been largely achieved, although we do recognize that there have been very serious and tragic humanitarian consequences. I wish to emphasize, however, that these operations were not expected to completely dismantle the FDLR, which has been entrenched in the Kivus for more than a decade.

    2009-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6244 (2009) · source

  16. MONUC has dispatched a military and civilian team to the area to help prepare the way for the return of the population and to facilitate the arrival of humanitarian assistance. In the east, we have focused our efforts on containing and reducing the threat posed by the main foreign armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, namely the Forces democratiques de liberation du Rwanda (FDLR) and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). October and November have seen significant numbers of surrenders and candidates for voluntary repatriation from both groups. Since the beginning of the year and until mid-December, more than 1,400 FDLR combatants have surrendered, roughly three times the average of previous of years.

    2009-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6244 (2009) · source

  17. It is an honour for me to provide once again an overview of the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and of the status of implementation of the mandate that the Council gave to the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) in December 2008. As the Council is currently discussing the future of the Mission, I shall concentrate on the remaining challenges in the peace process and on our proposals for addressing those challenges in the near future. (spoke in English) Members have received the Secretary General's report (S/2009/623), and I have little to add in the way of fresh information, except on the situation in Equateur province. Government forces have retaken the town of Dongo, where the incidents began three weeks ago.

    2009-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6244 (2009) · source

  18. These include the training of a professional republican army, the restoration of State authority throughout the national territory, reconciliation and the effective reconstruction of the country. I believe that the simultaneous tasks of stabilization and pacification must continue, with the support of MONUC and the material and diplomatic support of the Security Council.

    2009-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6203 (2009) · source

  19. Over the course of the decade, it has overseen the ceasefire and the withdrawal of foreign troops, stabilized the security situation, accompanied the inter- Congolese dialogue and the transfer and demobilization of armed groups in Kivu and elsewhere, facilitated the first free and transparent elections in 40 years, and helped the Government to manage the crisis in the Kivus and to combat armed forces. We are proud to have worked with the Democratic Republic of the Congo in its peace process, which has seen many reversals and developments, but certain essential objectives set out in the Sun City Agreement and that underpin MONUC's presence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo remain to be achieved.

    2009-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6203 (2009) · source

  20. In all of the activities, I want to add, MONUC works closely with Congolese authorities at the national and provincial levels. We also work with the special envoys of the Secretary-General, the African Union, the European Union and representatives of individual Member States. We value in particular the contribution of the European Union security sector reform and police missions to security sector reform, as well as the support of several Member States to the United Nations Security and Stabilization Support Strategy for the East. (spoke in French) In November, MONUC will have been present in the Democratic Republic of the Congo for 10 years. Beginning as a small observer mission, it grew to become the largest United Nations mission in the world.

    2009-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6203 (2009) · source

  21. Assuming that the surge is successful and that major military operations against foreign armed groups can be concluded in 2010, MONUC could then begin a phased troop drawdown at a pace consonant with the security situation on the ground. Should the Council so wish, this would permit the United Nations to reallocate, within a declining overall budget, additional resources to an intensified programme of security sector reform and, more broadly, to the strengthening of the rule of law as a prelude to the eventual departure of the United Nations peacekeeping presence. In the next report of the Secretary-General to the Council, we shall present the key elements of the integrated strategic framework as a contribution to the Council's review of MONUC's mandate and the possible reconfiguration of the Mission structure.

    2009-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6203 (2009) · source

  22. We shall also consider the possible structural arrangements required to implement such a strategic framework. In line with the Security Council's directives, MONUC has already deployed 95 per cent of the Mission's military resources to the East and, outside of the headquarters establishment, almost 90 per cent of the international civilian staff, drawn from all substantive sections, are also in eastern areas. We have conducted a review of ongoing United Nations operations in the western provinces and identified areas of responsibility that could be progressively transferred to the United Nations country team with minimal continued support from MONUC. In October 2008, the Council approved a surge capacity for MONUC, which is under deployment.

    2009-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6203 (2009) · source

  23. The integrated strategic framework builds on other initiatives developed by the United Nations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, notably the United Nations strategy to combat sexual violence, the strategy on protection of civilians, the stabilization programme for the East, and the multidimensional approach to dealing with the FDLR. The framework will consider challenges that do not fall directly under the mandate of MONUC but are of direct concern to the wider United Nations system. Nevertheless, we anticipate that the strategic framework will highlight issues that should be part of the MONUC mandate review. These will include the progress of the peace process, security sector reform, protection and the rule of law, conflict prevention and resolution, stabilization in the East and the democratic process and elections.

    2009-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6203 (2009) · source

  24. Resolution 1856 (2008) lists 41 tasks, which have given us considerable flexibility in a rapidly changing environment. However, it has also generated many demands and high expectations that perhaps need to be rationalized. The preparation of an integrated strategic framework, as requested by the Secretary-General's Policy Committee, provides us with an opportunity to reflect on how this might be done. The framework, which is a joint undertaking of MONUC and the United Nations country team, will outline the key challenges facing the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It will indicate how the United Nations might assist the country and respond in a cohesive manner, taking full account of the Government's own stated priorities and the directives of this Council as regards the focus and deployment of MONUC's resources.

    2009-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6203 (2009) · source

  25. Current tensions regarding the respective roles of the Conseil and the Ministry of Justice, and the paucity of budgetary resources, are impediments to progress in establishing an effective justice sector, which is a key pillar of security sector reform. As grave as the problem is with regard to the courts, the situation of prisons in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is even more critical. As the current level of national funding renders significant progress impossible, donor resources are urgently required to help us maintain the minimum humanitarian standards expected of a national prison system. In closing, I want to make some observations, if I may be allowed, about MONUC'S mandate, which will be reviewed by this Council at the end of the year.

    2009-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6203 (2009) · source

  26. Despite assurances from the Government that the local elections will be held before the general elections currently planned or scheduled for mid-2011, the timetable and dates for those local elections have not yet been announced and may well be pushed back again until late 2010. Also, the necessary enabling legislation has yet to be adopted by the legislature. We have informed the Congolese authorities that when they are ready we will be ready, but obviously the initiative lies with them and not with us. The report of the Secretary-General also mentions the dismissal of a large number of magistrates. There is concern regarding the establishment of mechanisms to ensure judicial independence and accountability, including the Conseil superieur de la magistrature.

    2009-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6203 (2009) · source

  27. The Minister of Defence will discuss its implementation with international partners once parliamentary approval has been obtained. MONUC has worked with the mediation, led by Presidents Obasanjo and Mkapa, to follow up on the 23 March agreements. As I have already mentioned, we have assisted with the release of former CNDP prisoners. We are mobilizing resources for war- wounded and for a training programme for the integrated police units. We shall also continue to press for a solution to the territorial administration in areas where ex-CNDP cadres still retain control on the ground. We will work with all concerned to ensure that the commitment to the 23 March agreements does not falter. Because of time constraints, I will not discuss a number of other areas of concern and activity of MONUC. Let me mention, however, the local elections.

    2009-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6203 (2009) · source

  28. In the framework of the stabilization programme, barracks are being constructed for these troops, with the assistance of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. A MONUC training programme for newly integrated troops will start in January at two or three planned training centres, with the support of training specialists from the Tanzanian army, who will join MONUC as a formed contingent. These activities are intended to consolidate military integration and improve the discipline and efficiency of the FARDC. They are the first steps towards army reform, which in itself is an important long-term project that will require substantial international support. The Conseil superieur de la defense has endorsed an army reform plan that has been submitted to Parliament for review.

    2009-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6203 (2009) · source

  29. More and more remnant groups are joining this process. They have been motivated by a combination of military pressure and dialogue. Although the official integration process is over, the FARDC continues to receive and to integrate those who surrender. At the same time, the army hierarchy is endeavouring to improve the conditions of service for newly integrated soldiers, although the timely payment of salaries is still a major problem that needs to be resolved urgently. We find that when salaries are not paid on time, discipline deteriorates, looting begins and other kinds of violence follow, especially violence against women. So it is absolutely essential that the problem of timely pay be resolved.

    2009-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6203 (2009) · source

  30. FDLR leaders abroad have sustained a propaganda campaign against operation Kimia II, discouraging rank-and-file combatants from surrendering. Additional pressure must be brought to bear on exiled leaders to change their attitude or sever their communications with combatants on the ground. MONUC has proposed that the Congolese Government and host countries of FDLR leaders in exile explore the possibility of criminalizing the FDLR under the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. There is overwhelming evidence of crimes in the Kivus, and if this initiative gained international support it would also serve as a powerful disincentive to those involved in illegal trading networks with the FDLR. Allow me now to report briefly on the integration of Congolese armed groups into the national army.

    2009-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6203 (2009) · source

  31. It would strengthen the ties between the leadership abroad and the combatants on the ground, thus obviating years of efforts at sensitization aimed at weakening these links. We do, however, agree that military pressure alone is not enough and should be part of a multifaceted approach to the FDLR problem that recognizes the need for enhanced measures to protect civilians and other action designed to encourage FDLR defections and the weakening of FDLR support outside of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Council will recall my earlier appeal for countries hosting FDLR leaders abroad to take legal action to neutralize their influence on the conflict. The Council's commitment and cooperation in this regard are particularly important.

    2009-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6203 (2009) · source

  32. Suspension would therefore undermine the FARDC's resolve and paradoxically, in our View, further weaken discipline by removing the immediate pressure for reform created by Kimia II. Rwanda might also see this as a step backwards from the rapprochement that has opened up an entirely new perspective for the Kivus since the agreement with the Democratic Republic of the Congo. A suspension would also make it more difficult for the Government to impose State authority and prevent the re-emergence of other armed groups that might well draw the conclusion that attacks against civilians will force the Government to give in to their demands. Above all, a suspension of operation Kimia 11 would be celebrated as a victory by the FDLR.

    2009-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6203 (2009) · source

  33. We have yet to receive any support in that area, even though it was authorized by the Council a year ago. Despite the efforts made by the FARDC and MONUC to improve and extend protection, it is obviously not possible to protect everyone, everywhere, all of the time in the Kivus, an area the size of California with a population of almost 10 million. So inevitably the question arises: Should Kimia ll be halted? Some observers have suggested that Kimia II operations should be suspended in order to give the FARDC time to get its house in order and improve discipline. We believe, however, that reducing the pressure now would give the FDLR time to regroup and rearm. It would also send an ambiguous message to some elements of the FARDC who have in the past cooperated with the FDLR.

    2009-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6203 (2009) · source

  34. In the past few weeks, the first elements of the additional 3,000 uniformed personnel authorized by the Council last year have begun to arrive in theatre and are being deployed exclusively in the East to further extend and reinforce our protection capacity. Another battalion is also being transferred from Kinshasa to Orientale province to backstop the operations against the LRA. With this transfer, only 500 United Nations troops will be left in the entire western area of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Unfortunately, the limited helicopter and fixed- wing aircraft capacity is still a huge constraint on our ability to quickly deploy and sustain MONUC forces in places where they are most needed. This is compounded, I might add, by our lack of tactical intelligence.

    2009-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6203 (2009) · source

  35. For example, on market days we provide armed escorts for thousands of villagers, in particular women, who wish to travel to market in safety, free of harassment and illegal taxation by armed groups. All of these activities have been integrated into a comprehensive civilian protection strategy developed by MONUC, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the protection cluster. Our protection efforts, however, are a daily exercise in managing scarce resources and, I must say, making hard choices. The Council is well aware of the strain on MONUC's military and logistical assets. I therefore want to pay tribute to the contingents and civilian personnel who are working to project MONUC's presence into very demanding areas throughout the East.

    2009-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6203 (2009) · source

  36. So it is very important that we have this joint approach as we try to tackle the problem of impunity in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. To underscore MONUC's full support for the President's zero-tolerance policy and to reinforce that policy, MONUC has told the Government that it will withdraw support from battalions that show a blatant disregard for international humanitarian law. MONUC is the first mission in which the Force Commander has issued a specific directive on civilian protection to all contingents. Under that directive, MONUC Blue Helmets provide protection against attacks by the FDLR and other armed elements, patrol key routes to facilitate the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance, and indeed go well beyond those responsibilities.

    2009-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6203 (2009) · source

  37. The refurbishment of Ndolo military prison in Kinshasa is nearly complete and will enable us to transfer military prisoners - serious offenders - from the East to secure facilities in Kinshasa. MONUC itself is helping to establish prosecution support cells and joint investigation teams within the military to assist them to act more speedily in investigating and prosecuting serious crimes, including rape. Partner assistance in this initiative is critical. I would like to underscore that we cannot make significant progress if we do not work on all of these areas simultaneously. We can arrest people and we can try them, but if they are not in secure facilities they can escape and return to do what they did before.

    2009-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6203 (2009) · source

  38. President Kabila himself has now declared a zero-tolerance policy for acts of sexual and gender- based violence, and the Government is acting against looting, corruption and other undisciplined behaviour in the armed forces. The five commanders who were identified by the Security Council have all been removed from command and, we are assured, will be prosecuted. Two are already under arrest, two more have been put under house surveillance or arrest in Kinshasa, and the last one has absconded. The FARDC has established a military court for the Kivus, which has handed down more than 30 sentences to soldiers found guilty of serious crimes. High-level commanders have been relieved of their duties for misconduct.

    2009-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6203 (2009) · source

  39. Deployment of these missions is guided by a rapid response and early warning cell that draws on information from a variety of sources, including civil society and surveillance networks established by the military at the provincial level. I believe we have circulated a map to the members of the Council showing the dispersion of all of those mission bases throughout the two Kivus. We are also using these mechanisms to monitor the performance of individual FARDC battalions and, as necessary, asking the military leadership of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to take corrective action when we see disciplinary problems. This will be the basis for any decision we may make on the necessity of withdrawing support if we see a blatant disregard for international humanitarian law.

    2009-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6203 (2009) · source

  40. Last year, we launched mobile operating bases so that we could respond more flexibly to the rapidly changing military environment. MONUC military is now present in more than 50 different locations throughout the Kivus and in five locations in areas LRA-affected in North-East Democratic Republic of the Congo, principally in Orientale province. The Council is aware that we have created joint protection teams, which have deployed into security- sensitive areas to assist the military and local authorities to analyse, anticipate and respond to specific threats against civilians. More than 50 joint protection missions have been launched in North and South Kivu, and we have started expanding this practice to the remaining areas of instability and vulnerability in Orientale province.

    2009-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6203 (2009) · source

  41. Thirdly, in areas that have been secured, the stabilization effort must be accelerated, giving priority to the control of mining sites to deprive armed elements of revenue, and backed up by the deployment of armed police and the reconstruction of roads and administrative infrastructure. Fourthly, non-military initiatives designed to encourage defections and surrenders among the 3 remaining FDLR combatants must be further intensified. Finally, but most importantly, the discipline of the FARDC and the national police, which itself is a vital dimension of protection, requires constant attention to signal and ensure that impunity will not be accepted. How will MONUC help to address these concerns? The Council has directed us to focus our attention on protection. We have identified protection hotspots.

    2009-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6203 (2009) · source

  42. Large numbers of people remain displaced and difficult to access, especially during periods of combat. The implementation of the 23 March agreements with the armed groups has been slower than we would have wished. Looking ahead, we see several issues that must be addressed if the momentum generated by the agreements reached between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda in December 2008 and the 23 March agreements with the armed groups is to be maintained. First, the areas cleared of FDLR presence by the FARDC must be fully secured to ensure continuing protection for the population and to allow internally displaced persons to return home. Secondly, major operations against the remaining FDLR strongholds should be completed as soon as possible, with proper regard for the protection of civilians.

    2009-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6203 (2009) · source

  43. The integration of the CNDP and other Congolese armed groups is approaching completion. Over 120 political prisoners were recently released and returned to the East, with MONUC's assistance. The stabilization programme is now moving into areas freed from the control of armed groups, opening the way for the return of State authority. Despite those positive developments, I do not want to imply that the troubles of eastern Congo are a thing of the past. The fast-track integration of up to 20,000 elements of former armed groups, some with very bad human rights records, into the FARDC has aggravated existing problems of indiscipline. Civilians in remote areas continue to suffer reprisals from the FDLR. There have been new population displacements and human rights Violations. There is still an appallingly high level of violence against women.

    2009-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6203 (2009) · source

  44. Two major figures wanted by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda for their involvement in the Rwanda genocide have been arrested and transferred to Arusha. I do not believe that would have happened without the military pressure that we have brought to bear on the FDLR. Most of the internally displaced persons who had been regrouped in camps on the outskirts of Goma as a consequence of the earlier conflict with the CNDP have returned home, although there is still a very high number of displaced people in North and South Kivu who are waiting for further improvements in the security situation before they go back to their villages. Significantly, more than 2,000 children have been separated from armed groups and the FARDC since the 09-56206 beginning of the year, with the help of MONUC and UNICEF.

    2009-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6203 (2009) · source

  45. A year on, there is now a real prospect that the conflicts that have for so long blighted the eastern Congo can be ended. There has been progress on a number of fronts. FARDC operations in the Kivus and in Orientale province have significantly eroded the strike capacity and domination of the FDLR and the LRA. Since the beginning of the year, 1,126 FDLR combatants and 1,622 of their dependents have been repatriated by the MONUC team for disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and resettlement or repatriation. That is more than double the repatriation rate for the same period last year. An additional 11,383 Rwandan civilians, many of whom had been held hostage by the FDLR, have returned to Rwanda with the assistance of MONUC and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

    2009-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6203 (2009) · source

  46. 09-56206 The FDLR have been scattered, but they are not yet neutralized. Armed attacks are continuing in both Kivus and in Orientale province, where residual elements of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) are carrying out sporadic raids. The return of displaced persons and refugees after many years has led to ethnic tension and land disputes. Ongoing sexual violence poses an enormous challenge. The return of security has raised the hopes of the population, who now want to see a real peace dividend. (spoke in English) When I spoke to the Council a year ago, the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was increasingly grave. We faced a security crisis of enormous dimensions following the resumption of hostilities with the Congres national pour la defense du people (CNDP).

    2009-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6203 (2009) · source

  47. The report (8/2009/472) of the Secretary-General before the Security Council provides an assessment of the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the activities of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). Overall, the Forces armees de la Republique democratique du Congo (FARDC) have made progress in their operations against foreign armed groups, and especially against the Forces democratiques de liberation du Rwanda (FDLR), which have been pushed out of most populated areas and now find themselves dispersed and weakened. The integration of Congolese armed groups is continuing. Displaced persons and refugees are in the process of returning to their homes. Nevertheless, serious risks and threats persist. We must not allow ourselves to become complacent.

    2009-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6203 (2009) · source

  48. However, without the Council's material, political and diplomatic support, we will not be able to succeed. The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and MONUC count on the Council's support in the weeks and months to come to re-establish lasting peace in the eastern part of the country and throughout the region.

    2009-07-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6159 (2009) · source

  49. Nevertheless, it is critical that we not lose sight of our goal, namely, neutralizing once and for all the threat posed by armed groups destabilizing the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and causing tremendous suffering to the inhabitants of the Kivus and Orientale province. Backing off halfway through could have devastating consequences, both for the provinces concerned and at the regional level, where foreign armed groups have been a major factor in tensions and even instability. We should pool our efforts to complete that task as part of a comprehensive and coordinated strategy that takes advantage of all the tools available; military, diplomatic, legal, socio-economic and political. MONUC has an important role to play in that strategy to support the Government.

    2009-07-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6159 (2009) · source

  50. 8 (spoke in French) We are now at a critical stage in our support for the simultaneous efforts of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to integrate Congolese armed groups and to neutralize the threat posed by foreign groups. We are well aware of the stakes involved. Given new acts of violence against civilians, in particular sexual violence, we are forced to adapt our strategy and to do everything possible to strengthen our role in the protection of civilians. To that end, I have reached an agreement with the Government to carry out a second assessment of Operation Kimia upon my return to the country.

    2009-07-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6159 (2009) · source