YouSaid · the spoken record

Keita

lines on the record
392
first
2000-01-13
most recent
2023-12-11
sittings or episodes
35
sources
un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

  1. In that regard, I call on all donors to make a contribution or to earmark additional funds for MINUSMA's support to the Joint Force. As the Council knows, MINUSMA's support to the Joint Force is limited to Mali itself, which is part of the Central Sector of the Joint Force's operations. Therefore, I also call on donors to step up their support to Sector East and Sector West, which so far have not received support from the United Nations. Finally, few of the pledges have been disbursed to date. I call on donors to disburse them as soon as possible.

    2018-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8266 (2018) · source

  2. (spoke in French) To date, despite the significant number of pledges received, the funds necessary to fully implement MINUSMA'S support to the Joint Force has still not been received. With the funds we have received so far, the Mission can provide only essential consumable goods and casualty evacuation. MINUSMA is still in urgent need of funds to provide engineering support to allow it to be able to assist in strengthening the G-5 for the Sahel camps in Mali. The lack of secure operational bases in Mali has proven to be a major obstacle to the full operationalization of the Joint Force. The troops who have already been deployed must live and conduct their operations under the most difficult conditions. However, MINUSMA's own experience in Mali demonstrates the need for effective camp-protection measures.

    2018-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8266 (2018) · source

  3. I also thank the European Union for its own generous and important contributions to MINUSMA's support to the Joint Force. However, I am also concerned that, while the support mobilized by the international community to date is indeed commendable, the support mechanisms, such as they have been set up by resolution 2391 (2017), will require perpetual resource-generation efforts to fund support to the Joint Force, including replenishing the African Peace Facility. In the medium to long term, it will be challenging to sustain the momentum achieved so far. What is more, the United Nations will continue to depend on others to be able to implement the support measures it has been mandated to provide to the G-5 for the Sahel Joint Force by resolution 2391 (2017).

    2018-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8266 (2018) · source

  4. An additional €80 million was raised at the conference, bringing the total amount of pledges in support of the Joint Force for the first year to over €400 million, which is almost the entirety of its projected budget for the first year of operations. The member States ofthe G-5 for the Sahel, the European Union and the United Nations also signed the technical arrangement defining the scope and modalities for providing MINUSMA support to the Joint Force, as requested by resolution 2391 (2017), on which we briefed the Council on 13 April. I applaud the European Union for managing the coordination hub, which is no small task. The hub is an important tool for coordinating and mobilizing member States' and partners' contributions.

    2018-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8266 (2018) · source

  5. In particular, I urge the member States of the G-5 Sahel to take advantage of the efforts carried out by the Joint Force, MINUSMA and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to establish a human rights and international humanitarian law compliance framework and cooperate for its rapid and effective implementation, including by supporting effective accountability mechanisms, ensuring the systematic deployment and presence of provost officers at the company level, and supporting the deployment of United Nations teams in countries of the G-5 Sahel. I also express my profound gratitude to the international community for its sustained and continual support to this important initiative. The outcomes of the international high-level conference on the Sahel held on 23 February in Brussels are a testament to that.

    2018-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8266 (2018) · source

  6. I also acknowledge that the Joint Force continues to urgently require equipment and training, including air and communication assets. Those capability gaps are another important factor delaying the full operationalization of the Joint Force, and the support of the international community will be required to overcome them. While not underestimating the complexity of military operations, we also believe it is important to address the recent reports about allegations of human rights Violations by security forces in the region as a matter of priority, as those may constitute obstacles for the provision of United Nations support.

    2018-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8266 (2018) · source

  7. The Joint Force conducted its first two operations in the Central Sector and undertook important first steps towards establishing its human rights compliance framework, including defining screening and monitoring mechanisms to address human rights violations. Nonetheless, much work remains ahead of us. The operationalization of the Joint Force has incurred delays and has yet to attain full operational capability. I call on G-5 Sahel member States to relentlessly follow up on the efforts made to date and deploy remaining troops as quickly as possible so that the Joint Force can resume its operations. I also call on the G-5 Sahel to further clarify the Joint Force's concept of operations and come together to jointly define its end state and objectives.

    2018-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8266 (2018) · source

  8. Against that backdrop, I can only express admiration for the member States of the G-5 Sahel, which have taken their fate into their own hands, and commend them for the efforts that they have undertaken over the past year to operationalize the Joint Force. As reported by the Secretary-General (S/2018/432), since the authorization of its deployment by the African Union Peace and Security Council this past April and the subsequent renewal of its mandate only a month ago, notable progress has been made. Member States of the G-5 for the Sahel have begun deploying their troops and equipping the command posts and sector headquarters in all three sectors. Burkina Faso and the Niger have each deployed one battalion on their respective borders with Mali, while the deployment of the Malian battalion in the Litpako-Gourma triangle is under way.

    2018-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8266 (2018) · source

  9. Over the past weeks and months, local security forces in the Liptako-Gourma triangle, as well as international forces and MINUSMA, continued to face devastating terrorist attacks, including on 18 April in Timbuktu. However, let us not forget those who suffer the most: local populations and civilians, who continue to be intimidated and harassed, live in fear for their lives on a daily basis, cannot send their children to school and/ or are unable to meet their most basic needs, including access to food and nutrition. Terrorism and transnational organized crime continue to be two of most pressing security challenges facing the Sahel region, and I fear that we will have to grapple with them for many years to come.

    2018-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8266 (2018) · source

  10. Ms. Keita: It is my pleasure to address the Security Council today and provide it with an update on the operationalization of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel (G-S Sahel), relevant international support, including by the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), and challenges encountered thus far, as well as possible measures for further consideration in accordance with the provisions of resolution 2391 (2017). I do not need to remind the Council that the security situation in the Sahel is dire. Just yesterday, we once again received reports of a shooting in Ouagadougou.

    2018-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8266 (2018) · source

  11. There is no military solution. I would urge the Security Council, as well as the African Union and members of IGAD, to use all possible leverage on the parties to reach a viable political agreement so that the people of South Sudan can finally see the peace dividend that has eluded them since independence in 2011.

    2018-02-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8192 (2018) · source

  12. That was done to protect witnesses and victims. The Office of Internal Oversight Services has already begun its investigation into the allegation and, in cooperation with the police-contributing country responsible, all efforts will be made to hold those found to have engaged in sexual exploitation or abuse accountable in line with the existing procedures. On the whole, the Ghanaian peacekeepers and police officers serving in UNMISS have made an excellent contribution to the protection of civilians and to the building of durable peace in South Sudan. It is very disappointing that the behaviour of some police officers risks staining that record of service as well as the Mission's reputation. In conclusion, I would like to reiterate that only a political solution can bring an end to the conflict in South Sudan.

    2018-02-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8192 (2018) · source

  13. The safety and security of people whose sole purpose is to provide assistance to the most vulnerable of South Sudanese should be a common cause for all in general, but for the Government in particular. As communicated by UNMISS on 24 February, an allegation of sexual exploitation involving several police personnel belonging to a Ghanaian formed police unit in Wau was documented at the Wau protection of civilians site. In that respect, let me reaffirm that Headquarters and the UNMISS leadership are fully committed to implementing the United Nations zero- tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse. As soon as the preliminary results of the investigation came through, the Mission took immediate action and removed the entire unit of 46 police officers from duty within the protection of civilians site and transported them to Juba.

    2018-02-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8192 (2018) · source

  14. Moreover, in order for UNMISS to deliver on its mandate effectively, the Mission will need to gain unfettered freedom of movement and the full cooperation of the Government, both of which remain insufficient today. I once again urge the Council to pronounce itself against the repeated violations of the Status of Forces Agreement, as well as the restrictions and impediments imposed on humanitarian partners. In addition, while the Mission has delivered satisfactorily on its task of creating conditions conducive to the delivery of humanitarian assistance, the safety and security of aid workers remain a serious concern that the Government must address urgently. Ninety-two aid workers have so far been killed since the conflict began, and of those 25 were killed in 2017.

    2018-02-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8192 (2018) · source

  15. That should be undertaken with existing resources and in close collaboration with the United Nations country team to avoid a duplication of effort. It is our considered judgment that the most effective way to protect civilians in a sustainable way is to reach a political solution to the conflict. A sustainable political resolution of the conflict is also the only avenue to chalk out a viable exit strategy for UNMISS. The four- pillared mandate of UNMISS remains valid, albeit with some adjustments, but the focus of the Council and the region should undoubtedly be on its fourth pillar, which is to support to the political process. Without progress in the political process, the Mission is likely to have to be deployed for a considerable amount of time, at a considerable cost to the international community.

    2018-02-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8192 (2018) · source

  16. South Sudan came into being with extremely limited institutional capacity in all areas of governance and Government services, with the exception of military forces. That situation has not improved in subsequent years. Poor governance and economic collapse have compromised already weak rule-of- law institutions. In the current political and security environment, the review found that a full-scale return to capacity-building for rule-of-law institutions is not warranted. An increase in the training of national security institutions in international human rights and humanitarian law and support to the investigation and prosecution of sexual and gender-based violence are, however, necessary, consistent with the requirements of the human rights due diligence policy.

    2018-02-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8192 (2018) · source

  17. Today, while the risk of instability and violence remains, the threat of military conflict in Juba has considerably diminished. The current environment in Juba therefore may call for some adjustment of the RPF mandate as currently scripted. Following the review, the Under-Secretary-General for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has ordered the conduct of a military and police capability study to explore how fewer troops can be dedicated to the protection of civilians sites and more deployed throughout the country to protect other civilians under imminent threats of violence. The capability study will also need to address the configuration of the RPF, as it is likely to have to support revised transitional security arrangements, to be agreed upon during the High-Level Revitalization Forum.

    2018-02-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8192 (2018) · source

  18. There will never be enough troops both to protect the protection of civilians sites and to extend the UNMISS protection footprint to other areas of large displacements in a country as large as South Sudan and with 2 million displaced. Increasing the effectiveness of protection efforts beyond the protection of civilians sites will need to continue being a major priority of the Mission, notably through the development of an integrated and people-focused, system-wide protection approach, aimed at filling existing gaps, generating synergies and removing duplication, and thus possible wastage of resources. With respect to the Regional Protection Force (RPF), since resolution 2304 (2016) was adopted on 12 August 2016, the security conditions in the capital have changed substantially.

    2018-02-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8192 (2018) · source

  19. Despite UNMISS efforts, and in the absence of criminal prosecution, sexual and gender-based violence has become a serious problem at some of them, where approximately 80 per cent of the population is comprised of women and children. The review found that largely over 50 per cent of the Mission's uniformed personnel are currently devoted to protecting those sites. While the vast majority of the people in the protection of civilians sites are there for their physical protection, and the protection of civilians sites will remain the responsibility of the Mission until the hosted population feel safe enough to leave them, those sites only represent a fraction of the South Sudanese civilians in need of protection. There are no easy answers to that dilemma.

    2018-02-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8192 (2018) · source

  20. The review found that the protection of civilians sites continue to dominate UNMISS protection of civilians activities. Managing and providing humanitarian assistance to those sites - a collective effort between the Mission and the humanitarian community - is a major and difficult undertaking. Some sites have become highly politicized, witnessing the activities of competing gangs and smuggling of goods - a level of criminality that is extremely difficult to manage with existing resources and without the cooperation of the Government, despite sustained efforts to improve security in its midst. The protection of civilians sites remain a continuing point of friction with the Government, which claims that it provides refuge to elements of the armed opposition and is refusing to investigate and prosecute crimes perpetrated on its premises.

    2018-02-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8192 (2018) · source

  21. Without criminal accountability for the crimes committed and an end to the supply of weapons and ammunitions to the warring parties, the suffering of the South Sudanese populations is unlikely to end. Meanwhile, we need to be aware that the economic situation in South Sudan is also expected to continue deteriorating. The army and security agencies have not received salaries for several months. Criminality is increasing and adding to the prevailing insecurity. Civil servant arrears are accumulating and many public-sector employees are no longer reporting to work. South Sudan is ranked 181 of 188 countries on the Human Development Index. The survival of the population will therefore require massive levels of international assistance for the foreseeable future.

    2018-02-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8192 (2018) · source

  22. A high-level revitalization forum on the peace agreement was convened on 18 December 2017 and delivered a new Cessation of Hostilities Agreement on 21 December. Since the new Agreement came into force on 24 December 2017, it has been breached repeatedly by the parties in various parts of the country. Special Envoys Wais and Haysom will brief the Council on the progress made during the second phase of the revitalization forum, but let me just echo here the message of the African Union Peace and Security Council, as expressed in its most recent communique, dated 8 February. If violations of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement and attacks against civilians are to end, we need to ensure that the signatories are held accountable and also deprived of the means to continue fighting.

    2018-02-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8192 (2018) · source

  23. More than 4 million have been displaced, half of whom are now refugees in neighbouring countries. As documented once again by the Human Rights Council Commission of Inquiry, which published its report last Friday, human rights violations and abuses, including horrific incidents of sexual violence, have reached alarming levels, and impunity for these crimes remains the norm. Moreover, more than 200,000 internally displaced persons continue to be protected on UNMISS bases, with the assistance of humanitarian partners. Since May 2017, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), supported by the African Union and the United Nations, has been working to revive the political process.

    2018-02-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8192 (2018) · source

  24. The special report therefore comprises the main findings of the review team and the observations and recommendations of the Secretary-General, to feed into deliberations on the renewal of the UNMISS mandate. UNMISS was established in 2011 as a capacity- building tool to assist a Government that lacked the capability to deliver services to its people. However, following the December 2013 outbreak of violence, UNMISS evolved into a Mission in which the protection of civilians, including from national security institutions, has become the main focus. This requirement unfortunately remains valid. The situation in South Sudan continues to remain a cause for grave concern for everyone. Tens of thousands of civilians are estimated to have been killed since the conflict began in December 2013.

    2018-02-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8192 (2018) · source

  25. The independent review of UNMISS was conducted from November 2017 to January 2018 by an integrated team that included representatives of DPKO and DFS, as well as agencies, funds and programmes, and was led by an independent expert, Mr. Kevin Kennedy, former Under-Secretary-General for the United Nations Department of Safety and Security. The team initially undertook a conflict analysis and consultations at United Nations Headquarters before proceeding to South Sudan, where it received detailed briefings and held extensive consultations with UNMISS and the United Nations country team, the Transitional Government of National Unity, the diplomatic community and non-governmental organizations. The team also visited Addis Ababa and engaged with regional partners and opposition figures.

    2018-02-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8192 (2018) · source

  26. Ms. Keita: Mr. President, I thank you for the opportunity to brief the Security Council. SpecialEnvoys Wais and Haysom as well as Special Representative of the Secretary-General Shearer will brief on the peace process and the situation on the ground, respectively. I will thus focus my remarks on the special report of the Secretary-General on the review and renewal of the mandate of United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) (S/2018/143). In line with the Secretary-General's agenda for reforming the peace and security pillar, the Secretary- General directed the Under-Secretaries-General for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS) to undertake independent reviews of eight major peacekeeping operations.

    2018-02-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8192 (2018) · source

  27. The Secretary-General's recommendations, contained in his letter to the Council, highlight an assortment of ways to move forward in this effort together.

    2017-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8150 (2017) · source

  28. Despite the substantial progress made in recent years to strengthen our approach and develop partnerships with Member States to fill capability gaps, there are inevitable limitations and some capability gaps remain to be filled. Therefore we will need to continue to enhance our collective efforts and be creative to fill some of our most pressing gaps. This will, of course, require troop- and police-contributing countries themselves to invest in more training and better equipment to maintain United Nations standards and adapt to new operating environments. Security Council members also have a strong leadership role to play in ensuring that mandates are matched by appropriate resources and by continuing to support the Secretariat in its strategic force generation efforts.

    2017-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8150 (2017) · source

  29. This coordination role would better direct those resources to troop- and police-contributing countries or missions. A more flexible and responsive mechanism is also required to support a Wider range of initiatives and meet multiple and sometimes unforeseen capacity-building and training needs. One such mechanism proposed is a pooled, multi-donor grant as part of the existing DPKO Trust Fund to augment existing resources to coordinate and deliver additional targeted and sustained training support for troop- and police-contributing countries. It would allow us additional flexibility to quickly respond to priority emerging issues and support more sustainable strategic engagement with troop- and police-contributing countries.

    2017-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8150 (2017) · source

  30. Ensuring that every United Nations peacekeeping mission is supported by properly trained, equipped, led and motivated troops and police, rotation after rotation, is a significant challenge that will require more partnership, resources and time to overcome. Much progress has been made over the past few years, but much work remains to be done. The Secretariat, for its part, will further enhance its ongoing work on strategic force generation and targeted training support. To that end, we will establish a light coordination mechanism to bring Secretariat entities involved in training, capacity- building and force generation together with relevant Member States involved in order to allow Member States with resources to contribute.

    2017-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8150 (2017) · source

  31. Mission-specific force generation events for missions with persistent capability gaps will continue and evolve based on the lessons learned from the force generation conference for the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali. Capability-specific capacity-building efforts must also continue. For example, the triangular partnership project should be expanded to include additional geographic regions, additional enabling capabilities and francophone countries. Furthermore, ongoing work on medical standards should be further buoyed through a partnership of interested Member States. Coordinated by the Secretariat, these Member States provide funding, expertise, convening and training to help improve engineering, signals, medical and other capabilities deployed to peacekeeping missions.

    2017-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8150 (2017) · source

  32. The constant turnover of personnel should be addressed by directing both United Nations and bilateral training support as far upstream as possible in order to build self-sustaining national training capacity. Opportunities for successful matchmaking between providers and recipients to fill capacity gaps have proven to be best realized through targeted engagement to develop partnerships around specific missions and countries and to address specific capabilities. These initiatives are Vital to the success of missions, but new, creative ways of generating and sustaining the required capabilities are also needed going forward.

    2017-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8150 (2017) · source

  33. This begins with proper basic skills training and United Nations- specific training that needs to be refreshed regularly. Critical training, such as e-learning programmes on the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse, should be further supported by Member States and included as part of mandatory predeployment training for all uniformed personnel. Equipment, too, cannot be sustained without appropriate systems for maintenance, repair and the acquisition of spare parts. To this end, Member States themselves should continue to invest in more sustained training initiatives and better equipment to maintain United Nations standards and adapt to new operating environments. One-off training just before deployment and the provision of equipment for one unit will not deliver self-sufficient capacities.

    2017-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8150 (2017) · source

  34. In that context, troop- and police-contributing countries must remain flexible and adaptive with regard to the capabilities that they provide and the time period for which they provide them. The generation of capabilities for United Nations peacekeeping cannot focus solely on the type of equipment or the number of personnel being sought. Instead, we must increasingly focus on all the aspects that make a capability perform effectively, including agility, training, equipment, technology, doctrine, leadership, discipline, interoperability, welfare, mindset and gender balance, as well as the absence of caveats. Deploying forces that meet our operational performance and conduct standards is a critical component of filling capability gaps.

    2017-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8150 (2017) · source

  35. To assist Member States in deciding where and how to provide training, the Department of Field Support of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) will continue to provide advice and technical support. We encourage Member States to ensure that their training and capacity-building assistance is focused on developing sustainable national training capacities and that their engagement is for the medium- to long-term rather than being a one-off event. In order to adapt to the evolving operational realities and to address the changing threats, missions require different capabilities at different periods in their life cycle. The mission concepts of operations will be continually reassessed and force compositions and operational plans will need to be adjusted.

    2017-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8150 (2017) · source

  36. The Security Council has an integral role to play in defining and in helping us to fulfil the current and future capability gaps in our missions, including through training and capacity-building assistance. Council members have hosted high-level meetings, pledged and prepared new capabilities, offered training and capacity-building support and provided direct financial and political support to our strategic force generation and training efforts. That momentum continued at the United Nations Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial Conference in Vancouver last month, where 49 new pledge announcements, including more than 20 training and capacity-building pledges, were made.

    2017-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8150 (2017) · source

  37. However, ultimately, we remain dependent on the capabilities that Member States are Willing to provide. Regional and subregional organizations, including the African Union and the European Union, can also play an integral role in filling gaps, especially during the start-up and surge phases of missions. We work closely with such organizations and their member States to ensure that United Nations peacekeeping standards are understood and observed. We work together on efforts to better plan the start-up of future missions and mission transitions. The capacity-building and training efforts of United Nations troop-contributing countries in Africa are also intricately linked to those of the African Standby Force, and more comprehensive information-sharing in that regard is required.

    2017-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8150 (2017) · source

  38. Ms. Keita: I would like to start by thanking Japan for convening this meeting today. The adoption of resolution 2378 (2017) in September clearly demonstrated the Council's strong commitment to strategic force generation as a core element of peacekeeping reform. It is one of the ways in which we can achieve the Secretary-General's vision to help to ensure that the United Nations is more nimble, pragmatic and flexible in its ability to plan, launch and manage a range of operations. As the Security Council has noted, United Nations peacekeeping missions must be resourced with the right capabilities, delivered at the right time to meet the challenges that they face today and those that lie ahead. We must continue to strive to ensure a diverse mix of contributors that provides the right capabilities.

    2017-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8150 (2017) · source

  39. Let me conclude by underlining the importance of having unified and unconditional international support for this process. As has been mentioned so many times in the past, there can only be a political solution to end the conflict in South Sudan. It will be crucial for the Government and all political parties to constructively engage in the peace agreement revitalization process and start by immediately ceasing all hostilities and taking a defensive military position. I would thus encourage the Council to unanimously express its support for the urgent revitalization of the peace process, so that the suffering of all South Sudanese civilians can come to an end.

    2017-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8115 (2017) · source

  40. Based on initial statements issued by IGAD on the progress of the consultations, all groups consulted to date appear to have stated their full and unconditional support to the IGAD initiative and affirmed their readiness to engage in principle in the high-level revitalization process. It is also clear, however, that they have raised a number of procedural and substantive questions to influence its outcome in their respective favours and we should be ready for a very difficult and arduous discussions. The summary of findings that the IGAD task force has been working on has now been submitted to the IGAD Council of Ministers, which as we speak is meeting informally in Abidjan and will formally discuss its recommendations during a formal Council of Ministers meeting on 11 and 12 December. The forum is expected to begin soon afterwards.

    2017-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8115 (2017) · source

  41. Meanwhile, political forces also started to organize themselves ahead of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) high-level revitalization forum. On 16 November, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) in Government and the SPLM former detainees issued the Cairo declaration, in which they committed once again to take all possible measures to end the war and support the peace process. On 18 October, six political movements, parties and fronts from the opposition also issued the Nyahururu declaration, following their deliberations in Kenya, which formally established an alliance. These opposition forces also agreed to participate in the IGAD high-level revitalization process through a joint delegation evincing a common position. The forum itself is now entering its final phase of preparations.

    2017-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8115 (2017) · source

  42. On the national dialogue, subnational consultations continued in the Government-controlled areas of Central Equatoria, Northern Bahr El Ghazal and Upper Nile, with plans to continue consultations in other parts of the country in the upcoming weeks. Consultations are also being carried out for South Sudanese living in refugee camps in Uganda. I must reiterate that it is of utmost importance that the national dialogue be complementary to the implementation of the peace agreement, transparent and genuinely inclusive of all political viewpoints, including those of other key political actors and parties to the conflict. Provided that it adheres to these principles, the national dialogue could serve as a useful forum for addressing the underlying conflict drivers of intercommunal violence and root causes of other grievances.

    2017-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8115 (2017) · source

  43. Reported monthly access incidents, which include issues of criminality, armed conflict, targeted violence or bureaucratic impediments, totalled 101 in September and 116 in October, of which 44 and 57 per cent were attributed to State actors, respectively. Two more aid workers were killed in November, bringing the total number of humanitarians killed in 2017 to 19. Clashes between armed groups and other sources of insecurity also continued to negatively impact the timely delivery of humanitarian assistance. In September, for example, at least 89 aid workers were forced to relocate, hindering humanitarian operations. Let me proceed with a few remarks on the political process.

    2017-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8115 (2017) · source

  44. I am encouraged that the President issued a new order dated 9 November calling for unhindered humanitarian access. This must now be backed by a genuine and concerted effort to ensure that that order takes effect at all levels, down to the lowest levels on the ground, where obstructions frequently occur, to facilitate meaningful improvement in the humanitarian operating environment. The catastrophic consequences of the humanitarian crisis are borne out by shocking statistics. Four million South Sudanese are either internally displaced or have sought refuge in neighbouring countries; an estimated six million people, half of the population, are severely food insecure, including 1.7 million on the brink of famine. Against this backdrop, the increasing number of incidents targeting humanitarian actors is cause for serious concern.

    2017-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8115 (2017) · source

  45. The patrol was allowed to proceed a week later. On 22 November, an integrated UNMISS patrol from Yei to Lasu, Central Equatoria, was stopped at an SPLA checkpoint on the Yei-Lasu road, officially due to insecurity in the area. The patrol team then observed large movement of SPLA forces on the Yei-Lasu road. These obstructions de facto prevent the Mission from fully implementing its protection-of-civilians mandate. I would like to request the Security Council to impress on the Government to uphold its obligations under the status of forces agreement and cease such obstruction. The humanitarian situation in South Sudan continues to be dire, compounded by widespread armed conflict, intercommunal violence, large displacements of the civilian population and access restrictions, which prevent the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

    2017-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8115 (2017) · source

  46. However, while the dispute surrounding General Malong's house arrest may have been resolved, these tensions point out to the risk of fragmentation within the security apparatus, which could further threaten the stability of the country. This trend will need to be closely monitored. As transmitted to the Security Council on 16 November, despite repeated assurances from the highest levels of Government, UNMISS uniformed personnel patrols and human rights officers continue to face frequent restrictions on their freedom of movement. On 15 November, a dynamic air patrol on its way to Aburoc, Upper Nile, through Kodok, had to return to Malakal from Kodok as a National Security Service Officer objected that the patrol did not have an SPLA Liaison Officer on board, warned the team against proceeding and threatened the air crew.

    2017-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8115 (2017) · source

  47. Meanwhile, the increasing insecurity around the UNMISS protection-of-civilians site in Bentiu is very worrying. On 4 November, during an exchange of fire between armed groups in proximity to the site, shots were directly fired at UNMISS troops, who subsequently returned fire, repelling the attackers, and apprehending one individual attempting to breach the perimeter of the site. Finally, on security, I am pleased to report that the tensions arising following President Salva Kiir's issuance ofa republican decree on 30 October, ordering the arrest and disarmament of the bodyguards of the former SPLA Chief of General Staff, Paul Malong, were handled without violence in Juba.

    2017-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8115 (2017) · source

  48. In Greater Upper Nile, fighting continued between the SPLA and pro-Machar SPLA-IO forces in Guit, Koch, Rubkona and Mayendit Counties in central Unity. The fighting has led to the curtailment of humanitarian operations in the area. On 26 October, UNMISS extracted five humanitarian workers from Kuerguini caught in the fighting between SPLA and pro-Machar SPLA-IO forces in Nimni, Guit county. On 27 October, UNMISS facilitated the further extraction of an additional 13 humanitarian staff members and two children, from Nimni west to Nyathol. One national staff member of an international non-governmental organization was killed during the clashes. On 22 November, 21 humanitarian personnel were evacuated from Leer to Rumbek, following an exchange of artillery and heavy machine gun fire between the SPLA and pro-Machar SPLA-IO forces.

    2017-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8115 (2017) · source

  49. During the past month, the security situation in the Equatorias has remained volatile, with reports of continued clashes betweenthe Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and the pro-Machar forces of the Sudan People's Liberation Army in Opposition (SPLA-IO). Between 9 and 13 November, the two forces clashed in Kariba on the Maridi-Mundri road, south-west of Mundri town, Western Equatoria. The subsequent SPLA clearing operations on the road reportedly led to the killing of six civilians, the burning of houses and additional civilian displacement. Armed elements allied to different opposition coalitions also fought one another. Clashes were reported between the SPLA- I0 and elements of Thomas Cirillo Swaka's National Salvation Front around Kajo Keji on 31 October.

    2017-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8115 (2017) · source

  50. While there has been tangible progress in the deployment of the Regional Protection Force and the technical discussions are ongoing with the Government on its concept of operations, I also have to report that certain operations of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) continue to be impeded by the national authorities. The security situation in South Sudan remains precarious. I am particularly concerned by the real risk of an escalation in violence with the onset of the dry season, as well as the Government's push to assert military dominance across the country, notably when faced with continued resistance from armed opposition groups. New military offensives would seriously undermine the political process and cause further civilian casualties and displacements.

    2017-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8115 (2017) · source