YouSaid · the spoken record

Jeremy Greenstock

lines on the record: 1,478
first: 1998-07-30
most recent: 2003-07-25
sittings or episodes: 194
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“The United Kingdom, too, is delighted to see the Spanish Prime Minister here among us in the Security Council, speaking about this extremely important subject. I must commend my Spanish colleague for achieving something in 32 days that I was unable to do in 18 months: to bring his Prime Minister to the Council to speak about counter-terrorism. Once again, the Prime Minister has underlined for us the importance of the global approach to terrorism. Individual States acting in isolation - however powerful they may be - cannot deal with the problem of terrorism on their own.”
2003-05-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4752 (2003) · source
“The Secretary-General is absolutely right to remind us of the fundamental criterion: the interests of the people of the country concerned. They should be the guiding spirit of what we are doing, within an acceptable political framework for them on the ground. We need to apply that experience, and the potential of the United Nations, more effectively to those ends.”
2003-04-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4748 (2003) · source
“Having a Deputy Special Representative in Sierra Leone for economic and social issues was a good experiment - one that worked - and I hope that it will be applied in other areas. I think the Great Lakes region is one that could benefit particularly from an improved structure in that area as we move forward. So yes, we as the United Nations have played key roles in Sierra Leone, Kosovo, East Timor, Afghanistan and other missions, and we must not underestimate the benefits of drawing on the expertise gained in these operations as we plan future ones. Too often I think the United Nations experience has been that we re-learn our lessons in each new operation; and mistakes are made accordingly. There are elements of previous missions that are relevant and can be applied in the future to the situation on the ground, and we must apply them.”
2003-04-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4748 (2003) · source
“This is something that we have got to talk about; there is a lot of good analysis now about transitional justice systems, which we can feed into our work. Secondly, the role of women, not just in bringing about peace, but in reconstructing society, needs to be implemented on the ground from the lessons we have learned. I am very pleased to note that the next biennial meeting between the Development Assistance Committee network on gender equality and the United Nations Inter-Agency Network on Women and Gender Equality will take place at Paris in July. Let us make that an operational meeting, not just a re-analysis of the role which we hope women can play. There is a role that we can structure them to play in United Nations activity. Thirdly, economic and social development more generally has to be part of the equation on the ground.”
2003-04-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4748 (2003) · source
“Thirdly, the exit strategy for the United Nations - even from the post-conflict period - is important. We have exit strategies for peacekeeping operations. But if we have an exit strategy for a peace- building operation, we will then have objectives for a peace-building operation - objectives which it will have to achieve before it leaves - and we will then have greater clarity, better leadership and greater competence on the ground. Then, there are three factors that we must always bear in mind as an adjunct to all of that. Although we talk about the first of these, we still do not necessarily develop the operational response to it: the rule of law and the importance of justice and reconciliation on the ground still constitute a haphazard objective.”
2003-04-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4748 (2003) · source
“I think there are three requirements in drawing out those lessons. One is about expectations - what the United Nations can be expected to do and what it cannot be expected to do. Here I think the role of public information is very important in order to avoid misunderstandings. Secondly, structure - the structure of the United Nations presence after a peacekeeping operation has gone - needs much more attention. We tend to walk away from it and not leave a structure on the ground - except the traditional one of inter-agency coordination through, for instance, regional coordination efforts. Sometimes that works well, but in more fragile situations it can easily go wrong. Here, liaison with the relevant regional players - the regional groups - is also very important.”
2003-04-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4748 (2003) · source
“I hope that when we come to look at the periods after the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor and after United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, we will take them as a test of how to set a basic model - a template - for how we, as the United Nations, are going to handle the post-conflict period. There are questions about disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and about the role of agencies on the ground and the roles and capacities of implementing partners, including the regional players, as well as international donors and civil society. Where is the coherence? Where is the operational structure to take forward the things that need to be done? We have a lot of experience of things going both right and wrong, but I am not sure we have drawn them all out into lessons for the future.”
2003-04-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4748 (2003) · source
“I think that, with the Secretary-General here, it is also fair to ask whether the structure and working methods of the Secretariat truly respond to the need for this seamless approach. I think that in the near future we ought to look particularly at the situations in Timor-Leste and Sierra Leone. The Secretary-General has rightly said that no two situations are the same. But every situation can benefit from lessons learned from others, and every situation has certain common factors, which I do not think we have been successful in drawing together.”
2003-04-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4748 (2003) · source
“But the humanitarian-to-reconstruction phase still remains weak in many situations where the United Nations has a role. We have all recognized the dangers of a transition gap, and we have tried to point to that in the recent past by encouraging efforts to get the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council to talk about complementary approaches to post- conflict peace-building, because none of us can deny that peace and development are inextricably linked. The Security Council cannot cut itself off into an area of peace and security alone and fail to recognize the seamlessness of events on the ground between security and economic and social issues. We, as an inter- governmental organ, have more to do on that.”
2003-04-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4748 (2003) · source
“As so often, Mr. President, you have demonstrated your commendable habit of focusing our discussion on things that really do need to be talked about; I thank you for that. Our three leading speakers - the Secretary-General, the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Economic and Social Council - have all given us a lot to think about. The principles to be followed in this general area will be well expounded upon by the representative of Greece when he speaks later on behalf of the European Union. I want to cover some points and try to look forward, rather than backward, to what the Security Council, with its partners, should be doing in this whole area. After a conflict there is always a fragile situation, and the agencies of the United Nations and civil society do extraordinarily well in bringing immediate relief.”
2003-04-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4748 (2003) · source
“He did not say "unnecessarily", but he did not point to a climatic or a coincidental reason. There are things there that, from a human perspective, could go better; ditto in some other parts of Africa, where the right policies could make this immediately better. To what extent does Mr. Morris believe that the Security Council is making a difference? Since he only has a few further minutes left with us today, what would he like us specifically to do, until he comes back to talk to us about it again, to make what he sees, from the WFP viewpoint, start improving, rather than continue to go worse?”
2003-04-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4736 (2003) · source
“If, behind this picture of starvation and misery, there is not just climate, agricultural policy and what is happening on the ground in the agricultural area, but also health and governance and wars and all sorts of other things, should not the interplay between WFP and the Security Council be looking at the coordination of the response? It is not all our business to get into these areas, but it is our business to do part of it and therefore to work with others in doing all of it. Does he not see a crying need for better coordination within the international and the United Nations systems, much of which may come back to the governance problem? Mr. Morris mentioned Zimbabwe because it is the one area of Southern Africa which is getting so much worse than the others.”
2003-04-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4736 (2003) · source
“Morris ended by saying how critically important the peacekeeping and diplomatic aspects are. I would like him, perhaps, to give examples of what the Security Council could actually do. There are three things in my mind. One is, of course, conflict resolution. He has pointed to Angola and Sierra Leone as having got better; Ethiopia/Eritrea as not yet better enough; and perhaps Cote d'Ivoire and other places getting worse. Liberia is still a problem and other parts where there are rebellions and wars are still difficult. Secondly, there is the problem of politicization and of governance. Perhaps that, too, is an area where the Security Council can play a role. The third area - one we have not really talked about yet, but one we ought to discuss among ourselves and with our sister organizations - is coordination.”
2003-04-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4736 (2003) · source
“Yes, it is production policy and the arrangements for food production; yes, it is always never enough donor activity; yes, we could do with twice as much money and twice as many agencies doing it all; but it also has to do with the interplay with health problems, particularly HIV/AIDS; with peace and security on the ground; with governance; and with long-term problems and short-term problems. We can go on analysing, and Mr. Morris's oral and written statements do that; but in the written version, the seven proposals, as well as the six he mentioned orally at the end of his presentation, are not really the responsibility of the Security Council, as such. They are a responsibility of the United Nations family, the donor countries and the Governments on the ground. Yet, Mr.”
2003-04-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4736 (2003) · source
“That means, as he says, that the Programme is looking at more than food issues and increasingly less able - I take this as implicit in what he is saying - to deal with the causes of what is happening. And yet, the causes are, as I gather from his report, as much structural as they are emergency, or due to bad luck or bad climate. Therefore, the United Nations system should be doing something about those structural causes, as well as addressing the misery that comes out of the lack of food and health worldwide.”
2003-04-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4736 (2003) · source
“I share colleagues' feelings on the importance of this briefing this afternoon and on the terrific role which the World Food Programme (WFP) is playing. I would like the Council's praise for that to go to the whole team led by Mr. Morris. It is a huge team effort - one of the most impressive United Nations agency performances of all. I want to home back in on why we are here in the Security Council, listening to this briefing. I want to put the question to Mr. Morris as to what he expects from the Security Council on this. He is saying that, increasingly, WFP is looking at symptoms, not causes, and dealing with the outflow of misery from hunger and other related problems.”
2003-04-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4736 (2003) · source
“I hope that we have given him a solid basis on which to continue. He can rely on the full support of the United Kingdom Government and the United Kingdom delegation in the period ahead.”
2003-04-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4734 (2003) · source
“I would be expected to add something else, which is the pride that I feel in the work of my own team in the United Kingdom delegation - Anna Clunes, Iain MacLeod, Juliette Gilbert, John Steven and Sue Broughton - in providing the intellectual and bureaucratic energy and innovation to fill the vacuum that stood in the world and in the Council on 4 October 2001 and in giving their dedication to the work of the Council and the Committee over that period. I thank them from the bottom of my heart. It has been an honour to chair the CTC for its first 18 months, and I thank the members of the Security Council for the confidence they have placed in me. Ambassador Arias has a far more daunting challenge ahead of him, as the Committee gets into the meat of its important work. But he has all the qualities to succeed.”
2003-04-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4734 (2003) · source
“The Committee's experts have brought to us their experience, their professionalism and their enthusiasm, and the CTC has relied on them fully. I thank the Secretariat for managing a voluminous paper flow, ensuring that we have meeting rooms and translation and interpretation as required, and overseeing the smooth running of the Committee. I thank the Vice-Chairmen through the past 18 months, Ambassadors Gaspar Martins, Lavrov, Koonjul, Valdivieso and yourself, Mr. President, for your wise guidance and immense dedication. I pay tribute to every member of the Committee, without exception, for his or her constant interest, patience and constructiveness over these 18 months.”
2003-04-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4734 (2003) · source
“It took a horrific terrorist act less than five miles from this building to shake the international community into adopting the legally binding and global standards of resolution 1373 (2001). But memories can fade, and so can the call of responsibility. The vigour of a central, catalytic body can make a huge difference to the maintenance of global law and order in this vital field. The CTC has become that. And perhaps, one day, it may become something more: a full-time, professional and global body of experts, working under the Security Council but following up all the avenues which resolution 1373 (2001) has opened. Speaking once again in my capacity as Committee Chairman, I cannot end without paying tribute to those most closely involved in our work over the past 18 months.”
2003-04-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4734 (2003) · source
“This was well illustrated by a meeting of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in Botswana last week, attended by our own chief technical assistance expert, where participants grappled with issues such as how to prevent the movement of terrorists and terrorist- related goods in an open border region. I doubt whether, before the CTC came into existence, the members of SADC would have ever expected to tackle counter-terrorism alongside their traditional development agenda. But raising Government counter- terrorism capacity is a key part of development. Counter-terrorism policies must be mainstreamed into Government programmes and development programmes. Only Governments working together can raise global counter-terrorism capacity. But they have to be organized.”
2003-04-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4734 (2003) · source
“The 6 March meeting showed that regional organizations will be stronger, and will serve their members better, if they develop institutional capacity on counter-terrorism. They have also, like the CTC itself, recognized the link between resolution 1373 (2001) and other obligations, particularly those in the human rights field. The CTC will follow up this awareness. I believe that collective effort will pay dividends, because no country can prevent terrorism in isolation. Parts of the world that never considered counter- terrorism before are now taking action.”
2003-04-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4734 (2003) · source
“Governments are understanding the connection between tackling terrorism and tackling organized crime and other illegal activity. They are on heightened alert for suspicious activity, including fund-raising. And they are beginning to recognize that the world has changed forever. Secondly, the Committee has unlocked the potential of collective effort. I suspect that many participants in the 6 March meeting were surprised by the extent of existing best practice and experience, on which they can now capitalize. The international and regional organizations have understood that there is a standard of activity to follow. To keep up, they must become more professional, harnessing the activities of the international community, and sharing this with their member States.”
2003-04-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4734 (2003) · source
“It is satisfying that the CTC has been complimented for the dynamism of its approach over the first 18 months. But there has also been criticism. Colleagues have asked: When is the CTC going to make a difference? When is it going to catch terrorists? How can it make a difference on the ground when it will not even say what terrorism is? They have accused the CTC of doing no more than push paper. These are perhaps understandable criticisms, but they are misguided ones. First, there has been a real change in a huge number of capitals. There is an almost universal awareness of the threat of terrorism as a particularly hideous form of violent crime. This has led to revised legislation, in some States already in force, elsewhere working through the parliamentary system.”
2003-04-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4734 (2003) · source
“First, it means a better flow of information. The CTC's web site will be expanded to host the best information, in an user-friendly format, so that in one place an interested person can access information on assistance, regional activities, implementation kits for the conventions and every piece of collective best practice relevant to resolution 1373 (2001). Secondly, the network must be exploited, so that best practice spreads quickly and easily. The CTC will further develop the list of contact points so that contacts are made as simple as possible. I encourage all States, and all international, regional and subregional organizations, to use these contact points, and the information about what others are doing, to develop collective action. Now let me say a few words in my personal capacity.”
2003-04-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4734 (2003) · source
“We have all seen, for instance in Bali and Mombasa, the effects a single terrorist outrage can have on tourism, investment, the economy, social structure and political stability of a whole region. Counter-terrorism, in response, has now gone global, with the United Nations at the centre. The special meeting I hosted on 6 March brought together the representatives of some 60 international, regional and subregional organizations, all with counter- terrorism programmes. The event was important for establishing a global structure in concrete terms. Participants recognized that every organization had its own role to play and its own mandate. But they agreed that, by working together, everyone could shorten the journey and add more value to the fight against terrorism. So what does creating a global network mean in practical terms?”
2003-04-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4734 (2003) · source
“The CTC will need to explore how it can broaden its cooperation with them, including in its exchanges with Member States. I must mention here the States that need to do more to achieve full current compliance with the CTC. Three States have still not submitted even a preliminary report to the CTC. They are Sao Tome and Principe, Swaziland and Vanuatu. The Council should now decide what further action to take in this regard. The Council should also consider what action to take, if any, with respect to the 51 States that have not yet met the deadline set by the CTC for subsequent reports. All late submitters have been repeatedly contacted and offered the necessary assistance, and are in contravention of resolution 1373 (2001). Could I recall that there is a self-interest reason for responding to the CTC.”
2003-04-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4734 (2003) · source
“Talk to our experts, who know where assistance might be found. Seek assistance from, or offer assistance to, your neighbours and partners. Set your own benchmarks or use your regional organizations to do this. Because terrorism will not remain static. New threats will emerge. In January, our ministers highlighted weapons of mass destruction. We must at all costs prevent terrorists getting access to the materials used in chemical, biological, nuclear and other deadly weapons. I am pleased that the CTC will shortly meet representatives of those organizations and agencies with experience in this area: the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the World Customs Organization and Interpol.”
2003-04-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4734 (2003) · source
“The CTC will need to move ahead with both sensitivity and firmness as it gets into the detail of monitoring implementation. The existence of legislation was relatively easy to judge: it was there or it was not. But as we get into what the CTC has called stages B and C, the existence and then the utilization of Government machinery to prevent terrorist activities and to bring terrorists to justice, the CTC will need to deepen its understanding of what is required of States, and communicate that to Governments. There is no one standard pattern of counter-terrorism machinery for all countries. So, I am convinced that the CTC's tailored approach must continue. States must be proactive in their response. The guidance is there. Log on to the CTC's web site, which is getting increasingly good as a source of information.”
2003-04-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4734 (2003) · source
“I should like to highlight for the Council two aspects: first, the excellent cooperation we have established with the vast majority of Member States; and secondly, the beginnings of a global network to tackle terrorism. Transparency and consistent hard work have been the instruments. In 18 months, the CTC has received 343 reports from States and others. In response, it has sent 243 detailed letters in its efforts thoroughly to monitor the implementation of resolution 1373 (2001). For those furthest ahead, the CTC's comments and questions are moving from examining legislation to establishing that executive machinery exists, is sufficient and is functioning effectively. We do not expect every State to move at the same pace, but we do expect each State to move at its best possible pace.”
2003-04-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4734 (2003) · source
“Sir Jeremy Greenstock: I thank you, Mr. President, for that statement. Nothing has given more momentum to the work of the Committee and of the Chair than the warm and consistent support of all my colleagues on the Council, and I thank them for that. Thank you, Mr. President, for convening this meeting to review the work of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) on the basis of the Committee's next quarterly work programme. We have absorbed and are working to implement ministerial instructions to the CTC within resolution 1456 (2003). The task of guiding the implementation of this programme will rest with my successor, Ambassador Arias, and I wish him well. The CTC's work programme for its seventh 90- day period, contained in document S/2003/387, builds on the solid foundation gained from 18 months' work.”
2003-04-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4734 (2003) · source
“I sincerely hope that the Council will play its part with responsibility in ensuring a well-functioning Iraq that no longer presents a threat to international peace and security, where people can enjoy their fundamental rights without fear of oppression, and where a representative Government provides effectively for its people and manages natural resources for the exclusive benefit of all the people of Iraq.”
2003-03-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4726Resumption1 (2003) · source
“Looking further ahead, we will need to consider carefully the role that the United Nations can play in building a stable and prosperous Iraq. The expertise of the United Nations and that of the international community will be needed to achieve that result. The United Kingdom is convinced that the United Nations must take a central role in the future of Iraq. The Prime Minister will meet the Secretary-General at United Nations Headquarters later today to discuss precisely that.”
2003-03-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4726Resumption1 (2003) · source
“We hope that the outstanding issues can be resolved rapidly so that the Secretary-General, as he has requested, has the necessary authority and flexibility to maximize the role of the United Nations in delivering humanitarian relief. An equal priority, including in the short term - a priority recognized and acted upon by the British Prime Minister as a central plank of British foreign policy - is to restore the Middle East peace process to health. That means both publication and implementation of the road map and progress on security as well as on all other issues. The peace process must not be sidelined because of Iraq, nor must it be promoted only because of Iraq. Justice for the Palestinians, security for Israelis and Palestinians alike, and a comprehensive regional settlement must all be urgent priorities in their own right.”
2003-03-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4726Resumption1 (2003) · source
“A broad coalition of well over 40 States is supporting this action materially or politically. We deeply regret the differences within the Security Council that have marked the past few months of discussion on this subject. Now is the time to put those behind us and to unite to ensure that the United Nations and the international community can act quickly to meet the needs of the Iraqi people during and after military action. Our first priority must be to ensure that the changing realities on the ground in Iraq are reflected in the operation of the oil for food programme, on which 60 per cent of Iraqis remain dependent. Many in this debate have spoken in support of the Secretary- General's proposals on amending the programme. We have made progress within the Council on a draft resolution.”
2003-03-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4726Resumption1 (2003) · source
“Coalition engineers are already at work building a water pipeline from Kuwait to distribute supplies in southern Iraq, while a Royal Fleet auxiliary ship will shortly be arriving at Umm Qasr, carrying the first coalition consignment by sea of humanitarian supplies. And I should like to underline that these significant efforts in Iraq will not detract from the funding and the very high priority that we are giving to all other development activity, particularly in Africa. The action that the United Kingdom is now taking with its coalition partners to uphold United Nations resolutions is both legitimate and multilateral. The use of force is authorized in the current circumstances under Security Council resolutions 678 (1990), 687 (1991) and 1441 (2002).”
2003-03-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4726Resumption1 (2003) · source
“We are doing everything possible to minimize the effect on civilians, to leave infrastructure intact and to ensure that the necessary humanitarian assistance reaches the Iraqi people as quickly as possible. We accept in full our obligations under international humanitarian law. The United Kingdom has already committed $80 million to support humanitarian agencies, including the excellent efforts of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent. A further $300 million has been set aside for the United Kingdom's humanitarian response. In addition to that, the United Kingdom is contributing one fifth of the growing European Union contribution.”
2003-03-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4726Resumption1 (2003) · source
“Iraq was clearly determined - even in the face of the threat of military action - to hang on to its prohibited weapons programmes and to develop others, with all the risks that that posed to peace and security in the region and more widely, including to the national security of the United Kingdom. Iraq has, furthermore, valued its defiance over the well-being of its own people, who have as a consequence endured a decade of sanctions. Coalition action is therefore now under way to enforce Security Council decisions on complete Iraqi disarmament. This action is being undertaken in a manner that is directed only at the regime that is responsible for this failure to respect the United Nations.”
2003-03-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4726Resumption1 (2003) · source
“I am fully aware that Member States, perhaps without exception, find the current situation deeply disappointing and distasteful. But they cannot set aside the clear, prolonged and universally available evidence that Iraq was repeatedly defying the United Nations in refusing complete disarmament of its weapons of mass destruction under the terms of successive resolutions. The express and explicit demands of the Security Council were never carried out by Iraq, and the United Nations has not succeeded in drawing the right conclusions about the consequences of that. Resolution 1441 (2002) was adopted unanimously but not implemented with any rigour by a united Council. International peace and security cannot be maintained with responsibility by avoiding hard decisions.”
2003-03-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4726Resumption1 (2003) · source
“The United Kingdom fully subscribes to the balanced statement made earlier by Greece on behalf of the European Union and its affiliated European States. My delegation has listened carefully to the points made by Member States of the United Nations in this debate. It is not surprising that, on a subject of this importance and intensity, there is such a wide diversity of views. Many speakers have referred to the 12-year period within which the peaceful disarmament of Iraq was attempted again and again by the Security Council. No one worked harder than the British Government to try to bring about that objective. No one has worked harder in recent weeks than the British Government to try to unite the Security Council around a position that would have maintained the vigorous line adopted unanimously in resolution 1441 (2002).”
2003-03-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4726Resumption1 (2003) · source
“We should encourage UNMOVIC and the IAEA to keep both documents under review. A more definitive work programme will be possible when there is an administration in Iraq which is prepared to cooperate fully, actively and unconditionally and when there is a secure situation on the ground.”
2003-03-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4721 (2003) · source
“The United Kingdom continues to see an important role for the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in verifying the disarmament of Iraq and in carrying out longer-term monitoring. We warmly commend the inspectors for their professional work in Iraq since the passage of resolution 1441 (2002). They bear none of the responsibility for the evolution of events. We note the respective work programmes and the key tasks which Mr. Blix and Mr. ElBaradei have put before us. Equally, we note that without a cooperating Iraqi Government, as resolution 1284 (1999) and resolution 1441 (2002) make abundantly clear, it would never be possible to be confident of the key tasks or of making progress on them.”
2003-03-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4721 (2003) · source
“These are issues on which members of the Council have voiced similar concerns. We will share our ideas on continuing the oil for food programme in the interests of the people of Iraq and on ensuring rapid humanitarian provision. I hope that, together, and with the active contribution of the Secretary-General, we can make rapid progress on this crucial area. The Secretary of State for International Development of the United Kingdom is visiting New York today, at the request of the Prime Minister, to discuss these issues with the Secretary-General. The British Government has already set aside about $110 million for immediate humanitarian provision if there is a conflict, and is likely to announce further funding.”
2003-03-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4721 (2003) · source
“I repeat what British ministers have made clear: any action which the United Kingdom has to take in this matter will be in accordance with international law and based on relevant resolutions of the Security Council. Whatever the present divisions and resentments, we the Security Council, we the United Nations, have a central role to play on Iraq and on the wider issues associated with it. In that regard, on 17 March the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs expressed the interest of the United Kingdom in Security Council action affirming Iraq's territorial integrity, ensuring rapid delivery of humanitarian relief, allowing for the earliest possible lifting of United Nations sanctions, promoting an international reconstruction programme and allocating the use of all oil revenues for the benefit of the people of Iraq.”
2003-03-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4721 (2003) · source
“I underline the United Kingdom's deep regret that it has not been possible for the Council to find an agreed way forward on Iraq. The United Kingdom tried as hard as any member of the Security Council to achieve that. In spite of that regret, which I know we all share, we should not forget what brought us to this point: the fundamental failure of Iraq to disarm in the face of 12 years of demands, pressure and pleas from the Security Council and from virtually the whole of the international community. If Iraq had made a genuine effort - that indispensable factor - to close outstanding issues of substance at any time in the past decade, particularly after resolution 1441 (2002) afforded it the final opportunity to do so, and if Iraq had respected the United Nations, we would not be where we are.”
2003-03-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4721 (2003) · source
“In conclusion, we believe that trade in small arms and light weapons poses real and urgent problems. The human dimension of these problems, including their impact on women and families, should be a powerful incentive for Governments throughout the world, not just in West Africa, to coordinate their efforts in combating the proliferation of these deadly weapons. The Council must therefore, from today onwards, act to ensure that ideas for curtailing the trade are put into effect and make a difference where it matters, in West Africa and elsewhere. The Presidential Statement we are considering is a good start and has our support.”
2003-03-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4720 (2003) · source
“This was the motivation behind the proposal by the United Kingdom and France last year for an independent monitoring mechanism on sanctions. Mechanisms need to be developed to strengthen the capacity to enforce United Nations arms embargoes at the national, regional and international levels. We would like to work further with Council partners on this. Others have made interesting proposals this morning. The Foreign Minister of Gambia, for instance, has pointed to the need for an international legal instrument to hold those who foster the small arms trade to greater account and for an international convention on mercenaries. We would be happy to consider these and other ideas, as well as ways of promoting greater coordination between all the different mechanisms and concepts in these areas.”
2003-03-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4720 (2003) · source
“These include the need for States to have adequate laws and procedures to exercise effective control over these weapons transfers, as well as to assess applications for export authorizations according to strict national regulations and procedures. We look forward to working with partners to follow up the conclusions of this conference. In this context, we welcome the establishment of the United Nations group of governmental experts that examines the feasibility of developing an international instrument, enabling States to identify and trace illicit small arms and light weapons. We believe that the Council itself must take a close interest in how all these initiatives are followed up and implemented. Thirdly, it is crucial that United Nations sanctions are more effectively implemented.”
2003-03-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4720 (2003) · source
“The Governments of those States that transfer small arms and light weapons bear a significant responsibility for controlling trade in such weapons. Strengthening export controls has to be an important step in the right direction. This includes careful scrutiny, not only of end-user certificates, but also of the wider environment in which the weapons are to be deployed. The United Kingdom held a conference in London in January during which participants recognized the central role for the United Nations in combating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. This conference discussed how to strengthen efforts to implement relevant commitments in the United Nations Programme of Action.”
2003-03-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4720 (2003) · source
“The Presidential Statement we are to adopt this morning includes several suggestions, including establishing an ECOWAS register of small arms and light weapons, strengthening national commissions, and introducing standardized end-user certificates for imported weapons. We encourage donors to provide additional assistance to ECOWAS to meet these challenges. And I would like to know whether the Executive Secretary can tell us more precisely what is needed in terms of items and cost, so that donors can respond to the requirements of his organization. Secondly, we also encourage arms producing and exporting countries to exercise the highest degree of responsibility in small arms and light weapons transactions.”
2003-03-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4720 (2003) · source