YouSaid · the spoken record

KOVANDA

lines on the record: 460
first: 1994-01-06
most recent: 1996-01-24
sittings or episodes: 65
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“This framework reflects a principle which we consider vital for the performance of these other forces - which are in the country at the invitation of only one of the parties: the principle of neutrality and impartiality which, for that matter, is embodied in their mandate. We hope that periodically more information on the relationship of the United Nations mission with these other forces will be available. There is a clear need for transparency in the activities of the Collective Peace-Keeping Forces of the CIS as well as of the non- Tajik border forces in Tajikistan. My Government believes that monitoring their neutrality and impartiality should be a part of UNMOT's job. In fact, this is one aspect of the situation which the draft resolution does not in our opinion reflect as fully as it might have.”
1994-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3482 (1994) · source
“Fifthly - and finally - it also includes a call to parties to ensure the safety and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel. We expect the Government of Tajikistan expeditiously to conclude an agreement on the status of UNMOT with the United Nations. But at any rate, any infringement of the security or freedom of movement of our observers would surely be considered in a very serious light when UNMOT's future next comes up for discussion. There is one more reason why my delegation is paying special attention to Tajikistan. The draft resolution sets a clear framework for the activities of other forces in Tajikistan and for their close liaison with UNMOT.”
1994-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3482 (1994) · source
“We think that this is an appropriate formulation of the question, since the whole process is still based on a Cease-fire Agreement which even describes itself as provisional or "temporary". Thirdly, we are sending an important message to both parties - namely, that the responsibility for adhering to the cease-fire rests with the Tajik parties themselves. What we are undertaking is only to assist the Joint Commission, the instrument for implementing it. An effective cease-fire in turn should help create an atmosphere in which political talks can lead to national reconciliation. Fourthly, our draft provides for regular reviews by the Security Council of the overall political and military situation in Tajikistan and of UNMOT's performance.”
1994-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3482 (1994) · source
“And it took the parties months beyond their original deadline to accomplish an exchange of prisoners and detainees that they themselves had agreed to. These are not encouraging signs. Even in this light, though, we believe that the Security Council has absorbed certain lessons. To nail down certain basic prerequisites for a United Nations operation to be successful, the Council has adequately addressed the following important elements in the draft resolution before us. First, a realistic and practical mandate, which follows the proposals of the Secretary-General, is reflected in the text of the draft. Secondly, the time framework for UNMOT has been clarified. Furthermore, there is a clear link between our commitment - that is, of international assistance - and the political process in Tajikistan - that is, of national reconciliation.”
1994-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3482 (1994) · source
“The success of these operations is measured by the degree to which national reconciliation is attained. In this context, my delegation has been consistently concerned about the fragility of the arrangements so far reached by the belligerent parties in Tajikistan. Fundamental institutional issues, including the consolidation of the country's very political make-up, have not yet been addressed by the parties. The next round of political talks, originally scheduled to take place in Moscow in early December, has been postponed for at least a month. The cease-fire that the parties have been grudgingly observing has been conditioned by the presence of United Nations observers, turning a principle on its head; for we would generally predicate the dispatch of observers, to whatever location, on the existence of an effective cease-fire.”
1994-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3482 (1994) · source
“We are closing down the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) which, despite its success in overcoming the famine and starvation of millions of people, has in essence turned out to be a failure as far as the political process is concerned. We are also closing down the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) which, precisely in terms of the political process, has been remarkably successful. In light of the lessons drawn from these two operations, we contemplate the prospects of the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT). All three of these operations represent a relatively new challenge to the United Nations, for we are dealing with critical preconditions for the peaceful and democratic domestic development of the countries in question.”
1994-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3482 (1994) · source
“Mr. President, as this is the first time my delegation has spoken in the Council this month, allow me to congratulate you on your assumption of the office of the presidency of the Council. Let me also thank and congratulate Ambassador Albright for the remarkable skills she and her entire delegation displayed last month. By authorizing a peace-keeping operation in Tajikistan, the Security Council is about to give United Nations a far more active role in yet another region of the former Soviet Union. And with the exception of the small operation of very limited duration in Chad's Aouzou Strip, this is the only operation that the Security Council has authorized this year. Meanwhile, several other operations are being phased out, based on decisions of the Council.”
1994-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3482 (1994) · source
“We underscore the importance of unity within the Contact Group if it to have even a chance of being effective. And as for the arms embargo we think one thing should be obvious: more guns do not yield more peace.”
1994-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454 (1994) · source
“We have also noted with great interest the European Union's suggestions as to the next steps Belgrade should undertake, as presented by Germany to the General Assembly last week, and we are very curious about Belgrade's reaction to them. Certainly, the need for mutual recognition of States in the area, within their internationally recognized borders, is one obvious next possible step; and, indeed, we consider the decision of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to close down its border with the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to amount to de facto recognition of that border. The approach of the Contact Group is not infallible, and its territorial proposals are not ideal. Still, we think that after the frustrations of the past years, it is the best option at hand.”
1994-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454 (1994) · source
“At this juncture, my Government believes that the best chance for ending this war lies in the continued diplomatic efforts of the Contact Group. These efforts would be dramatically undercut without an UNPROFOR. These efforts require that Bosnian Serbs accept the territorial arrangement proposed by the Contact Group. Resolution 942 (1994) is a vehicle to help them concentrate their minds on this, while resolution 943 (1994) is a vehicle for assuring Belgrade that the international community has noticed their change of attitude. We still hope that Belgrade's change of attitude amounts to a true change of heart, and we are reviewing very carefully the reports of the co-Chairmen of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia on how earnestly Belgrade is meeting its obligations.”
1994-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454 (1994) · source
“As I mentioned, troop contributors such as my own country might think of withdrawing their troops not only from UNPROFOR in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina but also from Croatia: after all, Chapter VII is Chapter VII. Withdrawing UNPROFOR from Croatia, that is, from Croatia's United Nations protected areas, would lead to further consequences. We realize that feelings of the Croat population about UNPROFOR have been mixed and, as my delegation stated last month in the General Assembly, we sympathize with their frustrations. Nevertheless, Croatian authorities welcome UNPROFOR's presence. A likely UNPROFOR withdrawal from Croatia as a consequence of lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia and Herzegovina would undercut the Croatian authorities and would again lead to spreading the war, and to its flaring up anew in that country as well.”
1994-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454 (1994) · source
“Certainly, there are pockets where even this meagre assistance is not available. But even this relief, admittedly limited, would disappear completely with UNPROFOR. The question, thus, is the following: What is more useful - in the short run for Bosnian civilians, and in the long run for ending the war in an equitable and acceptable way: the presence of UNPROFOR, with all its shortcomings, or an inflow of arms? My Government believes that the presence of UNPROFOR, especially of an UNPROFOR closely cooperating with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, is without a doubt the more useful vehicle. The implications of lifting the embargo are even wider, though.”
1994-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454 (1994) · source
“It is hard to imagine that they would twiddle their thumbs while forces of the Federation were being armed. It is much more likely that vicious fighting would erupt immediately throughout the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that - with UNPROFOR troops focusing on their own withdrawal and thus unable to provide any shield whatsoever to civilians - the war toll would be greater than we would today even want to contemplate. The plight of civilians would actually be even rougher than this: in many places, civilians manage today thanks to relief provided by United Nations agencies and international humanitarian organizations. These can frequently function only because of protection afforded by UNPROFOR. Certainly, lives dependent on relief are wretched. Certainly, UNPROFOR's protection is not air- tight.”
1994-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454 (1994) · source
“Lifting the arms embargo would, however, have the same effect as the knee-jerk reaction: it would lead, at the very least, to the disintegration of UNPROFOR as we know it. Many key troop contributors would respond to the increased level of danger by withdrawing their troops. Even my country, whose more than 900 troops are serving in Croatia, might be tempted to withdraw them. Some countries would no doubt stay, and others might step in to fill the breach; but even under the best of circumstances, UNPROFOR, weakened, possibly critically, would be in disarray. It would be weakened and in disarray at the very moment when the military theatre was in flux. It is hard to imagine that, once the embargo were lifted, Bosnian Serbs would sit on their hands.”
1994-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454 (1994) · source
“For a couple of years now, the preferred vehicle for reaching an equitable solution to the conflict has included the presence in the former Yugoslavia of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). In _ this, UNPROFOR has not met all expectations. It has not ended the war. It has not managed completely to investigate, or even prevent, let alone reverse, many barbarous instances of ethnic cleansing perpetrated by Bosnian Serbs. It has certainly not managed - nor actually was it designed for that purpose - to regain territory that Bosnian Serbs had usurped by force. The knee-jerk reaction to these observations might then be: "Let's get rid of UNPROFOR!" And yet, while its functioning has not met - indeed, could not have met - all our expectations, its presence in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is generally viewed as beneficial.”
1994-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454 (1994) · source
“This is the second time in so many weeks that the Czech Republic has had an opportunity to express itself on the matter at hand, having reviewed our position last week in the General Assembly. Still, a discussion in the Security Council allows us to elaborate further on some of its aspects. I will concentrate today on the issue of the arms embargo, far and away the bone of the greatest contention. The arms embargo, or its lifting, cannot be, and surely is not, viewed as an end in itself. Surely, even its advocates consider it a vehicle, a means, to reach an equitable solution, an acceptable end to the conflict in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”
1994-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454 (1994) · source
“Letting the refugees make their own decisions, permitting humanitarian organizations free access to them, and neutralizing the wolves is the international community's first and foremost responsibility. And once they are neutralized, by all means let them be duly tried and punished.”
1994-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3453 (1994) · source
“It is a travesty that the criminals should so far have managed not only to get away with murder, but to drag along ten times as many wretched refugees, whom they now use as a human shield and camouflage. Creating the tribunal is just another of several partial tasks of the international community. In the view of my delegation, it is even an easier, more straightforward task. But the really urgent task is that of getting into the camps of Goma and Bukavu, Munigi and Mugunga, Kibumba and Katale and Ndosha, and in the border regions of Tanzania, to separate the predators from the prey, the wolves from the sheep - which is a precondition for even beginning to deal with the wolves.”
1994-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3453 (1994) · source
“From the relative safety of those camps they continue to spew hatred against the Rwandan authorities - against, in reality, their intended victims who got away. They preach hatred, operate incendiary radio stations, keep an iron hold over the rest of the camp population, prevent ordinary people from going back to their homes and farms, throttle efforts of humanitarian operations - indeed, they are possibly preparing for a renewal of the war. This is a travesty of historical justice: namely, that hundreds of thousands of Rwandese should today be at the mercy of their own tribesmen, at the mercy of what used to be the Presidential Guard, what used to be the Rwandese Government Army, what still probably is the interahamwe militia, what used to be Radio Mille Collines.”
1994-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3453 (1994) · source
“The Tribunal might become a vehicle of justice, but it is hardly designed as a vehicle of reconciliation. Justice treats criminals whether or not they see the error of their ways; but reconciliation is much more complicated, and it is certainly impossible until and unless the criminals repent and show remorse. Only then can they even beg their victims for forgiveness, and only then can reconciliation possibly be attained. In this context it is important to note that we have seen few if any signs of remorse and repentance - let alone apology - from those responsible for the genocide. The very opposite is more likely the case. Even while we are creating a mechanism for trying these criminals, most of them are in the safe havens of refugee camps in Zaire and Tanzania.”
1994-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3453 (1994) · source
“It is especially necessary for Rwanda, which for decades has lived in a culture of impunity, a culture where massacres which have gone unpunished constitute a part of its contemporary history. The colloquial expression "getting away with murder," a vivid exaggeration of a daring exploit in the English idiom, carries a haunting literalness in Rwanda. For the organizers and instigators of the Rwanda genocide, getting away with murder is precisely what the international community wants to help prevent by way of the International Tribunal. Murder, let alone genocide, has to be punished for a sense of right, a sense of law and order, to be restored in a society that has seen all norms of life shattered. Justice is one thing; reconciliation, however, is another.”
1994-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3453 (1994) · source
“The fact that that instrument is being created by the Security Council safeguards an essentially unified approach to these international crimes, and therefore, while recognizing all the problems associated with creating ad hoc tribunals, we welcome it. Let us, however, remind ourselves that justice, no matter how carefully weighed out and dispensed, will not undo the tragedy. Even if all the perpetrators of the heinous crimes in Rwanda were identified, rounded up, tried and sentenced, it would not bring back to life the hundreds of thousands of their victims, it would not dispel the continuing terror in the eyes of the survivors, it would not return family love to the thousands of orphans. Still, justice is necessary.”
1994-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3453 (1994) · source
“Our decision today carries a broader significance which I will examine only in passing, merely to point out that it might signify a breakthrough in creating mechanisms that would impose international criminal law. These mechanisms have so far been treated like a Cinderella by the codification process of international law. While new concepts of international criminal law have been developed - war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and so on - rules of procedure have remained quite underdeveloped since the Nuremberg trial. In the aftermath of the Rwanda genocide, the Security Council has demonstrated that it can efficiently and rapidly create an instrument for dealing with certain international crimes - an accomplishment that has for decades been eluding international diplomatic conferences.”
1994-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3453 (1994) · source
“The Security Council has not dealt this year with developments more dramatic than those in Rwanda or with a country more tragic than Rwanda. Today, its tragedy has abated a little. The genocide is over; killings these days take place out of sight, even out of the country. And we sit here today in order to create a vehicle of justice. The independent Commission of Experts concluded that even though the conflict in Rwanda was a domestic one its consequences affected the entire international community, inasmuch as fundamental principles of international humanitarian law were violated. It therefore follows that the Security Council would react similarly as it did to the conflict in former Yugoslavia and initiate an ad hoc tribunal.”
1994-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3453 (1994) · source
“And we are particularly happy, Madam President, that you might be the first to launch these consultations, continuing your efforts to improve communications between the Council and_ other Members - efforts which, during your previous tour of duty as President, resulted in the lasting practices of, for example, regular meetings with the Chairmen of regional groups and the posting of the agenda of informal consultations in the Journal.”
1994-11-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3449 (1994) · source
“Such formal "shortcomings" - if that is what they are - do not trouble my delegation. After all, this is, in a sense, an internal decision of the Council - an addition, perhaps, to its rules of procedure. which for over a decade have had only "provisional" status anyway. The important thing is that an important step has been taken - a breakthrough even - and the actual shape of the envisaged consultations will be determined as much by actual practices, which no doubt will evolve and assume a routine of their own, as by the letter of the presidential statement. Thus the exact form of these consultations will probably vary to a certain extent from Council President to Council President.”
1994-11-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3449 (1994) · source
“The arrangements that the Security Council has decided upon, as elucidated in the presidential statement that was made earlier today, appear to my delegation to he a good balance between the constant thirst of non-members of the Council for information, the need of troop contributors to be consulted on important developments in "their" peace-keeping operations, the necessity that the Security Council be solely responsible for the actual decisions reached, and the imperative that actual peace-keeping management remain in the hands of the Secretariat. The steps outlined in the presidential statement in question do not necessarily answer every possible question. For example, they do not specify who is entitled to call for a joint meeting of Security Council members and troop contributors.”
1994-11-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3449 (1994) · source
“This is one of the perspectives that led my delegation to support, from the very outset, the principle of expanding the scope of information and, indeed, cooperation between the Security Council and troop contributors. Last January, during our presidency of the Council, we initiated a small step in this direction by convening the first meeting between the United Nations Operation in Somalia troop contributors and Security Council members. Such meetings have since become routine. Therefore, we wholeheartedly applaud the efforts of our distinguished colleagues from 10 Argentina and New Zealand, who have persevered with the present initiative. On the other hand, as a member of the Council, we have also gained some insight as to what arrangements are practical, as opposed to burdensome.”
1994-11-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3449 (1994) · source
“I should like, first, to congratulate you warmly, Madam, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of November and, at the same time, to thank Sir David Hannay for his remarkable leadership of the Council during October. The Czech Republic has almost 1,000 troops and military observers in United Nations peace-keeping operations in the former Yugoslavia, in Mozambique and in Liberia. Another small group is ready to leave for Georgia. We have previously participated in Angola and Somalia. My country thus ranks among the fairly important troop contributors, especially taking into account its total population of a little over 10 million.”
1994-11-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3449 (1994) · source
“My Government feels that if Iraq follows the recent communique between itself and the Russian Federation by actually recognizing Kuwait at the appropriate level and in the appropriate form, and if Ambassador Ekeus were to report on sufficient further progress in the work of UNSCOM, then, next month, the time may well have come to debate and decide on starting up a test period and on determining its length. Nevertheless, the Security Council cannot unequivocally determine that if a six-month monitoring period, for example, were to end successfully, sanctions 11 would be lifted. The Council, in other words, cannot commit itself to any action so far ahead of time. In conclusion, let me reiterate the point we made last Saturday: Iraq must become a good neighbour to all of its neighbours.”
1994-10-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3439 (1994) · source
“Yet, it certainly does not provide a sufficient impetus for lifting sanctions. It is in this context that we will be particularly looking forward to Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz's statement today. Resolving the Gulf crisis in a comprehensive and balanced way, in the opinion of my Government, calls for weighing both the negative experience the international community has had with Iraq lately, including during the last two weeks, and the positive steps Iraq has taken, particularly in its cooperation with the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM).”
1994-10-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3439 (1994) · source
“The necessary condition for resolving the crisis in the region, as my country has emphasized over and over again, is the recognition of the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Kuwait within its internationally recognized borders, that is to say, among other things, the acceptance by Iraq of resolution 833 (1993) and other relevant resolutions. In this context, we welcome Minister Kozyrev's observation that Iraq has accepted - and I quote his words as they came across in the interpretation - "the need to resolve positively the question of recognition of Kuwait without preconditions". But while Iraq has accepted the need to resolve the recognition question, it has not yet resolved the question. The step that Iraq has made, however, is a step in the right direction.”
1994-10-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3439 (1994) · source
“My delegation is very happy to have had the opportunity to listen to Minister Kozyrev's statement. We will be studying his remarks with great care; not only those that concern the issue at hand but also those that concern the broader issue of the work of the Security Council. We are also very happy to see among us His Excellency Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz, and we are very much looking forward to hearing what he will convey to the Council today. The Czech Republic rejects the threat of force as an instrument of international policy, and that is why we applauded the deployment of allied troops in the Gulf and why we supported resolution 949 (1994). We see this resolution, not as an end in itself, but as a means of achieving the overall objective of establishing peace and security in the region.”
1994-10-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3439 (1994) · source
“The main demand on Iraq is that it assume the standard posture of all of us, Members of these United Nations, which, to quote the preamble to our Charter, includes our determination "to practise tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours". Iraq has to become a good neighbour to all of its neighbours, and to that end has to respect the provisions of all relevant Security Council resolutions.”
1994-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3438 (1994) · source
“We always prefer diplomacy to sabre-rattling and, in truth, Iraq's reported recent statements to Minister Kozyrev would have been much more welcome if loud sabre-rattling had not preceded them. Together with the rest of the Council, my country reaffirms the need for Iraq to recognize, at the highest official level, the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kuwait in its internationally recognized borders. That is a long-standing and immutable position of the international community. It is also important for my Government, though, that this resolution in no way questions the territorial integrity of Iraq.”
1994-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3438 (1994) · source
“This Council has done a lot to reduce the menace that Iraq poses to Kuwait, but Iraq has by its recent actions demonstrated that it may still be looking for some windows. The resolute stance of the international community, including the rapid response of United States and allied troops and this Council's own unequivocal presidential statement of exactly a week ago, have led to a withdrawal of the menacing Iraqi troops. Whether this withdrawal has been partial or total is a matter of debate, but our resolution, among other things, leaves no doubt that a total withdrawal has to be effected and similar troop movements may not recur. Meanwhile, other diplomatic initiatives are under way. We welcome Foreign Minister Kozyrev's visit to the area and are looking forward to his impending visit to New York.”
1994-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3438 (1994) · source
“It is therefore imperative that in safeguarding international peace and security the Security Council should address, in particular, military challenges to which such small nations are exposed. In the case of Kuwait, history teaches vigilance. There is an entire booklet of resolutions that this body passed in the aftermath of the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait. In 1990, the international community rallied in defence of this small, vastly outgunned Member, and threw the aggressor out. My country is proud to have made its own modest contribution to that effort. But there is a Czech saw that describes the uninvited guest who is thrown out of the door but finds his way back through the window.”
1994-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3438 (1994) · source
“It will be doubly nervous when the neighbour in question is one which has occupied the small country only a short time previously, one which has a history of publicly referring to the small country as one of its own provinces, and one which continues to withhold an unequivocal declaration recognizing the small country's sovereignty and borders. My country has in living memory experienced the shadow of precisely such troop movements, manoeuvres, and declarations doubting its international legitimacy. To this day, historians argue whether an entirely different course of European history might not have ensued if the international community had demonstrated a stiffer resolve in 1938, for example. An overwhelming majority of these United Nations are small nations such as Kuwait or my own.”
1994-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3438 (1994) · source
“Let me first congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency this month. Your well-known diplomatic skills, which thankfully include a sometimes acerbic wit, will no doubt allow the Council to dispatch its work in a particularly efficient manner. I also wish to thank Ambassador Juan Antonio Yafiez-Barnuevo for the careful, methodical and very effective way he handled the Council's business in the month of September. A small country is bound to be nervous when a powerful neighbour starts moving troops for no apparent reason towards its borders.”
1994-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3438 (1994) · source
“In our resolution we stressed the importance we attach to mutual recognition, and my delegation wishes to underscore this particular point. One last point: both as a Security Council member and as an UNPROFOR troop-contributing country, with almost 1,000 men in Croatia, my delegation is particularly concerned by the continuing void in relations between the United Nations and Croatia. We still have not concluded a status-of-forces agreement, as several speakers have already mentioned. This, we feel, is strictly a matter of a political decision in Croatia, and, especially after our recent meeting with President Tudjman, we hope that such a political decision and the necessary political will to conclude such an agreement will become apparent.”
1994-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3434 (1994) · source
“This is where additional political attention and efforts of the parties have to be directed. Over and above these concerns, which are very practical for people of various parts of Croatia, and, in the case of the Adria pipeline, for several other countries of Central Europe as well, there is the question of mutual recognition of the several States that emerged from the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, mutual recognition within their internationally recognized boundaries. Last week, with respect to Bosnia and Herzegovina's relationship with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), I made a point of this. This is equally valid for the relationship between Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.”
1994-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3434 (1994) · source
“In this respect, the Czech Republic views the future of relations between Zagreb and Belgrade as one of the most important keys to unlocking the gate to a peaceful settlement in the entire region. Six months ago there were certain hopes. Zagreb and Belgrade had started to talk, and discussions were also initiated, within Croatia, between the Zagreb Government and the Croatian Serbs. These hopes, however, have yielded disappointing results. The political process of implementing the Vance plan by reintegrating United Nations protected areas with the rest of Croatia is going nowhere. The process of freeing communications within Croatia - that is to say, road and railroad connections, water supply, telephone links or the Adria oil pipeline - is virtually frozen.”
1994-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3434 (1994) · source
“Last week my delegation spoke at length about its views on the situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including its views on those aspects that were covered in the presidential statement that you, Mr. President, read out during our earlier meeting. We see UNPROFOR's role in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as critical, even if it is a role that is sometimes criticized. The ever-tighter cooperation between UNPROFOR and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is one aspect we are particularly happy about. There is, of course, only so much that a military peace-keeping force can attain. The central role of the political process is inescapable.”
1994-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3434 (1994) · source
“In the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, UNPROFOR's role is different - protecting humanitarian convoys, ensuring the security of Sarajevo airport, monitoring the no-fly zone, and showing the flag in safe areas, . In the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, . UNPROFOR, under Chapter VI, is an instrument of preventive diplomacy, and, as such, it has a calming effect on a difficult and potentially explosive situation. Yet UNPROFOR is not a panacea. The balance of the pluses and the minuses, however, is, in our view, overwhelmingly in its favour. The Czech Republic, therefore, did not hesitate to vote for an additional six- month extension of its mandate, and would have been even happier with a longer extension.”
1994-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3434 (1994) · source
“The Czech Republic considers the continuing operation of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as exceptionally important for the continuing political discussions on a peaceful settlement of the conflict in the region. The positive impact of the Protection Force has been different in each of these three countries. In Croatia, we have witnessed the stabilization. of the situation since a cease-fire in the United Nations protected areas was signed last March. We have seen 4 separation of the belligerent parties. Here UNPROFOR is operating as an actual peace-keeper.”
1994-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3434 (1994) · source
“After all, the Czech Republic emerged from a double process of disintegration of multinational entities, one in 1918 and one in 1992. 25 My delegation feels that by simultaneously slightly easing sanctions on Belgrade and tightening them on Pale, whilst leaving no room for speculation that tightening the sanctions gives Pale any excuse, let alone absolution, for the crime of "ethnic cleansing", this may help nudge the peace process a little further along, even with some of its participants digging their heels in or gritting their teeth. The carnage, mayhem and humiliation prevalent in the region has finally got to stop.”
1994-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3428 (1994) · source
“Or if, for example, Belgrade attempts to bypass the blockade of Pale by going through Serb-held Croatian territory. Any such activity would trigger a retightening of sanctions. The leadership of the FRY has been very unhelpful in the past and we will not forget this any time soon. It will have to do a lot to win any greater degree of confidence of the international community. One further helpful step, for example, would be to recognize the independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in its international borders, which our draft resolution mentions. This is a standing demand of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the international community at large. This is a concern that we understand especially well.”
1994-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3428 (1994) · source
“Thus, for the first time since the beginning of hostilities, the political direction of the FRY is uncoupled from that of the Bosnian Serbs. This development deserves recognition by the international community, and such recognition is awarded in the third draft resolution before us today. It proposes an easing of sanctions against the FRY. This proposed easing is slight, perhaps even symbolic, opening only one airport, only one port, only for civilians, and allowing participation in cultural and sporting events. The easing takes the form of a suspension, rather than the lifting, of sanctions. Consequently, it is an easing that can be reversed without much ado, if the change of course by the FRY leadership turns out to be temporary, conditional, half-hearted or insincere.”
1994-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3428 (1994) · source
“While the Bosnian Serbs have been intractably intransigent, there has been a change in the stance of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) which I will call FRY for short. In an important policy shift, and by contrast to Bosnian Serbs, the FRY has endorsed the territorial settlement proposed by the Contact Group. Additionally, in a measure underscoring the significance of this shift, it has decided to close its border with Bosnia and Herzegovina and to allow international observers to monitor this border. In this context we wish to express our appreciation to the efforts of participants in the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia to have FRY's international border monitored as effectively as possible, and also to those countries that have promised or have already sent personnel to aid in this effort.”
1994-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3428 (1994) · source
“This proposal, too, is nothing better than possibly the best bad deal possible. But its blanket rejection by the Bosnian Serbs has broken the limits of international tolerance and patience. Therefore, the next draft resolution we are considering imposes additional sanctions on Bosnian Serbs. Politically, they will be ostracized. The time for political talks is over. They have elected to become international pariahs. Well, then, so be it: that fate is their choice. Economically, they will be strangled. Their economic intercourse with the rest of the world now becomes illegal; their financial assets will be frozen. Nevertheless, the draft resolution takes care not to choke off humanitarian supplies of food, medicine and clothing. There is one way out for Pale: accept the territorial settlement proposed by the Contact Group.”
1994-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3428 (1994) · source