YouSaid · the spoken record

KOVANDA

lines on the record: 460
first: 1994-01-06
most recent: 1996-01-24
sittings or episodes: 65
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“Even more importantly, though, this issue is just one aspect of the exceedingly complex web of Israeli- Palestinian relations, and we believe that this entire web would be best left to the continuation of bilateral negotiations, however difficult these are turning out to be, outside the spotlight of international attention. We feel that some of the difficulties in the progress of bilateral negotiations stem from recent acts of brutal Violence. A year ago, in March, the Council strongly condemned the slaughter in Hebron. Today it is worth reiterating that the Czech Republic condemns all terrorism, whatever its motivation, under any circumstances.”
1995-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3505Resumption1 (1995) · source
“Important steps followed last year: the Gaza-Jericho Agreement of last May, the Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities of last August and, of course, the Peace Treaty between Israel and Jordan of last October. The issue of Israeli settlements in occupied territories is a difficult and emotionally charged one. The Czech Government considers settlements to be illegal and not conducive to the peace process. And yet the Israeli Government has effected important changes in this policy, and, whatever reservations one might have about the current shape of this policy, these changes should be noted.”
1995-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3505Resumption1 (1995) · source
“The Czech Republic wishes to reaffirm its attachment to a just, durable and comprehensive settlement of the Palestinian question and of the entire Arab-Israeli conflict, on the basis of resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) and within the agreed framework of international law. This includes the necessity of applying the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949. In recent years, efforts towards attaining a settlement of the conflict have resulted in the ongoing peace process. The Czech Republic accepts and supports it without reservation. We are heartened by the progress it has attained since the Washington Declaration of Principles was signed more than two years ago.”
1995-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3505Resumption1 (1995) · source
“Dramatic successes are perhaps not as attractive to the press as dramatic failures. In the opinion of my delegation, though, what we have learned in Mozambique is extremely valuable not only in connection with one country, with one peace-keeping operation, but also as a model to be emulated in other peace-keeping situations. We congratulate once again the ONUMOZ force and its leaders, the Secretary-General and his Special Representative, Mr. Ajello, and Mozambique's political leaders - but, above all, we congratulate the people of Mozambique.”
1995-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3494 (1995) · source
“The United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) - to which Czech military observers have also contributed - is leaving but we cannot in good conscience let the fragile success of peace collapse under the weight of a myriad of post-war problems. Peace- building, peace reinforcement, peace nurturing are what Mozambique needs, with the indispensable assistance of the international community, including the United Nations. This is not the time, and Mozambique is not the place, to let various United Nations agencies do their own thing without tight coordination and without strong political leadership. We therefore sincerely hope that the Secretary-General will maintain in Maputo a well-defined political presence. The success of Mozambique is real but it has been greatly underreported.”
1995-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3494 (1995) · source
“But the support for a market-economy development model which both parties profess is encouraging. In our experience, at least, it is the fastest way to mobilize hidden resources of entrepreneurship and industriousness that the country has, including for example those Mozambican expatriates who, having received international assistance to complete their studies abroad, have so far not returned, to contribute to their own country. Given these political and economic issues, it is imperative that the United Nations maintain a strong and well-coordinated presence in Mozambique - and this is our third challenge.”
1995-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3494 (1995) · source
“Both of the country's major parties have over the years demonstrated their viability and both no doubt have contributions to make, in one form or another, to the country's future. It is hard to exaggerate how important a flourishing democracy in Mozambique will be for the stability of southern Africa as a whole, including tormented Angola. Both parties also focused on raising living standards - and this is the country's second challenge. Mozambique is today one of the poorest countries of the world, when measured by the economic standards of its people, and even my quick visit there last year as a member of the Security Council Mission left me with an indelible impression of its poverty. The task of improving the lot of the people will perhaps be the toughest of all.”
1995-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3494 (1995) · source
“Apart from these tasks, we see three types of challenges ahead: political ones, economic ones, and United Nations-connected ones. Mozambique's democracy is very, very young and very fragile - and small wonder. Strengthening it will require careful nurturing for years to come. However, we are encouraged that in their election programmes both major parties declared their adherence to the important principles of protecting the peace and pursuing a policy of national reconciliation. Mozambique can and should become a model for other countries, especially in Africa, by demonstrating that winning elections does not necessarily lead to the arrogance of power and, conversely, that losing elections does not lead to political obliteration.”
1995-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3494 (1995) · source
“15) The way we are trying to use these or similarly defined factors as a gauge in other operations as well is evident, for example, from the Secretary-General's reflections in his recent Supplement to the Agenda for Peace. Even during this moment of celebration, though, we are all aware that success is not all-encompassing. The residue of its long civil war persists in the country in a number of ways. We are disturbed by the amount of weaponry that circulates freely. The Secretary-General's recent remarks concerning "micro-disarmament" are very pertinent in this context. Mine clearance will entail a long and arduous effort. And, conversely, fatigue with war has slowed the building up of the country's new democratic army.”
1995-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3494 (1995) · source
“During last fall's general debate in the General Assembly, my Foreign Minister, Mr. Josef Zieleniec, highlighted the case of Mozambique as an important case study from which the appropriate lessons ought to be drawn. He suggested that the following were among the success factors at play here: "a well-crafted peace plan; a realistic mandate for the United Nations force; the fact that the politicians concerned put the interests of their country above all else; the tenacity of United Nations personnel in carrying out their mandate". (Ofi'icial Records of the General Assembly, Forty-ninth Session, Plenary Meetings, 15th meeting, p.”
1995-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3494 (1995) · source
“It is indeed a pleasure and an honour to have among us today His Excellency Mr. Leonardo Santos Simao, the Foreign Minister of the new Mozambique Government, whom I most cordially welcome on behalf of my delegation. He epitomizes the success story of his own people and their political leaders, and of United Nations peace-keeping. Traversing the period since 4 October 1992, when the opposing parties in the Mozambican civil war signed the General Peace Agreement in Rome, has not always been easy; not always has there been every ground for optimism. I recall a feature last year in The New York Times Sunday Magazine which dealt with developments in Mozambique almost as an example of all that can go wrong. And yet here we are, greeting in the personage of the Foreign Minister an accomplishment of great importance.”
1995-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3494 (1995) · source
“Let me at this point also pay homage to the thousands of men and women whose dedicated work has allowed the Secretary-General to observe that "More progress has been made in the past few years towards using the United Nations as it was designed to be used than many could ever have predicted" (S/Z995/Z, para. 105), and especially to salute those who in this effort have laid down their lives.”
1995-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3492Resumption1 (1995) · source
“These principles are, by and large, being observed today, but we would like to see them become a truly integral and routine part of our decision-making. In conclusion, let me thank the Secretary-General and his team for the extraordinary document they have presented. My not touching on every one of its aspect suggests how rich it is, rather than a lack of interest on our part. The Security Council, dealing as it does day in and day out with the world's fires, seldom has the time or opportunity to sit back and contemplate the broader picture. The urgent usually pushes the important off our agenda. The document we are discussing today provides us precisely with the important, with the broader picture, and we will draw on it for a long time to come, I am sure.”
1995-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3492Resumption1 (1995) · source
“What we would recommend is some reflection as to whether the same or similar principles that apply to peace-keeping cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations should not also explicitly apply between the United Nations and the ad hoc groups of States entrusted with enforcement. In this regard, we would like to see an additional principle emphasized - the principle of transparency. Two elements should be considered here. First, there is a need for regular information to be provided by United Nations sources on the performance of the regional organization or of the group of States, information that would pay particular attention to the enforcer's impartiality. The second element is the need for up-to-date information provided by the regional organization or group of States itself to the Security Council.”
1995-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3492Resumption1 (1995) · source
“My delegation is particularly taken by the four principles he stresses for such cooperation, namely, establishing an agreed mechanism for consultations; respecting the primacy of the United Nations; clearly defining the division of tasks; and maintaining consistency, for instance of standards for peace-keeping operations. Elsewhere in the document, the Secretary-General discusses in a fresh way enforcement action by groups of States. Recalling the war in Korea usefully reminds us that this concept was not invented recently, even though it is only recently that it has been employed with any frequency.”
1995-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3492Resumption1 (1995) · source
“Quite frankly, though, we know of no simple solution and are grateful to the Secretary-General for his efforts, though they have so far been fruitless, in exploring some novel avenues. Despite certain doubts we all have about the effectiveness of sanctions and their impact on vulnerable segments of the civilian population, they are nevertheless one of the very few instruments we have at our disposal. We do, however, by and large support the Secretary- General's recommendations contained in paragraph 75 of his report. In a separate chapter, the Secretary-General discusses cooperation with regional organizations. Two of the forms such cooperation can take is co-deployment and joint operations.”
1995-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3492Resumption1 (1995) · source
“Sanctions are indeed a double-edged sword. Let us clearly state that well-targeted sanctions do have an important role to play. On the other hand, though, we know that they often stimulate the mobilization of domestic resources; in the short run, at least, they often strengthen rather than weaken the intended political target; they may inspire the population's mistrust in the international community. Gaps in a sanctions regime have a multiplier detrimental effect on their overall effectiveness and can exacerbate their counterproductive aspects, giving rise to ingenious ways of further obviating their intended role. The effect of sanctions on third countries is the unfairest side effect. No argument can be found for justifying the suffering of a third country that arises strictly from the accident of its geographical proximity.”
1995-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3492Resumption1 (1995) · source
“Suffice it to say that micro-disarmament as an issue cannot be separated from the world arms trade, with all the complexities that that entails. We contribute information to the United Nations Register of Conventional Weapons, and we also support efforts to reduce civilian casualties from land-mines and have taken important national steps to this end. As for sanctions, setting clear-cut criteria for imposing and lifting them would perhaps be desirable. We see a difference here between the political role of setting such criteria in every individual case and the technical role of determining whether the criteria have been met. We really ought to avoid giving the impression that the Security Council is, so to speak, moving the goal posts while the game is on, even if developments in the target country do not follow our original expectations.”
1995-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3492Resumption1 (1995) · source
“The sub-chapter on disarmament contains very important points on what the Secretary-General has privately described as "macro-disarmament": dealing with weapons of mass destruction. My Government is very keen on being a part of these efforts, but we feel other opportunities might be even more suitable for their in-depth discussion. For the record, though, let me stress the importance we attach to the forthcoming conference of the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and to the early entering into force of the chemical weapons Convention. As for micro-disarmament, my country supports efforts to limit the arms trade. The position and policies of my country since 1990 are well known.”
1995-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3492Resumption1 (1995) · source
“We would appreciate an evaluation of why the principle has been breached in some instances. Was it a manifestation of a Govemment's fickleness? Was it a result of excessive sensitivity to domestic public opinion - and who but the local politician can be the arbiter of that? Or was it perhaps a manifestation of lack of trust in the existing command? And, if so, are we doing all we can to appoint only the highest-calibre, universally respected soldiers to commanding posts? We have taken note of the Secretary-General's disapproving remarks in this sub-chapter concerning the Security Council's alleged increased propensity for micro-management. Other critical remarks addressed to the Council occur elsewhere in the document, and we reserve the right to discuss these important issues on some other occasion.”
1995-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3492Resumption1 (1995) · source
“We are often frustrated by the lack of information, even as we do acknowledge the value of information the Secretariat provides us at just about every informal consultation of the Council. Still, we will continue to be bewildered every time we hear from other sources, for example from the press, of developments which clearly affect the situation on the ground, and which the Secretariat is not in a position to confirm or deny. The need for full substantiation of statements is clear; nevertheless, one wonders whether the omission, albeit unwitting, of important facts, does not sometimes have the same effect as the commission of informational blunders. Unity of command is a principle we wholeheartedly support. Everyone else does too. So where is the problem?”
1995-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3492Resumption1 (1995) · source
“We would, however, hope that flagrant violations of human rights might in and of themselves constitute a good enough reason for the United Nations to step in. We draw attention to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which has agreed that the principle of non-interference does not apply to situations affecting human rights protection. For preventive diplomacy one needs, so to speak, "preventive diplomats," of which there is a dearth. It is perhaps of interest that the OSCE is developing a database of qualified, capable personalities. This is an idea the United Nations might wish to adopt, and it might perhaps even cooperate with the OSCE in utilizing its resources. A number of important issues are discussed in the sub-chapter on peace-keeping.”
1995-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3492Resumption1 (1995) · source
“But even within this group, being able to chalk up accomplishments in El Salvador, Namibia and Cambodia, in addition to Mozambique, is in and of itself a source of encouragement and pride. Allow me merely to touch on some of the different instruments for strengthening peace and security mentioned in the report. We agree with the Secretary-General - and, indeed, who would not? - that preventive diplomacy is preferable to resolving a conflict that has turned violent. The domestic nature of most conflicts is of course a difficulty here. We share the opinion that States should be automatically willing to accept the good offices of the United Nations, however far we may still be from this doctrine. Resorting to Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter is one way of legally buttressing these United Nations efforts.”
1995-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3492Resumption1 (1995) · source
“We should not lose sight of the fact that a peace- keeping operation is not an end in itself but rather a means toward the political settlement of a conflict. And if the settlement is nowhere on the horizon, does the time never come when we pack up and go? Of the more recent operations, some are clearly successful, and the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) is an outstanding example of these - and let me stress that it was also a multifunctional operation par excellence; others are grinding away towards a resolution more or less fuzzily outlined on the horizon. Reflecting upon them indicates very clearly one important point: they are all different, every one of them is sui generis. None of these peace- keeping operations is even four years old, and fully half of them are less than two years old.”
1995-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3492Resumption1 (1995) · source
“We have the "classics," the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), in place for 15, 20, 30, even 45 years or more, in situations where the United Nations has well-nigh run out of steam, ideas, often even initiative, and where any further change is most likely going to depend on events beyond the control of this Organization. We are in a holding pattern. The Secretary- General might as well remind us that international problems cannot be solved quickly or within a limited time.”
1995-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3492Resumption1 (1995) · source
“It may indeed be that when enforcement is needed we well-nigh have to look to the mechanism of farming out the task, such as to groups of States, as outlined in the sub-chapter on enforcement action. Nevertheless, of the several instruments at our disposal for safeguarding peace and security, peace-keeping is still one of the principal ones, the one employed most often and the one with which we have the greatest experience. And to what ends? Once we treat UNPROFOR and UNOSOM. as special cases, we end up with a mixed bag of results.”
1995-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3492Resumption1 (1995) · source
“Those are very serious points, and since it is the Security Council that draws up the mandates of peace- keeping operations, albeit on the recommendation of the Secretariat, they deserve our serious reflection. For it is probably not a coincidence that precisely the two largest peace-keeping operations, which together skew the overall statistics, are, on the one hand, the most typical multifunctional ones and, on the other, among the less successful ones. In studying the lessons they offer we will be touching on the limits of the possible in peace-keeping operations. One immediate lesson is that simply continuing to increase the size of a peace-keeping operation leads to diminishing returns. What I mean is that even the largest peace-keeping operation cannot enforce peace, whilst enforcement may be a task beyond our capacities altogether.”
1995-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3492Resumption1 (1995) · source
“We note that the success of the first of these operations has been rather limited - limited so far largely to preventing the expansion and dousing the intensity of the fighting - while the second operation has been, in political terms at least, largely unsuccessful. This lack of success may well have been caused by burdening the mandates of these operations with tasks that implicitly require the use of force, mandates that were thus based on the logic of peace-enforcement rather than of peace-keeping. The Secretary-General suggests that such tasks included protecting humanitarian operations during continued warfare, protecting civilian populations in safe areas, and pressing for reconciliation rather faster than the parties could handle.”
1995-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3492Resumption1 (1995) · source
“In multifunctional operations, peace-keepers have much more to do: in addition to their traditional task of monitoring buffer zones and cease-fires, they provide humanitarian relief, protect humanitarian operations of other agencies and non-governmental organizations and, even more important perhaps, their political role is heightened: they nurture in myriad ways the implementation in the field of a settlement reached at a conference table. The list of specific tasks - and the report does contain one - is indeed long. Two big examples of multifunctional operations are provided: Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Somalia.”
1995-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3492Resumption1 (1995) · source
“Rather, ill-defined and uncoordinated armed groups often operate throughout the territory, not only fighting their armed adversaries but also preying on or outright attacking civilian populations. This situation calls for a different, far more complex, response of peace-keepers, and, by implication, a different mandate. The Secretary-General makes the very interesting distinction between classical peace-keeping operations and multifunctional ones.”
1995-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3492Resumption1 (1995) · source
“Outside these two operations, we are fielding only some 20,000 people in peace-keeping operations, and the average size of each has actually decreased - from around 2,000 personnel in 1988 to fewer than 1,400 today. The Secretary-General disaggregates peace-keeping operations qualitatively, as he analyses the changes in the nature of conflicts that they deal with. One important change is the shift from purely international conflicts, which were the predominant concern of the Security Council in earlier years, to conflicts that either are domestic ones outright or follow on the heels of the disintegration of a larger State. This type of conflict entails different characteristics. Adversaries do not include only well-defined armies facing each other along a well-defined line.”
1995-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3492Resumption1 (1995) · source
“II), UNPROFOR, with its almost 40,000 people, is by an entire order of magnitude larger than the next group of operations. This next group includes the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, and until recently it included United Nations Operation in Mozambique - each with some 5,000 people. The United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus, the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force and the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission have about 1,000 people each, and the remaining nine operations each feature a few dozen to a few hundred people. Now, when we exclude UNPROFOR and UNOSOM II from the total sample the analysis of the changing size of peace-keeping operations looks quite different.”
1995-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3492Resumption1 (1995) · source
“These statistics imply that during this period the number of military personnel deployed in the average peace-keeping operation has just about doubled, and the annual cost of the average peace-keeping operation has increased by a factor of almost five. It would seem that the average peace-keeping operation is much more resource-intensive today than six or seven years ago. The question is, of course, whether "average peace- keeping operation" is a useful concept. Are the foregoing inferences, while they are correct, relevant? Some insights might be garnered from disaggregating extant peace- keeping operations by size. Today, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) is in a class by itself. Disregarding the rapidly diminishing United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM.”
1995-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3492Resumption1 (1995) · source
“Some three months ago, Mr. Josef Zieleniec, my Foreign Minister, highlighted in his statement to the General Assembly some success factors of those peace-keeping operations that have worked, and he contrasted them with some of the struggling ones. He said: "We must draw the necessary lessons." (Ofiicial Records of the General Assembly, F arty-ninth Session, Plenary Meetings, 15m meeting, p. 15) This is exactly what the Secretary-General and his collaborators have done by summarizing and assessing the experiences that have transpired in our efforts to maintain international peace and security over the past few years. Why such a synthesis was called for is clear from the Secretary-General's statistics on the upsurge of these activities since 1988 - a period during which the number of peace-keeping operations has increased from 5 to 17.”
1995-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3492Resumption1 (1995) · source
“Extending the UNOMIG mandate until 15 May will in effect synchronize the timetables of the United Nations and the CIS operations, something we have advocated in the past. We therefore fully support this extension and the draft resolution before us.”
1995-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3488 (1995) · source
“If there is one other thing we would like, it is richer reporting on the operations of the CIS peace-keeping force. We are grateful to the Russian delegation for the briefings it occasionally provides to Council members during informal consultations, and indeed I have used today some numbers precisely from these briefings. But we believe it would be very advantageous for their content to find its way into official documents of the Security Council, for the benefit both of greater transparency of the CIS peace-keeping operations and of fuller information for United Nations Members. No new ground would be broken in doing so: The United States delegation, for example, regularly provides comparable briefings on Haiti, which, as we all know, are publicly available as part of the official record.”
1995-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3488 (1995) · source
“It is cooperating well with the peace-keeping forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Its freedom of movement is being observed. Even its status in Georgia has been successfully settled. All this is very welcome news. And we are also happy to learn that an arrangement has been reached on the cooperation between the United Nations and the CIS forces, on the basis of the Secretary- General's proposals of 4 November last. This cooperation will, we hope, lead to an improvement of the security situation on the ground. It seems to be especially poor in the Gali region - which the Secretary-General's report touches on in several paragraphs. We certainly hope that the combined activities of the CIS peace-keepers and of UNOMIG will help calm the situation.”
1995-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3488 (1995) · source
“We do, however, agree with him that a general preoccupation with events taking place elsewhere in the Caucasus region hinders his efforts, and indeed that the crisis in Chechnya may impede the politics of seeking an Abkhaz settlement. This is just another reason why we hope the Chechnya crisis will be resolved soon - albeit not at any price. Heaven knows that the Caucasus region is already plagued by a goodly number of conflicts, and history shows that they influence one other. Would, therefore, that the impact of the crisis in Chechnya were indeed limited to politics, and the politics only of Abkhazia. If there is anything positive in this altogether gloomy situation, it is the work of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). UNOMIG has reached its full authorized strength. It has correspondingly expanded its activity.”
1995-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3488 (1995) · source
“If anything, the crisis deepened when Abkhaz leaders very unadvisedly adopted certain unilateral constitutional steps. In the light of these steps it is all the more important that our draft resolution once again clearly and unambiguously reiterate our support for Georgia' s territorial integrity. Its territorial integrity formed also the basis of a joint paper which the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Russian Federation submitted to the parties as a basis for further discussions - which, alas, again went nowhere. The Secretary-General has made many efforts personally, but even these have not been fruitful. We urge him, however, not to be discouraged and to continue trying, again and again, to get high-level talks on Abkhazia off the ground.”
1995-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3488 (1995) · source
“Repatriation has to be speeded up by at least two orders of magnitude, so that its end can be timed in months, not centuries. My delegation is in fact particularly chagrined that this draft resolution makes no reference to a repatriation timetable such as the one the UN HCR has repeatedly proposed - in vain - to the Quadripartite Commission, dealing with refugee issues; nor does our draft propose any other measure that would refocus our attention on the need to bring refugees and displaced persons back to their villages and fields. No movement on humanitarian issues of course follows from the absence of movement on political issues - the two are interrelated. We are distressed that no progress has been made in the last six weeks or so to resolve the political and constitutional crisis.”
1995-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3488 (1995) · source
“But even that has affected only a few tens of thousands of people, according to information provided by the Russian delegation - that is, a small fraction of the total refugee population. Meanwhile, in Georgia itself these refugees and displaced persons have been forgotten by the world. They suffer outside the field of vision of CNN cameras, and their suffering has resulted among other things in a full-blown health crisis: recently we dealt here approving the export of some vaccine against diphtheria - one of the diseases now plaguing Georgia. And it is pitiful that the operation of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UN HCR), the one organization that does help, is facing a financial crisis that might force it to curtail its work in one of the world's spots where it is needed most.”
1995-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3488 (1995) · source
“Today, we have little reason for optimism. The main problems of the crisis under review - namely, the humanitarian situation and the political process - have barely budged since our last meeting on this issue. The humanitarian situation resulting from the conflict and the fate of Georgia's one-quarter of a million refugees and displaced persons have always been the primary preoccupation of my country in this issue. In this context, we are horrified by the complete lack of progress on their repatriation. Fewer than 500 of the quarter million have been repatriated voluntarily over the past three months - which is absolutely laughable. At this pace, it would take about 182 years before the repatriation was completed. And it is small wonder that under these circumstances spontaneous repatriation is under way, with ail the risks it entails.”
1995-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3488 (1995) · source
“The European Union, through the delegation of Germany, suggested in the General Assembly a series of steps that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia could fruitfully adopt. Of these, the mutual recognition of States of the former Yugoslavia, within their internationally recognized borders, is a step that we, too, have repeatedly recommended. In this light, we look forward to further progress in the former Yugoslavia.”
1995-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3487 (1995) · source
“The safeguards of resolution 943 (1994) continue in place, unchanged, just in case Belgrade still turns out to be of two minds. Moreover, this new draft specifically reconfirms paragraph 12 of resolution 820 (1993), an issue which has been of particular concern to Croatian authorities. The draft at hand resembles a technical resolution, extending certain measures in place, but its role really is primarily political. In this light, even the ICFY Mission is playing a political role, inasmuch as it underscores the importance of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's playing ball with the international community. It is in the best interests of the international community to continue to stimulating Belgrade to exert pressure on Pale. As for the future of sanctions themselves, this is not the time even to consider their further abatement.”
1995-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3487 (1995) · source
“Nevertheless, the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia are cooperating with the Mission. They do react to complaints as they receive them. They have taken measures that clearly distance them from any smuggling that does occur. And we have seen no evidence that those authorities would have condoned, let alone participated in, the violations of the border regime that the Mission has detected. The situation on the border is far more favourable today than it was when we adopted resolution 943 (1994). That is why my delegation sees no reason to change the regime that resolution 943 (1994) introduced. We would have agreed to an extension even longer than another hundred days, but we have no problem with the proposal at hand.”
1995-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3487 (1995) · source
“There were safeguards built into resolution 943 (1994), though; the sanctions in question were only suspended, and a well-defined mechanism could have reintroduced them without much ado. The Mission of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) dealing with monitoring the border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina now has 184 international members from 16 countries, including the Czech Republic. It is about to be increased to 220 members. It controls some 70 checkpoints, most of them around the clock, on 540 kilometres of border. The work its members are doing is awesome, often involving great physical exertion, and my delegation would like to pay tribute to them here. What the ICFY Mission can do is no doubt limited, and some of the limitations are significant.”
1995-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3487 (1995) · source
“This difference between the Serb leaders in Belgrade and those in Pale was accentuated further when the Belgrade Government closed down the border with Pale-controlled territories of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Security Council decided not to ignore this fissure between the two leaderships, but, rather, to accentuate it further and capitalize on it. To this end, we adopted resolution 942 (1994), tightening sanctions on Bosnian Serbs, and on its heels resolution 943 (1994), slightly alleviating sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In so doing, we gave the Belgrade leadership the benefit of the doubt, assuming for the moment that its apparent change of heart was serious and would be long-lasting. We were running a certain risk as well. Belgrade might have played another trick and gone on in its old ways.”
1995-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3487 (1995) · source
“The Czech Republic figures among its sponsors, and there is a certain logic to this, for we co-sponsored the "original" resolution, resolution 943 (1994), as well. Resolution 943 (1994) recognized a certain shift in the attitude of the leaders of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). We all remember that they had long thwarted various attempts by the international community to seek a solution in the former Yugoslavia. Then, in the fall of 1994, an important shift occurred: they accepted the territorial arrangement for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as proposed by the Contact Group, which the leaders in Pale did not.”
1995-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3487 (1995) · source
“Allow me at the outset to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency. You certainly lost no time in exercising your firm, effective and businesslike leadership. I also congratulate Ambassador Bakuramutsa of Rwanda on the job he did last month. Let me also thank the Security Council members that left us at the end of last year. Our delegation certainly learned a tremendous amount from them, and we appreciated their support throughout the year. We also welcome the incoming members, three of which, not losing any time, have already delivered their first statement here. And today I welcome in particular the presence of Italy's Foreign Minister, His Excellency Mr. Martino, in this Chamber. We are discussing a draft resolution that can be described as "the son of resolution 943 (1994)".”
1995-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3487 (1995) · source
“On other matters, though, informal consultations have yielded a text that well balances the different concerns of Security Council members, and my delegation will vote for its adoption. More than that, discussions are already under way about the participation of Czech military observers in UNMOT. In closing, let me pay tribute to the several countries of the region and to the several organizations, including the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), that have acted as midwives and godfathers to the progress attained so far, as well as to the tireless efforts of the Secretary-General's Special Envoy, whose advice and counsel my delegation has invariably found useful.”
1994-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3482 (1994) · source