YouSaid · the spoken record

KOVANDA

lines on the record: 460
first: 1994-01-06
most recent: 1996-01-24
sittings or episodes: 65
sources: un-security-council

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“Finally - and here is the true technical nature of today's resolution - we are extending the mandate of our tiny little United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) by another three months. We stress in this context the necessity for their safety and freedom of movement. We would hate to see a repetition of the situation that occurred in the Gali region in early February. On that occasion, fighting broke out with perhaps thousands of combatants involved, resulting in additional thousands of refugees, but UNOMIG was denied access to the area for days. We should like to see the situation of UNOMIG improve enough for the chief military observer to find it useful to build the Mission up to its full authorized strength. In conclusion, my delegation wishes to recall that Abkhazia is not the only problem Georgia faces.”
1994-03-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3354 (1994) · source
“This, however, would probably call implicitly for a Chapter-VII operation. The Czech delegation believes that, even with these constraints, we can try to maximize our effectiveness. In our resolution, we urge the parties to continue talking, and in fact to establish a mechanism for a permanent dialogue, rather than just hold ad hoc meetings. We welcome in this context the readiness which the Georgian Government has expressed to continue negotiations. We furthermore reiterate our encouragement to States to lend a helping hand to Georgia in coping with hundreds of thousands of its internal refugees - without the benefit of international television cameras.”
1994-03-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3354 (1994) · source
“The important thing, though, is that all inhabitants of Abkhazia ante bellum should have such a say. We have always recognized the multi-ethnic character Abkhazia has had in the past. We find abhorrent any efforts to change its ethnic composition by force, in order to pursue ulterior political motives. Finally, the parties disagree on the role and area of deployment of peace-keepers. The Abkhazian leaders would like a peace-keeping operation to petrify, in essence, the line that today separates the territory they control from the rest of Georgia. My delegation believes that we do not need any more countries divided by a United Nations- protected "green line". The Georgian Government in turn wishes for a peace-keeping operation to oversee and safeguard the safe return of refugees, against Abkhaz opposition if need be.”
1994-03-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3354 (1994) · source
“Georgia is an additional example of the dangers inherent in efforts to change these borders by force. The right of refugees to return to their homes is a crucial right which we uphold in the case of Georgia as we do elsewhere in the world. Refining further the novel concept of "ethnic cleansing", Abkhazian authorities now seem to wish to screen those of the quarter-million refugees from Abkhazia who wish to return home. Those authorities wish to make sure that none of those refugees who might have actively defended their homes from the "ethnic cleansers" return. This is unacceptable. In addition to the humanitarian aspect of the refugee issue, there is also the aspect concerning what one might call the politics of demographics. The inhabitants of Abkhazia certainly will have a say in the future of their region.”
1994-03-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3354 (1994) · source
“The Secretary-General, in his very, very sober report of 18 March (S/1994/312), notes that the parties are far apart on three absolutely fundamental issues: recognition of the territorial integrity of Georgia; the repatriation of refugees and _ stateless persons; and the role and area of deployment of a possible peace-keeping force. Safeguarding the territorial integrity of Georgia is an issue upon which the Council has insisted on other occasions too. It is an issue that transcends Georgia itself: several former States that have disintegrated in recent years have bequeathed us the legacy of former internal borders. The issue of the borders between the former constituent parts of these States turning into international borders has become a burning issue.”
1994-03-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3354 (1994) · source
“It is by default that we have today adopted a resolution which in a sense is only technical. My delegation would have been prepared to discuss a very substantial resolution that would have authorized a serious peace-keeping effort in Georgia, for the situation there has not improved one iota since President Shevardnadze addressed this Council two or three weeks ago and eloquently requested the dispatch of such a force. We still hope that we will have the opportunity to discuss such a force sometime in the future. Unfortunately, the results of negotiations between the Georgian and Abkhaz parties have not been nearly as encouraging as we had all hoped.”
1994-03-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3354 (1994) · source
“However, the fact that the Security Council as a whole is managing to respond to the tragedy of Hebron only after four long weeks should give us pause for reflection. It has been the feeling of my delegation that the Council should have reacted immediately - whatever form an immediate response could have taken. But we have in effect allowed others to determine the form of our response, and then, logically and ineluctably, also its wording and its timing. In so doing we have, we feel, abdicated some of our responsibility, and my delegation fears that the reputation of the Security Council has consequently suffered.”
1994-03-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3351 (1994) · source
“In that effort they have the unflinching support of my country, which - and let me reiterate this - supports every one of the Security Council resolutions related to the occupied territories. Meanwhile, we mourn, pray and lament with the bereaved relatives of the victims. An abyss of tragedy suddenly opened up in front of every one of them in their inconsolable sorrow. Every individual affected is working through his or her grief alone, and here there is precious little the international community can do other than to offer its deepest, most sincere sympathies. These I offer, in all humility, on behalf of the people and the Government of the Czech Republic. 14 This is where one could have comfortably ended this statement had it been delivered four weeks ago, or even perhaps three.”
1994-03-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3351 (1994) · source
“Fortunately for the world, they are not ready to give up their efforts. They have, on the contrary, taken steps to prevent last month's mass assassination from assassinating our hopes for peace. And this is where we come in. For us, the international community, the main implication of this unspeakable horror is that we must be forward-looking. The main implication has to be that we must not surrender to the false vision of the cowardly lunatic, but, rather, must redouble our support for the true vision of the courageous leaders of both the Palestine Liberation Organization and the State of Israel as they blaze their path through the thorny thickets of violence and terror to the peace that surely awaits them at the end of the journey.”
1994-03-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3351 (1994) · source
“Belated though they are for the victims of the Cave of the Patriarchs, they will, we hope, help prevent further tragedies. My President, Mr. Vaclav Havel, has not failed to express how profoundly shaken and outraged he was by the massacre. He too hopes that stern consequences and appropriate security measures will follow the tragedy. And let me add here how despicable and incomprehensible we find the reactions of those of our fellow human beings who feel less than total revulsion at the massacre. We are heartened by the obvious determination of all concerned that fear of peace should not turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy. Fortunately for the world, the leaders of both communities that pray in the Cave of the Patriarchs are demonstrating imagination, courage and wisdom.”
1994-03-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3351 (1994) · source
“And these fears, as he acts them out, turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy. He might even succeed in his peace-wrecking if the peace-seeking leaders lose heart. There is a lunatic fringe in most societies. It is the role of the State to exercise control over this lunatic, extremist fringe, to protect all of the State's population in 13 the elementary sense of protecting their lives and peace of mind. Last month Israel manifestly failed to do this. In our resolution we call upon Israel to take measures that would prevent further illegal violence by its settlers and that would guarantee the safety and protection of Palestinian civilians throughout the occupied territory. The Czech delegation welcomes the steps Israel has taken so far.”
1994-03-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3351 (1994) · source
“Violence breeds violence; terror breeds terror. That, at least, is how the conventional wisdom would have it. Responding to terror with terror, to violence with violence, is the standard response, the intellectually undemanding response, the routine response: an eye for an eye, as it says in the Old Testament. Such a response does not require any great imagination, any great wisdom- not even any great courage. On the other hand, efforts to break out of the ensuing vicious circle require nothing less than imagination, wisdom and courage. It is the courageous leader who will shepherd his people through the thorny thickets of violence and terror in search for peace and prosperity. It is by contrast the coward who will ambush them, afraid perhaps that the search for peace might fail or that peace might not suit him.”
1994-03-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3351 (1994) · source
“This indicates that when necessary ways can be found to provide for members' input in good time - and you, Mr. President, helped find such a way on this occasion. My delegation hopes that, in this respect, today's meeting is a harbinger of things to come, and that on future occasions too the Council will find imaginative and innovative avenues for listening to members' concerns.”
1994-03-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3346 (1994) · source
“As for specific remarks on the situation in Georgia and on ways the Security Council might find to alleviate it, the Czech delegation reserves the right to comment at a later stage. (spoke in English) But there is a second reason why we are delighted to have had the opportunity of listening to President Shevardnadze's expose, and this has to do with the style of work of the Security Council. Member States of the United Nations sometimes comment that the Security Council takes decisions without interested parties having a chance to state their case to the Council. As a consequence, the Council is not felt to be as transparent and communicative as it could be. This is a matter of great concern to us. Yet, through its President, Georgia has been able to contribute substantively to deliberations of the Council that are only yet to take place.”
1994-03-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3346 (1994) · source
“And about half a century ago those same forces of international communism destroyed democracy in former Czechoslovakia, which had just been liberated from nazism. Today, both countries are benefiting from the new post-cold-war atmosphere of freedom and democracy. One cannot of course forget the personal role President Shevardnadze himself played in bringing this about, and we pay him all due respect for this. It was therefore not an accident that on his way to New York President Shevardnadze stopped over in Prague, where he met with Czech President Vaclav Havel. Nor is it an accident that my delegation has been following developments in Georgia with particular interest and is very eager to assist in any way it can.”
1994-03-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3346 (1994) · source
“Mr. Kovanda (Czech Republic) (interpretation from Russian): The Czech delegation is delighted to have had the opportunity of listening to President Shevardnadze's statement, for two reasons, which are rather different from each other. First, we are particularly concerned with what is happening in Georgia. There are long ties of friendship that link our two countries. Indeed, there are certain parallels between our two countries. From the point of view of geography, for example, we note that Tbilisi and Prague are about equidistant from Moscow. There are important historical parallels as well. Some 70 years ago, forces of international communism destroyed the young Georgian state that had just freed itself from Czarist rule.”
1994-03-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3346 (1994) · source
“These troops must leave, as demanded in the presidential statement your predecessor, Sir, issued last month. In closing, let me thank you, Mr. President, and your delegation for the strenuous efforts you have made in ushering this draft resolution through. It was a complex task, as you know best. For our part, we feel a certain disappointment that in order for it to be adopted - as we hope it will be - it had to be watered down. It takes unambiguous and clear-cut determination to attain success in negotiations and on the ground, and we are not quite sure that the Security Council is demonstrating such determination amply enough.”
1994-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3344 (1994) · source
“Moreover, we have every reason to expect that a part of this unit will be redeployed to Bosnia and Herzegovina very soon indeed. We still feel it important, though, that the size of UNPROFOR be commensurate to the tasks the Security Council gives it. Thirdly, while the draft resolution welcomes the significant developments in peace negotiations between the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Bosnian Croats and the Croatian Government, there still remains the vexing issue of the involvement of troops of the Republic of Croatia - the HVO - in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Czech Republic finds such involvement unacceptable under any circumstances and rejects any attempts to link their withdrawal with the political process under way, welcome though this political process is.”
1994-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3344 (1994) · source
“First, we have already declared as safe areas not one city, Sarajevo; not three cities mentioned in the preamble to today's draft resolution - namely, Sarajevo, Tuzla and Srebrenica; but six cities, including also Zepa, Gorazde and Bihac. In capitalizing on the Sarajevo success, we have to pay great heed to seeing that these earlier commitments of ours are met as well, especially since we are receiving very disquieting news about attacks having been renewed on some of them just as soon as they fade from the limelight. Secondly, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) is already stretched quite thin, especially with additional troops having been seconded to Sarajevo. I am proud to announce this evening that the Czech Republic is doubling the size of its UNPROFOR unit even as we speak.”
1994-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3344 (1994) · source
“Our draft resolution requests the Secretary-General to report on whether and how these three cities could also be afforded the protection envisaged in resolutions 824 (1993) and 836 (1993). It is particularly gratifying in this connection that the Bosnian Government and the Bosnian Croat party have recently signed a peace accord in Zagreb which might make the implementation of such protection all the more feasible, at least in Mostar and Vitez, and that these two parties, plus the Croatian Government, have in recent days embarked on even farther-reaching plans for constitutionally linking their respective territories and countries. Several warning points have to be made in this context however.”
1994-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3344 (1994) · source
“Moreover, the draft resolution focuses on three other cities: Mostar, which last month's discussion highlighted as a prime candidate for "safe area" status; Vitez, a Croatian enclave in central Bosnia which has been the target of Bosnian Government military efforts in recent weeks; and Maglaj, a predominantly Muslim community besieged by the Serbian party and desperately suffering. As for Maglaj, it would be tragically ironic if the Serbian party managed to break through its defences with the very weapons it has redeployed from around Sarajevo, which is what they are apparently trying to do, according to a recent letter from Bosnia's President Izetbegovic.”
1994-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3344 (1994) · source
“The Czech Republic has already stated its determination to help restore amenities in Sarajevo, and I trust that our authorities will find the trust fund a useful vehicle for doing so. During our debates last month, a number of speakers expressed their apprehension lest Sarajevo be singled out for special treatment and the rest of Bosnia and Herzegovina be forgotten. Our draft resolution today demonstrates that the rest of the country has indeed not been forgotten. It takes for granted that the rotation of UNPROFOR troops in Srebrenica will go ahead as planned and that Tuzla airport, long a difficult bone of contention, will also be opened up for humanitarian efforts, as envisaged earlier.”
1994-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3344 (1994) · source
“Our draft resolution, furthermore, requests that a senior civil official be appointed to act, in effect, as an administrative officer for the city, to help figure out how essential city services can be restored and then to help actually restore them - working all along hand in hand with the Government of the country, the mayor of Sarajevo and the local administration of its 10 districts. He will benefit from the work done the joint civil mission that the United States and the United Kingdom are about to dispatch to the city to assess what is needed. Whatever is needed will have to financed. In our draft resolution, we therefore invite the Secretary-General to establish a voluntary trust fund for this purpose.”
1994-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3344 (1994) · source
“Sarajevans themselves have compared their life to life in a giant detention camp. They can move about the city, or at least around parts of it, with less fear than they could a month ago. Nevertheless, there is a world of difference between free movement around Sarajevo and free movement per se. Our draft resolution today is directed at capitalizing on the February successes that the international community has had in stanching the blood-letting. As every toddler learning to walk finds out, one successful step requires another or the baby will fall. Our draft resolution is aimed at making that additional step, maybe even two. It aims at restoring even more normalcy to the life of Sarajevo by calling for freedom of movement to be restored, about the city and into and out of the city. Sarajevo must shed its detention-camp-like atmosphere.”
1994-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3344 (1994) · source
“Today we are discussing matters concerning Sarajevo, amongst others, yet again. The difference is this: last month we were mostly looking back, condemning what had happened. This month we are looking forward, thrilled that the steps which the international community has taken since that fateful Saturday of barely a month ago have yielded important results. It appears that the people of Sarajevo have come to enjoy their winter: they are taking in fresh air which is no longer polluted by the stench of gunpowder. Fresh air is free, and enjoying the snow is effortless. The people of Sarajevo are, however, far from living a normal life. The city lacks basic amenities: medical facilities, reliable water, fuel of all kinds, electricity, disposal of garbage, upkeep of city streets.”
1994-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3344 (1994) · source
“Let me congratulate you, Sir, on your assuming the presidency for the month. You have navigated us through the first few days of this month with such deftness and e/an, such a voracious appetite for work, that you will no doubt dispose of all the remaining issues the Council is facing by mid-March. Let me also thank and congratulate your predecessor, Ambassador Olhaye of Djibouti, who discovered that the shortest month of the year means anything but the least busy month. He amply demonstrated his diplomatic skills and led us is doing a great deal of work indeed. Mr. President, one of the outstanding achievements of your predecessor was the marathon session we held under his stewardship, during which we reflected upon the aftermath of the Sarajevo marketplace massacre of 5 February.”
1994-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3344 (1994) · source
“It would only compound the tragedy if parties to the conflict did not grasp this fact, if they failed to recognize that the option of peace is the only one available and if the Saturday massacre ended up being just another episode in accomplishing the self-serving but unattainable goals of military adventurers.”
1994-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3336 (1994) · source
“The fact that NATO has demanded more seriously than ever certain behaviour on the part of the combatants should drive home the point that the combatants themselves are, in the final analysis, responsible for reaching a settlement. That this did not happen in the latest round of the Geneva negotiations is not altogether surprising; the NATO measures significantly changed the Situation, and this change has first to be grasped, assimilated and analysed by all the participants in Geneva. We believe that the acute possibility of air strikes will eventually contribute to real progress. This conflict will not allow any party to emerge as an all-round, permanent victor.”
1994-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3336 (1994) · source
“Let me also mention in this context that we have never doubted that the Secretary-General has since last summer had all the necessary authority to invoke the use of air power, concerning both close air support and air strikes, as far as the Security Council is concerned. The threat of air strikes cannot be seen in isolation. It is a part of a broader set of measures and does not, in and of itself, amount to a solution. Any solution has to come from the three sides in the conflict. The threat has been issued, in particular, to prevent the strangulation of Sarajevo, which in turn will make it possible to place the city under United Nations administration, should that be the desire of the parties. The new air-strike Situation will, however, help concentrate their minds on seeking a solution.”
1994-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3336 (1994) · source
“We welcome with relief the visible and unequivocal readiness of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to put muscle behind the demands of the international community. We applaud in this regard NATO's response to the request of the United Nations Secretary-General to authorize air strikes against heavy-weapons positions responsible for attacks against civilians. The 10-day deadline is long enough to be met, but too short for any of the parties to squabble and seek a change in conditions. The latest reported conditions put forward by Bosnian Serbs indicate to us that they perhaps continue to prefer the military option, and this is unacceptable.”
1994-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3336 (1994) · source
“We have to address these questions in order to investigate our own sense of humanity in politics, our own reactions to war and the degree to which we have become inured to far-away suffering. On 9 February a cease-fire was agreed between the Bosnian Serbs and the Government forces. We welcome this step, of course. Still, we bear in mind the dozens of cease-fires agreed to previously, only to be honoured in their breach. We hope for the best in this latest cease-fire and are encouraged that, so far, it has been more or less holding. We hope that it proves to be durable enough to overcome the cynicism we have developed over the past months and years about the capacity of the parties to honour their own commitments.”
1994-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3336 (1994) · source
“More people than ever before lost life or limb on that fateful Saturday, but, in our opinion, Mr. Kovanda, Czech Republic) the difference between the death of six people and the death of more than 60 is one of numbers only. This is an occasion for us to do some soul-searching. We have to ask ourselves why the death of six schoolchildren last month did not have the same effect. Why did the death of 10 people on Friday, a day before the critical Saturday, not have the same effect? If 60 lost lives led us to see the conflict in a different light, would 50 have been enough? Or 40? If 10 lives lost were not enough to shake us up, would 20 have done the trick?”
1994-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3336 (1994) · source
“We feel, of course, the same indignation as every other speaker has expressed over the 5 February Sarajevo market-place massacre. We note that the guilty party has not been identified yet. Unless and until it is identified, we do not feel it appropriate to apportion blame, however strong our suspicions may be. At any rate, we hope that the culprit will be identified and then dealt with through appropriate legal mechanisms, especially the International Tribunal for Yugoslav war crimes. Meanwhile, though, there is an important sense in which the identity of the culprit this time around is irrelevant. The massacre of 5 February was just one of a number of atrocious attacks on the city, and the culprit in others has been identified only too clearly as the Serbian side.”
1994-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3336 (1994) · source
“The continuing conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina is one in which something called "sporadic fire" has been elevated to normality, in which massacres and "ethnic cleansing" are employed to change, and even create, borders and in which historical, religious and cultural monuments are destroyed as a matter of course. It is a conflict without parallel in post-war Europe. We find the Serbian party bearing primary responsibility for this conflict. Many of its leaders are fanning the dangerous flames of ethnic disturbances, which feed extreme nationalism on all sides of the conflict, nationalism that is so foreign to everything that Bosnia and Herzegovina used to represent before the war started. This results in a great danger for peace and security far beyond the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”
1994-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3336 (1994) · source
“This, in the case of UNOSOM II, was the first meeting of its kind. Exchanging views on matters of this gravity is indispensable, and has great value both for the operation in question and for the general relationship between Security Council members and other States - not to speak of the importance it holds for Security Council members themselves by expanding their horizons. My delegation sincerely hopes that this practice will be resumed at every opportune moment, with respect to every sizeable peace-keeping operation.”
1994-02-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3334 (1994) · source
“UNOSOM II has to stay until a political solution is found, lest all the dramatic improvements in the daily life of so many Somalis unravel in the chaos which would prevail otherwise. Yet we no longer have the wherewithal to disarm even the worst of the thugs and the bandits, which is a precondition to attaining the necessary political solution. We are trying to square a circle: in our view, resolution 897 (1994), puts UNOSOM II's work ina holding pattern. But we have supported it, since anything else would, realistically, be a recipe for disaster right now. In conclusion, let me mention the following point. The discussion on UNOSOM II led last month to a meeting of Security Council members and troop-contributing countries under the auspices of the United Nations Secretariat.”
1994-02-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3334 (1994) · source
“The key to the future - that is to say, toa political solution - is in political reconciliation, and clan elders, religious leaders and other respected personages have been doing their fair share to attain it. Political reconciliation is, however, predicated on disarming, especially on disarming those same thugs whose irresponsibility - to use as mild a word as I can find - aroused the conscience of the world two years ago and precipitated the sending of troops. Hopes for disarmament on a voluntary basis - or, as the resolution describes it, "cooperative S/PV.3334 42 efforts to achieve disarmament" (resolution 897 (1994), para. 2 (a)) - are, in our opinion, so much wishful thinking.”
1994-02-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3334 (1994) · source
“But, having been Signed by a number of parties to the conflict, they can be changed only if and when these same parties agree to change them. Short of that, they continue to provide the basic guideposts for the future, and our resolution recognizes that. Resolution 897 (1994) redefines the role which UNOSOM II is to play in the country. We will soon be operating with a smaller force - even if it continues to be the second largest peace-keeping operation the United Nations fields anywhere - and accordingly its mandate is more modest. In particular, we have come to realize that UNOSOM II cannot force the factions to give up their arms. This, however, leads to continued worries about the future of the country.”
1994-02-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3334 (1994) · source
“Fighting among the clans may have subsided, but it remains to be seen whether it has stopped for good. Far from disarming, the parties to the conflict S/PV.3334 4l are apparently rearming. Embryonic local administrative institutions - district and regional councils - are being created in a number of parts of the country, but their legitimacy is being questioned by some of those who used to freely plunder the emergency supplies of food. These same people, incidentally, now talk about UNOSOM II having outlasted its welcome. Some things therefore bear emphasizing again: The Addis Ababa Agreements of January and March 1993 may not be perfect. Nevertheless, they constitute the only solid ground we have to build upon. Certainly, they can be changed.”
1994-02-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3334 (1994) · source
“In 1992 the United Nations took action in Somalia not because of the absence of a government, not because of mere skirmishes among clans, factions and parties, certainly not because of the need to keep a non-existent peace, but, above all, in order to help the people of Somalia - the people who were dying of starvation while trigger-happy gunmen, joy-riding in well-armed jeeps, were paralysing the efforts of humanitarian organizations to deliver food. Today, on the one hand, there is absolutely no mistake about the extraordinary progress made in improving the lot of the people. In this respect, UNOSOM II, with the contribution of countless non-governmental organizations, has done a splendid job, and we salute it. On the other hand, the political scene in Somalia has not improved as much as one might have hoped.”
1994-02-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3334 (1994) · source
“First of all allow me to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the Office of President of the Council for the month of February. You can count on the support of our delegation this month, just as we benefited from your support in January. Furthermore, I wish to thank all the previous speakers for their kind and generous words addressed to me, even though most of them were quite undeserved. The Czech Republic welcomed the Secretary-General's report on Somalia for its thoroughness and comprehensiveness, and for the conscientious way in which it outlined the several options concerning the future of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM ITI). The situation of Somalia itself evokes mixed feelings in us.”
1994-02-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3334 (1994) · source
“The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda. The meeting rose at 5.10 p.m.”
1994-01-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3332 (1994) · source
“A political settlement and the presence of peacekeepers appear in Georgia to constitute a variation of the chicken-and-egg problem. It is alleged that the presence of peacekeepers would help spur a political settlement. Yet we could hardly support sending peacekeepers into a situation where a political settlement had not been achieved. Chicken or egg, the political settlement must come first. And we will therefore look with great expectations towards the next round of talks between the opposing parties, which we recommend should start as early as possible, hoping that they yield substantive progress. That would tremendously simplify our role in the weeks ahead. I now resume my function as President of the Council. There are no further speakers on my list.”
1994-01-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3332 (1994) · source
“We could, for example, consider appointing a "Super-envoy" of sorts, representing both the United Nations and the CSCE. Such an appointment would send a signal about both organizations' willingness to pool resources - of which neither has an abundance - with respect, perhaps, to all of Georgia's problems. Let us recall in this context that while the United Nations is focusing on Abkhazia the CSCE is focusing on Southern Ossetia, another part of Georgia seeking a different constitutional arrangement. Georgia is, of course, such a small country that whatever happens in one of its parts deeply and immediately affects all others, and the CSCE's so far exclusive involvement in Southern Ossetia is just another reason why the two organizations should cooperate as closely as possible.”
1994-01-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3332 (1994) · source
“And we also recall President Shevardnadze's words of a little over a year ago, addressed to the Secretary-General, when he found "Particularly disturbing ... the participation of the Russian troops stationed in Abkhazia on the side of Abkhaz extremists." (S/25026, annex -2) We have to investigate whether the leopard has indeed changed its spots or whether we are talking about an entirely different animal. The Czech Republic is particularly pleased that in its efforts in Georgia the United Nations is cooperating with the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). This, too, is reflected in the Secretary-General's report and is recognized in the resolution we have adopted. We would wish to strengthen this cooperation even further.”
1994-01-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3332 (1994) · source
“And even if, in fact, it turns out to be only a Band-Aid, even if it turns out to be too little and too late, it is probably all we can do now. We have decided to extend the mandate of UNOMIG by another five weeks, provide for expanding it to its full, originally sanctioned strength, and meanwhile to study, very carefully but very intensively, how best to create an international force of the required strength. There is no question that involving the United Nations in any force that would have a substantial contingent of Russian troops, operating in a country which since 1801 has been almost uninterruptedly under Russian control, necessarily calls for such circumspection. This is particularly called for in view of recent developments on the Russian Federation's domestic scene.”
1994-01-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3332 (1994) · source
“Equally egregious is the reported effort of insurgent Abkhazians to repopulate their territory with mercenaries and tribesmen, including Russian Cossacks, from other areas. The Secretary-General's report recognizes most of these difficulties. It soberly assesses what we can do and the limits to what we can do. As sympathetic as we may be to the plight of the refugees from Abkhazia, and as well-respected as President Shevardnadze is in the international community, it would be very challenging for us to interpose a sizeable international contingent of peace-keepers in this conflict. Indeed, it would be impossible to do so now, without having prepared such an operation thoroughly. Decisions about so important a matter cannot be made under pressure of time. What we have decided to do today is rather less.”
1994-01-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3332 (1994) · source
“These are the problems facing the Georgian Government, and they are problems we understand. There appears, however, to be no easy way in which the Security Council can help. The foundation for any peace-keeping operation is a basic political settlement between the opposing parties, and we are encouraged by progress that has been made along these lines. We are encouraged also by the fact that the truce the parties have agreed to continues to hold. On the other hand, we are very disturbed by the fact that the recent quadripartite meeting on the repatriation of refugees did not lead to an agreement. "Ethnic cleansing" is impermissible under any circumstances whatever. Trying to alleviate the results of "ethnic cleansing" by picking and choosing who of the "cleansed" refugees may or may not return is also impermissible.”
1994-01-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3332 (1994) · source
“In addition, they represent a constitutional problem in the continuing struggle between Georgian Government authorities and the Abkhazian insurgents, for, even if a constitutional solution to the issue of Abkhazia were to be grounded on a referendum, one would have to doubt the results of a referendum in an area that had lost more than half its original population to refugee camps outside the area. Finding a political status for Abkhazia that is acceptable to both sides appears to be the main stumbling block. Finding the right solution will take time. Anything that both parties agree to will probably be internationally acceptable; but, in our view, autonomous status for Abkhazians within the Republic of Georgia would be preferable. We support Georgia's territorial integrity.”
1994-01-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3332 (1994) · source
“The fighting between the Abkhazians and the Georgian Government eventually led to a truce, and the United Nations was invited to introduce its own military observers, the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). The truce was later broken by the Abkhazians, and the peace-keeping force remained of only token size. It has since expanded, but still only to a meagre 20 men, less than one one-thousandth the strength of the United Nations force in Somalia or in the battlefields of the Balkans. The agony of Georgia, however, is very acute. The 300,000 refugees from the Abkhazian region constitute a severe strain on the political and social fabric of the rest of Georgia and also affect neighbouring countries.”
1994-01-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3332 (1994) · source