YouSaid · the spoken record

Keita

lines on the record: 392
first: 2000-01-13
most recent: 2023-12-11
sittings or episodes: 35
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“On 17, 28, and 29 January, SLA/Abdul Wahid elements attacked Sudanese Armed Forces personnel in the Manabu farming area, 15 kilometres south-east of G010, and in total, three Sudanese Armed Forces personnel were killed. On 2 February, UNAMID heard sporadic gunfire in the area and sent out a patrol, but was prevented from proceeding further by the Sudanese Armed Forces, which cited the lack of security clearance. The Sudanese Armed Forces and the SLA/Abdul Wahid faction continued to exchange fire in Manabu on 9, 11, 17, and 19 February, resulting in the death of seven SLA/Abdul Wahid members and one Sudanese Armed Forces member in total. In addition, infighting between two sub-factions of the SLA/Abdul Wahid was reported in Daya village, 12 kilometres north-east of Golo, on 17 January and 7 and 13 February, with four casualties.”
2019-02-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8468 (2019) · source
“Subsequently, on 9 February, the SLA/ Minni Minnawi, JEM/Gibril Ibrahim and two other groups - the Sudan Liberation Movement/ Transitional Council and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement- North, led by Malik Agar - extended a unilateral cessation ofhostilities in Darfur and Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states for an additional three months. The impact of the recent developments in Khartoum on the dynamics related to the peace process in Darfur has yet to be assessed, but the replacement of all walis will have a bearing on the process, and some rebel groups have demonstrated a stiffening of their position. In Jebel Marra, intermittent clashes between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid faction continue.”
2019-02-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8468 (2019) · source
“It should be noted, however, that all along sporadic protests in Darfur have taken place in Nyala, South Darfur, on 13 January, and in E1 Geneina, West Darfur, and Ed Daein, East Darfur, on 17 January. Yet, citing solidarity with the protest movements, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)/Gibril Ibrahim faction and the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA)/Minni Minnawi faction reversed their December 2018 agreement to resume talks with the Government of the Sudan in January 2019. Meanwhile, President Al-Bashir declared an open- ended cessation ofhostilities in Darfur and the two areas on 28 January.”
2019-02-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8468 (2019) · source
“In that context, the federal and the state Governments were dissolved, while maintaining the national and state assemblies and the Ministers for Foreign Affairs, Justice and Defence. The Minister of Defence was appointed to also assume the functions of the First Vice-President. In addition, 18 new governors from the military and security apparatus were appointed to replace the dismissed governors, known as walis. The Sudanese Armed Forces have been given the task of delivering law and order, in addition to national defence. Those developments came at a time when the Darfur peace process had come to a standstill once again, in the context of the ongoing demonstrations against the economic and political conditions in the Sudan.”
2019-02-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8468 (2019) · source
“The objectives of our visit were, first, to inject momentum in the transition process; secondly, to convey joint messages on the Withdrawal of UNAMID and the transition to the Government of the Sudan, United Nations interlocutors and key partners; and, thirdly, to explore challenges and modalities related to the transition and how those could be addressed early and effectively. Before I share my observations and findings from the visit, I would like to touch upon several updates since the publication of the most recent report of the Secretary-General, dated 14 January 2019 (S/ZOl9/44). The most significant development was the declaration of a state of emergency by President Al-Bashir on 22 February, which applies to the whole country and is foreseen to be in place for one year.”
2019-02-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8468 (2019) · source
“Ms. Keita: I thank you, Mr. President, for this opportunity to brief the Security Council on the situation in Darfur and the operations of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). Ihave just returned from a visit to the Sudan and Darfur with my colleagues Assistant Secretary- Generals Oscar Fernandez-Taranco and Mourad Wahba, of the Peacebuilding Support Office and the Regional Bureau for Arab States of the United Nations Development Programme, respectively.”
2019-02-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8468 (2019) · source
“MINUSMA, through the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, remains committed to supporting the parties in their efforts to advance the implementation of the peace agreement.”
2019-01-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8445 (2019) · source
“I wish to call on G-5 Sahel member States to take all steps necessary to resume the operations of the Joint Force as soon as possible, and on international partners to provide it with the support it requires. In parallel, we also must redouble our efforts to address resilience, governance and development deficits in the region. In this regard, the United Nations will continue to move forward in the implementation of the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel. In conclusion, it is important to continue impressing on all parties to the peace agreement the importance of maintaining positive momentum in order to continue accelerating the implementation of priority measures of the peace agreement and register meaningful progress without further delay.”
2019-01-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8445 (2019) · source
“Overall, the humanitarian situation in Mali remains dire, with 2.3 million vulnerable people targeted by the 2019 humanitarian response plan. Over 800 schools remain closed due to insecurity. Addressing the challenges facing Mali must take into account the complex cross-border dynamics and drivers of conflict occurring within the broader regional context. I therefore reiterate the Secretary- General's call on national, regional and international actors to redouble their efforts to tackle the multiple threats facing Mali and the Sahel region. The Group of Five for the Sahel (G-S Sahel) Joint Force remains an instrumental part of the response needed to address the threat of violent extremism in the region.”
2019-01-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8445 (2019) · source
“On 4 January, President Keita visited the village where the attack took place. MINUSMA is engaging the Government to define the political parameters framing the approach in the centre and is stepping up its support to the Government in responding to the rapidly evolving situation and protecting civilians, in coordination with the United Nations country team. With regard to security in central Mali, MINUSMA is enhancing its assistance to the Government in the protection of civilians by increasing its mobility and its presence. This approach should also enable the United Nations country team and humanitarian and development partners to intensify their contributions to peace and development. The deteriorating situation resulted in a dramatic 75 per cent increase in displaced persons in December 2018, compared with June 2018.”
2019-01-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8445 (2019) · source
“From September through December, Malian instructors, previously trained by MINUSMA/UNMAS, delivered their first explosive-ordnance disposal courses to their own troops in Bamako. The training was supported by MINUSMA but entirely delivered by Malian trainers, marking a milestone in the development of national capacities and contributing to the restoration of State authority. We remain concerned about the further deterioration of the security situation in the centre, where intercommunal violence, instrumentalized by extremist armed groups, has intensified over the past months. On 1 January, 37 members of the Fulani community were killed in an attack in the Bankass district. The authorities swiftly responded by deploying a Malian armed forces unit to the site of the incident and opening an investigation.”
2019-01-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8445 (2019) · source
“In Me'naka, MINUSMA was targeted on 21 December by a complex attack on its camp, which once again indicated the determination of extremist groups and spoilers to prevent the Mission from implementing its mandate. Our peacekeepers and the Malian defence and security forces continue to serve under very difficult conditions. Far too often, they pay the ultimate price in supporting peace and stability in Mali. Last year, Mali experienced a significant increase in improvised explosive device (IED) incidents, particularly in the centre of the country. MINUSMA and the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) continue to support the Malian authorities through the provision of advice, training and specialized equipment to mitigate the risks posed by the IED threat.”
2019-01-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8445 (2019) · source
“A constructive and inclusive dialogue among political stakeholders, including civil society, women and young people, is essential in order to carry out the ambitious reform agenda set out in the 2015 agreement. Recent signs of a more open dialogue - which made it possible, for example, to reach a consensus on postponing the elections - are encouraging. I strongly urge the political class to continue along that path, working together to build the foundations of a united and reconciled nation with an inclusive system of representation. (Spoke in English) As I witnessed during my visit to Gao and Mopti, the security situation remains of grave concern and a major challenge to the implementation of the peace agreement. Asymmetrical attacks continue to target peacekeepers, national and international forces and, increasingly, civilians.”
2019-01-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8445 (2019) · source
“I therefore not only invite the Government but also members of the political class, whether they be the opposition or the majority, to pursue their efforts in order to ensure greater inclusivity in these discussions. With regard to national reconciliation, the National Assembly has postponed discussions on the national accord act in order to allow for more consultations. I urge the parties to continue their efforts to support the reconciliation process, which is indispensable to fulfilling the Vision of a Mali that is united and fully anchored on the path of peace. In that context, the fight against impunity must remain a top priority. There can be no compromise that would jeopardize the progress that has been made towards reconciliation. It must be noted that the political landscape has remained polarized since the presidential election.”
2019-01-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8445 (2019) · source
“The progress highlighted in the Secretary-General's report under consideration touches upon issues that are central to the peace process, including the institutional reforms envisaged in the agreement. The reconstitution and reform of the defence and security forces remains key to establishing lasting peace in Mali. The launching, in November, of an accelerated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process is a first concrete step to that end. The holding ofa high- level workshop on security sector reform in December enabled progress on important issues. With regard to institutional reforms to strengthen decentralization, we welcome the holding in November of consultations on administrative restructuring as a first step in carrying out territorial reform. Dialogue must continue in order to reach a consensus on these reforms.”
2019-01-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8445 (2019) · source
“However, it is fair to say that the parties are fully aware of the Council's frustration and its impatience with regard to the ongoing delays in the implementation of the agreement. That undoubtedly explains the efforts under way to accelerate the implementation of its key provisions. Finally, we were pleased to note through our conversations with the parties that the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) continues to be seen as playing an essential political role in working with all parties to accelerate the implementation of the agreement. The conclusions of our joint visit will be reflected in the Secretary-General's next report, to be submitted to members of the Security Council for their review in early March, six months after the swearing in of the President of the Republic.”
2019-01-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8445 (2019) · source
“During our visit, we were particularly encouraged by the constructive momentum that seems to be present in relations among the parties. The general opinion is that, since the holding of the presidential elections in July and August, more emphasis has been placed on the implementation of the agreement. The determination of the signatory parties has been illustrated, among other things, by the establishment in September ofa ministry tasked with monitoring the implementation of the agreement and by the signing of the Pact for Peace in October. The more frequent meetings of the Agreement Monitoring Committee is another concrete example. It is no doubt too early to fully evaluate the impact of the sanctions adopted by the Council in December against three people who have hindered the implementation of the peace agreement.”
2019-01-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8445 (2019) · source
“I thank you, Mr. President, for this opportunity to brief the members of the Security Council on the latest report of the Secretary-General (S/2018/ 1174) on the situation in Mali. Before doing so, allow me to share with the Council some brief observations following my visit to Mali one month ago, accompanied by the Assistant Secretary- General for Peacebuilding Support, Mr. Oscar Fernandez-Taranco. We were there to assess the progress made in the implementation of the 2015 Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali. During our stay, we had the privilege of meeting President Keita, his Prime Minister, the members of the Government, the signatory movements to the agreement, the opposition, civil society, the diplomatic community and the United Nations country team, among others.”
2019-01-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8445 (2019) · source
“A new Government and the leadership of the newly appointed Head of MINUJ USTH and Special Representative of the Secretary General for Haiti, Ms. Helen La Lime, who is here with us today, should create renewed momentum in our partnership with Haiti, the strength of which is essential to the achievement of our transition targets. Ms. La Lime, who assumed her functions and began her in-briefing in New York this week, will deploy to Port-au-Prince next week. We hope that the Security Council and the friends of Haiti will continue to provide strong support for their endeavours.”
2018-09-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8342 (2018) · source
“Together, MINUJUSTH, the country team, the Government of Haiti and other partners will need to redouble efforts to make up for the time lost because of the challenges resulting from the events of 6 to 8 July, given the time-bound nature of the mandate and the transition process. Those are all challenges that must be addressed by a fully functioning Government, the forthcoming establishment of which presents an invaluable opportunity to reset the dynamics among national actors, reinvigorate the national sector-based dialogue and catalyse the devising and adoption of a new governance and stability pact. In that regard, we welcome the announcement by Prime Minister- designate Jean-Henri Ce'ant of the proposed members of his ministerial Cabinet.”
2018-09-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8342 (2018) · source
“Resentment among the people is fuelled by a steady stream of revelations about the alleged benefits of State officials and the debate surrounding the questionable use of PetroCaribe funds over the past 10 years. The risk of major unrest remains at a heightened level, given the combination of political and socioeconomic triggers without losing sight of the possibility of natural disasters during the current hurricane season. (spoke in English) Time is of the essence to make concrete progress on MINUJUSTH's mandate implementation through the 11 benchmarks acknowledged by the Council.”
2018-09-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8342 (2018) · source
“Today marks exactly two months after the beginning of the violence that broke out on the streets of Haiti amid protests against the abolition of long-standing subsidies for oil products, which has led to an increase of 38 per cent in the price of petrol and diesel and 51 per cent in that of kerosene. Such a flare-up in violence, not seen in Haiti for several years, highlights the volatility of the current security situation. Since the July unrest, the authorities have not sought to address the root causes of the unstable social conditions, while the process by Parliament to ratify the policy statement of the appointed Prime Minister and the assumption of office by the new Government remain pending.”
2018-09-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8342 (2018) · source
“One unit, with special weapons and tactics capacity, will be transferred to Port-au-Prince, while two formed police units will cease operations by early March 2019 in anticipation of the repatriation of their personnel and equipment by the end of the same month. The regions from which the FPUs will be withdrawn have been selected on the basis of their respective levels of stability, improved security situation, progress made in achieving target indicators and the need to ensure the smooth functioning of MINUJUSTH operations until October 2019. Mitigation measures are being put in place to accompany the withdrawal, in consultation with the Haitian authorities. Above and beyond clear, well-crafted plans, the situation on the ground must be closely monitored.”
2018-09-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8342 (2018) · source
“They include the lack of sustained efforts by national authorities and international partners to provide the necessary financial resources to support the full implementation of the plan. In that regard, the ongoing commitment of the country's leaders and the international community will be essential as the transition progresses. In close consultation with its national counterparts, MINUJUSTH has developed an integrated security transition plan, as requested by the Council. The plan will guide the first phase of a responsible and effective withdrawal of the United Nations police presence in Haiti, in accordance with resolution 2410 (2018) - from seven to five formed police units (FPUs), between 15 October and 15 April 2019.”
2018-09-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8342 (2018) · source
“Regrettably, armed gangs are still well known for the pressure they exert on politicians to negotiate access to areas under their control during the election campaign period, and, in many cases, even their attempts to influence elections in their favour. The successful implementation of the Haitian National Police 2017-2021 development plan, with the support of MINUJUSTH, will enable the Haitian Government to gradually continue to assume its security responsibilities. Although an evaluation of the first year ofimplementation of the plan, to be presented to donors on 10 September, shows encouraging signs of progress, it also reveals gaps that must be addressed quickly to ensure that progress continues.”
2018-09-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8342 (2018) · source
“It is covered in benchmark l and indicator 8. (spoke in French) With regard to security, while the number of murders fell during the period under review, covered in benchmark 6 and indicator 3, significant threats persist, including an increase in gang-related crimes. Armed gangs in Martissant and other areas south of Port-au-Prince - covered in benchmark 6 and indicator 5 - seeking to expand their illegal operations and areas of influence in order to generate greater resources and position themselves before the next legislative elections, in 2019, remain a challenge for the Haitian National Police.”
2018-09-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8342 (2018) · source
“The nomination of the nine members of a Permanent Electoral Council, which is the last visual aid on the dashboard, is covered in benchmark 11 and indicator 1. The representation of women in key State institutions, such as the Court of Cassation and the Superior Council of the Judiciary, have not been achieved. That slide refers to judicial appointments, with three methods to monitor the gender situation, covered in benchmarks 2 (a), 2 (b) and 2 (c). Targets on oversight and accountability bodies are also lagging, especially those pertaining to judicial inspection, covered in benchmark 5 and indicator 1. They are critical to the strengthening of the judiciary, and, once achieved, would ensure a speedier reduction in the length of prolonged pretrial detention, on which progress is so badly needed.”
2018-09-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8342 (2018) · source
“While the Mission is engaged in providing support to Parliament to implement a road map towards the adoption of the draft penal code and the draft code of criminal procedure, and is encouraging legislators to finalize and adopt the draft law on legal aid, the drafting of legislation to enhance police work and improve the functioning of the penitentiary administration has yet to commence. I am referring to the first visual aid pertaining to legislation, covered in benchmark 1 and indicator 1. Similarly, indicators, such as the availability of the national action plan for human rights and human rights obligations, shown on the previous slide, are covered in benchmark 9 and indicator 1.”
2018-09-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8342 (2018) · source
“In that regard, it is important to point out that, in consultation with the Haitian authorities, MINUJUSTH has developed a political strategy that seeks to help build momentum and strengthen political buy-in from Haitian stakeholders, through a concrete course of action within a clear timeline, in support of efforts by the Haitian authorities to achieve key targets under the benchmarks and in close cooperation with other international partners. One such critical area on which progress on several benchmarks hinges is the adoption and promulgation of key rule-of-law legislation.”
2018-09-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8342 (2018) · source
“Constant efforts must be undertaken, for example, to ensure that the development plan ofthe Haitian National Police is fully implemented, so that both the professionalism and the number of police officers continue to improve. As the dashboard shows, the rate of officers per 1,000 citizens has slightly dropped, to 1.32, for several reasons, including resignations. Members can see the three elements reflected on the visual aid, with regard to the police. I mentioned the first element as an example. The indicators are also a useful tool for the Mission and highlight the areas in which more focused strategies and renewed efforts are necessary to address the thornier issues. Many of those will require political, rather than technical, work to make a difference.”
2018-09-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8342 (2018) · source
“The dashboard, which presents a diverse and representative sample of the main areas covered by the benchmarks, is not meant to replace the comprehensive overview that the benchmarks in their entirety reflect, but rather gives a quick, general overview of the progress made thus far. The traffic-light matrix included in annex I to the report provides a more comprehensive picture depicting the trend in the realization of each of the 46 indicators. Both visual aids tell the same story - there has been some progress, albeit uneven, in most areas. Nonetheless, several challenges remain and dedicated intervention to spur progress is required for all targets to be achieved by October 2019.”
2018-09-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8342 (2018) · source
“Following the report of the Secretary-General of June 2018 (S/2018/527), which presented the 11 benchmarks to the Council, this report provides a measure of their implementation through an assessment of 46 distinct indicators. To that end, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Mission have jointly engaged in an exercise to set up a more comprehensive data-collection mechanism and to track the progress of each indicator since the Council took note of the benchmarks three months ago. The visual infographics that are being distributed to Council members are the result of that exercise.”
2018-09-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8342 (2018) · source
“(spoke in English) The report reviews the Mission's work with the Government, the United Nations country team and external partners to prepare, in accordance with resolution 2410 (2028), the transition to a non-peacekeeping United Nations presence in the country beginning no sooner than 15 October 2019. The focus of MINUJUSTH remains centred on mandate implementation, particularly in the priority areas identified by the benchmarked exit strategy, which weaves together a framework of the evolving conditions under which the current United Nations configuration can confidently transform into a non-peacekeeping presence in the country.”
2018-09-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8342 (2018) · source
“At the outset, I would like to express my gratitude to the United States, in its capacity as President of the Security Council, for convening today's meeting on Haiti. I would also like to take this opportunity to welcome the presence of the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Haiti. I am happy to present to the Security Council the second of four reports (S/2018/795) requested by the Security Council during the current mandate of the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH), which ends on 15 April 2019, in accordance with resolution 2410 (2018). I will also provide an update on developments in Haiti since the report was published, on 30 August.”
2018-09-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8342 (2018) · source
“Lastly, let me emphasize that the process will also require the constant support and engagement of the Security Council so that all stakeholders understand that a peaceful South Sudan will be supported by the international community, with consequences for those who continue to fuel the conflict.”
2018-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8299 (2018) · source
“Machar are positive developments that must be supported and capitalized upon. However, peace in South Sudan will not be achieved or sustained merely based on a bilateral deal between the two leaders. While the outcome of regional and international efforts to deliver a political settlement remains unclear, I must reiterate that peace will be sustained only if the revitalized agreement is inclusive and fair, addresses the root causes of the conflict and engages all stakeholders, including women and young people. In that regard, I wish to acknowledge the efforts exerted by the Office of the IGAD Special Envoy for South Sudan to enhance the participation of women in the revitalization process.”
2018-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8299 (2018) · source
“"Former Detainees" and other political parties signed the Khartoum declaration of agreement among parties to the conflict of South Sudan. Although the Declaration broadly deals with all the contentious issues, further discussions are needed to iron out details to ensure that, this time, the parties implement the agreement under an effective implementation mechanism. Yesterday, the Secretary-General welcomed the signing of the declaration and urged all parties to demonstrate the political leadership required at this critical juncture of the peace process and commit to reaching agreement on the outstanding issues of governance and security arrangements in moving towards a fair, inclusive and implementable agreement. The engagement by the regional leaders and face-to- face meetings between President Kiir and Mr.”
2018-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8299 (2018) · source
“The same day, an Extraordinary Summit of IGAD Heads of State and Government was held, during which it was decided that the two leaders would meet again in Khartoum under the auspices of the Sudanese President Omer Al-Bashir to be followed two weeks later by another meeting hosted by President Kenyatta in Nairobi. The meeting in Khartoum took place on 25 June and was also attended by President Museveni of Uganda. In Khartoum, both President Kiir and Mr. Machar pledged to work for peace, and they have begun to discuss some of the contentious issues related to power-sharing and security arrangements. On 27 June, President Salva Kiir Mayardit, Mr. Riek Machar Teny and representatives of the South Sudanese Opposition Alliance, SPLM.”
2018-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8299 (2018) · source
“That is a heavy and unfair price being paid by the most vulnerable members of society though no fault of their own. Moreover, in 2017, 30 aid workers were killed as a consequence of the conflict, and 7 have been killed since the beginning of this year. The past two weeks have seen significant activity Vis-a-vis the peace process led by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). On 21 June, the IGAD Council of Ministers met to discuss the way forward, which led to the first face-to-face meeting between President Kiir and Mr. Machar in Addis Ababa.”
2018-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8299 (2018) · source
“The continued fighting in South Sudan has had a direct impact on the humanitarian situation, in general, and food security, in particular, such as displacement from agricultural land and the destruction of food stocks; and an indirect impact, such as disruptions to food systems and markets and reduced water supply. The people of South Sudan are heavily suffering, as the country is rapidly approaching the peak hunger season of this year. Hunger and malnutrition have reached record levels, and 1.75 million people are on the brink of a catastrophe. By late July, more than 7 million people could be severely food insecure in the absence of sustained assistance and access, according to the latest food security analysis. It has been estimated that more than a million children under the age of five will be malnourished in 2018.”
2018-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8299 (2018) · source
“In the course of preparing the Secretary-General's report pursuant to resolution 2418 (2018), UNMISS requested the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism to share its verified reports. UNMISS received the Monitoring Mechanism reports on 26 June, which concluded that, since 1 June, there have been 11 verified incidents of fighting among parties and 12 other potential incidents that are under investigation. The Monitoring Mechanism report will be shared with the Council as an annex to the Secretary-General's upcoming report, and on July 5 Under-Secretary-General Lacroix will brief the Council thereon.”
2018-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8299 (2018) · source
“On 20 June, UNMISS received information that, due to continued clashes between pro-Machar SPLA in Opposition and SPLA forces in Saura and Li-Rangu, 10 and 17 kilometres to the north of Yambio, Western Equatoria, respectively, many people from the Ndavuro. Makpara and Yabongo areas of Yambio fled to Yambio town. In addition, civilians from Ikpiro and Napere reportedly took refuge south of Yambio, in Masia and Kuze. On 23 June in Western Bahr el-Ghazal, UNMISS once again received reports of fighting between the SPLA and the pro-Machar SPLA in Opposition in areas near Wau. The SPLA reportedly deployed troops and military equipment, including tanks, into Baggari and Mboro. The fighting reportedly took place in Baggari, Wadhalelo, Mboro and Biringi, near Wau.”
2018-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8299 (2018) · source
“Fighting was also reported between Transitional Government of National Unity and SPLM/A in Opposition forces at Wadhalelo in Jur River county and Ngobaggari in Wau county from 14 to 16 June. On 18 June, in Western Bahr el- Ghazal, UNMISS continued to receive information on ongoing attacks since 14 June on pro-Machar SPLA in Opposition positions in Baggari in Wau county and Wadhalelo in Jur county by the SPLA. Allegedly, the SPLA now occupies both locations, which were formerly under control of the opposition. On the same day, during an UNMISS patrol to Masna, in Wau county, ongoing fighting in Wadhalelo in Jur county was confirmed, as artillery and small fire arms were heard.”
2018-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8299 (2018) · source
“Also on 14 June, two men in a pickup were reportedly killed by a rocket-propelled grenade fired at their vehicle near Malal, north of Koch. The weapon was allegedly fired by SPLA in Opposition forces in the area. On 18 June, Transitional Government of National Unity forces, accompanied by a tank, allegedly attacked SPLM/A in Opposition forces in the area of Pilling, Thonyor-Kuidak in Leer county. On the following day, Transitional Government of National Unity forces allegedly attacked Thonyor and Pilling. Fighting continued near Thonyor on 19 June, which reportedly resulted in civilian deaths and injuries. On 17 June, in Western Equatoria, SPLM/A in Opposition forces reportedly attacked the SPLA barracks at Makpandu.”
2018-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8299 (2018) · source
“In Unity, between 5 and 6 June, the Transitional Government of National Unity and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in Opposition forces reportedly fought in Guar, Koch county, followed by attacks on Buok, Bieh, Leah, Lual, Botha and Padeah villages, in Leer, Mayendit and Koch counties. Reports of military attacks resumed on 12 June, with an alleged attack by Transitional Government of National Unity forces on Dablual, Mayendit county. Those were followed by further alleged attacks by Transitional Government of National Unity forces on Buaw, Koch county on 13 June and on the SPLM/A in Opposition positions in Mirmir, Ruol and Rubnor, Koch county, on 14 June. During the alleged attacks from 12 to 14 June, a number of civilians were reportedly killed and injured, civilian homes burned, and cattle and food looted.”
2018-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8299 (2018) · source
“In the context of this fighting, UNMISS has documented gross violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, particularly in central and southern Unity. Reporting on security incidents and the situation on the ground is a mandated task of UNMISS, and the Mission uses various tools to report on them. However, a distinction must be made between incidents reported by UNMISS and the reports of the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism, which is mandated to verify ceasefire violations and then report on them. Since the publishing of the Secretary-General's report on 14 June, UNMISS has recorded various security incidents.”
2018-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8299 (2018) · source
“Ms. Keita: I am grateful for this opportunity to brief the Security Council on the situation in South Sudan and the ongoing peace process since the publication of the report of the Secretary-General on 14 June (S/2018/609). Let me begin by condemning in the strongest possible terms the killing of a peacekeeper of the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) earlier this week. Let there be no doubt that this is a war crime. In the coming days, we will engage all possible stakeholders to identify those who are responsible for heinous acts and expect the South Sudanese authorities to bring them to justice. The security situation on the ground remains a serious concern with parties to the conflict in consistent breach of the cessation of hostilities agreement that they themselves pledged to honour.”
2018-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8299 (2018) · source
“I also welcome the efforts undertaken by the G-5 for the Sahel to strengthen its Permanent Secretariat and its links with the Joint Force command in Sevare. An important next step, which I urge the G-5 for the Sahel to pursue, is the strengthening of its ownership of efforts to operationalize the Joint Force, as well as efforts to mobilize resources and to therefore establish the support group. The establishment of such an important structure would allow for more concerted and systematic cooperation with the region, the African Union and other international partners, and would ensure that the Joint Force's operations were aligned with a broader strategy for the region as a whole. The commitment of the United Nations to that important initiative remains unwavering. It is up to all of us to ensure that the Joint Force succeeds.”
2018-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8266 (2018) · source
“The interventions of the Joint Force will remain a security- focused initiative, but must be embedded within a broader and holistic framework, combined with initiatives to improve governance, access to nutrition and basic social services, and creating opportunities for young people. They must also always maintain the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali as their primary objective, as that is the cornerstone of all stabilization efforts in the region. I welcome the progress made in the establishment of the Joint Force compliance framework, but I remain concerned about reports of human rights violations committed by local law-and-order forces. The Joint Force will succeed only ifit enjoys the trust and support of the local population.”
2018-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8266 (2018) · source
“Over the long term a and here I echo the recommendations made by the Secretary-General in his most recent report - our overall goal must be to consider together which mechanisms will allow for more predictable funding, including through mandatory contributions, as well as support measures and more predictable and sustainable financing, for the G-5 Sahel Joint Force. That would provide better support for MINUSMA and ensure that it can effectively fulfil its own mandate. Ultimately, any attempt to overcome instability and insecurity in the Sahel will succeed only ifit focuses on the link between development, peace and security.”
2018-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8266 (2018) · source