YouSaid · the spoken record

Keita

lines on the record: 392
first: 2000-01-13
most recent: 2023-12-11
sittings or episodes: 35
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“1 would like to conclude by commending ECOWAS for its leading role and steadfast commitment to ensuring stability in Guinea-Bissau, including the maintenance of the ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau, despite other security challenges facing the region. My sincere appreciation also goes to all partners, including the African Union, the CPLP and the European Union, for their valuable contribution to stabilization efforts in Guinea-Bissau.”
2019-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8614 (2019) · source
“All national actors must be mindful of their duties towards the people of Guinea-Bissau and the need to transcend narrow individual and party interests. All efforts must be made to ensure the timely holding of an inclusive, credible and peaceful presidential election. Both the Government and the international community should abide by their commitment to providing resources for the election. In the longer run, key institutional reforms, including a constitutional review, will remain critical to consolidating the country's stability. Collaboration between all branches of power and in the National People's Assembly will therefore be vital in preparing the ground for an inclusive reform process. The sustained engagement of international partners will also be crucial to accompany Guinea-Bissau in its path towards lasting stability.”
2019-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8614 (2019) · source
“Meanwhile, UNIOGBIS and UNOWAS have already started strengthening their information-sharing arrangements and Special Representative Chambas of UNOWAS has increased his engagement with UNIOGBIS on the political process, having also visited Bissau twice this year. The year 2019 is pivotal for Guinea-Bissau in terms of seizing the opportunity to end the recurring cycle of instability that has hampered its socioeconomic development for decades. The risk of further instability in the period leading to the presidential election is high, with political rivalries and poor economic prospects for the population. The role of national political stakeholders in ensuring stability cannot be overemphasized.”
2019-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8614 (2019) · source
“A full-scale transition implementation will be launched in close coordination with the United Nations country team, the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) and the national authorities following the conclusion of the presidential election. The United Nations presence in Guinea- Bissau has also engaged with the Government on the gradual transfer of the UNIOGBIS residual mandated tasks to the United Nations country team, UNOWAS and other partners. With the arrival of the new Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ms. Rosine Sori-Coulibaly in Bissau, as of 5 September, scaled-up engagement with the Government is planned, in particular after the presidential election.”
2019-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8614 (2019) · source
“I appeal to the international community to provide financial and technical support to the Government of Guinea-Bissau in its fight against drug trafficking and organized crime in order to prevent losing the gains achieved thus far. Pursuant to resolution 2458 (2019), measures have been put in place for the United Nations transition plan for the prospective closure of UNIOGBIS by 31 December 2020. As a first step, one regional office has been closed and the remaining three will follow by 31 December this year. Additionally, coordination structures to oversee and plan for the transition have been established in Bissau and at Headquarters. The development of the United Nations transition plan, including a preliminary mission drawdown plan, is ongoing.”
2019-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8614 (2019) · source
“Upholding these rights remains crucial to sustaining peace, stability and development in Guinea-Bissau. Meanwhile, drug trafficking and organized crime continue to pose threats to peace and security in the country and beyond. The seizure by the judicial police of about 1,869 kilogrammes of cocaine on 2 September signals that Guinea-Bissau remains a transit route for drug trafficking, but also illustrates the enhanced capacity of the judicial police to combat the scourge. The signing on 2 August of a memorandum of understanding between Guinea-Bissau, The Gambia and Senegal to combat drug trafficking and organized crime along their borders is a commendable effort to tackle the cross-border threat.”
2019-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8614 (2019) · source
“Since the formation of the Government, UNIOGBIS has developed, with the Minister for Women, Family and Social Solidarity, a programme to promote the visibility of the eight women Ministers, support their outreach to the population and discuss key public administration programmatic areas from a gender perspective. UNIOGBIS has also supported a civil society network, including women organizations, in monitoring and advocating for key reforms during the post-electoral period. The political environment continues to negatively impact the economic performance of the country and the living conditions of the population. The human rights situation continues to be negatively impacted by socioeconomic tensions, including targeted restrictions on freedom and civil liberties.”
2019-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8614 (2019) · source
“With 75 days left until the presidential election, it is important that funding be made available now, either bilaterally or through the United Nations Development Programme-managed basket fund, to ensure that electoral operations in the month of November- namely, the training, deployment and payment of polling and security personnel, as well as the movement of materials to all polling stations - are completed in a timely manner. I therefore wish to take this opportunity to encourage international partners to extend their generosity to Guinea-Bissau to provide the necessary financial support for the election with urgency. Time is of the essence. The partner's contributions will be instrumental in ensuring the holding of the presidential election on 24 November.”
2019-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8614 (2019) · source
“To address this, the United Nations Development Programme has contributed $100,000 to the basket fund, while the Government has contributed approximately $160,000 directly to both electoral management bodies: the National Electoral Commission and the Technical Support Office for the Electoral Process. Efforts to mobilize resources from the international community have yielded limited results so far. Several pledges and indications of interest have been made, but with no actual contributions. We expect the first batch of financial contributions from international partners to arrive before the first week of October. Should the funding arrive, it will be applied to the training of civic educators and of polling-staff trainers during October.”
2019-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8614 (2019) · source
“The United Nations is working closely with the authorities and the electoral bodies to fine-tune and finalize the budget. Additionally, the Government has committed to contributing to the electoral budget to cover initial expenses for the presidential election, amounting to $730,000, in addition to paying the outstanding debt of $1.6 million incurred from the legislative elections. The voter register correction exercise, which started on 24 August, is the first of the major electoral activities and is expected to end on 24 September. However, less than one-quarter of the funding required for that exercise has been disbursed thus far.”
2019-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8614 (2019) · source
“Meanwhile, the initiatives taken by the Government and the electoral management bodies - the National Electoral Commission and the Technical Support Office for the Electoral Process - to enhance general communication and consultations with political parties, are steps in the right direction. To support that, the United Nations recommends the establishment of an all-inclusive stakeholders platform of national actors for information-sharing purposes. In the meantime, civil society organizations, including women's groups, have begun preparations for the establishment of a situation room to jointly monitor the election. They have also put in place coordinated efforts for the preparation and implementation of a code of conduct for the election. The Government has developed a consolidated election budget that amounts to $5.3 million.”
2019-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8614 (2019) · source
“In its final communique, it insisted that in the absence of consensus among all political parties on the voter register correction exercise, that the same voters register used for the legislative elections be applied for the presidential election. It also took note ofthe decision of the electoral bodies to hold the election in 2019, including the second rounds, if needed. The communique also requested a clarification of the responsibilities of the Secretary of State for Electoral Management. In its response, the Government indicated today that the correction process will proceed for now but that the actual register will be updated only if the presidential candidates agree during an upcoming meeting at the Parliament.”
2019-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8614 (2019) · source
“To address that, the group of five international partners in Bissau - the African Union, the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries (CPLP), ECOWAS, the European Union and the United Nations - has advocated for enhanced procedural control, transparent measures, information-sharing mechanisms and the development of a communication strategy on the voter register correction exercise. Ultimately, the joint message is that the country must remain focused on ensuring the timely holding of the presidential election. Moreover, yesterday, 9 September, an ECOWAS ministerial delegation Visited Bissau to assess progress in the organization of the election.”
2019-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8614 (2019) · source
“Meanwhile, the electoral process remains fraught with challenges. Some political actors have expressed concern about the correction of the voters' register to regularize approximately 25,000 persons who were disenfranchised in the legislative elections, owing to their fear of fraud. They have also questioned the creation of the new position of Secretary of State for Electoral Management. There is a general feeling ofmistrust among national stakeholders surrounding the electoral process, which must be addressed before the election if we are to ensure a peaceful and consensual process and an outcome that is accepted by all.”
2019-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8614 (2019) · source
“However, given the current tensions Within and among political parties, including within the majority alliance led by the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cabo Verde, the approval of the new Government's programme by the National People's Assembly will be a testament to the majority alliance's strength and ability to govern the country. Since the inauguration of the Government, the political arena has been dominated by preparations for the presidential election. Several political parties have organized primaries to select their candidates, while some independent candidates have also emerged. As we approach the 25 September deadline for the submission of candidacies to the Supreme Court for validation, we will continue to witness the emergence of new candidates.”
2019-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8614 (2019) · source
“However, the recent nomination and replacement of senior officials in key positions, including the new Commander of the National Guard, Rear Admiral Agostino Sousa Cordeiro, who is under European Union sanctions for his participation in the 2012 coup d'e'tat, have triggered negative reactions from national and international stakeholders. Meanwhile, the Government has adopted a seven- month emergency plan aimed at providing relief to key sectors, namely the education, health, infrastructure and public services sectors. It has also submitted its programme to the National Assembly for approval.”
2019-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8614 (2019) · source
“The decision of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) of 29 June addressed those issues, enabling the swearing in of a new Government on 3 July and determining that President Vaz would remain in office until the holding ofthe next presidential elections, with limited powers, leaving the management of national affairs to the new Government. Allow me to commend the Government for the unprecedented achievement of gender parity and the appointment of some highly qualified young people in the new Cabinet. That opens a new window of opportunity for inclusive governance in the country. The 31-member Government is composed solely from the majority alliance, reflecting the results of the legislative elections.”
2019-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8614 (2019) · source
“Ms. Keita: I thank you, Sir, for the opportunity to brief the Council today on developments in Guinea- Bissau and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS). Following the successful holding of legislative elections on 10 March, renewed political tensions resulted in a stalemate over the composition of the Executive Bureau of the National People's Assembly and delayed the appointment of a Prime Minister and the formation of a new Government. The situation was further complicated by the conclusion of President Jose Mario Vaz's five-year term in office on 23 June, amid differing opinions regarding interim arrangements for the office.”
2019-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8614 (2019) · source
“This unacceptable attack on a female lawmaker constitutes a serious crime against women and the prospect for women playing a role in political life in Libya. We are grateful to those Member States that have continued to follow the case closely and reiterate our demand that the authorities in Benghazi assume their responsibility and find those responsible for this cowardly abduction of a female parliamentarian in front of her family.”
2019-08-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8595 (2019) · source
“I therefore ask the Council to express its emphatic support to ensure that the truce takes place not only in the areas under the clear control of specific security forces but also in areas where there is no clear security actor. The United Nations family has been active in trying to address the urgent humanitarian priorities in Murzuq through the provision of safe passage for the injured and emergency supplies of food, shelter and medicine. I would like to conclude by raising an issue that the Special Representative and many Member States have been following closely, that is, the fate of abducted lawmaker Siham Sergewa. Ms. Sergewa was abducted from her home in Benghazi on 17 July and has not been heard from since.”
2019-08-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8595 (2019) · source
“Simmering intercommunal tensions between Tebu and Ahali groups in Murzuq, exacerbated by countrywide political polarization, took a turn for the worse. On 4 August, three LNA air strikes against Tebu elements, including a number of civilians, resulted in approximately 45 fatalities. Murzuq suffers from the same environment as much of Libya - an absence of State institutions manifested through the absence of services, an almost total lack of governance, a lack of impartial security forces and an absence of hope. It is a tragedy that so many have died in a town where there are deep-rooted grievances that, in the current circumstances, risk taking on a national dimension. It is essential that the intracommunal violence in Murzuq not spread to other towns in the south.”
2019-08-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8595 (2019) · source
“Consistent with the Special Representative's initiative, such a meeting would then be followed by a meeting of Libyans themselves. The Council's press statement of 5 July (SC/13873) in support of the call for a truce was certainly an important element in demonstrating the renewed unity of the international community, its faith in the Special Representative and its commitment to his three-point initiative to end the conflict. The public and private support of key Member States has also played a considerable role in building the credibility and necessity for the truce that is now about to start. The situation on the ground necessitates a countrywide truce. The continued brutal descent of southern Libya into chaos and intercommunal feuds is a disturbing harbinger of what may ensue should the wider conflict persist.”
2019-08-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8595 (2019) · source
“In the days leading up to the truce, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya worked hard to build confidence between the parties. The proposed immediate humanitarian measures, including the exchange of prisoners, the exchange of mortal remains and visits to prisoners or phone calls, can re-establish contacts and lower tensions to enable a truce. We urge the parties to seize this opportunity. This is the first step in returning to a political process. It is essential that the truce be deepened and strengthened through these important confidence-building measures and that the parties quickly participate in an international meeting to recommit to a road map to transition the country from conflict back to a peaceful, democratic process.”
2019-08-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8595 (2019) · source
“We have made it clear on several occasions, in front of this same audience, that no party can emerge as the winner from the current conflict. Today is clear evidence that there are already many losers, the majority of whom are innocent Libyan civilians. This message has resonated both with Libyans directly party to the conflict and to those international and regional stakeholders in Libya, who have seen that after more than four months of conflict there is no quick military win capable of resolving the complex situation on the ground. Terrorism cannot be effectively fought under the current circumstances on the ground, the tragedy of illegal migration cannot be adequately addressed and Libya's substantial economic potential cannot be realized for the benefit of the Libyan people or as a stabilizing influence in the region and beyond.”
2019-08-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8595 (2019) · source
“It also confirms that this latest bout of hostilities is creating a vacuum that is easily exploited by radical elements that thrive on chaos and violence. The United Nations does not intend to evacuate from Libya. For the foreseeable future, our place remains alongside the Libyan people, like our brave colleagues who gave their lives today. There are other significant developments today in Libya. It is a positive development that both Prime Minister Serraj and General Haftar's Libyan National Army forces have agreed to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General's 29 July call for a truce for the period of Bid Al-Adha to begin this evening. I can only hope that both sides will genuinely abide by their public commitment in good faith. This senseless and absurd violence needs to stop.”
2019-08-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8595 (2019) · source
“Ms. Keita: I begin with the tragic news of the car bomb explosion that took place in Benghazi today. There were a number of casualties, including United Nations staff working and living in Benghazi. We are now in a position to confirm that three United Nations staff members were among the fatalities. Two others were injured and are now being treated. Scores of Libyans are also among the injured. This horrific attack came as the people in Benghazi were preparing for the Bid Al-Adha holiday, in an area supposedly under the full security control of General Haftar's Libyan National Army (LNA) forces. It serves to highlight the continued danger of terrorism across the country and the limits of effective security control in the absence of one Government and one military and police force working across the country.”
2019-08-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8595 (2019) · source
“The United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel remains a valid framework for such coordinated action, and I call on partners to support its operationalization, in particular for climate adaptation, the empowerment of women and youth, and cross- border initiatives for peace. I also call on the G-5 Sahel member States to implement their priority investment plan without further delay. The African Union can play an important role in providing an umbrella for the various security initiatives in the region, and I welcome the recent resumption of the Nouakchott process. Finally, the time for action is now. We all have a shared responsibility for the Sahel, and we must each deliver on our part of the promise to help provide much- needed relief and empowerment to the populations across the Sahel that need it most.”
2019-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8526 (2019) · source
“Every contribution makes a difference, and the predictability of financial flows will greatly enhance the Joint Force's planning capacity. In concluding, let me say that even once fully operational, the Joint Force cannot shoulder the burden of fighting terrorism and stabilizing the region on its own. A security-driven approach alone will not be sufficient to combat violence in the region in a sustainable manner. It must go hand in hand with our collective and coordinated efforts and a broader strategy encompassing poverty reduction, good governance, development and humanitarian assistance, and security interventions.”
2019-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8526 (2019) · source
“I call on the members of the Security Council to consider other options that will allow for more predictable financial support and facilitate more effective long-term planning. I would like to extend my gratitude to the European Union for its extensive and consistent support for the Joint Force and for managing the coordination hub. I also welcome the decision to move parts of the coordination hub to the Sahel region to enhance visibility and ownership by the G-5 Sahel as soon as all the necessary requirements are in place. I thank all donors that have so generously come forward in support of the Joint Force, and I urge those that have made pledges but not disbursed them yet to follow through without delay.”
2019-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8526 (2019) · source
“I also reiterate his call for a caveat; obviously, MINUSMA's main focus should and will remain support to the peace process in Mali and, as such, support to the Joint Force should not add any additional strain on the Mission's resources or supply chains. Consequently, the geographical limitations on MINUSMA's support to the Joint Force should be removed only for the provision of life-support consumables and only as long as the Joint Force or a third party can guarantee the pick-up and transport of rations, fuel and water procured by MINUSMA. That proposal notwithstanding, it is evident that in the long run a different support model for the Joint Force needs to be envisaged.”
2019-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8526 (2019) · source
“However, the Mission's support to the Joint Force has been limited by a number of factors, including the hiatus in the Joint Force's operations until January, but also certain limitations imposed by resolution 2391 (2017). In particular, geographical restrictions imposed on MINUSMA's support have prevented the five other battalions of the Joint Force that operate outside of Mali from benefiting from life-support consumables. That has proved to be one of the obstacles to the full operationalization of the Joint Force. As such, I reiterate the Secretary-General's call for the lifting of the geographical restrictions on MINUSMA's support.”
2019-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8526 (2019) · source
“I welcome the initiative taken by the European Union to play a key role in organizing and coordinating international support for the establishment of the police component of the Joint Force. Ensuring compliance with legal norms, including with regard to detention, will help to strengthen trust and relationships with local communities. It is also an essential element in establishing the rule of law in the region. (spoke in English) The United Nations continues to provide international operational and logistical support to the Joint Force. I commend MINUSMA for its efforts undertaken in support of the Joint Force so far and its swift action and flexibility in responding to requests for support.”
2019-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8526 (2019) · source
“The establishment of the human rights compliance framework is another encouraging development. The few cases of alleged violations that have already been committed by the Force are detrimental to the achievement of its military objectives. However, they also demonstrate the need for such a framework and for a collective effort of the national armies of the G-5 Sahel member countries, as well as the Joint Force itself, to actively contribute to its implementation. Over the past 12 months, the Joint Force has significantly stepped up its efforts to combat such behaviour. That cooperation should continue to be strengthened so that the Joint Force can achieve its goals in terms of security and protecting the population.”
2019-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8526 (2019) · source
“They are being conducted by the armed forces ofthe G-5 Sahel countries, either alone or bilaterally, jointly with international forces or as part of the G-5 Sahel Joint Force. In the future, in order to strengthen command and control and ensure ownership, it will be important to clarify the framework within which the various operations of the G-5 Sahel member States are conducted. In that connection, I call on the leaders of the Joint Force, in close collaboration with the Governments of the G-5 Sahel countries, to further clarify the strategic concept of operations of the Joint Force. I also encourage them to accelerate the planning process and to develop a clear strategic plan for the months and years ahead. That will also facilitate international support.”
2019-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8526 (2019) · source
“That is a truly encouraging development and I commend the Force Commander, Brigadier General Hanena Ould Sidi, for his leadership and all the units of the G-5 Sahel Joint Force for their commitment and sacrifices in the service of this important cause. It is now essential to maintain that momentum. I have urged the G-5 Sahel member States to urgently accelerate the full operationalization of the Joint Force so that it can finally reach its full operational capacity. Effective operations will send a strong signal to terrorist groups that their encroachment on the lives of the population will no longer be tolerated and will be rejected through the collective determination of the Member States in the region. Many security operations are currently under way in the Sahel, often simultaneously.”
2019-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8526 (2019) · source
“That is compounded by poor governance and a lack of resources and employment opportunities for young people, which create a breeding ground for violent extremism. The major cross-border initiatives taken by the region's political leaders to jointly develop solutions to that security situation demonstrate their willingness to unite and address the many threats facing their region. In the same spirit, the G-5 Sahel has taken additional measures to operationalize the Joint Force after the devastating terrorist attack on its headquarters last June. I am particularly encouraged by the resumption of the Joint Force's operations in January this year. To date, it has carried out four operations in the three sectors since the beginning of the year.”
2019-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8526 (2019) · source
“The region faces serious problems, ranging from climate change and drought to growing insecurity, violent extremism, the illicit trafficking in persons, weapons and drugs. As always, it is the civilian population that pays the highest price. Terrorist groups continue to evolve and to spread beyond borders, including in Burkina Faso, the Niger, Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana and Togo. The humanitarian crisis in the Sahel is deteriorating, with an unprecedented number of schools and health centres that have been closed owing to insecurity. Countless farmers have missed yet another planting season in the Niger delta. As a result, more and more people will now depend on cereals and other food products provided by the international community.”
2019-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8526 (2019) · source
“I thank you, Mr. President, for the opportunity to address the Council today in the presence of His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Burkina Faso; the African Union High Representative for Mali and the Sahel, President Buyoya; and the European Union Special Representative for the Sahel, Mr. Angel Losada Fernandez, to provide an update on the standing-up of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel (G-S Sahel); the international support provided in that regard, including by the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA); and the difficulties faced and possible measures that could be taken in the future, as requested by resolution 2391 (2017). The situation in Mali and the Sahel in the broad sense remains extremely worrisome.”
2019-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8526 (2019) · source
“In the meantime, I can assure the Security Council that UNAMID will spare no effort to give priority to progress against the benchmarks and indicators focused on the protection of civilians, particularly relating to internally displaced persons and returning refugees, human rights, the rule of law, the humanitarian situation and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, as requested by the Council. I look forward to discussing initial parameters of the review with members of the Council.”
2019-02-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8468 (2019) · source
“Between now and June, we will have an opportunity to assess and recalibrate what UNAMID has achieved and will leave behind. In that context, I would like to acknowledge Security Council presidential statement S/PRST/2018/l9, of 11 December 2018, which clarified that some of the proposed benchmarks and indicators contained inthe Secretary-General's report of12 October 2018 are of more immediate priority and that some reflect longer-term peacebuilding objectives in Darfur. The strategic review, ahead of the presentation of the recommendations by the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for the UNAMID mandate renewal, will offer an opportunity to better unpack those indicators.”
2019-02-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8468 (2019) · source
“The way forward on the Darfur peace process needs to be discussed jointly between the United Nations and the African Union, including its objectives, expected outcomes and interlocutors and their constituencies, particularly in the context of evolving national and regional dynamics. The Jebel Marra area is still a conflict zone, without a cessation of hostilities. Overall, there are still close to 2 million internally displaced persons in Darfur. Local rule-of- law capacity needs to be strengthened for the prevention and resolution of inter-communal tensions, particularly where clashes persist over access to land, migration routes and other sources of livelihood. Human rights issues, including as it pertains to the protection of women, children and vulnerable youth from violence, remain significant.”
2019-02-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8468 (2019) · source
“In addition, efforts should be made in earnest by the international community to mobilize the resources that are needed to support the UNAMID exit strategy and its immediate effect on the ability of the Government of the Sudan and the United Nations country team to address the challenges of the transition in Darfur, while focusing on a difficult economic and social and humanitarian context in the broader Sudan. Moving forward, the recent developments and the ongoing evolution of the conflict dynamics mentioned earlier - namely, the lack of tangible progress in the peace process and the localized conflict in Jebel Marra - compels us to think through what can and should be done during the UNAMID drawdown and beyond.”
2019-02-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8468 (2019) · source
“At the same time, our visit also served to bring to the fore the challenging factors that the Government, UNAMID and United Nations country team are facing to maintain the pace of the transition, including in terms of the availability of resources. Indeed, despite all efforts by the Mission and the United Nations country team to conclude in less than two months the memorandums of understanding pertaining to the state liaison functions and the allocation of programmatic resources to the country team for the implementation of key mandated tasks in the areas of human rights, the rule of law and durable solutions for internally displaced persons, their effective implementation on the ground could end up been complicated by the shortages of liquidities.”
2019-02-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8468 (2019) · source
“In that regard, on 7 February, the Secretary-General issued a planning directive on the transition and, as I mentioned, during our visit with Assistant Secretaries-General Taranco and Wahba we participated in a retreat organized jointly with Government representatives, UNAMID and the United Nations country team to further enhance coordination during the transition process. Allow me to stress that, as noted during my visit, the United Nations system has made considerable political, humanitarian, and peacekeeping investments since the escalation of the conflict in Darfur 15 years ago. It is our collective responsibility to ensure that UNAMID's exit does not create a vacuum that leads to persistent local-level tensions or new risk factors. The engagement of the Government of the Sudan will be ever-more critical in that context.”
2019-02-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8468 (2019) · source
“The new mission headquarters in Zalingei is now fully operational, while the office of the Joint Special Representative was relocated to Khartoum. Meanwhile, UNAMID and the United Nations country team, with the support of their respective headquarters, continue to work together to ensure a smooth transition from peacekeeping in Darfur and lay the ground for sustainable peacebuilding. The entire United Nations system is committed to ensuring that we operate as one, in close coordination with the Sudanese Government.”
2019-02-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8468 (2019) · source
“A group of armed men in military attire fired indiscriminately on 13 January at a group of farmers in Am Siro, in North Darfur 34 kilometres north-west of Kutum, killing one. The death of an Awlad Zaid man in West Darfur triggered clashes between Misseriya and Awlad Zaid in a village approximately 80 kilometers north-east of El Geneina on 16 and 21 January. Seven Misseriya and one Awlad Zaid were killed, and 560 houses were burnt in seven villages. In line with resolution 2429 (2018), we completed the closure of 10 team sites by December 2018, which were handed over to the Government of the Sudan. The former sector headquarters in Nyala, Ed Daein and El Geneina are due to be closed by June, leaving the remaining 13 team sites in the greater Jebel Marra and the logistics hub in El Fasher.”
2019-02-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8468 (2019) · source
“Another denial of access took place near Menawashei, South Darfur, by Sudanese military intelligence, which cited the lack of security clearance. As a result, the mission could not verify allegations made by the SLA/Abdul Wahid that Sudanese Armed Forces artillery fire had resulted in the burning of villages, thereby causing fatalities, on 24 January. The Sudanese Armed Forces denied UNAMID access south-east of Kutum, in North Darfur, claiming that the area close to the Libyan border was rife with rebels and that the safety of peacekeepers could not be guaranteed. The frequency of inter-communal tensions and other security incidents remains relatively low, except for a few hotspots, in particular in the Jebel Marra area.”
2019-02-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8468 (2019) · source
“I would like to call on the Government of the Sudan to continue its efforts aimed at creating conditions propitious for the return of internally displaced persons, and, among the confidence-building measures that could be envisaged, to pursue a constructive dialogue with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict and swiftly adopt a framework of cooperation as a basis for addressing sexual violence, includingjustice and accountability, in line with resolution 2429 (2018) and consistent with the benchmarks presented in the report of the Secretary- General of 12 October 2018 (S/2018/912). There were three incidents of movement restrictions around the G010 area by the Sudanese Armed Forces, who claimed a lack of knowledge regarding UNAMID's patrols.”
2019-02-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8468 (2019) · source
“Conflict-related sexual violence remains a threat to the population in Darfur, especially displaced women and girls, who face particular risk when they engage in livelihood activities outside internally displaced persons camps. And the fear of sexual violence also hampers the return of civilians to their places of origin. I would like to emphasize in that regard that, during our visit to Darfur, and more specifically to the Sortony team site, we had an opportunity to have an exchange with internally displaced persons, all of whom expressed their deep concern over the departure of UNAMID in the absence of trusted and professional law enforcement agencies.”
2019-02-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8468 (2019) · source
“Reportedly, those factions disagree over their prospects as participants in the peace process, while some of their clashes also seem to indicate competition over scarce resources. Although those clashes have not resulted in new displacement, civilians in the area have been exposed to numerous incidents of robbery, abduction and violence, attributed to both personnel in military attire and SLA/Abdul Wahid elements. UNAMID also received reports of repeated sexual violence by the Rapid Support Forces in the Guldo area on 6 February. As mentioned in the progress report before Council members, the intensification of the conflict in areas of Jebel Marra last year saw an increase in reported sexual violence incidents.”
2019-02-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8468 (2019) · source